



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THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY
A New History of the World
EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN

FRANCE

**THE NATIONS
OF TO-DAY**

A New History of the World

EDITED BY

JOHN BUCHAN

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THE NATIONS OF TO-DAY

A New History of the World

EDITED BY JOHN BUCHAN

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THIS series has been undertaken to provide for the ordinary citizen a popular account of the history of his own and other nations, a chronicle of those movements of the past of which the effect is not yet exhausted, and which are still potent for the peace and comfort of the present. The writers conceive history as a living thing of the most urgent consequence to the men of to-day; they regard the world around us as an organic growth dependent upon a long historic ancestry. The modern view of history—apart from the pedantry of certain specialists—is a large view, subordinating the mere vicissitudes of dynasties and parliaments to those more fateful events which are the true milestones of civilisation. Clio has become an active goddess and her eyes range far. History is, of course, like all sciences, the quest for a particular kind of truth, but that word “truth” has been given a generous interpretation. The older type of historian was apt to interest himself chiefly in the doings of kings and statesmen, the campaigns of generals and the contests of parties. These no doubt are important, but they are not the whole, and to insist upon them to the exclusion of all else is to make the past an unfeatured wilderness, where the only personalities are generals on horseback, judges in ermine and monarchs in purple. Nowadays, whatever we may lack in art, we have gained in science. The plain man has come to his own, and, as Lord Acton has put it, “The true historian must now take his meals in the kitchen.”

The War brought the meaning of history home to the world. Events which befell long ago suddenly became disruptive forces to shatter a man's ease, and he realised that what had seemed only a phrase in the textbooks might be a thing to die for. The Armistice left an infinity of problems, no one of which could be settled without tracing its roots into the past. Both time and space seemed to have “closed up.” Whether we like it or not, our isolation is shattered, and not the remotest nation can now draw in its skirts from its neighbours. The consequence must be that even those who are averse to science, and prefer to settle everything by rule of thumb, will be forced

to reconsider their views. Foreign politics have become again, as they were in the age of Pitt and Castlereagh, of Palmerston and Disraeli, urgent matters for every electorate. The average citizen recognises that the popular neglect of the subject contributed in no small degree to the War, and that problems in foreign affairs are as vital to him as questions of tariff and income tax. Once it used to be believed that a country might be rich while its neighbours were poor; now even the dullest is aware that economically the whole world is tightly bound together, and that the poverty of a part lessens the prosperity of the whole. A merchant finds his profits shrinking because of the rate of exchange in a land which was his chief market; he finds his necessary raw material costly and scarce because of the dislocation of industry in some far-away country. He recognises that no nation is commercially sufficient to itself, and he finds himself crippled, not by the success, but by the failure of his foreign colleagues. It is the same in other matters than commerce. Peace is every man's chief interest, but a partial peace is impossible. The world is so closely linked that one recalcitrant unit may penalise all the others.

In these circumstances it is inevitable that interest in foreign countries, often an unwilling and angry interest, should be compulsory for large classes which up to now have scarcely given the matter a thought. An understanding of foreign conditions—though at first it may not be a very sympathetic understanding—is forced upon us by the needs of our daily life. This understanding, if it is to be of the slightest value, must be based upon some knowledge of history, and Clio will be compelled to descend from the schools to the market-place. Of all the movements of the day none is more hopeful than the spread through all classes of a real, though often incoherent, desire for education. Partly it is a fruit of the War. Men realise that battles were not won by muddling through; that as long as we muddled we stuck fast, and that when we won it was because we used our brains to better purpose than our opponents. Partly it is the consequence of the long movement towards self-conscious citizenship, which some call democracy. Most thinking people to-day believe that knowledge spread in the widest commonalty is the only cure for many ills. They believe that education in the most real sense does not stop with school or college; indeed, that true education may only begin when the orthodox curriculum is finished. They believe, further, that this fuller training comes by a man's own efforts and is not necessarily dependent

upon certain advantages in his early years. Finally, they are assured that true education cannot be merely technical or professional instruction; that it must deal in the larger sense with what are called the "humanities." If this diagnosis is correct, then the study of history must play a major part in the equipment of the citizen of the future.

I propose in these few pages to suggest certain reasons why the cultivation of the historical sense is of special value at this moment. The utilitarian arguments are obvious enough, but I would add to them certain considerations of another kind.

Man, as we know, is long-descended, and so are human society and the State. That society is a complex thing, the result of a slow organic growth and no mere artificial machine. In a living thing such as the State growth must be continuous, like the growth of a plant. Every gardener knows that in the tending of plants you cannot make violent changes, that you cannot transplant a well-grown tree at your pleasure from a wooded valley to the bare summit of a hill, that you cannot teach rhododendrons to love lime, or grow plants which need sun and dry soil in a shady bog. A new machine-made thing is simple, but the organic is always subtle and complex. Now, half the mischiefs in politics come from a foolish simplification. Take two familiar conceptions, the "political man" and the "economic man." Those who regard the citizen purely as a political animal, divorce him from all other aspects, moral and spiritual, in framing their theory of the State. In the same way the "economic man" is isolated from all other relations, and, if he is allowed to escape from the cage of economic science into political theory, will work havoc in that delicate sphere. Both are false conceptions, if our problem is to find out the best way to make actual human beings live together in happiness and prosperity. Neither, as a matter of fact, ever existed or could exist, and any polity based upon either would have the harshness and rigidity and weakness of a machine.

We have seen two creeds grow up rooted in these abstractions, and the error of both lies in the fact that they are utterly unhistorical, that they have been framed without any sense of the continuity of history. In what we call Prussianism a citizen was regarded as a cog in a vast machine called the State, to which he surrendered his liberty of judgment and his standard of morals. He had no rights against it and no personality distinct from it. The machine admitted no ethical principles which might interfere with its success, and the

citizen, whatever his private virtues, was compelled to conform to this inverted anarchy. Moreover, the directors of the machine regarded the world as if it were a smooth, flat high-road. If there were hollows and hills created by time, they must be flattened out to make the progress of the machine smoother and swifter. The past had no meaning; all problems were considered on the supposition that human nature was like a mathematical quantity, and that solutions could be obtained by an austere mathematical process. The result was tyranny, a highly efficient tyranny, which nevertheless was bound to break its head upon the complexities of human nature. Such was Prussianism, against which we fought for four years, and which for the time is out of fashion. Bolshevism, to use the convenient word, started with exactly the same view. It believed that you could wipe the slate quite clean and write on it what you pleased, that you could build a new world with human beings as if they were little square blocks in a child's box of bricks. Karl Marx, from whom it derived much of its dogma, interpreted history as only the result of economic forces; he isolated the economic aspect of man from every other aspect and desired to re-create society on a purely economic basis. Bolshevism, though it wandered very far from Marx's doctrine, had a similar point of view. It sought with one sweep of the sponge to blot out all past history, and imagined that it could build its castles of bricks without troubling about foundations. It also was a tyranny, the worse tyranny of the two, perhaps because it was the stupider. It has had its triumphs and its failures, and would now appear to be declining; but it, or something of the sort, will come again, since it represents the eternal instinct of theorists who disregard history, and who would mechanise and unduly simplify human life.

There will always be much rootless stuff in the world. In almost every age the creed which lies at the back of Bolshevism and Prussianism is preached in some form or other. The revolutionary and the reactionary are alike devotees of the mechanical. The safeguard against experiments which can only end in chaos is the wide diffusion of the historical sense, and the recognition that "counsels to which Time hath not been called, Time will not ratify."

The second reason is that a sense of history is a safeguard against another form of abstraction. Ever since the War the world has indulged in a debauch of theorising, and the consequence has been an orgy of catchwords and formulas, which,

unless they are critically examined, are bound to turn political discussion into a desert. The weakening of the substance of many accepted creeds seems to have disposed men to cling more feverishly to their shibboleths. Take any of our contemporary phrases—"self-determination," "liberty," "the right to work," "the right to maintenance," "the proletariat," "class consciousness," "international solidarity," and so forth. They all have a kind of dim meaning, but as they are currently used they have many very different meanings, and these meanings are often contradictory. I think it was Lord Acton who once said he had counted two hundred definitions of "liberty." Abraham Lincoln's words are worth remembering: "The world has never yet had a good definition of the word 'liberty,' and the American people just now are much in want of one. We are all declaring for liberty; for in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. We assume the word 'liberty' to mean that each worker can do as he pleases with himself and the product of his labour, while, on the other hand, it may mean that some man can do as he pleases with other men and the product of other men's labour." Are we not in the same difficulty to-day? Perhaps the worst sinner in this respect is the word "democracy." As commonly used, it has a dozen quite distinct meanings, when it has any meaning at all, and we are all familiar in political discussions with the circular argument—that such and such a measure is good for the people because it is democratic; and if it be asked why it is democratic, the answer is, "Because it is good for the people." "Democratic" really describes that form of government in which the policy of the State is determined and its business conducted by the will of the majority of its citizens, expressed through some regular channel. It is a word which denotes machinery, not purpose. "Popular," often used as an equivalent, means merely that the bulk of the people approve of a particular mode of government. "Liberal," the other assumed equivalent, implies those notions of freedom, toleration and pacific progress which lie at the roots of Western civilisation. The words are clearly not interchangeable. A policy or a government may be popular without being liberal or democratic; there have been highly popular tyrannies; the German policy of 1914 was popular, but it was not liberal, nor was Germany a democracy. America is a democracy, but it is not always liberal; the French Republic has at various times in its history been both liberal and democratic without being popular. Accurately employed, "democratic" describes a

particular method, "popular" an historical fact, "liberal" a quality and an ideal. The study of history will make us chary about the loud, vague use of formulas. It will make us anxious to see catchwords in their historical relations, and will help us to realise the maleficent effect of phrases which have a fine rhetorical appeal, but very little concrete meaning. If political science is to be anything but a vicious form of casuistry it is very necessary to give its terms an exact interpretation, for their slipshod use will tend to create false oppositions and conceal fundamental agreements, and thereby waste the energy of mankind in empty disputation.

The third reason for the study of history is that it enables a man to take a balanced view of current problems, for a memory stored with historical parallels is the best preventive both against panic and over-confidence. Such a view does not imply the hard-and-fast deduction of so-called laws, which was a habit of many of the historians of the nineteenth century. Exact parallels with the past are hard to find, and nothing is easier than to draw false conclusions. A facile philosophy of history is, as Stubbs once said, "in nine cases out of ten a generalisation founded rather on the ignorance of points in which particulars differ, than in any strong grasp of one in which they agree." Precedents from the past have often been used with disastrous results. In our own Civil War the dubious behaviour of the Israelites on various occasions was made an argument for countless blunders and tyrannies. In the same way the French Revolution has been used as a kind of arsenal for bogus parallels, both by revolutionaries and conservatives, and the most innocent reformers have been identified with Robespierre and St. Just. During the Great War the air was thick with these false precedents. In the Gallipoli Expedition, for example, it was possible to draw an ingenious parallel between that affair and the Athenian Expedition to Syracuse, and much needless depression was the consequence. At the outbreak of the Russian Revolution there were many who saw in it an exact equivalent to the Revolution of 1788 and imagined that the new Russian revolutionary armies would be as invincible as those which repelled the invaders of France. There have been eminent teachers in recent years whose mind has been so obsessed with certain superficial resemblances between the third century of the Christian era and our own times that they have prophesied an impending twilight of civilisation. Those of us who have been engaged in arguing the

case for the League of Nations are confronted by its opponents with a dozen inaccurate parallels from history, and the famous plea of the "thin edge of the wedge" is usually based upon a mistaken use of the same armoury.

A wise man will be chary of drawing dapper parallels and interpreting an historical lesson too rigidly. At the same time there are certain general deductions which are sound and helpful. For example, we all talk too glibly of revolution, and many imagine that, whether they like it or not, a clean cut can be made, and the course of national life turn suddenly and violently in a different direction. But history gives no warrant for such a view. There have been many thousands of revolutions since the world began; nearly all have been the work of minorities, often small minorities; and nearly all, after a shorter or longer period of success, have utterly failed. The French Revolution altered the face of the world, but only when it had ceased to be a revolution and had developed into an absolute monarchy. So with the various outbreaks of 1848. So conspicuously with the Russian Revolution of to-day, which has developed principles the exact opposite of those with which it started. The exception proves the rule, as we see in the case of our own English Revolution of 1688. Properly considered, that was not a revolution, but a reaction. The revolution had been against the personal and unlimited monarchy of the Stuarts. In 1688 there was a return to the normal development of English society, which had been violently broken. It may fairly be said that a revolution to be successful must be a reaction—that is, it must be a return to an organic historical sequence, which for some reason or other has been interrupted.

Parallels are not to be trusted, if it is attempted to elaborate them in detail, but a sober and scientific generalisation may be of high practical value. At the close of the Great War many people indulged in roseate forecasts of a new world—a land fit for heroes to live in, a land inspired with the spirit of the trenches, a land of co-operation and national and international goodwill. Such hasty idealists were curiously blind to the lessons of the past, and had they considered what happened after the Napoleonic wars they might have found a juster perspective. With a curious exactness the history of the three years after Waterloo has repeated itself to-day. There were the same economic troubles—the same rise in the cost of living, with which wages could not keep pace; the same shrinking of foreign exports owing to difficulties of

exchange ; the same cataclysmic descent of agricultural prices from the high levels of the war ; the same hostility to profiteers ; the same revolt against high taxation, and the same impossibility of balancing budgets without it. The Property tax then was equivalent of our Excess Profits tax, and it is interesting to note that it was abolished in spite of the Government because the commercial community rose against it. There was the same dread of revolution, and the same blunders in the handling of labour, and there was relatively far greater suffering. Yet the land, in spite of countless mistakes, passed through the crisis and emerged into the sunlight of prosperity. In this case historic precedent is not without its warrant for hope.

One charge has been brought against the study of history—that it may kill reforming zeal. This has been well put by Lord Morley : “ The study of all the successive stages and beliefs, institutions, laws, forms of art, only too soon grows into a substitute for practical criticism of all these things upon their merits and in themselves. Too exclusive attention to dynamic aspects weakens the energetic duties of the static. The method of history is used merely like any other scientific instrument. There is no more conscience in your comparative history than there is in comparative anatomy. You arrange ideals in classes and series ; but the classified ideal loses its vital spark and halo.” There is justice in the warning, for a man may easily fall into the mood in which he sees everything as a repetition of the past, and the world bound on the iron bed of necessity, and may therefore lose his vitality and zest in the practical work of to-day. It is a danger to be guarded against, but to me it seems a far less urgent menace than its opposite—the tendency to forget the past and to adventure in a raw new world without any chart to guide us. History gives us a kind of chart, and we dare not surrender even a small rushlight in the darkness. The hasty reformer who does not remember the past will find himself condemned to repeat it.

There is little to sympathise with in the type of mind which is always inculcating a lack-lustre moderation, and which has attained to such a pitch of abstraction that it finds nothing worth doing and prefers to stagnate in ironic contemplation. Nor is there more to be said for the temper which is always halving differences in a problem and trying to find a middle course. The middle course, mechanically defined, may be the wrong course. The business of a man steering up a difficult estuary is to keep to the deep-water channel, and that channel

may at one hour take him near the left shore and at another hour close to the right shore. The path of false moderation sticks to the exact middle of the channel, and will almost certainly land the pilot on a sandbank. These are the vices that spring from a narrow study of history and the remedy is a broader and juster interpretation. At one season it may be necessary to be a violent innovator, and at another to be a conservative; but the point is that a clear objective must be there, and some chart of the course to steer by. History does not provide a perfect chart, but it gives us something better than guess-work. It is a bridle on crude haste; but it is not less a spur for timidity and false moderation. Above all it is a guide and a comforter to sane idealism. "The true Past departs not," Carlyle wrote, "nothing that was worthy in the Past departs; no Truth or Goodness realised by man ever dies, or can die; but all is still here, and, recognised or not, lives and works through endless change."

JOHN BUCHAN.

PREFACE

TWENTY CENTURIES OF FRENCH HISTORY

A HISTORY of France written by Englishmen for an English-speaking public, in a spirit of warm sympathy, but also—and inevitably—from the point of view of British tradition and British understanding: such is the bold undertaking of the authors of this book. I can imagine no other equally audacious, except a history of Great Britain written by Frenchmen. Both, however, deserve to be published.

We are near neighbours. One hour only of sea separates us. The great events of recent years have wedded the sacred blood of our dead. Yet we remain mysteries to one another, mysteries that geography, racial traits, political history and social development have gradually built up in the course of centuries. On the one hand, a seafaring nation; on the other, a continental nation. On the one hand, a people without neighbours; on the other, a people with an open frontier. In England, a polity the result of long experience, and free from Roman influence; in France, a love of Latin logic, impregnated with syllogisms. In England, laws which change without need of abrogation; in France, constitutions built up before any attempt is made to test their materials. Two monarchies, different in origin and different in development; the one destroying feudalism, the other always furnishing new blood to its aristocracy. Evolution opposed to revolution; great landed estates opposed to small holdings; commerce opposed to agriculture. One might develop these never-ending contrasts through hundreds of pages. Nothing is more difficult for an Englishman than to understand, in the bottom of his heart, the soul of France—unless it be for a Frenchman to grasp, in his innermost being, the soul of England.

This very book, written in an honest endeavour to understand, shows how difficult it is; and more than once, as I read it, I was tempted to join issue with it. I have resisted the temptation, for however much I may disagree with some of its con-

clusions, I am, nevertheless, greatly impressed by the immense value of the effort it represents. The attempt has been made to help the English-speaking public, in readily accessible form, to know a nation which it respects and loves. In all things essential, the aim has been achieved; but there are certain points to which I would call attention.

Nothing is more of one piece than the history of France. People have been tempted at times to cut it up into conflicting phases. Our modern historians have caught up the endless thread, and brought out the continuity—even in the acts of our great Revolution—of the constant aims of the Monarchy. Throughout the centuries we have pursued the same work of cohesion, under the menace of the same aggressor. England, protected by the seas, has been able to play skittles with every kind of European political combination. Not so France. Even during the short period in which we have had natural frontiers, those frontiers have not sufficed to protect us. The Rhine has always been crossed. As to the moral consequences of the invasions, this also has not changed. Tacitus defined it . . . he might, in 1914, have repeated himself word for word.

Hence, our national soul has an impress which the English find it hard to understand. What better proof could one have than the contrast between their state of mind and ours since the Armistice. England, her warlike interlude finished, considered that she had won *the* war, once and for all. France, weighted down by centuries of experience, was content to know that she had won *a* war; for the eternal danger lying in the will of sixty million Germans survived the victory. The greatest obstacle to a wholesome carrying out of our indispensable alliance lies in the fact that so many Englishmen are incapable of understanding this fundamental truth.

Another similar misunderstanding—the spirit of inconstancy with which we are too often charged. We are a country of continuity. The magnificent effort wrought by the Monarchy had tended to make of France the most united nation in Europe; the first act of the Revolution was to declare the Republic one and indivisible. The struggle of the central power against local bodies was waged by the Kings before it was waged by democrats: Richelieu beheaded just as many people as the Convention. The determination of the State to ensure its independence from spiritual power dates from its very beginning; and the Republican laity of the nineteenth century had a worthy forerunner in Philippe le Bel. In her inner life, as in her European life, France has ever obeyed unchanging laws. That

is why eight years ago she was so spontaneous in her sacrifice—for her own salvation and for the salvation of the world—of a million and a half of her sons.

In recalling this harmonious unity of French history I bring, it seems to me, a necessary conclusion to a book which, in order to be clear, had of necessity to lay stress upon the successive phases. Follow the patient or abrupt effort of great ministers of the Republic—Thiers, Gambetta, Ferry, Waldeck-Rousseau, Delcassé, Clémenceau—and you will discern in the diversity of their methods, and even in their very errors, the common perception of those higher ideals of national power which before them inspired the great ministers of our Kings. Each of these men has been criticised: each of them had his share in the common triumph when, forty-seven years after the Treaty of Frankfort, the Treaty of Versailles consecrated the triumph of Right.

France on the morrow of her victory is the same as she has always been. She remains a rationalist; she believes in the value of international contracts as she does in the virtue of constitutions. Our American friends, when they first—for reasons which were not altogether of an impersonal or diplomatic order—refused to be bound by the signatures solemnly exchanged, dealt, without intention and without calculating its effect, a serious blow to the moral health of France. British imperialism, being now put at its ease, did not refrain in turn from suggesting certain modifications to the signed undertakings. Lord Balfour declares, not without pride, that England has no constitution. Why, then, should we be surprised that the English understand less than we do the necessity of a constitution for Europe?

Much trouble was caused thereby. What is the good of shutting one's eyes to it, when everybody is suffering from it? Europe lacks an acknowledged law. Now a law, even though not absolutely satisfactory to each of those countries interested, as was a treaty signed by so many nations, is still better than no law at all. Peace, based on mutual concessions, had together been negotiated by the Allies and Associates. Peace has not been put into execution by the Allies and Associates, *together*. From this is derived much of our present difficulty.

If France, at the beginning of 1920, had asserted this truth, I believe her voice would have been heard. Those who spoke in her name have not found the right words. This incompetency has cost us all dear. It is no easy matter, now that for two years the nations have ceased to have faith in the binding

character of treaties signed in their names, to establish an acknowledged law in any part of the world.

Of all nations none has suffered from this anarchy more than France. It is alleged that we are discontented and nervous; it would be truer to say that after five years of confidence, born of the most splendid of Ententes, we have become sceptical. We have no doubts of ourselves. We are at work. We are bravely bearing an unprecedented financial burden. We are rebuilding our ruins. . . . But we cannot forget that a Treaty—cruelly mutilated in the course of the last year—had promised us that Germany should pay for the lives and property she had destroyed. And when we see how little material and moral support has been given to our Right, we sometimes doubt—not of ourselves—but of others, even those we love the best.

I ask, with all the strength that for twenty years I have placed at the service of the Entente Cordiale—I ask our comrades of war to understand that since 1920, by the fault of men and circumstances, France, which is actually the most powerful nation in Europe, has suffered morally from a solitude which is no bearer of good counsel. It was an English philosopher who said, “My right is your duty: my duty is your right.” France believes her right is so clear that it imposes upon others duties equally clear.

Our history is replete with triumphs and with sorrows, and of these sorrows Victory healed the cruellest. Pacific for four and forty years, despite the dismemberment of our country, in the face of aggression we rewelded our national unity. Not a single human being was placed beneath our sovereignty who was not, and had not long been, French at heart. Our wish is for Peace. But Peace, according to us, means: reparations for the past and present, security for the future. In our cemeteries, too small for our dead, our children learn of the horrors of war. But they also learn that the dead must not have died in vain, and the arms of the crosses stretched out over this land repeat the solemn warning—“Security; Reparations.”

On reading, in this book, of our slow and laborious progress, our English-speaking friends will learn something of our soul, overjoyed yesterday by the most righteous of victories, crushed to-day by two parlous years which, when posterity writes their history, will reflect honour upon no Government. When, shoulder to shoulder, facing the enemy, French, British, Americans, Belgians, Italians—all felt that they were one, they were right; for man is not mistaken in the face of death. If to-day they find themselves less closely united, it is because since the

Armistice they have turned their backs on this truth. All together let us work to undo the errors which none can longer deny, that there may be reborn for us, in the labours of Peace, that splendid brotherhood of the fields of battle.

ANDRÉ TARDIEU.

PARIS,
1922.

NOTE

THIS volume has been prepared under the care of Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen. *History*, down to 1871, is the work of Mr. Arthur Hassall, M.A., Student and Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford. It is preceded by an introductory chapter, the work of Mr. Hilaire Belloc. The section on the *Third Republic* is by the late Mr. J. R. Moreton Macdonald of Largs. Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B. (late Director of Military Operations, General Staff, during the War), is responsible for *Military Operations* in the Great War, and Mr. George Adam, recently the *Times* correspondent in Paris, for the chapters on *France behind the War-Zone* and *Peace and After*. The chapter on 1922 is by Captain L. Kennedy, M.C., and Mr. Stephen Gwynn has written on *French Civilisation and Character*. The section dealing with the *Economic Position of France* is based on a valuable and largely statistical contribution by M. Etienne Clémentel, late French Minister of Commerce in M. Clémenteau's Government; whilst the two chapters on *Finance* are by Mr. Gordon D. Knox, the *Morning Post* correspondent in Paris.

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I. HISTORY

INTRODUCTORY

THE LAND OF FRANCE

BEFORE discussing the effect of physical conditions upon the growth of a nation one must define one's material. Some write as though nations were made by their physical conditions. It is not so. A nation, being composed of men, is made by the characters of those men. Physical conditions are but limiting and directing agencies. They do not make.

The nation now called the French, and of old the Gauls, forms a highly distinct moral unity which was present on the same soil (equally distinct) at the beginning of recorded history. With the exception of a tiny corner in the south-west, inhabited by the quite separate Basque race, the whole quadrilateral of Gaul is stamped with a common tradition, and presumably a common origin, apparent in expression, gesture and everything else which marks the type of a race.

But the physical conditions under which that race has lived have powerfully affected both its character and the part which it has had to play in history ; and a catalogue of these physical limiting circumstances must be drawn up before we can follow the history of the people. In the first place, let us note the boundaries.

The geographical boundaries of the French people or Gauls are peculiarly sharp, i.e. marked out with peculiar clarity by nature. They are the singularly exact line of the Pyrenean crest in the south, stretching the whole way from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. It is a wall a parallel to which does not exist anywhere else in Europe, for its evenness, simplicity and absence of low passes, as also for its completeness as a barrier, rising, as it does, straight out of the sea at either end. On the other land frontier, that on the east, something like half of the line is similarly marked by the crest of high mountains, the Alps and (after the narrow and difficult gate of the Rhône) the Jura.

But from the Jura north-west to the sea the frontier, though in the main natural, is less clear. You have, indeed, for the first hundred miles of it or so the wooded crest of the Vosges Range, but after that there is an open plain or gap until you

strike the edge of the great Northern Woods beyond the plain of Metz, and this gap may conveniently be called "The Gap of Lorraine." The great Northern Woods (the remains of which are variously known as the Ardennes Forest, and further north by sundry local names) originally formed a natural obstacle and frontier as perfect as any mountain chain. Civilisation has cleared them until now the passages between their various portions are numerous and wide. But their original effect limiting the Gauls is still plain.

Lastly, between the vague northern edges of these woods and the sea you have the confused flat and rolling land of Flanders, in which no natural limit is set.

Everywhere else—to the north, to the west, to the south—the French race is bounded by the sea.

Such is the frame. Its general statement is, of course, subject to numerous exceptions, due in the main to the combatant energy of the race set within that frame. There has been an overflow of the race north of the Great Woods and also down the only practicable valley piercing the Great Woods, that of the Meuse. Again in the gap of Lorraine there has been an overflow several miles beyond the shortest line between the Vosges and the Great Woods. Again there has been an overflow beyond the Jura, and even here and there an accidental push beyond the main ranges of the Alps. There has also been a considerable extension of the Gaulic type through the only easy passage of the Pyrenees—the Cerdagne.¹ Similarly there have been slight impositions of foreign blood and even foreign colonial effort within the quadrilateral of Gaul, though very few of its effects can be traced, so rapidly were the numerically insignificantly alien elements absorbed in the general type. Thus, there were Greek and even Phœnician settlements along the southern coast, some slight Germanic elements introduced into the north and east, and even a sprinkling in the south through the presence of Germanic mercenaries in the Roman armies (Franks, Goths, Burgundians), a touch of Scandinavian blood for a generation or two in the Province of the second Lyonesse (which we now call Normandy), etc. But in the main

¹ We need not trouble ourselves about language, which is no index of national type; still less with the guesses of anthropologists drawn from the measurements of skulls, and so forth. A national type is a thing which anyone can recognise and bear witness to. It is a reality. The other categories are guesswork or illusory. It is no good, for instance, to tell us that Devonshire is "Keltic" and Norfolk "Teutonic," for a Devon man and a Norfolk man are clearly both of them Englishmen, and the fact that they are Englishmen is the important reality compared with which these new "scientific" categories are insignificant.

the boundaries are and have been, from the beginning of recorded history, those here stated, and their effect in bounding the race and keeping it within a certain fairly definite area—with all the consequent results of unity and intensification of the national effort—are apparent throughout the 2,000 years and more of its recorded history.

Within that framework are to be noted certain physical characteristics which have modified the history of its inhabitants. The first of these—the most important—is the presence of the race upon the two seas. The Gauls are the only united people with a common experience of the warm tideless Mediterranean to the south and cold, tidal waters to the north. This has made them at once a centre of Western civilisation and a bridge, the effect of which is clearly apparent to-day even in the details of French life. Pick up a French newspaper and you will see in it a general conspectus of Europe, such as you do not find in a newspaper published to the north or south of France. That which has been called the “sense of proportion” in the French in international politics: that which, for instance (to take a very recent and important example), gave France a continuous foreign policy which ended in the alliance with England and therefore success in the Great War, was due to this central position.

But this central position has had, of course, many other effects. It makes of the French the only people familiar with, having a long maritime tradition of, the inner and the outer seas; in modern terms, it makes them potentially both a permanent Mediterranean and a permanent Atlantic power. Again, it gives them an experience of the two somewhat sharply defined climatic belts between which the highest civilisation of the world, that of Western Europe, is divided.

We shall not appreciate these two zones and, as I have said, their rather sharp contrast if we try to build them up synthetically upon lines of equal temperature, equal barometrical pressure and so forth. Here again reality is to be appreciated by direct observation and common experience much better than by exact measurement. There is, and has been from the beginning of recorded time, a certain climatic influence belonging to the inland sea and characterised by the vine and the olive. There is, and has been from the beginning of recorded time, a distinct northern climate with other fruits of the earth, other skies and other effects upon character. Wheat, the staple food of the race, is common to both. The products of the south have extended northward artificially; the vine in particular has

been carried to latitudes where it could never flourish save for the continuous labour and artifice of man. But the two zones remain quite distinct, and in nothing are they more divided than in this: that in the southern zone the period of the year in which man is most handicapped is the hot season, and in the northern zone the cold. The south builds and thinks in terms of protection against heat and too much light: the north in terms of protection against cold and darkness. To take the limiting extremes: the Italian has for his habitat the one climate, the Englishman the other; the Frenchman has a national experience of both. And this has been of an effect curious to note throughout all his history. There have been, as it were, waves of influence from the south to the north and from north to the south in French history; the last of which, that extending from the Renaissance to our own day, has been of the former character. Modern France is essentially a country wherein the influence of the south has expanded over the north. The modern domestic architecture of the French northern towns, their wide streets, their large open official buildings and the rest, are extensions of the south. But in the Middle Ages it was the other way. If you were travelling from York to Rome in, say, the twelfth century, you would have noted the same sort of architecture, the same way of living (the high-gabled roofs built for the snow, the warm, low rooms and the rest), as far south, say, as Vienne on the Rhône; and Bordeaux was, until a good deal after the Renaissance, essentially a northern city.

Now this distinction of the two zones is emphasised in France by the presence of a great area of mountainous, hilly and difficult land standing in the midst of the quadrilateral, radiating from and taking its name from the district occupied by the old Avernian tribe, which to-day we call Auvergne. A man going directly from south to north—from Narbonne, say, to Cherbourg—starts in the purely Mediterranean climate with a harvest in what we should here call the end of spring, with the southern fruits, and with a summer of overwhelming light. He soon goes up a steep wall into a desolate mountain land, and traverses this for many days of journeying on foot. He comes down over the tumbled brushwood and heath of what the Middle Ages called “The March” (i.e. the boundary or division), and finds himself in the middle Valley of the Vienne—a full northern climate which he carries with him to the Channel.

There is a second smaller bunch of high land which has been little noticed in spite of its great effect upon history. It lies

to the north-west of the Auvergne central group and is to-day called the Morvan. It interrupts no communication, for there is low land upon either side. It contains no great city and has produced but very few men who have counted in the history of the race. Yet it has been of great effect because it was the pivot of Caesar's conquest. It was the home of the Aedui, whose constant fidelity to Rome (save in one lapse) was the determining factor of Caesar's success. Their very isolation was their power, and his support, and perhaps their rude climate added somewhat to their strength.

The last and most important of the main physical circumstances of Gaul to be noted are the great natural ways through the country, and these are in the main determined by the river valleys.

Here we note at once an extremely important point. The rivers of Gaul and of its neighbourhood have never acted as boundaries, but always as highways. For instance, the German national type occupies both banks of the Rhine and has occupied them from the beginning of history, and though Caesar mentions the lower Seine as the political limit of what he calls the Belgic part of Gaul, yet the Seine does not appear as a true boundary in any of the French fighting or in any of the French variations of territory. It is, on the contrary, a central axis like all the other great French rivers.

Further, these rivers happen, by a peculiarly geographical accident of great advantage to the development of the country, to connect by very low and flat passes. It is perhaps this geographical condition which has made possible, or at any rate accentuated, the singular unity of France throughout history. Note, for instance, that the watershed between the Rhône Valley and the Rhine, which should, one would imagine, be a continuous range and which is part of the great divide of Europe between the north and the south, is bridged by a wide, perfectly flat and very low gate between the Vosges and the Jura known as the Gap of Belfort. Note again that the Rhône Valley is prolonged northward by the wide and easy valley of the Saône, and that there is no really difficult land between the upper middle part of this valley and the middle Loire Basin to the north-west. Hence there has always been a great highway from south to north followed by the Roman trunk road and marked by the cities—Marseille, Arles, Lyon, Autun, Nevers, Sens. By an exception rare in the communications of modern Europe the modern main trunk railway line does not follow this obvious passage. It goes round by Dijon for the sake of

easy gradients. But the simpler and better way will almost certainly be restored with the reappearance of road travel. Again, there is the singular gap giving access from the middle Garonne Valley to the Mediterranean, a gap advantage of which is taken by the canal of the south uniting the two seas. It is this peculiar passage which has suggested a policy of building a new great modern canal capable of carrying sea-going ships from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, and which has from the beginning of history united the Narbonnese to Toulouse and so on to Bordeaux. Again, it is to be noted how the great waterways have converged upon natural markets or centres, of which Paris is the most important. Paris may be said to have been created by the convergence of the Oise, the Marne and the Seine Valleys within the one small district of the Parisis, with Pontoise at one end and Charenton (only a long day's walk away) at the other. Lyon, in the same way, is the product of three converging natural highways—that through the Gap of Belfort, that through the Gateway of Geneva and that down the Valley of the Saône (much the most important of the three), which leads from north to south. Toulouse is the convergence of the communications of the middle Garonne and of the way through the gap from the Mediterranean.

There is in all this scheme of natural passages only one exception, an exception which still dominates the French railway system and all modern French travelling, and which interrupts the otherwise complete scheme of the French canals, and that is the high mass of Central Avernian land where the upper waters of the rivers flowing north and south have no easy passes leading from one to the other, but run through high mountain land and difficult gorges.

A last clause must be added to this analysis: the situation and the character of the ports. The system of French ports suffers under modern conditions from one of two difficulties everywhere present. Either you have a good natural deep-water harbour well sheltered but with no great productive district immediately behind it, or you have comparatively shallow entries to serve a productive district. You have further, of course, as throughout northern and western Europe, a silting-up of old ports¹ and in places a rising of the land destroying their value; but you have not had, as you have had upon the coast of Britain, corresponding subsidence in any useful place creating a new entry. One of the great historical contrasts in Western Europe is that between the excellence of entry into Britain by the sea

¹ Cf. Abbeville, which was in the Middle Ages a seaport.

compared with the difficulty of the entry into Gaul. This difficulty has had to be met by artifice. The excellent port of Brest naturally serves only the comparatively unproductive district of Brittany. The vast highway and productive Valley of the Loire has the difficult shallows of its mouth to contend with; Nantes, the old transshipment point, is difficult for modern traffic. Cherbourg has been artificially created; so has Havre. Rouen, pressed to its utmost, can hardly become a very great port, with its narrow limits upstream. Marseille is similarly built artificially outwards into the tideless sea with new jetties and is similarly somewhat distant from its main source of supply—the Valley of the Rhône. West of Marseille there is no main harbour at all. They have all either silted up or are not of a size for the largest modern work. Bordeaux, as was proved in the late war, is naturally insufficient for its task, and again needs artificial aid. La Rochelle has to be supplemented, or rather supplanted, by La Palice, and Saint Nazaire has performed the same office somewhat indifferently for Nantes in the Valley of the Loire. To this insufficiency of ports may be partly ascribed the retardation of French action during the great industrial change of the nineteenth century, though political factors, successive wars (domestic and foreign) and the absence of sufficient fuel and ore are of more account.

CHARLEMAGNE TO NAPOLEON III

I

THE CAROLINGIANS

(800-987)

ON Christmas Day 800 A.D. Charlemagne was crowned at Rome by Pope Leo the Third as Emperor of the Romans; and thus was established the Holy Roman Empire which existed till 1806. The magnificent inheritance was soon however split up by his successors Louis le Débonnaire and Lothaire; and the Partition of Verdun in 843, forced upon the latter by his two brothers, marked the end of Frankish unity. By this treaty most of the present France was assigned to Charles the Bald; the country east of the Rhine went to Ludwig the German; whilst to the Emperor Lothaire's share fell a strip running from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, including Italy, Provence, Burgundy and Frisia.

Wars soon broke out between the brothers and were continued by their descendants; Scandinavian raiders from the north descended on the French coasts and penetrated far inland; and in the midst of this turmoil the nobles, relieved from the guidance of a strong central autocracy, grew ever more and more independent and sought to increase their power by annexing each other's provinces. Less than seventy years after the death of Charlemagne the Carolingian monarchy was beginning to show signs of decay. The "Rois Fainéants" and others who succeeded to Charles the Bald were with few exceptions unable to cope with the situation, and their only successes were spasmodic victories over the Danes and Northmen who continued to invade their territories. It may indeed be said that up to the beginning of the eleventh century the only solid historical features which emerged from the confused welter of French politics were the increasing power of the Church, the growth of feudalism, and the settlement in Normandy of the Northmen under Rollo (c. 920).

THE ROMAN EMPIRE OF CHARLEMAGNE

Shewing the confines of the various states that were included



THE TREATY OF VERDUN, 843.



THE MIDDLE AGES

II

THE CAPETS

(987-1328)

IN 987 Louis V, the last of the Carolingians, was accidentally killed, and Hugh Capet, the most powerful of his feudal barons, was elected King. There were already large numbers of semi-independent hereditary rulers in France at this epoch. Such were the powerful Dukes of Burgundy, Normandy, Aquitaine, Gascony, the Counts of Brittany, Flanders, Anjou, Blois and Toulouse, and innumerable lesser Counts who, with the Archbishops and Bishops, had secured privileges from weak Carolingians. Hugh Capet's election, due in great measure to ecclesiastical influence, simply implied the triumph of a leading feudal house which possessed the admirably situated Duchy of France in which stood Paris and Orléans. From Hugh Capet's accession in 987 to that of Louis VI in 1108 the new monarchy had a difficult task, surrounded as it was by "a luxuriant feudal forest." After a reign of nine years Hugh Capet died, France still being divided into a number of small feudal states. Nevertheless he had successfully resisted the hope of the Papacy that the dynasty of the Ottos of Germany should exercise a kind of supremacy over France. Thus he aided in establishing the separation of the French kingdom from Germany, from which it was becoming rapidly distinct, both in language and customs.

Hugh's successors, Robert II and Henri I, wisely recognised the value of keeping on good terms with Normandy, and until the middle of the eleventh century there was not only peace but friendship between them. Troubles however arose, and the split in their friendly relations in 1054, when fighting broke out, was the origin of that conflict between France and England which, with intervals of peace, continued till the capture of Calais by the Duke of Guise in the reign of Queen Mary. Twelve years later the conquest of England by William of Normandy added fuel to the trouble; and this was not lessened by the revolt of his son Robert, supported by the French King Philip I, against him. Further hostilities took place, chiefly in the Vexin—a district round Beauvais which had foolishly been ceded to

the Normans as a *gage d'amitié*—and the seeds were sown of the terrible wars which for over a hundred years were to lay desolate the fair lands of France.

Louis VI's accession in 1108 marks an important epoch in the history of France. In 1099 the Crusaders had taken Jerusalem, and till the close of the following century the Crusades occupied the chief attention of a large proportion of the chief French nobles and knights. Consequently the Royal power was enabled to strengthen itself, while the inhabitants of towns began to resist the exactions of their (mostly absentee) overlords. The Crusades dealt a blow at Feudalism from which it never recovered, for during their continuance a social and industrial revolution was gradually carried out. The reign of Louis VI not only witnessed the opening of this movement towards local self-government by the towns and their attainment of social liberty, but it also saw the beginning of what has been called the Twelfth Century Renaissance, which was also made evident by the development of architecture and church-building. But though his wars with Henry I of England (1112–1120) were indeed inglorious, we may yet say that by the close of his reign in 1137 Louis had strengthened the Capetian monarchy, had encouraged the development of a national life, and had taught his subjects to look to the King for protection. Many of the abuses of feudalism perished during his reign, and the process of emancipating the agricultural and industrial classes had definitely begun. From this time too the communal movement steadily grew in spite of the resistance of the nobles. Among the builders of modern France Louis VI holds a leading place.

The long reign of his successor Louis VII (1137–1180) was chiefly marked by disputes, and eventually alliance, with the Church; by the presence of the King at the Second Crusade (1147–50); and by the folly of the monarch in divorcing his wife Eleanor of Aquitaine: for within two months she married Henry Plantagenet (later Henry II), taking with her the Duchy of Aquitaine and Poitou and thus giving our ambitious sovereign a powerful foothold on the continent. This event rendered the position of France most critical in view of Henry's combination with the Emperor of Germany. The genius however of Louis' son Philippe Auguste (1180–1223) eventually counteracted this error. Embarking with Richard I on the Third Crusade (1191), Philip returned hastily in the following year with the intention of seizing the English King's lands in France. A fierce and intermittent war broke out between them with varying results; and on the death of Richard, John

carried on the conflict—but with small success. He had indeed at one moment lost all the English possessions in France except Aquitaine; but he recovered himself, and with the assistance of the Emperor Otto IV, Flanders and Lorraine, gained the upper hand in 1214. But not for long. A great battle ensued at Bouvines (near Lille) in which the English and their allies were decisively beaten, and the long struggle between Philip and the House of Anjou was over. The battle has been described as “a determining influence on the history of three nations. In France it set its seal upon the predominance of the Capets and ushered in a period of autocratic centralisation. In Germany it ensured . . . the return of the Hohenstauffen to the Imperial throne. In England it . . . was the prelude to half a century of civil wars and constitutional debates.”¹

After the signing by John of the Magna Carta (1215) the barons, who saw that he had no intention of carrying out its terms, invited Philip's son Louis to come over and accept the English crown. Louis at once agreed and brought over an expedition; but owing to John's death and to the conciliatory policy expressed by his successor Henry III the barons fell away from Louis, and his forces were defeated at Lincoln and on the sea; and, unsupported by his father, he was obliged to return to France.

Philip died in 1223. Internally his reign had been of great importance. He increased the power of the Crown at the expense of the feudatories, strengthened the communes, contributed greatly to the growth of the towns, and by his liberal measures gave considerable impetus to trade and industry. Both as an administrator and legislator Philippe Auguste will always be regarded as one of the most important kings of the House of Capet.

The consolidation of the monarchy proceeded apace during the next four reigns. Louis VIII in his short term of three years strengthened his position in the south of France; (Saint) Louis IX extended the Royal power over Normandy and, broadly, over the centre of the country, and kept the lords of Burgundy, Flanders, Brittany and elsewhere under strict observation; he also crushed several incipient attempts at rebellion, and defeated (1242) Henry III in the south, confining him to his possessions of Guyenne and Gascony. The Treaty of Paris (1258) however restored several of the south-western provinces to England on condition of the latter's renunciation of her efforts in Auvergne, Brittany and the north. But Louis

¹ Davis, *England under the Normans and Angevins*, p. 379; London, Methuen.

28 THE VALOIS AND HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

had allowed himself to become entangled in the Crusades, and after a futile expedition to Egypt in 1248 he set out again on a Quixotic errand in 1270, which ended in his death at Carthage in the same year.

Under the two Philips who succeeded him the country prospered. Philip the Bold quarrelled with Peter of Aragon over the question of the two Sicilies and annexed Navarre and Brie; whilst Philip (IV) the Fair pursued the policy of weakening the English hold in the south; he also allied himself with the Scots, and laid the foundations of a more or less independent Gallican Church. Aided by excellent ministers, he did yet more; and to his credit stand the institution of the Parlement of Paris as a High Court of Appeal, and the calling together of a States-General, including representatives from 270 towns, to supply a formal expression of public opinion when consulted by the King; and, after many conflicts with the Popes, the supremacy in France of the Crown over the Church.

The next three kings—Louis X, Philip V and Charles IV (all sons of Philip IV)—reigned for only fourteen years altogether, and achieved nothing of importance; and the line of the Capets came to an end in the person of the last-named. There was no direct heir to Charles, and the crown was accordingly handed to his first cousin, Philip of Valois.

III

THE VALOIS AND THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

(1328-1491)

THE outbreak of the Hundred Years' War in 1337 was probably inevitable. There were many causes of friction between France and England, and it needed but a small spark to set the powder off. First of all the English possessions in Guyenne and the south-west could hardly be viewed with equanimity by the French; secondly, the cause of the Scots, and especially of David Bruce, who was anathema to the English King, had been warmly espoused by Philip VI; on the other hand, Edward III had received at his court Count Robert of Artois, who had been accused of murdering his wife, Philip's sister; and serious trouble was brewing in Flanders—always a bone of contention between the two countries.

Matters came to a head when Louis de Nevers, Count of that Province, with the approval of Philip, arrested all the English merchants there and forbade any commercial relations with England. Edward retaliated by stopping all export of English wool—which was absolutely essential to the existence of the Flemings: and the fat was in the fire.

The French started operations by attacking Guyenne and ravaging the south coast of England. In reply Edward assumed the title of King of France and invaded Flanders, but with poor success. A more hopeful ground for interference lay in taking part in the quarrel over the Duchy of Brittany, and intermittent campaigns went on till 1347, when the English invaded Normandy in strength, defeated the French forces at Crécy, near Abbeville (August 26, 1346), and took Calais.

Philip died in 1350; but the war went on in spite of Papal efforts to bring about peace, until the French King John, after suffering a series of misfortunes, was defeated and captured by the Black Prince at Poitiers (September 19, 1356). The government was carried on with great difficulty by the young Dauphin Charles in the face of internal outbreaks—such as the Jacquerie—and treasonable actions—such as those of Etienne Marcel—but John was not released (at a cost of three million gold crowns) until, after renewed fighting, the Treaty of Calais was signed four years later. By this treaty (October 28, 1360) Calais and Aquitaine remained in English hands, the question of Brittany being left for subsequent settlement.

The country was in a terrible state after the war, and it took all the ability of Charles V, who had succeeded his father in 1364, to restore order: for guerrilla warfare was still going on all over the country, "free companies" were roving through the land, and a campaign had become necessary in Spain. The latter resulted in a most useful alliance with Spain, and when war with England again broke out in 1369 the French quickly secured the upper hand. A truce from 1375-77 was of little avail for the English, and when another truce for six years was agreed on in 1381, a year or so after the death of Charles, England's position in France had been broken: for of all her French possessions she only retained Bayonne, Bordeaux, Brest and Calais. Meanwhile the power of Charles the Bad of Navarre had also been broken, both in the south and in Normandy, and the weary country began eagerly to look forward to a period of comparative peace. The first phase of the Hundred Years' War was over.

Charles VI was only twelve years old when he succeeded his

father; the government was consequently carried on by a Regency Council, and in this his uncle, the Duke Philip of Burgundy, attained a speedy pre-eminence. Revolutionary movements soon broke out in Paris and in Flanders, but were quickly suppressed by Burgundy's iron hand; and the latter rose more and more to power as, by marriage and other means, he succeeded in increasing his territories. Charles took over the government in 1388, and showed much sympathy in dealing with his subjects. But four years later he became partially insane, and Burgundy again took charge. A truce of twenty-eight years with England was signed in 1396; but on Richard II's death in 1399 it came to an end, and hostilities again broke out, the French King's brother Orléans (his daughter being widow of Richard) being fiercely opposed to Henry IV. French privateers ravaged the English coast, and a French expedition, with Glyndwr of Wales as its ally, landed in Wales and reached Worcester before it was defeated. Meanwhile Orléans had not succeeded in turning the English out of Guyenne: and in 1407 he was murdered by the emissaries of Jean sans Peur, who had succeeded his father Philip as Duke of Burgundy.

Civil war between the Orleanists and the Burgundians was the natural result, Burgundy being supported by the English; and the turmoil lasted till 1415, when the Armagnacs (allies of the new Duke of Orléans) remained in possession of the King and of Paris.

In this year Henry V of England, having in vain demanded the restoration of his "Kingdom of France," landed an army of 60,000 in France and took Harfleur. A month afterwards (October 25, 1415) he heavily defeated the French at Agincourt and took Orléans prisoner, following this up by conquering and annexing Normandy (January 1419). Meanwhile Burgundy and the Dauphin (eldest son of Charles) had been at war; they arranged a treaty, and met on the bridge of Montereau-sur-Yonne (July 1419); but Jean sans Peur was here foully murdered by the Dauphin's men—an act which resulted in throwing Burgundy into the arms of the English for the next fifteen years. In May 1420 the Treaty of Troyes, extracted from the French at the point of the sword, made our Henry V Regent of France and ensured that he should succeed Charles VI as King. But the West and South of France rose in revolt at this humiliating bargain, and in 1421 beat an English force under Clarence. Henry V returned, but he died at Vincennes in 1422; and a few weeks later Charles VI was also dead.

As Henry VI of England was only a few months old, the Duke

English Miles

English Possessions shaded thus

Burgundian, "



of Bedford now became Regent in France, whilst the Dauphin took the title of Charles VII King of France, and for several years carried on a disastrous war against the English. It was at this juncture that Joan of Arc appeared as the saviour of her country; and by raising the siege of Orléans in 1429 she turned the tables against the foe. Charles VII was crowned King at Reims, but the unfortunate girl was captured at Compiègne (being left outside the gates when pursued by the enemy on her return from an unsuccessful foray), and, Charles lifting no finger to help her, she was eventually burnt as a witch by the English at Rouen in 1431. From now onwards the cause of England began to decline; and Burgundy's reconciliation with the French Crown in 1435 dealt a further heavy blow at her position in the country. France was becoming reunited, and in spite of internal plots and risings she laboured hard at placing her military forces on a secure footing. The nucleus of a standing army was actually formed; many drastic military reforms were carried out; and especially were these pressed during the period of the five years' truce arranged with England by the Treaty of Tours in 1444.

That these reforms were of the utmost value to France was speedily shown in the fighting which broke out again in 1449. Normandy, Guyenne, Bayonne and Bordeaux successively fell into the hands of the French; and before the close of the year 1453 Charles VII was master and ruler of all France save Calais. The Hundred Years' War had come to an end.

The remaining years of Charles' life were occupied in checking the power of Burgundy and to devoting himself to Italian politics—in which he had but little success. On his death in 1461 the French monarchy had been firmly established, and no constitutional government was possible for many years to come.

His son Louis XI speedily incurred the wrath of the feudal princes at the abolition of whose prerogatives he was aiming; and in spite of his good work in promoting trade and agriculture a "League of the Public Good" was formed against him (1465) by the Dukes of Berri and Bourbon, strongly supported by Charolais, son of Philip of Burgundy. There ensued hostilities, in which neither side could claim the victory; and a treaty was signed at Conflans by the terms of which it was obvious that the recalcitrant princes aimed rather at their individual independence than at national unity. Louis was supported in his actions against the feudatories by the Parlement and the States-General; but for several years his position was critical, all the more so as his chief enemy—Charolais, now become Charles

the Bold—was allied with the English. By the most skilful combinations and utter disregard of the sanctity of his word he managed to evade disaster; the Burgundian invasion of France (1472) ended in failure; and the country was saved. Charles' efforts were now directed to forming a great Middle Kingdom for himself, but, largely owing to Louis' intrigues, they ended in failure. Charles himself was killed in 1477, and before his own death in 1483 Louis had seized and definitely united the Duchy of Burgundy to the French monarchy, leaving the latter again most firmly established for his successors.

The accession of his son Charles VIII, who was under the guardianship of Anne of Beaujeu, was followed by an attempt of the feudal party, headed by Louis of Orléans, to control the Government. Supported however by the States-General, the Royal army defeated a Breton army, and Orléans was cast into prison. The death of François of Brittany in 1488 left Anne triumphant and resolved to bring about a marriage between the young Duchess of Brittany and Charles VIII. In December 1491 the marriage took place, and the last great independent French fief was united to the Crown. For France the Middle Ages had now closed.

THE GOLDEN AGE

IV

THE STRUGGLE FOR ITALY

(1491–1559)

IN 1453 the Hundred Years' War had closed with the victory of the French over Talbot at Châtillon. No longer did the continental connection of England hinder her destiny as a sea-going power, and similarly, no sooner was France quit of her long struggle with England and reorganised under Louis XI than she was able to enter upon the path of overseas empire, and upon an attempt to establish her supremacy in Italy. These changes in French policy were not evident till the reign of Charles VIII, though the way was cleared as it were for his

enterprises by the firmly consistent policy of Louis XI, whose policy contributed so profoundly to the union of France.

The reign of Charles VIII, whose invasion of Italy in 1494 marked the beginning of the modern age, illustrates the immense vitality of the Gallic race. During his reign and that of his successors, the civilisation which had its roots in Roman Gaul entirely recovered from the horror of the Hundred Years' War and spread its influence over all Europe.

The conquest by the Turks of Constantinople, the crossing of the Atlantic by Columbus in 1492, Vasco da Gama's voyage to India in 1497-8—all indicated a complete revolution in the political ideas of the time. Already the restoration of Greek in Italy had taken place before the fall of the Eastern Empire, and it was in 1494, when Charles VIII made his famous expedition to Italy, that the Italian Renaissance was already at its height. French interest in Italy was no new thing. Under Charles VII Genoa had received a French governor, while Louis XI was accepted as "the arbiter of Italian fortunes"; but Italy during his reign was regarded as "rich, disunited and helpless."

Shortly after his accession Charles VIII was invited by Venice to conquer Milan and Naples, its request indicating that Charles would find allies in Italy should he invade that country. Old-standing claims upon Milan and Naples by the French King and the House of Orléans were adduced by Venice to rouse the interest of Charles VIII, who then possessed a powerful standing force of cavalry. So after marrying Anne of Brittany and making treaties with England (Étaples, November 1492), with Spain (Barcelona, January 1493) and with the Emperor Maximilian (Senlis, May 1493), Charles found himself with a free hand to invade Italy in 1494.

French intervention in Italy, as has been stated, had been evident in the reign of Charles VII, while Louis XI had shown considerable interest in the affairs of this country. Lorenzo de' Medici had died in 1492, and with his death the peace of Italy was threatened by the rivalries of the States which composed that country. In 1491 Ludovico il Moro, the ruler of Milan, realising his danger from the possibility of the Duke of Orléans asserting his claim to Milanese territory, sent an embassy to France and secured the renewal of the alliance with that country which his father had made. The chief pretext for an invasion of Italy thus left to Charles was the French claim on Naples.

In May 1494 the French expedition started, but it was not

till November 17 that Charles reached Florence, entering Rome on December 31. In the Neapolitan country the French met with opposition; this however was easily overcome, and on February 22, 1495 Charles occupied Naples. Meanwhile opposition was gradually being formed. Venice swung round and suggested a league which soon included the Pope, Milan, Maximilian and Ferdinand and Isabella. Florence alone of the chief States did not join it. On May 21 Charles departed from Naples, leaving a mixed force behind him. At Fornovo he met the army of the League, and a battle ensued, in which Charles was victorious. The result was that he, without meeting with further opposition, was able to return to France in the middle of October. On April 7, 1498, while meditating another invasion, he died, and was succeeded by his cousin Louis of Orléans, under the title of Louis XII.

Like his predecessor, Louis made several treaties before he invaded Italy—one with Spain and another with Philip, son of Maximilian and ruler of the Low Countries. He also renewed the Treaty with England, and arranged for Swiss assistance. In 1499 he crossed into Italy and occupied Milan, which however was regained by Ludovico Sforza in February 1500, only to be retaken by the French in April. Though Louis and Ferdinand of Spain conquered Naples in 1501 they soon quarrelled, with the result that in 1505 Louis gave up his rights in Naples to his niece Germaine de Foix, who, after the death of Isabella, married the Spanish King. In 1508 with Maximilian they formed the League of Cambrai against Venice and defeated her in the battle of Agnadello on May 14, 1509. After helping to commit this "great political crime," Louis was himself attacked by the Holy League in 1511, the object of which was to drive the French out of Italy. After unsuccessful campaigns in Italy, where Louis was beaten by the Swiss at Novara, and in France, where Henry VIII, who had meanwhile invaded the country, won the "battle of the Spurs" at Térouanne (or Guinegate) in August 1513, peace was made with England; and Louis, who had lost his wife, Anne of Brittany, in January 1514, married Mary, Henry of England's sister, in the following October. He died in January 1515, leaving France threatened by the hostility of many of the European Powers.

The invasions of Italy by Charles VIII and Louis XII thus marked the beginning of modern times and had the most important and far-reaching effects upon the political situation in Europe, and upon literature and art. The intercourse between nations was one result of these invasions of Italy by

Charles and his successors; and though the political union of Italy was rendered impossible, "captive Italy made her domination felt not only in France but also in Germany and Spain."

Until the expedition of Charles VIII the Renaissance can hardly be said to have affected France. But for a century after that expedition, certainly till the death of Henry III, the intercourse between France and Italy was continuous. Lascaris the Byzantine lectured on Greek in Charles VIII's and Louis XII's reigns, and the Italian Aleandro, who came to Paris in 1508 and remained there till 1516, was appointed Rector of the University and lectured on Hebrew, Greek and Latin. Greek books were already published in Paris, and Budæus, the famous French scholar and the best Greek scholar in Europe, published his *Commentary* in Paris in 1529. Many other names could be adduced to illustrate the growth of French Humanism and the effect upon it of the contact of French and Italian minds.

This development of Humanism in France coincided with a period of war which continued with short intervals of peace till the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was signed in 1559 between Henry II and Philip of Spain. Charles VIII and Louis XII had failed in their Italian policy; it was left to Francis I,¹ who had inherited a compact kingdom, to endeavour to establish the French hold upon Italy. The Peace of Noyon with Charles of Spain (later Charles V) in 1516 shelved the questions raised by the victory of Francis I over the Swiss at Marignano in 1515, but the question of a partition of Italy between Habsburg and Valois was not there definitely settled.

The election of Charles V to the imperial dignity in 1519 rendered the outbreak of war with France inevitable; but the meeting of Francis and Henry VIII at the Field of Cloth of Gold in June 1520 did not secure for France the English alliance that had been desired. To safeguard his interests Charles allied himself with Pope Leo X, and thereafter, in 1522, with Henry VIII. On the outbreak of war in 1521 Charles occupied Milan, while in 1522 the coasts of Brittany and Normandy were raided by English and Spanish fleets. The total defeat of the French army at Pavia by the forces of the Empire in February 1525 and the capture and imprisonment of Francis were followed by the Treaty of Madrid in January 1526, Francis ceding the Duchy of Burgundy to Charles, and renouncing his rights over Genoa, Asti, Naples, and Milan. As Charles refused to dis-

¹ Louis XII's son-in-law, son of the Count of Angoulême and great-grandson of the Louis Duke of Orléans who died in 1407.

member France, Henry VIII forsook him, but he did not join the League of Cognac against the Emperor in May 1526, though in April of the following year an offensive treaty was concluded between the English and French Kings. French successes in Italy were nullified by the defection of the famous Admiral Andrea Doria, and in 1529 the Peace of Cambrai closed the first stage in the settlement of the affairs of Western Europe.

Before the next war broke out between France and Charles V in 1536 Europe had to recognise the danger to its eastern frontier from Suleiman, the Turkish Sultan. Already Francis had entered into relations with him, and in February 1536 he concluded a treaty. This alliance, together with Suleiman's invasions of Eastern Europe, was of the utmost significance in the history of the Reformation and in the future wars between Charles and Francis. In March 1536 war between the two monarchs opened with the invasion of Provence by French troops, followed by that of Artois and the occupation of Savoy and Piedmont. But it ended in November the following year, and in June 1538 the truce of Nice was arranged for ten years, the French King and the Emperor meeting at Aigues-Mortes in July.

For Charles peace was especially necessary in order to be able to ward off the Turkish danger and to deal with the religious situation in Germany. Moreover both Powers had now reached what has been called "a position of comparatively stable equilibrium." The truce marks one more stage to the permanent settlement established later by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.

The truce did not however continue for many years, though it enabled Charles V to attack Barbarossa, the Turkish corsair, with the object of then turning his power against Constantinople. Failure however attended his efforts, and in 1542, in alliance with the Sultan, Francis entered upon campaigns in the Netherlands and Roussillon.¹ Allied with Henry VIII, Charles fully held his own in 1543, while Henry in July in the following year besieged Boulogne. But Charles, anxious to deal with his three remaining difficulties—Turkish, Lutheran and Papal—signed the Peace of Crépy on September 13, 1544. Among the terms of the Peace the most important were those which provided for the co-operation of Charles and Francis against the Turks and against the Protestants. Hitherto the opposition of France and the Ottomans and the lack of Papal support had checked the Emperor's desire for ecclesiastical reform and for the coercion

¹ Just north of the eastern end of the Pyrenees.

of the Protestants in Germany. Francis at once did his utmost to exterminate the Vaudois Protestants, and in 1546 continued his persecutions in France, Stephen Dolet, one of the main leaders of the "heretics," being burnt alive. Francis himself died in March of the following year.

By a Treaty made by his son Henry II with Edward VI in March 1550 Boulogne was restored to France, and the French King was enabled to enter upon war with the Emperor Charles in March 1552. This war marks a new development in French policy, for Henry II, allied with the Protestant Princes of Germany and with the Turks, aimed at securing new accessions of territory on the eastern border of France. Henry at once invaded Lorraine and occupied the chief places in the bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun. The war continued in an indecisive fashion till February 1556, when the Truce of Vaucelles gave the combatants a short respite. The same year saw the close of Charles V's career, and the outbreak of war between Henry II and Philip II of Spain, the latter being in alliance with England. The defeat of the French in the battle of St. Quentin on August 10, 1557, laid the way open to Paris. Guise, now the most influential man in France, took advantage of Philip's refusal to advance on Paris, reorganised his own army, and on January 1, 1558, besieged Calais, which he took from the English in eight days: thus did we lose our last possession on French territory. In the following April Mary of Scotland (daughter of King James V of Scotland and Mary of Guise) married the Dauphin.

The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis between France, Spain and England, signed on April 2, 1559, marks an epoch in European history, closing a struggle which had continued for some sixty years. Italy was left as Charles V had wished, and Savoy became a buffer State between France and Italy. The Peace itself was a triumph for the party of the Constable Montmorency, who had always been opposed to a French alliance with the Sultan of Turkey or with the German Protestant princes; but in this policy he was opposed by the House of Guise, whose aims have been described as being ever "aggressive, enterprising, provocative." The influence of Francis Duke of Guise had procured the rupture of the Truce of Vaucelles; while to that of Montmorency was mainly due the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis.

A new era was now about to dawn. The accession of Elizabeth of England in 1558 and of Francis II (son of Henry ¹)

¹ Henry II was accidentally killed at a tournament, by a lance-splinter in the eye.

in 1559, the death of Charles V in 1558, the accession of Pius IV in 1559, the appointment of Margaret, sister of Philip II, as Regent of the Netherlands, the separation of Spain and Germany (Charles' successor as Emperor being his brother Ferdinand I)—all these events mark the close of an old epoch and the opening of a new one. Moreover, the new epoch is marked by the definite opening of the Counter-Reformation movement (inaugurated at the Council of Trent, the sittings of which were closed in December 1563), by the revolt of the Netherlands, which opened with the capture of Brill in 1572 by the "Beggars," and especially by the outbreak of the wars of religion in France.

V

THE WARS OF RELIGION

(1559-1610)

THE Reformation Movement in France, which began in the reign of Francis I, developed rapidly during his reign and that of Henry II, mainly owing to the occupation of the Government in foreign wars, and this in spite of the persecution to which its supporters were subjected. That movement was mainly based on the Genevan system and, as time went on, its members advocated social and political changes. The Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis closed the national wars which had begun with Charles VIII's expedition to Italy, and marked the beginning of the religious wars which only closed with the Peace of Westphalia. The death of Henry II shortly after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis left the Crown in the hands of his weak son Francis II, who was entirely under the influence of his wife Mary Stuart.

At the moment France was in a condition somewhat resembling that of England at the close of the war with France in 1453. As long as foreign wars continued, the nobles were fully occupied in support of the Crown. Peace however implied the growth of turbulence among the nobles at a time when the monarchy was weak; and it did not become strong till the accession of Henri IV.¹ Moreover the religious factor made the position of the Crown still more difficult.

During the religious wars both the Catholics and Huguenots placed their respective religions above nationality. We find

¹ This monarch is so well known as "Henri Quatre" that the French spelling of his name has been retained.—ED.

the Huguenots offering Calais to Queen Elizabeth and bringing English forces to Havre, and the Guises intriguing with Spain and willing to dismember France. Only a series of strong monarchs could have held the nation together, but during the years from 1560 to 1590 personal government completely broke down under the weak rule of Francis II, Charles IX and Henry III.

At this time there were several parties, each struggling for the management of the kingdom. First was that of Catherine de' Medici, widow of Henry II; then came that of the Bourbon princes represented by Antoine King of Navarre and Louis Prince of Condé, who were supported by the Protestant Admiral Coligny; and thirdly that of Francis Duke of Guise, the captor of Calais, and his brother Charles of Lorraine, Cardinal Archbishop of Reims. There were also to be considered the Constable of Montmorency and his friends, who opposed Catherine no less than the Bourbons. During the reign of Francis II the Guises were in the ascendant. Owing to the conspiracy of Amboise in March 1560, the object of which was to seize the Guises, Condé was condemned to death, and he only owed his life to the death of Francis II (December 5, 1560) and the accession of his brother Charles IX, when Catherine became Regent and the Guises ceased to carry on the government.

Mary (Queen of Scots), the widow of Francis II, arrived in Edinburgh in August 1561, only to find that all French troops had been withdrawn from Scotland and that the Calvinistic Confession of Faith had been adopted. Before she left France the Guise domination had ended and the new monarch Charles IX, being only ten years old, was during his regency immediately under the influence of Catherine de' Medici. Owing to the condition of religious parties in France, disturbances in various towns took place, and finally, on January 17, 1562, the Huguenots did indeed obtain legal recognition, but they were not allowed to assemble within any city. The Huguenots reluctantly accepted the Edict, but the Catholics were not satisfied, and the attack by Guise on some Protestants at Vassy on March 1 inaugurated the religious wars. The immediate result of that massacre was that Guise, Montmorency and the Marshal St. André (the Triumvirate) became all-powerful, while Condé headed the Huguenots. During the first war King Antoine of Navarre, Marshal St. André, and Guise¹ perished, and the Constable of Montmorency and Condé arranged the Pacification of Amboise, which closed the war (1563). The Huguenots were

¹ Guise was assassinated by a Huguenot in 1563.

now allowed liberty of conscience, and they aided in the expulsion of the English from Havre in July 1563. Catherine, now supreme, declared Charles IX of age, and peace reigned till 1567. During those years a treaty, that of Troyes, was made with England in 1564, and in the following year the famous meeting between Catherine and the Duke of Alva took place at Bayonne. Meanwhile countless intrigues were being carried on by the leaders of both religious parties in France, and in 1567 the second war broke out. In the battle of St. Denis on November 10 Montmorency, who was opposing Condé, was killed. The latter, after besieging Chartres, concluded in March 1568 the Peace of Longjumeau, the terms of which were little more than a repetition of those of the Convention of Amboise.

Catherine's attempt to seize Condé and Coligny led to the outbreak in November of the third war. On March 13, 1569, the Huguenots were defeated in the battle of Jarnac, and shortly afterwards Condé was assassinated, being succeeded in the leadership of the Huguenots by Coligny, though the Bourbon Prince of Béarn (afterwards King of Navarre and Henri IV) and the young Prince of Condé were nominally the heads of the party. Coligny failed to take Poitiers, and on October 8 was defeated in the battle of Montcontour by the Duke of Anjou and Tavannes. Early in 1570 Coligny won a victory at Arnay-le-Duc, and in August the Peace of St. Germain ended the war. The Huguenots obtained favourable terms, four towns—La Rochelle, La Charité, Montauban and Cognac—being left in their hands for two years. This treaty closes the first period of the religious wars.

The years 1571–2, which divide the first and second periods of the religious wars, are full of interest; Charles IX married (1570) Elizabeth of Austria, daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II, an Anglo-French alliance was concluded, and French schemes with regard to the Netherlands eventuated in the seizure of Valenciennes and Mons. On August 13, 1572, Henri Bourbon of Navarre married Marguerite of Valois, sister of Charles IX, and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew—in which thousands of Huguenots, including Admiral Coligny, were exterminated—took place during the week following. The Queen-Mother, Catherine de' Medici, owing to her determination to attack the Huguenots and get rid of Coligny, was certainly answerable, with Henry of Anjou (afterwards Henry III), for the massacre, which was also advocated by the municipal authorities in Paris. While the historian Martin is an advocate of the view that the massacre was unpremeditated, Motley points out that at Rome

the news of the massacre created a joy beyond description, and that the Pope went to the Church of St. Mark to render thanks for the grace thus singularly vouchsafed to the Holy See and to all Christendom. Sismondi has no hesitation in averring that Philip II of Spain, as well as the Pope, approved of the massacre.

The wars which immediately followed the Massacre of St. Bartholomew were the life-and-death struggle of the reformed religion. In those struggles the secular was if possible more prominent than the ecclesiastical element, for it was advisable for the Huguenots to conciliate those Catholic malcontents who had broken away from the Crown. Moreover, it was necessary to put forward a theory of government in opposition to that of absolutism which, formulated by Macchiavelli, had been applied by the Crown through the influence of Catherine de' Medici.

Within seven years of the massacre many Huguenot works, several being direct attacks on Macchiavelli, appeared, all justifying the right of resistance to authority when wrongfully used. In the meantime the Huguenots were unable to give the insurgents in the Low Countries any help, and they now aimed not at securing political control of the government but at religious toleration and at the establishment of a number of federal republics. For a time the Huguenots by their alliance with the Politiques, who desired toleration, seem to have regained much of this power in the south-west of France. But their efforts were hampered some seven years after the massacre by the outbreak of a social conflict which, begun in Dauphiné, seemed not unlikely to spread over France. "There is," writes a Venetian in 1584, "extremely bad feeling between the nobles and people, who are much oppressed by the large quantities of poor gentry who play the tyrant and expect to live, dress and take their pleasure at the people's expense." The ultimate victory of Henri of Navarre over the League and Spain, with whom the Peace of Vervins in May 1598 was concluded, checked for a time the growth of the Federalist spirit, which did not again show itself in any marked degree till the days of Richelieu. By the Edict of Nantes (April 1598) liberty of conscience was granted to the Huguenots, and guarantees were given them for their safety. The Edict was practically a "Treaty between two powers comparatively equal."

After the massacre of St. Bartholomew the fourth war, of which the massacre was the first act, broke out and closed with the Treaty of La Rochelle in June 1573, the Huguenots being promised liberty of conscience and the right to hold services in La Rochelle, Montauban and Nîmes.

During the late war the Politiques or Moderate Catholics had begun to draw closer to the Huguenots, and Francis of Alençon, the King's youngest brother, was regarded as their chief. In July 1573 Henry of Anjou, brother of the King, was elected King of Poland, and on May 30, 1574 Charles IX died, it being suspected that he was poisoned to make way for Henry of Anjou, who became King as Henry III and arrived in France in the following September. Catherine's family now consisted of Henry III, François Duke of Alençon (and now of Anjou), and Margaret (La Reine Margot) Queen of Navarre. Soon after Henry's return the fifth war broke out; this ended on May 6, 1576, when the Peace of Monsieur (so-called after d'Alençon) was signed, eight cities being allotted to the Huguenots. Peace being made, d'Alençon, "a prince of no principle, bad temper and small capacity," turned his attention to Flanders. Owing to a sudden change in the policy of Queen Elizabeth, who now wished to establish friendly relations with Spain, the Flemings were forced to invoke the aid of France, much to the irritation of the English Queen, who, like Edward III, dreaded a French protectorate over Flanders. In 1578, Flanders being threatened with the arrival of Spanish troops from Italy, d'Alençon entered the Netherlands at the head of 10,000 men.

In March 1579 he endeavoured without success to induce Henry III to support his Flemish enterprise. Having failed in his attempt, he disbanded his troops and again, though in vain, endeavoured to induce Queen Elizabeth to marry him. On her definite refusal he set out for Antwerp in February 1582, only to find that a Spanish force was advancing to Flanders and that the Flemings had become convinced that he intended to annex their country. In January 1583 the French troops had secured for d'Alençon several towns, including Dunkirk and Ostend. Ghent and Bruges were too strong to be seized, and the men of Antwerp drove out the French troops. In June he retired with his army and Spain occupied the country. In June 1584 he died. Meanwhile Henry III had found that the States-General, which met at Blois in November 1576, was violently anti-Huguenot and anti-monarchical. From that time the formation of Catholic Leagues supported by the new Duke of Guise constituted an ever-growing menace to the monarchy. Guise was acting in close connection with Philip of Spain and united the Catholic Leagues into one single organisation. There is no doubt that he was aiming at the crown of France. To discredit the government of Henry III and to keep on good

terms with Spain were absolutely necessary for the success of Guise's projects, and these had been endangered by d'Alençon's Flemish projects.

The sixth war ended on September 17, 1577, with the Peace of Bergerac, and the seventh (the "War of the Gallants") with the Peace of Fleix in November 1580, both Peaces being due to the diversion towards the Netherlands. The Huguenots now held eight cities, and for some eight years peace was preserved. During this period the development of the Catholic League proceeded rapidly and was welcomed by Philip II, who made a treaty in January 1585 with Henry of Guise, the chief object of which was to prevent the accession of Henri of Navarre to the French throne. The same year, by the Treaty of Nemours (July 1), Henry III definitely broke off friendly relations with England and accepted the policy of the League. The years 1587, 1588 and 1589 were noteworthy in the history of France. The eighth war, or the War of the Three Henrys (Henry III, Henri of Navarre, and Henry of Guise), was of no little interest. On October 15, 1587, Henri of Navarre won the battle of Courtras, but Paris, defended by Guise, turned against Henry III, who in May 1588 retired to Chartres.

The danger to France from Philip II was fully realised by the French Court, for not only was Spain firmly established in the Netherlands, but in revenge for the aid given by d'Alençon to the rebels the King of Spain supported the League with all his power. The French Court was, we are told, paralysed with fear when the Spanish Armada approached its coast. The failure of the Armada was followed by great Royalist rejoicings. "God has deferred our ruin," wrote the Tuscan agent, "contenting Himself with our torments of civil war." In August Henry met at Blois the States-General, and the League expressed a wish to give the crown to the Duke of Guise. The failure of the Armada in August 1588 encouraged Henry to act, and on December 23 he carried out the assassination of Guise at Blois, and of his brother the Cardinal on the following day. Henry now hoped that all serious checks on his power had been removed. But he had not counted on the irreconcilable attitude of Paris, which set up the Duke of Mayenne, the brother of Guise, as Lieutenant-General of France. Before Henry could decide what action to take, the Queen-Mother Catherine de' Medici died on January 5, 1589. In view of the fury of the Parisians, Henry's life was no longer safe. His only course was to ally himself with Henri of Navarre, and on April 3, 1589 a treaty was made; on the 30th the two Henrys met near Tours,

and in July they invested Paris. On August 1 however the last Valois King of France was stabbed by a Jacobin friar and died on the following day, after recognising Henri of Navarre (his brother-in-law) as his heir.

From the death of Henry III in 1589 to the acceptance of Roman Catholicism by Henri IV in 1593 war continued with the League. During those years Henri defeated Mayenne at Arques in September 1589, and at Ivry in March 1590. He was still opposed by the League, which had its headquarters in Paris now strictly besieged by the Royalist army. Obeying the instructions of Philip II, Parma forced Henri to raise the siege and revictualled the city. A reactionary movement however set in, even in Paris, where the "Sixteen" were anticipating by their cruelties the reign of terror in 1793-4; and public opinion declared itself against Spanish domination. France, worn out by the civil war, was now ready to accept Henri as King. In July 1593 he formally adopted the Catholic religion, and in the following year entered Paris and made an alliance with England, an alliance which was shortly afterwards joined by Holland. The civil wars in Provence and Brittany closed in 1596, 1597 and 1598, and the war with Spain, formally declared in January 1593, continued till it was closed by the treaty of Vervins in May 1598, being preceded in April by the famous Edict of Nantes, which gave the reformed religion certain liberties. Catholicism remained supreme; but toleration was given to the Huguenots.

After 1598 Henri lost no time in restoring order in France and developing industry and commerce, which had been practically non-existent during the forty years of civil war. Henri found in Sully a minister admirably fitted to carry out measures necessary for the material development of France. It is stated by a competent authority that whereas in 1597 the total income of the State was 23,000,000 livres it had by 1609 risen to 39,000,000.¹ During those years the national debt was considerably reduced, officials and governors of provinces were compelled to renounce their illegal exactions, and a considerable reduction in the standing army was effected. The export of corn was freed from all restrictions, roads and bridges were improved, and industries of all kinds, among which must be mentioned the manufacture of silk, were encouraged. Paris itself was immensely improved. At the same time trade was bettered by commercial treaties with England, Spain and Turkey,

¹ This sum must be multiplied by about eight for its equivalent in modern currency. *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. iii, p. 693.

and support was given to the efforts which were being made to colonise Canada. In one respect a reactionary step was taken. In order to check the venality of judicial offices and to increase the revenue, Henri and Sully, by the advice of a certain Paulet, converted the judicial offices into heritable property. The result was the creation of the *Noblesse de la Robe*, who held vested and heritable rights, which enabled them frequently to adopt an independent attitude towards the Crown.

Till his death in 1610, while the internal resources of France, which owing to the late disturbances had become completely disorganised, were being developed, Henri was specially interested in the European situation. In October 1600 (having divorced his wife Margot of Valois in the previous year) he married Marie de' Medici, niece of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the same year found him at war with the Duke of Savoy, from whom in 1601 he took Bresse, Bugey, Gex and Valromey, thus considerably advancing the French frontier. In 1609 the Clèves-Juliers question seemed likely to involve Europe in a general war—a war of Catholicism against Protestantism. Everything pointed to the outbreak of the "Thirty Years' War" in 1609. On his way to the frontier however Henri was murdered (by Ravallac, May 14, 1610), and for some years France retired from the foremost place in Europe—a position in which Henri had left her. Had he lived longer the Habsburgs might have been humbled with comparative ease, in which case France and not Austria would have remained the leading power in Europe—a position which she did not occupy till the reign of Louis XIV.

With Henri IV's death closes the first period in the history of French colonisation. During the sixteenth century the French maintained a forward place in the race of adventurous explorations beyond seas; and at the end of that century the rivalry among the western maritime nations had begun in earnest. Constant allusions to strange peoples, distant voyages and the wealth of Asia are made by Rabelais, Montaigne and Bodin. But the religious wars which occupied France during the last thirty years of the century enabled the English and Dutch to gain ground, though Henri IV had entertained vast commercial and colonising projects after the Treaty of Vervins. In his colonial as well as in his home and foreign policy Henri adopted an absolute attitude. In his reign French absolutism is seen at its best, for though he was ambitious and a lover of pleasure his chief thought was for the State and not for himself. France after the religious wars required a strong, unselfish and capable ruler, and found one in Henri IV.

VI

LOUIS XIII

(1610–1643)

SHORTLY before his death Henri IV had arranged that his Queen, Marie de' Medici, should be crowned at St. Denis and appointed his Regent. Europe was practically at peace at the time of the accession of his son Louis XIII, then nine years old. In 1609 the long war between Spain and the United Netherlands had closed, and in 1612 the peace between France and Spain was cemented by the engagement of Louis XIII to Anne, daughter of Philip III, known later as Anne of Austria, and by that of Elizabeth, sister of Louis, to Philip, Prince of the Austurias and brother of Anne. From the death of Henri IV to the suppression of the Huguenot rebellions between 1626 and 1630 France however had little influence in Europe. During that period the weakness of the Crown and the lack of governing power on the part of Marie de' Medici, who was influenced by favourites such as Leonora Galigai and her husband Concini, (created in 1613 Marshal d'Ancre), brought about at once a state of things resembling civil war. Sully was dismissed a year after Henri's death, and the money which he had accumulated in the Treasury was wasted in various ways, pensions as well as governorships being heaped upon the nobles. Under such a weak ruler as was Marie de' Medici the feudal element rapidly became discontented and more and more grasping, while the Huguenots were greatly discontented at limits being set to their right of assembling in Council, at the reclamation of the Church lands in Béarn and at the Spanish marriages. When therefore Condé headed a rebellion in 1614, accusing the Crown of prodigality and demanding the summoning of the States-General, Marie de' Medici saw the necessity of yielding, and in October 1614 the States-General met in Paris. It is remarkable not for what it did, but for the fact that it did not meet again till the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. During its proceedings in 1614 Richelieu distinguished himself by his grasp of national questions, and two years later he became Secretary of State, controlling war and foreign affairs.

The States-General was dissolved in February 1615, and in the same year the double marriages aforesaid took place at Bordeaux, whilst Condé, who had again headed a rising, was

declared in September a rebel. In May 1616 however Marie de' Medici made terms with Condé and his Huguenot allies. The Treaty of Loudun, according to which Condé became Chief of the Council, implied the triumph of the nobles over the Crown; but somewhat suddenly Marie showed unexpected energy: Condé was in September thrown into the Bastille, and three armies were sent to suppress the rebellious nobles. Marie's reign of power had however now come to a close, for on April 24, 1617 Louis XIII carried out a *coup d'état*, D'Ancre (Concini) was killed, Marie de' Medici retired to Blois, and Richelieu was sent to his diocese.

The next seven years form a confused and somewhat uninteresting portion of French history. In 1620 a rebellion of the nobles on behalf of Marie de' Medici took place, but this was, through Richelieu's influence, ended by the Treaty of Angoulême, resulting in the reconciliation of the King and his nobles. A rising of the Huguenots followed in the same year, and the war between them and the Crown in 1621 and 1622 ended with the Treaty of Montpellier, which forbade the Huguenots, who now only occupied two strong places, La Rochelle and Montauban, to hold political meetings. Before hostilities had actually broken out, Louis had marched to Pau and reunited Béarn and Navarre to the Crown. Shortly after this war Richelieu was reconciled to the King, and in September 1622 he became a Cardinal. Meanwhile in 1618 the Thirty Years' War had broken out, and the possibility of the House of Habsburg becoming all-powerful in Europe had to be considered.

For the next fourteen years France took no active part in checking the progress of the Catholic League in Germany. In 1624 however Richelieu entered the King's Council, and till his death in 1642 he directed French policy at home and abroad. Before France could intervene actively in the Thirty Years' War it was necessary that she should be united at home. Prior to dealing with the Huguenots, who were not only as intolerant as the Catholics but who placed the interests of their religion before that of the State, Richelieu was able to deal a blow at the Habsburgs by preventing the Spaniards from conquering the Valtellina.¹ He continued the alliance of France with Holland, and he negotiated the marriage between Henrietta Maria, the sister of Louis XIII, and Charles Prince of Wales. His next step was to bring about unity in France by crushing the Huguenots and checking by severe measures the turbulence of the nobles. The Huguenot leaders, Soubise and Rohan, gave

¹ N.E. of Lake Como.

him the opportunity when they organised in 1625 a rising which was speedily quelled. In 1627 a more serious Huguenot rising took place, which was encouraged by the appearance of Buckingham and the English fleet off La Rochelle in July. In the following year, though the English fleet had returned in May it could do nothing, and La Rochelle fell to Richelieu on October 28. In 1629 the Treaty of Alais gave France internal peace. With the destruction of the fortifications of La Rochelle no town now existed which could oppose the forces of the Crown. At the same time by the Treaty full toleration was given to the Huguenots, which they enjoyed till Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

With the selfish nobles Richelieu dealt equally drastically and successfully. He easily suppressed a conspiracy which included Condé, the Duchess of Chevreuse (widow of Luynes) and several nobles, and in November 1630 (the "Day of Dupes") he crushed a more serious conspiracy which was headed by the Queen-Mother and supported by Gaston Duke of Orléans and several nobles. In 1632 Orléans again conspired in Languedoc with the Governor, one Montmorency, who was executed, Orléans being pardoned. Richelieu was now secure from noble conspiracies and able to devote his energies to the situation abroad.

In 1624 the war of the Mantuan Succession had broken out, Casale, which was held by some French volunteers, being besieged by Spanish and Savoy troops. Richelieu at once led a force into Italy and relieved Casale. He then returned to force the Huguenots to complete submission, and after the Treaty of Alais had been signed he returned to Italy and took Pinerolo, near Turin, on March 22, 1630.

Since 1624, when he began to direct the policy of France, Richelieu had realised the necessity of re-establishing France in the position in Europe in which Henri IV had left her. But before the country could withstand Austria and Spain and extend and safeguard her frontiers it was necessary to secure national unity at home and monarchical centralisation. In 1630 national unity had been secured and was rendered more permanent by the creation of a class of *Intendants*, who aided in the formation of an administrative system on the ruins of provincial and noble liberties. This absolute and centralised system continued till the French Revolution.

After the overthrow of the conspiracy of Marie de' Medici and Gaston of Orléans in November 1630, Richelieu's position at home was practically unassailable, and he was able to give his whole attention to foreign policy. Already he had in 1630



sent Father Joseph to the Diet of Ratisbon in order that he might sow discord between the Princes and the Emperor. In 1631 the Treaty of Cherasco, a brilliant triumph for Richelieu, had closed the war of the Mantuan Succession. The death of Gustavus Adolphus in the battle of Lützen in November 1632 closed the religious period of the Thirty Years' War, which now tended more and more to become a struggle of France, Sweden and Holland against the Habsburgs—a struggle into which Henri IV at the end of his reign had proposed to enter. Having therefore occupied Lorraine and invaded Alsace in 1633, the King of France in 1634 took Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar and his troops into his pay, and a French army at the end of the year occupied Mannheim and forced the Imperialists to raise the siege of Heilbronn.

From 1634 to 1638 the fortunes of the war varied. George of Saxony and the Emperor made peace in 1635, while, on the other hand, Sweden and France formed a new alliance, and France declared war on Spain and made treaties with the United Provinces and the Italian Princes. During the years 1635 and 1636 the French failed to reduce the Milanese, Burgundy was invaded by the Austrians, and Spanish forces threatened Guyenne. The invasion of Picardy in 1636 by the Spaniards, though they were driven back, caused a panic in Paris; but in 1637 the tide turned in favour of the French (though they lost their hold on the Valtellina), for in that year the Spaniards were driven out of Languedoc, and in the following year the French fleet dominated the Mediterranean. In reply to risings in Guyenne and Normandy the local privileges in those provinces were suspended, and to *Intendants* were given the duties of administration. Alsace was occupied by French troops, and in 1640 the revolt of the Catalans and Portuguese distinctly weakened the aggressive power of the Spaniards.

Richelieu's war administration had now been crowned with success. France was no longer in danger of invasion, Spain was crippled, and the power of the Emperor was steadily weakening. Successful abroad, Richelieu was able to develop his policy of centralisation at home, and in 1641 the *Parlement* of Paris was ordered to register all royal edicts without delay and was forbidden to exercise any political functions.

Thus while in his foreign policy he continued that opposition to the Habsburgs which marked the years 1521–1558 and which continued till the diplomatic revolution of 1756, Richelieu's policy at home aimed at the gradual establishment of a centralised and absolute government based on the destruction of noble and

provincial liberties. From 1632 to the Cardinal's death in 1642 the nobles appeared to submit to the loss of their political power, but no sooner were Richelieu and Louis XIII dead ¹ than the reactionary nobles, acting like their predecessors after the death of Henri IV, began to demand the abolition of the *Intendants* and the restoration to them of the government of the Provinces.

VII

LOUIS XIV

(1643-1715)

THE first act of Anne of Austria, who acted as Regent during Louis XIV's minority, was to place Cardinal Mazarin at the head of the Council. For some ten years the struggle between Mazarin and his opponents the nobles continued, his position at home being distinctly affected by the success or failure of the French armies abroad. Thus the victory of Rocroi over the Spaniards by the young Duke of Enghien (later Prince of Condé) in May 1643 strengthened Mazarin's hands in suppressing the conspiracy of the *Importants* on September 2. Again, in 1645 an early outbreak of the Fronde—a revolt of the nobles, *Parlement* and citizens of Paris against Mazarin—was only averted by the victory of Enghien and Turenne over the Imperialists in the battle of Nördlingen; a few weeks after Nördlingen therefore a *lit de justice* was held.

But already in 1644 it was found absolutely necessary to raise money, and the proposals of the Treasurer Emery were causing widespread discontent. The necessary taxes were voted and the Government had triumphed: but the triumph did not last long. The continuance of the war had completely disorganised the financial administration. In May 1648 matters came to a head, and the *Parlement* of Paris formulated its demands in the Chamber of St. Louis, one being the abolition of the *Intendants*, another that no tax should be levied unless previously voted by the *Parlement*. The arrest of Broussel, one of the chief opponents of Mazarin, on August 6 led to a rising in Paris. In September the Court moved to Rueil, away from the influence of the capital, Mazarin carrying out a policy which Mirabeau in 1790 in vain urged upon Louis XVI. On October 24 the Treaty of Westphalia ² and

¹ Louis died on May 14, 1643, his son Louis XIV being then four years old.

² Putting an end to the Thirty Years' War.

the Treaty with the Parliamentary Fronde were signed, and on October 30 the Court returned to Paris. The Treaty of Westphalia was a triumphant close to the wars between France and the Habsburgs, begun under Francis I. France obtained Upper and Lower Alsace, though the rights of the Imperial princes had to be recognised. Her possession of the Metz, Toul and Verdun bishoprics was recognised, and she obtained Old Breisach on the right bank of the Rhine. Spain however continued the war against France, till in 1659 the Peace of the Pyrenees completed the pacification of Europe.

Meanwhile in France the Parliamentary Fronde had continued its attacks on the Government, and on January 5, 1644, Mazarin suddenly moved the Court to Saint-Germain. Civil war broke out and continued till April 2 when the Treaty of Rueil—a compromise—ended the Twelve Weeks' War, and in August the Court returned to Paris, Condé—who was now reconciled to Mazarin—having suppressed risings in Normandy, Provence, Anjou and Guyenne. But the unstable though powerful Condé soon turned against Mazarin, and the movement known as the New Fronde, formed by the nobles and princes, took shape, one of its chief members being the Cardinal de Retz.

A confused period of history is that of the years 1644–1654, chiefly marked by the arrest of the three princes—Condé, Conti and Longueville—in January 1650, and their imprisonment till February 1651, when Mazarin retired to Cologne, by the attainment of his majority by Louis XIV, and by the opposition of Turenne to the Court. This was however followed by his loyal support of the King in 1652, when he won the battle of Jargeau in March, cutting Condé's Spanish contingent to pieces in May, and defeating Condé in the Faubourg St. Antoine in July. In consequence, Louis XIV was able to return to Paris in October to arrest De Retz and to exile many of the leading Frondeurs. In February 1653 Mazarin returned to Paris, and in the following year Louis was crowned at Reims.

The Fronde movement being over, Mazarin was able to devote his attention to the war with Spain. Taking advantage of the civil war in France the Spanish troops had taken Gravelines and Dunkirk in 1652. Negotiations for an English alliance were opened at the close of 1655, and the Treaty of Paris between France and England was signed in March 1657, by which England was to receive Dunkirk and Mardyck in consideration for her assistance with 6,000 men. In the fol-

lowing year the advantage of this alliance was seen, for both Dunkirk and Gravelines were taken from the Spaniards by the French. The fate of Spain was now settled, and in August the efforts of Lionne were successful in forming the League of the Rhine, consisting of Sweden, Bavaria and the Rhine Electors, the object of which was to secure their adherence to France. Negotiations were also opened with England and Holland to secure the enforcement of the Treaty of Roskild which had been made between Denmark and Charles X of Sweden, who had been warring in Northern Europe since 1655. On November 7, 1659 the Peace of the Pyrenees closed the war between France and Spain, France gaining Roussillon, Cerdagne (south-west of Roussillon), Artois and a number of fortresses in Flanders, Luxemburg and Hainault. In the succeeding February the death of Charles X led to the establishment of peace in the north, while on May 29 Charles II returned to England. In March of the following year (1661) Mazarin died, Fouquet, late Treasurer, was imprisoned, and Colbert became the leading minister in France. Louis XIV henceforward not only reigned but ruled.

“*L'état c'est moi*” expressed accurately the principle upon which Louis XIV ruled from 1661 to his death in 1715. He adopted the theory of divine right and was convinced that his decisions could not be otherwise than correct. His policy towards the Huguenots, Jansenists¹ and Quietists was based on religion, though in his attacks upon them he weakened the unity and prosperity of France. During his reign the States-General were never summoned, and in 1673 the *Parlement* of Paris was ordered to register all Royal edicts without remonstrance. All ancient municipal liberties were crushed even in Provence and Brittany, while the nobles, though allowed to keep their privileges, were not admitted into government offices, and ceased to be a political power. Indeed, when after Louis XIV's death the Regent Orléans attempted to make use of the nobles, it was found that they were quite incapable of carrying on any administrative functions. (The cleavage between classes was clearly illustrated by the departure from France of the nobles during the early years of the French Revolution.) Louis was moreover supported by the Church which desired the repression of Huguenotism, and by the Jesuits whose jealousy of the Jansenists became frequently apparent.

¹ Theologians who held the somewhat fatalistic doctrines of Jansen (1585–1638). They were vehemently supported by Pascal.

The new administrative system which Richelieu had to some extent founded was fully established and developed under Louis XIV. Over all the provinces were *Intendants*, whom Richelieu had first used, and who had been fiercely attacked by the Frondeurs, and with some reason: for the *Intendants* with their assistants (*sub-délégués*) exercised a complete supervision over the provinces. In establishing a strong, absolute, personal monarchy Louis was supported by the nation, which had realised during the Fronde the worthlessness and selfishness of the nobles. Royalty was popular in France, and the French people looked to their King to defend the frontiers, to check all internal anarchy and to inaugurate a successful foreign policy.

After the death of Mazarin Louis found ready to serve him soldiers like Turenne, diplomatists like Lionne, Servien and Gremonville, and an administrator in Colbert. To place France in the foremost place among the nations of Europe at the earliest possible moment was Louis' fixed determination.

He soon was able to put his ideas into force owing to the state of European politics between 1660 and 1678. In fact, till the Peace of Ryswick (1697) the policy of Charles II and James II of England, the weakness of Holland after the Treaty of Nimwegen (1678), the collapse of the Spanish monarchy, and the war between Austria and Turkey which, opening in serious fashion in 1683, only ended with the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699, enabled Louis XIV to carry out successfully an aggressive policy in Western Europe. Had he adopted the views of Leibnitz with regard to Egypt, and at the same time strongly supported Colbert's colonial and Indian schemes and resisted his own desire to extend the French frontier, the position of his country at the end of his reign would have been strong. As it was he anticipated the action of France in the Seven Years' War, devoted his chief efforts to strengthening the French position in Europe and adding to his possessions, only to find at the end of his reign that France had suffered enormously, that the greater portion of his conquests had to be restored, and that England had gained a foothold in Canada.

On the death of Mazarin in March 1661 the personal rule of Louis XIV began. The young King, like Napoleon, was practical, and like Napoleon he had a scorn for most ministers except as useful hacks, suppressed able men and encouraged obedient mediocrity. "I wish you could see the King," wrote Primi Visconti, "he has the air of a great dissembler and the eyes of a fox." France, it has been said, is the land of common

sense, and Louis XIV was the most French of Frenchmen. Under Louis the theory of absolute monarchy was shown in action, while under the later Stuarts it was never pressed to its logical conclusion.

The young King lost no time in asserting his authority. The fall of Fouquet and the appointment of Colbert in September 1661 clearly indicated that Louis intended to be his own First Minister. The struggle during the following month in London between the French and Spanish Ambassadors ended in the victory of the former.

The European situation was moreover calculated to facilitate Louis' determination to place France in the leading position in Europe. The League of the Rhine and a war between the Emperor Leopold I and the Turks in 1663 and 1664 in which the former was aided by French troops indicated clearly the weakness of Germany, in which such States as Brandenburg and Bavaria held semi-independent positions. As his reign proceeded it became evident that no serious opposition to Louis' schemes would proceed from England as long as it was ruled by Stuart kings. Nor was any danger to be anticipated from Spain.

In 1665 Portugal secured its independence: in the same year Philip IV of Spain died and was succeeded by Carlos II, whose weak health seemed to presage his early death, in which case it was almost certain that the partition of the Spanish dominions would at once take place, and Spain would suffer the fate destined for Poland in the following century. This fact explains the anxiety of Louis to be first in the field, and as soon as possible to make himself master of the Spanish Netherlands. Events seemed to aid him in the most unexpected way, for during the years 1665, 1666, and till July 1667, England and Holland were engaged in a fierce struggle, while the Emperor was occupied with troubles in Hungary which Louis had stirred up.

Taking advantage of the European situation, Louis, basing his action on a civil custom which prevailed in Brabant, claimed Flanders in the name of his wife Maria Theresa, whom as Infanta of Spain he had married in 1660. Her claims on the Netherlands had on her marriage been renounced, but Louis as early as 1662 had endeavoured though in vain to obtain the revocation of that renunciation, and to secure possession of Luxemburg, Hainault, Cambrai and Franche-Comté. In 1667 his army had been thoroughly reorganised by Le Tellier; Flanders was conquered by Turenne in the months of May,

June, July and August 1667 in what was called the *Jus Devolutionis* War, and in February 1668 Condé occupied Franche-Comté.

These successes had however alarmed Europe. England and Holland composed their differences by the Treaty of Breda in July 1667, and on January 23, 1668 the famous Triple Alliance between England, Holland and Sweden to check the French designs was formed. Four days however before this Treaty was signed Louis had made a secret Treaty of Partition of the Spanish Empire with the Emperor Leopold. Louis was now faced with a possible war against a powerful coalition, but taking the advice of Lionne and Colbert he agreed to enter into negotiations, the result being the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in May, in accordance with which Louis withdrew from Lorraine but kept possession of twelve strong fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, which was now at his mercy. During the next four years he devoted his efforts to securing the isolation of Holland. Not only did he hope to ruin her politically and economically, but he wished in accordance with his treaty with the Emperor to annex the Spanish Netherlands. In his preparations he received valuable help financially from Colbert, and diplomatically from Le Tellier, who also strengthened the army.

In 1670 his work of breaking up the Triple Alliance and forming a powerful combination against Holland definitely began. Not only was a defensive alliance with Bavaria concluded in February, and the Elector's support secured in the event of the partition of the Spanish Empire, but in June the infamous secret Treaty of Dover was made between Louis and the English King Charles II, who undertook not only to assist Louis in his schemes against the Spanish monarchy but also to aid in the coming Dutch war. In the following year treaties were signed with various North German princes, and in 1672 Sweden agreed to join the League against Holland. War was declared by France upon the Dutch Republic in April 1672, and Holland was invaded.

By opening the sluices the Dutch, who had already been promised assistance by the Great Elector, saved Amsterdam from capture, and the French retired, only to enter upon a war of five years with the Emperor, Spain, Holland, Brandenburg and the Prince of Lorraine. Successful till 1675, when Turenne died, the war continued till August 1678, when it was closed by the Peace of Nimwegen¹ (Nijmegen). By this treaty Louis gained Franche-Comté, various towns stretching from

¹ Called Nimeguen by the French.

Dunkirk to the Meuse, and practically half of Flanders, Spain thus being the chief sufferer. But during the war Louis had been compelled to realise that his hopes of effecting a Roman Catholic restoration in England were doomed to failure. He was however now in a position admirably adapted for fresh aggressions.

During the ensuing ten years Louis acted as though he were not only supreme in Europe but as though it were impossible for any power or powers to check him. Such was his fame that the King of Siam allowed the establishment of a French factory in 1680 and sent embassies to France in 1681 and 1686. The creation of Versailles, which became the official seat of the monarchy, the *Chambres de Réunion* by means of which Strassburg, Casale and other less important places were occupied by French troops, the Truce of Ratisbon in 1684 with Spain which gave Louis for twenty years possession of all the towns assigned to him by the *Chambres de Réunion*, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685—all mark the period when the *Roi Soleil* had reached the meridian of his splendour. From that date the opposition to Louis becomes steadily stronger, and the year 1685 may be compared to the year 1807, when Napoleon signed the Treaty of Tilsit, thinking that he was supreme in Europe and that his position was impregnable.

In 1683 the death of Colbert took place, and had Louis not devoted himself to furthering the aggrandisement of France in Europe he might have adopted the scheme presented to him by Leibnitz in 1672 for the conquest of Egypt and the command of the Mediterranean trade, thus anticipating the policy of Napoleon. As it was, in spite of Louis' wars in Europe, Colbert had at the time of his death succeeded to some extent in his colonial and trading policy. The colonial policy of Colbert followed closely on that of Henri IV and Richelieu, who imitated the policy of England and Holland and organised companies to counteract the vast accumulation of transmarine possessions by Spain. The special motive however underlying the colonial policy of Richelieu and indeed of Mazarin was the propagation of Christianity. "In 1629," we read, Richelieu promulgated an ordinance imposing "religious missions upon the Companies, and Catholicism upon the Catholics, making Christianity almost as important as commerce in the colonial question." As a result, the Jesuits soon acquired great power among the colonies in North America. Unfortunately the Government also insisted on directing and superintending all colonial projects, and thus from the first officialism and ecclesi-

asticism—represented by priests, nobles and officials—hampered the natural development of overseas enterprises. This system was entirely unlike that of England and Holland, both of which countries formed chartered associations for trade purposes, the English practice being to leave the merchant adventurers to plant factories and settlements on their own responsibility and with their own resources.

Under Colbert however France had entered upon a period of great colonial expansion, marked in 1664 by the formation of the two Companies of the East and West Indies. The East India Company was not to busy itself with conquering and converting the heathen but was to secure for France a considerable share of the commerce in Asiatic goods. Extension of trade, not the conversion of the heathen, was the chief object of Colbert's policy. Nevertheless it was stated that if the heathen agreed to accept Christianity they would become naturalised French subjects. Having little faith in the consistency of a Government as despotic as was that of Louis XIV, French traders gave the Companies a very qualified support, and about 1674 the West India Company broke down. Nevertheless the East India Company, in spite of its early failure to colonise Madagascar or to gain a foothold in India, might have been successful had not Louis plunged France into a series of continental wars, in which plans of campaign were substituted for colonial and commercial projects.

Though in some respects the colonial prospects of France were by no means unpromising at the time of Colbert's death, Louis had during the ten years following the Peace of Nimwegen in 1678 made a series of blunders which not only tended to weaken France but also to rouse the hitherto latent opposition to him in the greater part of Europe. In July 1686 the League of Augsburg was formed—a League which included the Emperor, the Kings of Spain and Sweden, the Dutch Republic, the Elector of Saxony, the Elector Palatine, and the circles of Bavaria, Franconia and the Upper Rhine. It was joined in the following year by the Dukes of Bavaria and Savoy. By 1689 the League had become the Grand Alliance, and was headed by William of Orange, who had become King of England at the beginning of the year. In July Louis declared war against England, and thus opened the Second Hundred Years' War, which continued, with intervals of peace, till 1815.

Writing of the European situation in 1683 Leopold von Ranke points out that "the most prominent question of the

day and that of the highest importance for the further development of mankind in Europe was the rise of the French monarchy to an universal preponderance which threatened the independence of every country and every race.”¹

Owing to James II's somewhat independent attitude towards Louis, and the belief held in some quarters that the arrival in England of William of Orange would be followed by a civil war which would distract the attention of the English people from continental affairs, no attempt was made to hinder William's landing at Torbay. After war with England had broken out in May 1689 Louis attempted to rectify his serious blunder by sending over to Ireland early in 1690 a corps (of 7,300 men) under Lauzun. Though the French fleet won the battle of Beachy Head on June 30, the cause of James was lost the following day in the battle of the Boyne.

Undeterred by James' defeat Louis, whose troops were winning victories in Italy, Belgium and Germany, projected a French invasion of England, but his fleet was on May 19, 1692 defeated in the battle of La Hogue by an Anglo-Dutch fleet. The capture of Namur, the victories of Steenkerke, Neerwinden, Landen and Marsaglia in the years 1692 and 1693 merely helped to exhaust the resources of France. In 1695 the French lost Casale, but in the following year Louis detached Victor Amadeus of Savoy from the League and was thus enabled to transfer troops to Flanders. It was however now becoming evident that the question of the Spanish Succession, in the expected event of the death of Carlos II, might at any moment be before Europe, and in consequence Louis showed himself favourable to a cessation of hostilities. In 1697 the Peace of Ryswick (Rijswijk) closed the war, Louis recognising William III as King of England, allowing the chief strongholds on the frontier of the Spanish Netherlands to be garrisoned by Dutch troops, and ceding to the Emperor all towns taken since the Treaty of Nimwegen except Landau and Strassburg. He promised also to restore to England all the lands conquered in Hudson's Bay and Newfoundland.

Thus the Peace of Ryswick marked the first occasion on which Louis made overtures for peace, while its terms constituted an open condemnation of the policy pursued since the Treaty of Nimwegen. The effect too of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was now apparent. Huguenot industries had been driven from the country, new manufactures could not

¹ L. von Ranke, *History of England principally in the Seventeenth Century*, book xxi, chap. x, p. 298. Oxford: The University Press, 1875,

now be created, the country was impoverished, all necessities were at a high price, the late war had exhausted the finances. In this deplorable state of things it is said that "every man was either soldier, beggar or smuggler." Nevertheless it must be remembered on behalf of Louis that the Grand Alliance was now broken up and that France "with her recuperative powers and her well-organised government remained," in spite of her apparent set-back at Ryswick, "the strongest and most united power in Europe."¹ Louis' attention was now however fixed not on the internal condition of France but on the question of the Spanish Succession, and in October 1698 the First Partition Treaty and in March 1700 the Second Partition Treaty—both of them made with William III—were drawn up.

The news of the Partition Treaties roused the greatest indignation in Spain, and on October 3, 1700 Carlos made a will leaving the Crown of Spain to the Duke of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV. On November 1 Carlos died and Louis, throwing the Treaties overboard, accepted the will. "*Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées*," exclaimed the Spanish Ambassador in Paris; but, what was more important, Louis in December reserved the right of Philip of Anjou, the new King (Philip V) of Spain, to the crown of France. In England the Parliament in February 1701 accepted the situation, but the Spanish Succession War was rendered inevitable by Louis' actions during the year. His troops occupied in February the fortresses forming the Dutch Barrier in the Netherlands, and a feeling hostile to France began to show itself during the summer in England.

On September 7 the Grand Alliance was again formed by William, the Emperor and Holland, but Louis made war inevitable when on the death of James II in September he recognised his son as James III of England. The English Parliament, furious at this act on the part of Louis, decided on war: and this was declared in London, Vienna and at The Hague on May 4, 1702. Meanwhile William III had died in March and been succeeded by Queen Anne, who formed a ministry of Tories.

In the ensuing war colonial questions came much to the fore.

Since the year 1683 the French colonists in Canada "in whose traditions lived the memories of Cartier and Champlain" had been full of energy. La Salle had advanced south from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi and had reached the sea,

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. v, p. 63.

giving the country through which he passed the name of Louisiana after Louis XIV. The English colonists, who far outnumbered the French colonists—the latter amounting only to about 11,000—were thus encircled, and their advance westwards checked. From that time the antagonism between the two races increased and frequently showed itself in massacres and petty wars. From one point of view the Spanish Succession War was a colonial war, for in Queen Anne's declaration of war against France on May 4, 1702 it was stated that the union of France and Spain must be resisted, otherwise "the free intercourse of navigation and commerce in the Mediterranean, India and other places will be utterly destroyed."

In 1699 Vauban, in his *Mémoire sur les Colonies*, saw clearly the necessity of abolishing the religious orders in North America where, he says, "the monks are incomparably more successful in enriching themselves than in converting the heathen." A few years later the French colonies were reduced by the terms of the Peace of Utrecht (1713), which, wrote Alberoni, "has left the seeds of endless war," but it was not till 1763 that the results of the Seven Years' War completely fulfilled Vauban's forebodings, though during the years from 1713 to 1758 it seemed not unlikely that France would hold her own in North America and in India.

Already during 1701 war had broken out in Italy between the French and the Austrians under Prince Eugène, who had successfully withstood the French advance. On the outbreak of the general European war in 1702 Louis was supported by the Elector of Bavaria and his brother Joseph Clement of Cologne, and at first he could rely upon Victor Amadeus of Savoy, and on Portugal. But in May 1703 Portugal joined the Grand Alliance, and thus the operations of the English and Dutch troops in Spain were facilitated; while on August 4, 1704 Gibraltar was captured by Rooke, who subsequently inflicted a severe defeat upon the French fleet under the Count of Toulouse—with the result that during the remainder of the war the Allies were supreme in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile in August 1704 Marlborough had won the battle of Blenheim, and Vienna was saved from a French attack. Before the year closed however Villars had removed one source of weakness to the French cause by suppressing the rebellion of the Camisards¹ in the Cévennes, which had broken out in the previous year. The following year was marked by

¹ An armed body of Protestants who revolted after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

the death of the Emperor Leopold, his son Joseph, who reigned till 1711, succeeding him. No military event of great importance however took place till May 1706, when the French sustained a decisive defeat at the battle of Ramillies, the result being the loss of the Netherlands. Other important events marked the year. The Archduke Charles of Austria was proclaimed King of Spain in June, while after the battle of Turin in September all French troops evacuated Piedmont. Louis in the previous month had made his first overtures for peace. He was willing to consent to the cession of Spain to the Archduke Charles if Philip were given Milan, Naples and Sicily. These proposals the Allies refused to accept, and military operations continued. The year 1707 was an anxious one for the Allies. Marlborough's operations were seriously hampered by the fear that Charles XII, the King of Sweden, who in April was in Saxony, would attack Vienna, as Louis XIV hoped. Fortunately for the Allies he turned to the Ukraine and was defeated at Pultava in 1709 by Peter the Great. Nevertheless the presence of Charles in Germany had hindered the arrival of German contingents in Western Europe. During the year Louis had evacuated Italy and transferred his troops to Spain, Flanders and the Rhine. In April the defeat of the Allies by the Spaniards in the battle of Almanza assured the throne of Spain to the House of Bourbon, and in August Eugène and Victor Amadeus invaded Provence, but failed to take Poulon. Meanwhile Vauban remained on the defensive on the borders of the Netherlands, while Villars invaded Germany. The loss of Italy to the Spanish monarchy constituted the only reverse which the French sustained during 1707, though the Whigs in England had passed a resolution in October that no Bourbon was to rule in Spain. The year 1708 saw the defeat of the French in the battle of Oudenarde and the loss of the citadel of Lille after a brilliant defence by Boufflers. Louis was now ready to make peace, and negotiations were opened in February 1709 at The Hague. But Louis found it impossible to accept the proposed terms, the negotiations broke down, and he made a direct appeal to the French nation which roused the greatest enthusiasm. In September Villars was defeated in the battle of Malplaquet; but while the French had about 12,000 casualties, those of the Allies reached 20,000. In 1710 peace conferences took place at Gertruydenberg, but as Louis refused to take up arms against Philip no result followed, while before the end of the year the defeat of the Allies in Spain at Brihuega (December 8) and at Villa Viciosa (December 10) practically

ruined the Habsburg cause in the Peninsula and left Philip assured of his throne.

Several events now took place favourable to France and the cause of peace. In the summer of 1710 the warlike Whig Ministry fell and was succeeded by a Tory Government, of which the chief members were Harley and St. John. In April 1711 the death of the Dauphin, son of Louis XIV, took place, and in the same month the Emperor Joseph died and was succeeded by the Archduke Charles, henceforward known as Charles VI. It was obviously impossible to continue the war in order to place the crown of Spain on the head of the new Emperor, and accordingly in October the English ministers announced that they were about to treat for peace. Warlike operations however had continued, and in September Marlborough had taken Bouchain and was ready to make an advance into France. However on December 31 the Tory Government dismissed him from all his offices. In January 1712 negotiations between the Allies and France were opened at Utrecht. Owing to the deaths of the Duke¹ and Duchess of Burgundy and of their son the Duke of Brittany in February and March, their youngest son became Dauphin and later Louis XV.

On April 11, 1713 the Peace of Utrecht was signed. While the Spanish now became the Austrian Netherlands, the United Provinces were given a strong barrier to defend them against French aggression. France yielded Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia) and Hudson's Bay to England, though she reserved Cape Breton and fishing rights. She recognised the Protestant succession in England and engaged to dismantle Dunkirk. Philip V renounced for himself and his heirs his claim to the French crown, and ceded to England Gibraltar and Minorca; at the same time he granted to the South Sea Company the *Asiento*, which allowed the right of importing a certain number of slaves each year into Spanish America.

As the Emperor and Empire had not joined in the Peace of Utrecht war continued between him and France in 1713 and till March 1714, when the Treaties of Rastatt and Baden were signed.

During the course of the war Clement XI had in 1705 issued a Bull denouncing the Jansenists, and in 1710 Louis, influenced by the Jesuits, ordered the destruction of their monastery Port Royal. In 1713 Clement issued the Bull *Unigenitus* condemning a Jansenist book written by Father Quesnel and

¹ Son of the late Dauphin and grandson of Louis XIV.

published in 1695, on the ground that it contained more than one hundred errors. Several French bishops refused to accept the Bull, as did the *Parlement* of Paris and many Frenchmen. Louis at once persecuted all who opposed the Bull and, at his death, France was on this subject divided into two bitterly hostile camps. On September 1, 1715 Louis died, and a famous era in French history was closed. He left France face to face with Great Britain, her rival in Canada, India and on the sea.

THE REVOLUTION AND ITS CAUSES

VIII

LOUIS XV

(1715-1774)

THE Peace of Utrecht closed the second act in the Second Hundred Years' War between France and England. France had undoubtedly been the aggressor in 1688 and again in 1701; one result of the war had been to set up the Austrian instead of the Spanish rule in Flanders, whilst another gave England Gibraltar and a valuable portion of Canada—Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Hudson's Bay. Both countries needed rest after this long period of war, and till 1744 war between them did not formally break out, though the battle of Dettingen in the previous year marked in reality the beginning of the third phase in the Second Hundred Years' War.

In 1717 the famous Triple Alliance, through the efforts of Dubois, was formed between France, England and Holland; it was joined shortly afterwards by the Emperor Charles VI, the hostile attitude of Spain to France and Austria being evidenced by a plot formed by Cellamare, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, and by the Spanish seizure of Sicily. In fact it was not till after the marriage of Louis XV and the birth of the Dauphin in 1729 that the King and Queen of Spain accepted the fact that the throne of France was closed to them.

Meanwhile Orléans, who was appointed Regent in 1715—Louis XV being but five years old—attempted to rule the country by means of Councils of nobles, and generally by reversing the strictly autocratic rule of Louis XIV. The

Parlement of Paris was restored to its former functions, but it proved refractory, and in 1720 it was exiled to Pontoise. The attempt too to govern France by means of Councils proved a failure, and before his death in December 1723 Orléans had to a great extent returned to the autocratic system of Louis XIV. Dubois had died in the previous August and the Duke of Bourbon became First Minister. In 1725 Bourbon arranged the marriage of Louis to Marie Leszczynska of Poland, and the same year saw Europe threatened by a war, both the Emperor Charles VI and Elizabeth Farnese, Queen of Spain, being for different reasons antagonistic to France and England.

The alliance of Austria and Spain by the Treaty of Vienna in April 1725 was answered by the Treaty of Hanover between France, England and Prussia in September, and for a short time the outbreak of hostilities seemed imminent. But various events saved Europe from a general war. Catherine I succeeded Peter the Great in February 1725, and she was strongly in favour of a French Alliance, while Ripperdá, the warlike Spanish minister, fell from power in May 1726, and his successor Patiño—the Colbert of Spain—was, like the British minister Walpole as well as Fleury, who succeeded Bourbon the same year, a strong advocate of peace. War did indeed break out in 1727, but only between England and Spain, the government of which latter country wished to secure Gibraltar. Two years later, the birth of the Dauphin having taken place in September 1729, Spain joined France and England in the Treaty of Seville (October), by which the succession of Don Carlos, brother to King Philip, to the Italian Duchies was guaranteed, and in 1731 was carried out, the Maritime Powers securing the assent of the Emperor by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction. The peace of Europe being apparently assured the *Parlement* of Paris entered upon a struggle with the Government which led to the exile of many of the magistrates. Owing however to the imminence of the Polish Succession War the Court for the moment yielded to the demands of the *Parlement*, which continued to discuss ecclesiastical matters.

In 1733 the war of the Polish Succession broke out, nominally on account of the question of the Polish Succession. Stanislaus Leszczynski, the father of the French Queen, had in September been elected King of Poland, while in October Augustus II, the Russian and Austrian candidate, was elected; France declared war in the same month upon Austria. France had already in September made the Treaty of Turin with Sardinia, and in November she arranged a family compact with Spain

known as the Treaty of the Escorial. The importance of this treaty lies in the fact of the reunion of the two Bourbon Powers against England, though that fact was to some extent kept secret. They affirmed the eternal alliance of France and Spain, and France undertook to aid in the recovery of Gibraltar, while the fleets and armies of both countries were to act in concert.

Till 1737 however both Powers were fully occupied in the war against Austria, at the close of which France gained the reversion, on the death of Stanislaus, of Lorraine, the Duke of which province was to receive Tuscany; whilst Don Carlos, instead of Parma and Piacenza, was to receive the kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Tuscan Presidencies. The Bourbon Powers had thus won a conspicuous triumph, and French diplomacy was evident in all parts of Europe. Unfortunately the French navy was in weak condition, and that fact probably decided Fleury not to join Spain in her war with England—which broke out in 1739.

On the outbreak of the war of the Austrian Succession France was in a strong position. There had been a revival of the commercial prosperity of France during the thirty years of peace with England, and under the pacific ministry of Fleury trade had vastly increased. The French East India Company had, since the time of Law's Land Bank speculations,¹ taken a fresh lease of life, and Pondicherry was flourishing. But already the rivalry of France and England was manifest both in India and in America, and in 1740 Labourdonnais was advocating to the French Government the destruction of all English trading factories in the East Indies. The design too of pushing down the valley of the Ohio in order to prevent the expansion of the English Colonies westwards was being seriously considered. "The greatest danger to England lay in the power of France, and that power for several generations had been rapidly increasing."² The Austrian Succession War illustrated the power of France (though its support of Charles Edward, the Young Pretender, proved unavailing), and justified the opinion of several observers that the affairs of France had been so completely re-established that "the French King is the master and arbiter of Europe." The war closed with the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (October 1748), which was obviously only a truce in the inevitable struggle between France and England on the sea, in India and in Canada. We will deal with India first.

¹ John Law, a Scotsman, had been made director of a new (French) Royal Bank in 1718 (*v. p.* 283).

² Lecky, *History of England*, vol. i, p. 356.

In accordance with the Treaty Dupleix restored Madras to the English, but he continued to prosecute his ambitious enterprises among the natives, and to enter upon his great design—the subjection of the Powers in India to French ascendancy. As a matter of fact hostilities never ceased between the French and English East India Companies, the latter being represented by General Stringer Lawrence, who commanded the troops in Madras, and by Robert Clive. The years 1752–54 were the most eventful period in Indian history. In August 1752 Lawrence relieved Trichinopoly, but in 1753 Clive was invalided to England, returning to Bombay two years later. Clive's absence encouraged Dupleix to hope that he would be able to form a great confederation which would lead to the capture of Trichinopoly, to the overthrow of the English and the restoration of his own ascendancy in the Carnatic. But already powerful influences in Paris were opposing him on the ground of his failure to reduce Trichinopoly, and the Company resented the suspension of their trade and the vast expense involved in the continuance of hostilities. The French Government too was anxious to conciliate England, and feared that the struggle in the Carnatic might lead to a European war. Consequently in 1754 Dupleix was recalled, being succeeded by Godeheu, who in December made a treaty with the English, sacrificing all his predecessor's conquests. At the same time the Governor of Madras informed the English Government that “the French influence with the country Powers far exceeded ours.” After the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756, and after the Black Hole massacre, Clive recovered Calcutta, and won the battle of Plassey in June 1757. Subsequent to Lally's failure to take Madras in 1759 the French were totally defeated at Wandewash by Sir Eyre Coote. At the close of 1760 all hope of establishing a strong French colony in India had vanished, though French settlements were by the Peace of Paris (1763) allowed; no fortifications however were permitted.

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had come fortunately for England, as she was unable to check the victorious career of Saxe in the Netherlands, while in India Dumas, the Governor-General of the French East India Company, was showing great administrative ability, and a little later the efforts of Dupleix, as we have seen, gave France the ascendancy over England. During the Austrian Succession War the English had captured Louisbourg in Cape Breton Island (Nova Scotia)—a splendid fortress the possession of which made its owner “master of the entrance to the river which leads to New France.” At the

Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle the French recovered Cape Breton and Louisbourg, and in 1749 claimed the Ohio Valley. From that time till the opening of the Seven Years' War a state of warfare existed between the French and English East India Companies in India, and between the French and English colonists in America, where the important point in dispute related to the French attempt to secure the territory west of the Alleghanies, the possession of which would confine the English colonists to the coast settlements and would prevent any expansion westwards. On the building by the French of Fort Duquesne on the disputed territory an English force was, without declaration of war, sent out under Braddock: upon which the French despatched 3,000 soldiers. Though two French ships, the *Alcide* and *Lys*, were captured by an English Admiral, Braddock suffered a severe defeat near Fort Duquesne in July 1755.

At the close of 1755 war between England and France was inevitable. In May 1756 France and Austria made the Treaty of Versailles in reply to the Second Treaty of Westminster between England and Prussia in the previous January. "Nothing," it has been said, "could be more deplorable than the condition of England, and the years 1756 and 1757 were among the most humiliating in her history."¹ England had declared war on France on May 15, 1756, but for war she was apparently totally unprepared. In June the French took Minorca, while on the American Continent Montcalm captured Oswego in August. The Second Treaty of Versailles in May 1757 united still more closely France and Austria—thus effecting an unexpected revolution in European politics—and in July D'Estrées defeated the Duke of Cumberland at Hastenbeck. But with the total defeat of the French by Frederick the Great at Rossbach in November a complete change for the worse took place for France, for defeat followed defeat in Europe, in Canada, in India and on the sea. Wolfe took Quebec on September 18, 1759, and by the close of 1760 all Canada was in English hands. In the same year the French fleets had suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of Boscawen and Hawke. Though Spain joined France in the famous Third Family Compact² in August 1761, all Choiseul's hopes of a change in the war operations favourable to France were doomed to disappointment, and in February 1763 the Peace of Paris was signed.

"It is almost certain," writes Mr. Egerton, "that but for the new spirit which entered upon the scene with Pitt, France

¹ Lecky, *History of England*, vol. ii, p. 452.

² I.e. Louis XV and Carlos III of Spain—both Bourbons.

would have, at least for the time, been successful in the struggle with England for the dominion of America.”¹ Had Pitt not fallen from power in October 1761, France would have been forced to accept less acceptable terms than those offered her in 1763. As it was, she lost Minorca, the greater part of her Indian possessions, her Empire in America, and Senegal. She received however the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, with the right of fishing on the Newfoundland Banks. Florida was ceded to England by Spain but Havana was restored to her, and France gave England Louisiana. In the following month Austria and Prussia made peace, Prussia retaining Silesia. Though at one time it had seemed as though Prussia must succumb owing to the alliance between Russia and Austria, the accession of Peter III to the Russian throne in January 1762 closed the period of Russian hostility to Frederick, and on May 5 peace was made between the two monarchs.

No sooner was the Seven Years' War ended than Choiseul at once began preparations for a war of revenge upon England. From the close of the Seven Years' War to his fall in 1770 Choiseul was bent on avenging France for her losses in the above war. He had supported the suppression of the Jesuit Order in 1762 by the *Parlement de Paris*, whose ascendancy continued throughout his ministry, and whose opposition to financial reforms justified its suppression in 1771. But though his sympathy with the *Parlement* deserves hostile criticism, his energy deserves commendation. He carried out valuable military and naval reforms, he specially improved the artillery, he built new ships—all with the object of renewing the struggle with England on the first favourable opportunity. His foreign policy had the same object. Thus, he maintained the alliance with Austria and further strengthened it by arranging in 1770 for the marriage of Marie Antoinette to Louis the Dauphin, afterwards Louis XVI. During his ministry France acquired Lorraine (in 1766) on the death of Stanislaus, and in 1768, a year before Napoleon was born, he arranged for the purchase of Corsica.

In 1770 Choiseul had fully intended to join with Spain, which power had seized the Falkland Islands, in a war with England, but Louis was opposed to the idea of war, and on December 24 he was dismissed from office. A few years later however the help given by France to the Americans in their War of Independence and the position to which England was reduced at the close of that war seemed an ample compensation

¹ H. E. Egerton, *Short History of British Colonial Policy*, p. 165.

for the loss of Canada in the Seven Years' War. The conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles in September 1763 marked the triumph of the policy of Vergennes and indeed of Choiseul.

From 1771, when the *Parlements* were overthrown in consequence of their violent behaviour, the Government was in the hands of the Triumvirate—Maupeou, Terray and D'Aiguillon—who set up the *Parlement Maupeou*. The last years of Louis XV's reign saw the First Partition of Poland carried out, a revolution in Sweden—the success of which was partly due to the efforts of Choiseul and Vergennes—and the triumph of Gustavus III. On May 10, 1774 Louis XV died.

IX

LOUIS XVI AND THE REVOLUTION

(1774–1799)

THE transition from the feudal to the modern State was only effected in France by means of the Revolution of 1789. Within three years a new Constitution was drawn up, the whole of the ancient organisation of Society being destroyed. The policy of centralisation under Louis XIV had indeed been carried too far, and Richelieu while suppressing the nobles as a political power had allowed them to retain their privileges, such as immunity from taxation, the right to the *gabelle* or salt-tax, and the right to the *corvée* or forced-labour rents. These with sundry other privileges brought about a cleavage between the privileged and non-privileged classes. Owing to the rigid barriers between classes in France there was no real unity in the nation, while the Government remained highly centralised.

The Church too had become a feudal and privileged institution, with a censorship over the press. There was also a separation of interest between the higher and the lower clergy which manifested itself during the Revolution. The higher clergy were strongly opposed to independent thought, and their opposition was manifest during the reign of Louis XV. The death of Louis XIV had brought with it a sense of emancipation which showed itself in the outbreak of an intellectual revolt which preceded the later political revolt. That intellectual revolt was marked by the rise of a spirit of criticism

and inquiry which owed much to the influence of England, and was first seen in the treatment of abstract questions by Montesquieu, Diderot and the Encyclopædists. To the philosophers, who were the enemies of supernaturalism, the Church was especially odious. It suppressed the Encyclopædia, it burnt "Emile," it brought about the execution of Calas and La Barre, it opposed toleration, and persecuted Protestants and Free-thinkers alike. Voltaire's "*écrasez l'infâme*" represented the opinion of most educated Frenchmen.

The intellectual revolt however soon extended to political questions, and here the influence of Voltaire, the Physiocrats and Rousseau was clearly manifest. The doctrines of the *Social Contract*¹ aroused the deepest enthusiasm, as offering not only an explanation of the origin of society but as being an indictment of the French Government and a demand for a better treatment of the whole body of citizens.

While the writings of Rousseau and others were sapping the absolute monarchy in France, the financial chaos into which the Government was steadily falling justifies the dictum that "the penny makes the Revolution." The accession of Louis XVI found France labouring under a deficit, and Turgot and Necker made strenuous attempts to place the country in a sound financial condition. Turgot's programme was an extensive one, but like the Emperor Joseph II he attempted to do too much in a short time. His proposed reforms raised many vested interests against him; he quarrelled with the *Parlement* of Paris which Louis had re-established, and he was opposed by Marie Antoinette. Necker's administration was for a time successful, but the entry of France into the American War increased her financial liabilities, though some little time after Necker's fall in 1781 Calonne by means of excessive borrowings gave France the appearance of being financially in a sound position. But with the failure of his credit, the death early in 1787 of Vergennes, whose brilliant foreign policy had placed France in a leading position in Europe, the formation of the Triple Alliance of 1788 (England, Prussia and Holland), and the administration of Loménie de Brienne, it was evident that France had rapidly declined politically and financially since the close of the War of American Independence, and was faced with bankruptcy.

According to the French Constitution the legislative power resided in the Sovereign, and a representative assembly "was simply a council to give advice which might or might not be

¹ By J. J. Rousseau, 1762.

accepted." No such representative Assembly had met since 1614, and, owing to the centralised system under which France was governed, there were practically few who had any adequate experience of public affairs. Under the second administration of Necker the States-General met on May 5, 1789. The formation of the Three Orders (Nobility, Clergy and Third Estate) into a National Assembly, the failure of the King to act firmly, and the fall of the Bastille, testified to the early success of the States-General, the meeting of which marked the transition from the feudal to the modern State and implied a revolution which within three years destroyed the whole of the ancient organisation of French Society.

All authority had now passed to the Third Estate, the supremacy of Paris in the Revolution being also established. The summer and autumn witnessed the progress of the revolutionary sentiment, the attempt of the Assembly to draw up a Constitution and the transference of the King and Court from Versailles to Paris. Though admiring the American Revolution France was in no way affected by the American Constitution, which did not come into operation till March 1789. So France lost the benefit of the American experience.

By the end of the year 1789 France found herself in a very different position from that in which she was when the year opened. Feudal privileges had been abolished, the King was only allowed a suspensive veto, a single representative Assembly had been decided upon, and in spite of Mirabeau's efforts a sharp distinction had been created between the executive and legislature. Church property had been appropriated for State uses—and this was all the more necessary as taxes had ceased to be paid and the Government was without funds. In July 1790 the subjection of the clergy to the State was secured by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, whose allegiance to the Pope was consequently invalidated. Instead of possessing an independent Church the French had now established a body of elected officials who received their salaries from the State. Consequently a serious schism arose in the Church which continued till the rise of Napoleon.

In their attitude towards the Church the Constituent Assembly had entirely ignored the principle of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity," and especially Article 10 of their own Declaration of Rights, which stated that "no one may be interfered with on account of his opinions, even on the subject of religion." The Constituent Assembly also, by confiscating without indemnity all Church property, had violated Article 17 of the

Declaration of Rights, which stated that even if anyone, owing to public necessity, is deprived of his property, fair compensation shall be paid. Moreover the Constituent Assembly ignored Article 6 of the Declaration of Rights by retaining a property qualification for voters. Thus the leaders of the Revolution and the Constituent Assembly failed to carry out the principles which they had so loudly proclaimed in 1789, being at that time entranced by Rousseau's assertion that all members of the community have equal rights, as society and government originated in a social contract.

In 1790 the affair of Nootka Sound¹ had led the Government of Spain to hope for the aid of France in a war with England. But owing to Mirabeau's efforts the danger was averted in October. In 1791 the death of Mirabeau and the King's fruitless flight to Varennes still further weakened the monarchy, and all hopes of a peaceful future for France during which the country might settle down were destroyed by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on September 30, and by the meeting of the Legislative Assembly, composed, in accordance with a most absurd resolution, of men who had not been members of the Constituent Assembly.

The new Assembly met at a critical moment in the history of Europe. The Emigrés on the border of France were attempting to raise an army, and as the attitude of the Emperor Leopold and, after his death on March 1, 1792, that of his successor Francis II was considered unsatisfactory, war was declared against Austria on April 20, and against Prussia on July 24. Till the beginning of September it seemed not unlikely that the Allies would invade France. Great excitement consequently prevailed in France; the extreme party raised an insurrection, and on August 10 deposed Louis XVI and carried out the notorious September massacres. On September 20 the French National troops won over the Prussians the so-called battle of Valmy, which proved to be one of the decisive battles in the history of Europe. The whole character of the war changed. From being an old-fashioned war against Austria, it now became practically a war against all established governments. In October the French armies reached the Rhine, the provinces on the west of that river welcoming the invaders, while on November 6 Dumouriez won the battle of Jemmapes, occupied Belgium, declared the Schelde open and threatened Holland. It only required the Decrees of November 19 and December 15,

¹ A dispute between England and Spain over contested territory in Vancouver Island. Spain eventually gave way.

calling on all nations to rise, and the execution of Louis XVI on January 21, 1793, to unite all Europe against France, which declared war on England and Holland on February 1 and on Spain in March.

Robespierre and the Jacobins, who had not approved of the declaration of war against Austria in 1792, now favoured the outbreak of a general European war, overthrew the Girondists at the end of May and, amid the "Reign of Terror," established the Government of the Committee of Public Safety. By 1794 general success attended the French arms. The victory at Fleurus in June 1794 established the French in Belgium; Spain was invaded, the King of Sardinia was defeated, and in December Holland was conquered. During these years the attention of Prussia, and to some extent of Austria, had been diverted to Poland, partitions of which took place in September 1793 and January 1795, while in France the feeling that, her safety from invasion being secured, the government of the Committee of Public Safety and the Reign of Terror were no longer necessary had led to the overthrow and death on the scaffold of Robespierre (July 27, 1794).

In 1795 the Treaties of Basle were made with Prussia, Holland, Sweden, Spain and certain German States, France remaining at war with England, Austria and Sardinia, while in France the Directory was established in power and governed France with the aid of two elected Councils till 1799. Between those years hostilities continued without cessation by sea and land. In spite of the defeat of the French navy by our own on June 1, 1794, the Directory in 1796, anticipating some of the later designs of Napoleon, made elaborate preparations for sending troops to India to aid Tippoo Sahib, and for the invasion of Ireland with a large force and of England with a smaller. All these plans ended in failure, a force of 1,500 men who landed in Pembrokeshire in February 1797 having to surrender to Lord Cawdor.

The Italian expedition under the young General Napoleon Bonaparte (born 1769) was, on the other hand, entirely successful. Aided by the withdrawal of the English fleet from the Mediterranean in November 1796 (Spain having declared war upon England in October), Bonaparte conquered all North Italy and forced the Austrians to sign the Preliminaries of Leoben (Styria) on April 18, 1797. Negotiations continued during the summer and early autumn, the Habsburgs hoping "that the internal difficulties in France would clog her diplomacy."

There was some ground for the Austrian expectation of a rising in France against the Directory, for during the early months of the year the Clichian or Constitutional party, which desired a constitutional monarchy, had strengthened itself in the Assembly, and struggles took place between the Constitutionalists and Revolutionists. In the early autumn Barras, the leading revolutionist, appealed to Bonaparte, who sent Augereau and 2,000 men to Paris, by whose aid the revolution of 18 Fructidor, which resulted in the crushing of the Council of Ancients and of the "Five Hundred" by the Directory, was carried out. The first result of this revolution was the conclusion on October 17 of the Peace of Campo Formio between Austria and France, the latter gaining Belgium and the Ionian Islands.

After the Peace of Campo Formio was signed in 1797, the terms of which clearly indicated Napoleon's interest in the East, Britain remained the only opponent of France; and her navy, her colonies, her position in India and her wealth made her indeed a formidable opponent of the French Republic. Moreover she was as ever a refuge for the French royalists and for all the enemies of the Directory. Consequently an attack upon England was projected, and Napoleon was appointed to the command. That the danger of invasion was realised in England is shown by the organisation in Kent and other countries of local forces under the clergy, etc., of the various parishes. But Napoleon early in 1798 realised that, owing to the demoralisation of the French fleet consequent upon the revolution of 1789, an invasion of England was impossible. If however the English fleet could be lured into the Mediterranean owing to a French occupation of Egypt an attack on London was within the bounds of possibility.

The idea of an occupation of Egypt had been entertained by Leibnitz in the days of Louis XIV, who however was too much occupied with his projects in Western Europe to anticipate the action of Napoleon. Choiseul, the most prominent statesman in Louis XV's reign, had seized Minorca and meditated upon the conquest of the Nile Valley. Napoleon indeed had from his youthful days been impressed by the mystery of the East, and regarded the campaign of 1797 as the first step towards the realisation of his wish to lead a French army to India, and in alliance with the Mahrattas to expel the English from that land.

He had no little difficulty in securing the sanction to his project of the Directors, who were eventually not unwilling

to see Napoleon actively engaged on an expedition which would ensure his absence from France for an indefinite time. His well-known saying is worth noting: "Do you think," he had asked Miot in 1797, "that I triumph in Italy in order to make the greatness of the lawyers of the Directory?" In 1797 "the pear was not ripe," though the *coup d'état* of Fructidor had placed the control of France in the hands of a weak and corrupt Government.

The immediate invasion of England being hopeless, and the Directory having by means of the exaction of some million francs from Rome and Switzerland supplied the necessary funds, Napoleon sailed from Toulon on May 19, 1798, and, having taken Malta, landed in Egypt at the beginning of July. After inflicting a crushing defeat on the Mamelukes near the Pyramids, he reached Cairo. But his plans were now completely altered by the destruction of his fleet on August 1 in Abu Qir Bay by Nelson, and by the declaration of war by Turkey a month later. Napoleon therefore, having visited Suez and Mount Sinai, determined to conquer Syria, deliver the population from Turkish rule and make the country a convenient base for further eastern operations. His failure to take Acre in March 1799 necessitated a rapid retreat to Egypt, where he heard of the expulsion of the French from Italy in the war of the Second Coalition. He at once determined to return to France, where the late events had severely shaken the corrupt Government of the Directory.

Ever since the 18 Fructidor (1797), when the Directory entered upon the second period of its administration, it had become steadily more and more unpopular. This was due partly to its intolerance, partly to its inefficiency. After the Fructidor Revolution it had endeavoured to bring about the total suppression of Catholicism, by the enforcement of the "Décadi" to take the place of the Sunday and by seizing every opportunity of deporting the priests from the country. Thus Frenchmen were deprived of religious liberty. At the same time no order was kept in France, and brigands infested the highways. Moreover the attempted enforcement of a loan in June 1799 resulted in the cessation of all business on the Bourse in Paris, and in a panic among merchants and bankers. While France internally was in this state of disorder and anarchy the foreign policy of the Directors had suffered a severe blow. In the War of the Second Coalition in 1799 the French had been defeated by Suvórov and his Russian forces and driven out of Italy, General Joubert being killed. On

September 20 the Directory wrote to Napoleon urging him to return. But he had already heard of the events in France, and having inflicted a severe defeat upon a Turkish army which had landed in Abu Qir Bay, Napoleon, leaving his forces under the command of Kléber, returned to France, landing at Saint Raphael on October 9. His journey to Paris was simply a triumphant progress, for all men hoped that his return implied the defeat of the enemy and the establishment of peace and order in France.

The failure of Napoleon's original object in the Egyptian Expedition must not blind us to the fact that that expedition was followed by valuable results for the inhabitants, for Napoleon, it is truly said, "introduced Egypt to the methods of a civilised government, and Europe to the scientific study of the ancient monuments and language of the Nile Valley." Moreover he never seems to have abandoned his Eastern projects, and after Tilsit returned to them with increased ardour. The universal welcome which he received in France on his return was followed by the *coup d'état* of 18 and 19 Brumaire, in which the Directory was overthrown, and by the establishment of the Consulate.

[The Republican Year 1 was that between September 22, 1792 and September 21, 1793, both days inclusive. The months, each of thirty days, were known as Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire; Nivôse, Pluviôse, Ventôse; Germinal, Floréal, Prairial; Messidor, Thermidor, Fructidor. The remaining five or six days in each year were Republican feast-days.]

THE GREAT NAPOLEON

X

CONSUL AND CONQUEROR

(1799-1811)

THE Consulate which was established after Brumaire in 1799 lasted four years, during which everything pointed to the absolutism of Napoleon. The constitution of the Consulate was a remarkable illustration of the skill of Siéyès as a constitution-monger. According to his plan there were to be four

bodies—a Council of State to initiate laws, a Tribunal to discuss them, a Legislative body to accept or reject them and a Senate with power to veto any laws which should affect the Constitution. Two Consuls were to wield the executive power, and a Great Elector to be above them.

Before however the Constitution could be put into force, and before Napoleon had a secure position, it was necessary to bring the War of the Second Coalition to an end. Russia having retired, only Austria and England remained under arms, and on June 4, 1800 Genoa, which had been defended by Masséna, capitulated. However on June 14 the crushing defeat of the Austrians at Marengo by Napoleon's army gave the French all Italy west of the Mincio. Moreau's victory over the Austrians at Hohenlinden on December 3 was followed on February 9, 1801 by the Treaty of Lunéville, which marked the beginning of the end of the Holy Roman Empire. The eastern frontier of France was to be the Rhine, and the Batavian, Helvetic and Cisalpine Republics were recognised by Article 11. Holland was however to be evacuated by French troops as soon as the war with England came to an end, and this important undertaking was repeated in a Franco-Dutch Convention of August 29, 1801.

The Treaty was for Italy of great importance, for it ejected the Austrians from Central Italy, and was a step towards the unification of that country. Roads and bridges were made, a single civil and criminal code was used, and gradually a sense of nationality awoke. In the Treaty too the principle of secularising the German bishoprics was recognised.

Austria having retired from the war, England alone remained in arms against France. In attempting to crush England Napoleon anticipated his later policy. In December 1800 the Armed Neutrality of the Northern Powers—Russia, Prussia, Denmark and Sweden—had been renewed to protest against England's right to search neutrals. Paul I of Russia was the chief member of the League, and was allied with Napoleon, who supported this attack on British commerce. But the battle of Copenhagen, followed by the death of Paul in March 1801, destroyed the League. Napoleon's second aim was to occupy the South of Italy with 15,000 troops and thus to facilitate communication with Egypt. The Treaty of Florence between the King of Naples and Napoleon in March proved useless, as in that month Abercromby defeated in decisive fashion the French army in Egypt at Alexandria. Napoleon had also instigated Spain to attack Portugal. But on June 6

the war was closed by the Treaty of Badajoz, and Portugal refused to close her ports to English commerce.

All Napoleon's plans had failed. The sea-power of England had dispersed the Northern Coalition, had reduced Egypt to submission, and had retained control of the Mediterranean, with the result that on October 1 preliminaries of peace were signed, while on the following day came the news of the surrender of the French Army in Egypt. On March 25, 1802 the Peace of Amiens was concluded; it was in every way favourable to Napoleon, there being no protest against a French Lombardy, a French Piedmont, or the occupation by French troops of Holland—with regard to which the English negotiators depended upon Napoleon's undertaking in the Treaty of Lunéville to withdraw from Holland as soon as peace with England was concluded. England gave up all her conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad, but Napoleon had to postpone his Eastern schemes for a few years. The Peace of Amiens was obviously merely a truce, but it gave Napoleon an opportunity to settle finally the religious question in France, the Concordat being proclaimed in April, and to arrange that he should be appointed First Consul for life (May).

As First Consul Napoleon, having crushed Austria and made peace with England, became supreme in France. While he restored to France an efficient government, he never ceased devising schemes for undermining the English position in India. The weakness of our representatives during the negotiations at Amiens and the character of the ministry of Addington fully justified him in believing that, no matter how often he broke the terms of the Treaty, he had nothing to fear from Great Britain. Having re-established the Catholic Church in France he put in force the Civil Code (or "Code Napoléon") which was "founded upon the principles of Toleration and Equity." It holds a position of great importance in the history of civilisation, registering and perpetuating as it does the enormous social improvements which the French Revolution had introduced into Europe.

All his plans for the defeat of England, to be followed by the supremacy of France in the Mediterranean and India, were however doomed to failure owing to the successes of Wellesley in India and to his own inability to understand the British nature. (The same inability was as late as the summer of 1914 seen in the case of the German Emperor and his advisers.) Napoleon decided that the weak government of Addington, whose representatives agreed to the Peace of Amiens, would

not resent his failure to adhere to the terms of that Treaty, his determination not to relax the commercial duties upon English goods, and his refusal to agree to a commercial treaty. Early in 1802 his agents had stirred up discontent in Ireland, and before 1802 closed he had annexed Piedmont, Parma and Piacenza, while Ney in October occupied Switzerland.

Moreover he never ceased his preparations for a final blow at Great Britain, for the establishment of colonies on the American Continent, for securing French supremacy in the Mediterranean and for the execution of his Eastern projects. Early in 1803 an expedition was sent to India; but what specially roused public opinion in England was the publication in the *Moniteur* of January 30 of Colonel Sebastiani's report of his mission to Eastern Europe, in which he indicated the ease with which Egypt might be reoccupied. Consequently, faced by Napoleon's open hostility, the English Government was fully justified in refusing to relinquish its hold upon Malta, especially as Napoleon had refused to recall the French troops from Holland. His famous interviews with Lord Whitworth showed clearly that he was taken by surprise at the attitude of England, which he declared should be invaded. On May 16, 1803 Great Britain declared war, and the struggle opened which was only finally concluded at Waterloo in 1815.

Already before the war began several important events had happened in Europe, the chief being the reconstitution of Germany, which was secularised and Protestantised by the Diet at Ratisbon (Regensburg) on February 25, 1803. Thus definitely began the revolution in Germany, which saw in June 1806 the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, the members of which looked upon the French Emperor as their chief. On August 6, 1806 the Holy Roman Empire came to an end and the Emperor Francis became the Emperor of Austria. In the great wars in which Napoleon was involved this revolution gave him incalculable help, for from 1805, when he attacked the Third Coalition, he was able to use troops from Bavaria and the other States which formed the Confederation of the Rhine. It was not till shortly before the battle of Leipzig in 1813 that the majority of the States comprising the Confederation of the Rhine, headed by Bavaria, deserted him.

In 1803 and 1804 England was however the only Power with which he was at war. Hanover and Naples were at once occupied by French troops, San Domingo, which had been reconquered in 1802, was left to the Negro Government, and all efforts were concentrated on elaborate preparations for the

invasion of England. In 1804 Napoleon made a great political blunder in seizing and executing the Duc d'Enghien,¹ in consequence of which the Russian ambassador left Paris. In May Napoleon became Emperor of the French by a Decree of the Senate, which was ratified at the Elections in November.

To Napoleon the invasion of England seemed quite possible. In 1805 a powerful army was established on the coasts of the Channel, mainly round Boulogne, and a number of flat-bottomed boats were ordered. But the Emperor could not secure the mastery of the English Channel, for at that time the French fleet, such as it was, was partly scattered, partly blockaded in Brest Harbour by Admiral Cornwallis. Before however any attempt at the invasion of England could be made Austria and Sweden had in July decided to join Russia and England in the Third Coalition, and Napoleon's only method left of subduing England was by means of a continental blockade.

In September the Grand Army swept like a whirlwind into Germany, forced Mack, the Austrian general, to capitulate at Ulm, and defeated the Russians and Austrians on December 2 in the battle of Austerlitz. Prussia, which had pursued a vacillating policy, was forced to agree on December 15 to the Treaty of Schönbrunn supplemented by a Treaty on February 15 the following year, losing Cleves and Anspach but receiving possession of Hanover; while on December 26 Austria signed the Treaty of Pressburg, losing the Tirol, part of Swabia, Venice, Istria and Dalmatia. Meanwhile on October 21 the French and Spanish fleets had been utterly defeated in the battle of Trafalgar, and England was safe from any attack by sea.

In the war just closed with Austria the total absence of any national feeling in Germany was clearly apparent, Napoleon receiving assistance from such States as Bavaria and Württemberg, the rulers of both obtaining the title of king. In fact, until after the Moscow Campaign in 1812 the only evidence of any national feeling in Germany was seen in Austria during the war of 1809. Consequently it may be said that Napoleon's overthrow of Austria in 1805 and of Prussia in 1806 was most beneficial to both States. In February 1806 Napoleon established his brother Joseph as King of Naples, and in June his brother Louis as King of Holland. The settlement of Germany, as Napoleon hoped, was completed by the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine in July under his protection; this included among other States Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg

¹ Son of the Prince of Condé, and suspected, on very meagre grounds, of plotting against Napoleon.

and Hesse Darmstadt. On August 6 the German Revolution was formally closed by the renunciation by Francis II of Austria of the title of Holy Roman Emperor.

Meanwhile Napoleon was hoping to receive Sicily from the Whig Government of England, and thus to strengthen his position in the Mediterranean with a view to the execution of his Eastern projects. An English force had however in July defeated Régnier in the battle of Maida, and the English continued to hold Sicily. Before Napoleon could take any action in the Mediterranean Prussia, resenting the offer of Hanover which Napoleon had made to the English Government, declared war, only to suffer a total defeat on October 14 at Jena and Auerstedt, and to lose Berlin, which Napoleon entered later in the month. From that city he issued his famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, followed at the end of the succeeding year, in reply to the bombardment of Copenhagen in the previous September, by the Milan Decrees.

Meanwhile the remains of the Prussian army had joined the Russians, and a famous campaign was entered upon in 1807 by Napoleon, who, having won a decisive victory in the battle of Friedland, found Alexander, who was deeply irritated at the lethargic character of the English Government, ready to treat. By the Treaties of Tilsit the two monarchs combined to dominate Europe, Alexander agreeing to help to carry out the continental blockade. Thus Napoleon was left free to use his best endeavour to exclude the English from the Mediterranean and so to forward his Eastern schemes.

Up to this time his conquests had in reality benefited Europe, which required to be forced to adopt reforms and to set its house in order. But in Napoleon's eyes all his conquests were but the preparatory step leading to the execution of his Eastern plans, which involved the overthrow of England. From this time onwards he made a series of colossal blunders which were not fully apparent to Europe till 1813. One was his anti-papal policy. Pius VII had refused to join in an offensive war against England; in 1808 Rome was occupied by a French force; in 1809 Pius was imprisoned at Savona, and was not again in Rome till 1814. This blunder on the part of Napoleon had been preceded by a still more important one, namely the deposition of Charles IV of Spain and his son in favour of his own brother Joseph in May 1808.

These acts had been preceded in December 1807 by the arrival of Junot in Lisbon, only to find that the royal family had sailed to South America. In the previous month Napoleon

had visited Italy to make preparations for securing the command of the Mediterranean. To carry into effect this project the complete subservience of Spain was absolutely necessary. Had he, on the resignation of Charles IV, recognised his son Ferdinand as king, it is quite possible that for a time at least the Mediterranean might have been closed to English ships. But his action at Bayonne in forcing upon Spain his brother Joseph as king may be said definitely to mark the turning-point in his career. He had made a blunder which he was never able to rectify. Unlike Germany, Spain was a nation, and was held by the tie of religion—"a religion, fierce, ignorant and intolerant." Moreover the latent feeling of patriotism rapidly arose after the Bayonne interview.

On July 20 Joseph the new King of Spain arrived in Madrid. On July 22 the French General Dupont capitulated at Baylen to a Spanish force, and a national rising of the Spaniards took place. On July 28 Joseph, who had already warned Napoleon of the difficulties involved in an attempt to subdue Spain, left Madrid, and on August 30 the Convention of Cintra resulted in the removal of Junot and his army from Spain.

A French army could not reach Spain before October, and in the meantime, to reassure himself of his position in Germany, Napoleon met Alexander at the famous Conference of Erfurt in September and October. Alexander refused to leave Prussia at Napoleon's mercy, and thus the Spanish Rising "saved Prussia from virtual extinction." In November and December Napoleon was in Spain, but hearing of the warlike preparations of Austria, and of the intrigues in Paris of Fouché and Talleyrand, he left to Soult the task of pursuing Sir John Moore to Corunna and reached Paris on January 23, 1809.

Hostilities with Austria began in the spring of 1809, Austria representing the new patriotic spirit which was already pervading Germany. Her failure at the battle of Wagram (July 6) was followed some weeks later by the Treaty of Vienna (October 14) which deprived Austria of Trieste and the Tirol. Had Napoleon proceeded to Spain between November 1809 and March 1810 the history of the Spanish Rising would have been very different from what it was. His decision not to conduct personally the campaign in Spain may be regarded as a turning-point in his career and in that of the French Empire.

In April 1810, having divorced Joséphine (Beauharnais), he married Marie Louise of Austria, thus, as he thought, strengthening himself in Germany, and enabling him, whilst carrying out active operations in Spain by means of his



CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1812

AND CAMPAIGNS OF 1792-1810



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generals, to devote himself to the extension of the Continental System and thus to force Great Britain to come to terms. Between the close of 1810 and the middle of 1812 the period was, it is said, "the calmest enjoyed by the French nation since the Consulate."

In 1810 then Napoleon had apparently good reason to hope that England would shortly yield. On August 5 a severe decree was passed against English smuggling (though colonial goods could be admitted) and was enforced as far as possible by French troops who filled the Prussian ports and those of Lübeck and Hamburg. By an Order of August 18 Oldenburg was included, Napoleon justifying his action on the ground that such measures were the only ones which would destroy Great Britain. On October 19 all British goods were ordered to be publicly burnt, and on December 10 Napoleon sent a message to the Senate announcing the annexation of the Hansa Towns and of all the region between them and Holland, including Oldenburg.

XI

THE FALL

(1811-1815)

THE Emperor had now overreached himself, for on December 31, 1810 appeared an Edict from the Tsar Alexander modifying his adhesion to the Continental System. Napoleon was furious. "This was the leak," he said, "which was sinking the ship." Napoleon accepted the Tsar's attitude as a direct menace to France, and hostilities were now inevitable, Russia's abandonment of the Continental System being the real ground of the war of 1812. On June 23, 1812 Napoleon set out from Paris on his well-known Moscow expedition. On October 15 he retired from Moscow and on December 3 he left the shattered remains of his Grande Armée and returned to Paris, having lost 300,000 men. The Russians advanced into Germany, and on February 28, 1813 the Treaty of Kalisz was made between the Tsar and the King of Prussia. Napoleon however soon collected another army, and the War of Liberation opened. Having defeated but not destroyed the Allied armies at Lützen on May 2 and at Bautzen on May 20, he agreed to the Armistice of Pleswitz, which was to continue from June 4 to August 10.

Jomini declares that in agreeing to an armistice Napoleon

“made the greatest mistake in his military career.” As things turned out this assertion cannot be disputed, but as things were on June 4 Napoleon’s action can be defended. He had not destroyed the Allied army, which had retreated in the direction of the Austrian frontier. His cavalry required reconstruction, and he expected some 12,000 cavalry from Spain. Furthermore both Hamburg and Dresden required to be fortified and strengthened. Moreover he now had an excellent opportunity of concluding a satisfactory arrangement with Austria, the result of which would have been the defeat of Russia and Prussia. He refused however to accept the terms proposed by Austria, being absolutely confident in his ability to defeat the three great military Powers (Russia, Prussia and Austria) and to reconquer Spain.

His overweening confidence, in spite of the English victory at Vittoria on June 21 and Wellington’s invasion of France, proved the salvation of Europe. On August 10 hostilities again began, Napoleon with his quarters at Dresden being faced by the Austrian, Russian and Prussian troops. After one success (at Dresden) against the Austrians, defeat followed defeat, and his disasters culminated at the battle of Leipzig in October (16–19). Had the Allies pressed on, Europe would have been spared the Campaign of 1814 in France. As it was, Napoleon was able to make a most brilliant defence, and it was not till his defeat at Arcis-sur-Aube on March 20 that his cause was lost—a letter in which he proposed to deceive the Allies having been opportunely found. On March 31 the Allies entered Paris; on April 6 Napoleon abdicated; on May 30 the Treaty of Paris was signed by Louis XVIII,¹ and Napoleon was sent to Elba.

In the autumn of 1814 the Congress of Vienna met to reconstruct Europe, and owing to a dispute with the King of Prussia, who wished to annex all Saxony, war almost broke out among the Allies. That danger being averted, the settlement of Europe was proceeded with. Suddenly Napoleon on February 26, 1815 escaped from Elba, Louis XVIII fled, and Napoleon reached Fontainebleau on March 20.

In the famous Waterloo campaign Napoleon showed great military skill. His object was to force his way between the armies of Blücher and Wellington and then to defeat each in detail. On June 15 he defeated the Prussian army at Ligny, whilst at Quatre Bras Ney prevented a junction between Wellington and Blücher. On June 18 the Battle of Waterloo

¹ Brother of Louis XVI.

was fought, and the arrival—so unexpected by Napoleon—of Blücher helped the English and Germans to win a decisive victory. On June 22 Napoleon abdicated at Paris and took refuge on board the *Bellerophon*, being shortly afterwards taken to St. Helena; here he died on May 25, 1821.

FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC

XII

BOURBONS, ORLEANISTS AND THE SECOND REPUBLIC

(1815–1852)

THE reign of Louis XVIII marks a most unattractive period in French history. We enter, it has been well said, upon “a kind of political wonderland where topsy-turvydom prevails,”¹ France was divided between the Royalists, the Revolutionists, and the Bonapartists. On July 8, 1815 Louis re-entered Paris with the Allies. Talleyrand became First Minister, the other important offices being held by Fouché, Gouvion St. Cyr, Pasquier and Baron Louis. The general arrangements for the government of the country which Napoleon had made were not interfered with, and the Code Napoléon remained untouched. Acts of severity against the chief participators in “the Hundred Days” were followed in the summer by the “White Terror,” which was the name given to the savage warfare in the South of France conducted by the Royalists against the Bonapartists and the Jacobins. Fouché was dismissed in September, in which month it was evident that the elections had resulted in favour of the Royalists. Talleyrand’s ministry in consequence resigned, and it was succeeded by that of the Duc de Richelieu, a patriotic man who was a personal friend of the Tsar, and in whose ministry Decazes was Minister of Police.

On November 20, 1815 the Second Peace of Paris was signed. By this treaty France lost territory, had to pay an enormous indemnity, was excluded from the Concert of Europe, and was forced to support for five years a large army of occupation. Meanwhile France was to remain under the surveillance of the Great Powers. The execution of Ney on December 7 was in

¹ J. R. Moreton Macdonald, *A History of France*, vol. iii, p. 253. London: Methuen & Co.

no sense a political act, but simply the punishment for treachery. With it the year closed with France governed (owing to the condition of the franchise) by a violent reactionary monarchy. Richelieu had no option but to pursue a balancing policy, at first a difficult task owing to the severe laws passed by the reactionary party. Its tyrannous acts and blood-thirsty excesses had however roused throughout the country such opposition that Louis, by the advice of Decazes and without the knowledge of the Comte d'Artois, the leader of the reactionaries, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies on September 5, 1816. The verdict of the elections was a blow to the Royalists, the majority of the new members holding moderate opinions but supporting the King. Richelieu and Decazes remained in power, the last-named being in favour of a course of liberal administration, though by a measure passed in February 1817 a new electoral law restricted the electorate to about 100,000 persons.

In 1818 Richelieu at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle secured the retirement of the foreign garrison from France, as well as that of the Committee of the Powers which since 1815 had sat in Paris. On December 28 on his return from the Congress Richelieu retired from office and was succeeded by General Dessolles, whose chief colleagues were Decazes, Gouvion St. Cyr, Baron Louis and De Serre. This ministry was weakened from its formation by a division in its ranks as to the policy to be pursued. Dessolles, Saint Cyr and Louis favoured a strong liberal policy, while Decazes desired only a moderate liberal policy. France seemed to be falling into a condition which would justify the intervention of the Allies. At this crisis in the internal affairs of France the Duc de Berry, second son of the Comte d'Artois (later Charles X), was attacked in Paris on February 13, 1820 and killed. The Ultras at once attributed the murder to the late liberal legislation, the ministry fell, Richelieu formed his second ministry, and the elections held in the autumn of 1820 resulted in the return of a large Royalist majority. On December 12, 1821 Richelieu resigned and was succeeded by Villèle, who headed a strong Royalist ministry. Plots were severely repressed, the Press was muzzled and there was a decided political and religious reaction. Moreover Louis XVIII vastly pleased the Ultras by accepting the proposal made at the Congress of Verona that France should intervene in Spain. Villèle had at Verona refused to break with Spain, but when Louis declared war on January 28, 1823 he accepted the position. By September the war was ended,

and Ferdinand of Spain was able to re-establish an absolute monarchy.

On August 16, 1824 Louis XVIII died, leaving the Bourbon monarchy by no means firmly established in the affections of the French nation. He was succeeded by his brother as Charles X, who as Comte d'Artois had fled from France in July 1789 and in vain had attempted to persuade the rulers of other countries to restore by force of arms the *ancien régime*. On his accession he found Paris the literary and artistic centre of France. The nation was weary of strife and accepted the quiet accession of Charles with pleasure, if not with enthusiasm.

Charles X has often been compared to James II of England. He was just as short-sighted and bigoted and held similar absolutist ideas. His short reign was not marked by any attempt to carry out a constitutional policy. So far from recognising the meaning to France of the Revolution of 1789 and of the Empire, he made no secret of his intention to restore the *ancien régime*. A few months after his accession the *Emigrés* were compensated and the Church was rehabilitated, with the result that it became closely united to the Bourbon dynasty. In fact it might almost be said that the *ancien régime* was restored; at the close of 1826 indeed a severe measure to check the freedom of the Press was brought forward, which however was not passed—Paris on its rejection being illuminated.

Meanwhile exciting events were taking place in consequence of the Greek Insurrection, and on October 20, 1827 the French and English fleets won the battle of Navarino over the Turko-Egyptian fleet of Ibrahim Pasha, the news being received with enthusiasm in France. In November the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was followed by the election of a large body of men opposed to Villèle, who in January 1828 retired, being succeeded by M. de Martignac; the immediate duty of the latter was to pacify the country, which was urged to revolt by the Liberals, by Paris, and the Press. His policy of conciliation pleased neither the King nor the Liberals, a large section of whom yearned for an active and brilliant foreign policy which should secure for France the Rhine boundary. In August 1829 the Duke of Polignac, an incapable and obstinate man, formed a ministry on Royalist and reactionary lines. Though he favoured an active foreign policy and intervened in Algiers, his policy was so criticised that Charles appealed to the country. But after the elections in May Charles dissolved the New Chamber before it met, and issued his famous ordin-

ances altering the electoral law, annulling the recent elections and suspending the freedom of the Press. Ever since the appointment of Polignac the French Liberals had been preparing for a struggle, and in the *National*, edited by Thiers, the possibility of a change of dynasty had been hinted at.

On July 27, 1830 the Revolution of Three Days began and, too late, Charles realised the folly of his policy. In August he arrived in England, having formally abdicated in favour of the Duc d'Orléans,¹ who as Louis Philippe accepted the crown, his accession representing the definite triumph of the Revolution of 1789 over the *ancien régime*, and the establishment of a government of compromise.

The abdication of Charles X marked the third and final downfall of the Bourbons, and left France in a position not unlike that of England when James II fled to France. In both countries government by divine right had come to an end. The Revolution of 1830 was in striking contrast to that of 1789, and there were no signs of the repetition of the Terror. The majority of the French people desired neither an absolutism nor a republic. A limited monarchy under Louis Philippe of Orléans was therefore set up, and though the first ten years of his reign were marked by political and social unrest it was not till 1840 that signs of the coming overthrow of the Orléans monarchy definitely began to appear.

One of the first results of the revolution in France and the accession of Louis Philippe was the outbreak of a revolution in Belgium. Emissaries of the French Radical party had intrigued with the extreme opponents of the Dutch rule, and on August 25, 1830 the first rising took place in Brussels. Shortly afterwards most of the leading towns in Belgium acted likewise, and by the end of October reconciliation with the King of Holland was impossible. On December 20 a Congress in London of the chief European Powers recognised the independence of Belgium. In the following year Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was selected as King, upon whom King William of Holland at once declared war. The arrival of French troops soon ended the campaign, but it was not till 1839 that William recognised Belgian independence.

The first ten years of Louis Philippe's reign witnessed in Western Europe vast industrial and economic changes which resulted in France in numerous strikes and an attempted insurrection in Paris in May 1835. After frequent ministerial

¹ Son of Philippe Egalité (executed 1793) of the Orleanist branch of the Bourbons, which had branched off in Philippe of Orléans, son of Louis XIII

changes France enjoyed two years of peace at home and abroad, first under the ministry of Guizot (1836 to March 1837), and then under his colleague Count Molé, whose skill as an opportunist was remarkable. Under this ministry the railway system was developed, the finances were placed on a sound footing, and general prosperity prevailed, while diplomatic successes in Greece, in Italy, and especially in Belgium, whose independence and neutrality were secured in 1839, testified to the ability of Molé in the Foreign Office. Moreover the French occupation of Constantine in October 1837 foreshadowed the later establishment of France in Algiers. Guizot and Thiers meanwhile united in the determination to bring about the fall of the Molé ministry which, they asserted, represented the personal government of Louis Philippe. The elections of March 1839 resulted in a defeat of the Government, and after an interval of two months, during which an insurrection which foreshadowed that of 1848 was suppressed, Marshal Soult formed a ministry, which was succeeded by that of Thiers in March 1840.

Meanwhile Russia, Austria and Prussia had formed a League at Münchengrätz in June 1833 to resist the liberal tendencies of England and France, which countries, supported by Spain and Portugal, formed a Quadruple Alliance. This division of the European Powers did not continue for many years, for in 1839 and 1840 France opposed the coercion of Mehemet Ali by Russia, England, Austria and Prussia; but the Egyptian ruler was compelled nevertheless to withdraw from Syria and content himself with Egypt.

Thiers, previous to his formation of a ministry in March 1840, had intrigued with Mehemet, and in consequence of the Treaty of July 15 settling the Egyptian question he made preparations for a popular war against England. Louis Philippe however refused to be drawn into such a war. Thiers fell, and a new ministry was formed, nominally under Soult (who retired in 1847) though Guizot was the chief member. The ministry of Thiers in 1840 had heralded the Republic of 1848. While in Molé's hands the foreign policy of France had been marked by success, under Thiers it had proved a failure, and it contributed greatly to the fall of the dynasty.

The continuance of the alliance with England was of the first importance, but during Guizot's supremacy after 1840 the English friendship was lost, and at the opening of 1848 France was in a position of isolation in Europe. The arrest by the French admiral of the English Consul at Tahiti in March 1844 had indeed been followed in September by a visit of Louis

Philippe to England, but in 1846 England was finally alienated by the action of the French Government with regard to the Spanish marriages. Meanwhile Guizot's general policy of peace and no reforms had not satisfied the French nation; on February 21, 1848 a reform banquet was suppressed in Paris, and on the following day a revolution broke out in Paris which led to the abdication of Louis Philippe on February 25.

The whole system of Guizot's Cabinet has been described by a Deputy as "Nothing, Nothing, Nothing." That policy did not commend itself to any portion of the French people, and thus led to Guizot's fall and the flight of Louis Philippe. Lamartine's administration, the rising of the Red Republicans in May and June and Cavaignac's Presidency each in turn failed to satisfy the French nation. Constitutional monarchy and middle-class government followed by republican administration had been tried in vain, with the result that the supporters of order concurred in the election of Napoleon,¹ who represented the brilliant successes of his uncle the First Napoleon and who became President on December 10, 1848. It had become apparent as early as May 1848, when the elections were held, that France did not desire socialism, the supporters of which were defeated after three days' fighting in Paris. In 1850 and 1851 it became equally apparent that the Provinces desired the establishment of order, and were strongly in favour of Napoleon. On the night of December 2, 1851 a *coup d'état* took place. Many of the statesmen and generals in Paris were arrested in their beds, some 235 representatives of the people were cast into prison, and in January 1852 a new constitution was promulgated, all executive power being entrusted to the President, who was responsible to the people and in whom alone lay the right of initiative. Fear of anarchy had thus led to an almost universal wish to give another Napoleon supreme power.

XIII

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III

(1852-1870)

ON December 1, 1852 Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor at Saint-Cloud and entered Paris the following day. During the next ten years France occupied a leading place among European

¹ Son of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland (1806-1810).

monarchies in consequence of the part she played in the Crimean War, one result of which was to relegate Russia into a secondary position. The revival of the rights of the Latin Church in Jerusalem had been supported in France in 1850 and had roused the resentment of the orthodox Tsar, though by the Treaty of 1740 between France and Turkey the French were guarantors of the Latin interests. Napoleon showed no wish to push matters to an extreme point, and it was only after the Tsar's provocative attitude to Turkey, the despatch of Russian troops over the Pruth, and the sinking of the Turkish fleet off Sinope on November 30, 1853, that the Allied fleets entered the Black Sea. The French Government, acting in harmony with that of England, declared war in March 1854, and for two years hostilities continued, the French army especially distinguishing itself by the capture of the Malakoff.

It has been said that "if the Crimean War had never been fought the two subsequent decades of the century would not have seen the formation of a United Italy and a United Germany." The Peace of Paris in 1856 had closed the Crimean War, in which through the influence of Cavour the Italians had taken part. Italy had been represented by Cavour at the Congress of Paris. What was clearly evident after the close of the Congress was that Austria was isolated, that the Great Powers were favourably inclined towards Italy, and that the foremost position in Europe was held by France, which was regarded as the most formidable of continental nations.

Though Napoleon sympathised with the spirit of nationality which was daily becoming more apparent in Italy, many reasons caused him to hesitate before taking up the cause of Piedmont. Cavour's policy was clearly antagonistic to that of Rome, and religious France represented by the Empress was strongly opposed to any quarrel with the Pope.

Moreover the idea of the consolidation of Italy was not popular in France as being unfavourable to French interests, which would be better served by the existence of weak neighbours. "Tell Walewski in confidence," Napoleon however had said to Cavour in Paris, "what you think I can do for Italy," and after the Congress was over he added, "I have a conviction that peace will not last long." These words may have meant little when uttered by a man so habitually irresolute as was Napoleon. Cavour however was encouraged, and early in 1857 the Société Nationale Italienne was formed to advocate the Italian cause in Lombardy and even in Venetia, and to influence the Press throughout Europe. On January 14,

1858 an Italian conspirator named Orsini, who had made his plans in London, attempted to assassinate Napoleon in Paris. To the astonishment of Europe the relations between France and Sardinia were not broken off, and in June Napoleon and Cavour had a secret meeting at Plombières, where they rearranged the map of Italy. That meeting, in which he was in reality influenced by Cavour, can be compared with a meeting at Biarritz a few years later, when he thought he had won over Bismarck to his views.

On January 1, 1859 Napoleon informed Hübner the Austrian Ambassador that the relations of France and Austria were not so good as before. On April 26 Austria sent an ultimatum to Sardinia and war ensued with France, Napoleon intending to secure a free but not a United Italy. He was willing that Piedmont should extend from the Alps to the Adriatic, but he had no wish to interfere in Central or Southern Italy. As compensation for his assistance he was to receive Savoy and Nice. The idea of a strong and united Italy was not favoured by Napoleon nor by the French nation. The campaign was short and decisive. The victorious battles of Montebello, Palestro, Magenta and Solferino were fought in May and June, and on July 11 the war ended with the Armistice of Villafranca. The spread of sickness amongst his troops and the hostile attitude of Prussia probably contributed to Napoleon's sudden decision to end the war. Lombardy was handed over to Piedmont, and he arranged that the Italian States should be formed into a confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope. For the moment Napoleon did not insist on annexing Savoy and Nice. It is said that Napoleon rose to his zenith when he signed the famous Treaty of Villafranca. In fighting for an idea which appealed to liberal Europe he had defeated a strong military power and he had shown moderation in victory. Never had he stood in such a striking position. During the past eleven years he had shown himself a successful ruler, France had played a notable part in the Crimean War, and he had now freed Italy and seen Lombardy (exclusive of Mantua and Peschiera) annexed to the kingdom of Sardinia.

The object for which Napoleon entered the war had been accomplished; but the prospect of a United Italy had never been entertained by him. The Italian States, in his opinion, would now be formed into "a Confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope." But he soon found himself unable to check the movement for a United Italy, and "in Italy," to quote the striking language of M. de la Gorce, "the fate of the

Second Empire was sealed." Central Italy at once refused to take back its old rulers, and soon threw in its lot with Sardinia, while the invasion of Sicily by Garibaldi, followed later by the invasion of Romagna by the Sardinian army, brought utter discomfiture to the Emperor's diplomacy. The English Cabinet urged that Italy should be left to settle its own affairs, for French intervention would have endangered the good relations of France with Great Britain which the Emperor was so anxious to maintain. Napoleon, too, had not the courage to insist that Sardinia should carry out the arrangements made at Villafranca, and in order to cover the discomfiture of his policy he annexed Savoy and Nice, the incorporation of which into France, though agreed to at Villafranca, increased his difficulties, for it alienated the Italians, destroyed the goodwill of the English people and aroused their suspicions.

What still further added to his anxieties was the invasion of the Roman Provinces by the Sardinian army and the subsequent defeat of a force commanded by a French officer, General Lamoricière. Thus, though but a little more than a year had passed since the Armistice of Villafranca had been arranged, the year 1861 saw the programme then drawn up completely annulled. In February 1861 Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed King of Italy, and the idea of Italian federation under the Pope had disappeared.

The victories of Magenta and Solferino had thus been followed by diplomatic disaster, the effect of which was to weaken the Emperor's authority in France, where the Catholics and Conservatives, strengthened by the influence of the Empress, warmly supported the Papal government. While the Pope complained of the loss of his territory the Italians complained that, owing to the Emperor's attitude, they could not give United Italy Rome as her capital, and the leaders of the small but powerful Liberal party in France pointed out that Napoleon was posing as the champion of liberty in Italy while governing autocratically in France. "You cannot," said M. Pichon in the French Chamber, "be revolutionary in Italy and remain conservative at home."

Already however the Emperor seems to have realised the inconsistency of his policy in Italy and France, for on November 24, 1860 he allowed the Legislature some liberty of discussion by a Decree which has been called the foundation-stone of *L'Empire Libéral*. A year later he surrendered his right of "opening supplementary credits when the Legislature was not sitting." Though he often disregarded his promise, still his

concession had yielded up the power of the purse, and his not infrequent disregard of his surrender of it afforded opportunities to the Opposition leaders which they did not hesitate to seize. The General Election of 1863 gave France a Liberal party. Every constituency in Paris was won by the Liberals, and the elections, in the words of M. de Morny, "had left the Emperor and the democracy face to face." That democracy was formidable enough, owing to the ability of its leaders, who had no hesitation in criticising and, if necessary, in thwarting the Emperor's policy.

Moreover in the latter part of 1863 France was deeply involved in the Mexican campaign 5,000 miles from home. Mexico, the capital, had been occupied by a French army in June, in order to induce the country to accept the Austrian Archduke Maximilian¹ as their ruler and Emperor. He shortly afterwards landed at Vera Cruz in June 1864. This Imperial adventure would, it was hoped by Napoleon, check the Teutonic Republic of the North and prevent the American Continent from falling definitely under the commercial control of New York and the political influence of Washington. Napoleon's position at home made it necessary for him to show immediate results in the critical eyes of Paris. As it was, the expedition to Mexico proved a disastrous failure, and while events of deep significance were taking place in Europe a valuable French army was "locked up" in Mexico. Its absence during the years 1866 and 1867 had a very important effect upon Napoleon's foreign policy.

The year 1863 was not only a notable one in the change of the attitude of the French nation towards Napoleon; it also marked the failure of his foreign policy, while the failure of the Mexican expedition was not apparent till 1867. In January 1863 an insurrection broke out in Poland, which not only was suppressed with great cruelty but led to a defensive Treaty between Russia and Prussia. France had always taken a keen interest in the cause of Poland, but Napoleon realised that by championing the Poles he would alienate Russia, whose friendship had enabled him to undertake the Italian War and to annex Savoy and Nice.

Napoleon's true policy should have led him to ignore the excitement in Paris—for Poland was inaccessible—and to refrain from doing anything. As it was, the notes which the French and British Governments sent to St. Petersburg had not only no effect in aiding the cause of the Poles but lost to

¹ Brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

Napoleon the friendship of Russia. Moreover, as, in spite of the excitement in France which followed Russia's refusal to discuss the Polish question, Napoleon refused to embark single-handed upon a war with the Tsar, the discredit into which he had already fallen was increased.

Before the year closed the Schleswig-Holstein "affair" occupied the attention of Europe. A close understanding between England, France and Russia might have prevented the solution of that question to the advantage of Prussia. But Napoleon, embittered by his failure in the Polish question, had no intention of running any further risks. On December 24 the troops of the Germanic Confederation entered Altona (Hamburg), and a situation was created which produced highly important but at the time unforeseen results.

Apparently Napoleon had regarded the Danish question as one of secondary importance, for on November 4 he had issued invitations to a Congress at Paris which he hoped would result in the readjustment of the frontiers of States to the advantage of France, and restore his reputation, already shaken by his Italian and Polish policy. The proposed Congress never met, and it became evident within a few years that his true policy should have been to make an agreement with Great Britain as to the question of the Danish Duchies. The year 1863, with Napoleon's decision not to interfere in the Danish question, marks not only the first stage of Bismarck's policy of bringing about the Prussian supremacy in Northern Germany but also a definite stage in the decline of the French Empire.

The defence of Napoleon's inaction lies in the fact that his intervention in the Polish question had somewhat discredited him, and with the Mexican War on his hands it was only to be expected that a man of his character would shrink from incurring fresh responsibilities.

Of course he could not in 1863 realise that the fate of the Second Empire had been sealed in Italy, or foresee that its grave would be dug in Mexico. As Great Britain early in 1864 informed the Russian Government that she had no intention of interfering on behalf of Denmark, Austria and Prussia were enabled to annex Schleswig and Holstein without any fear of the intervention of Great Britain, France or Russia.

"The great crime of the eighteenth century was the partition of Poland, which neither France nor England knew how to prevent. The great blunder of the nineteenth century was the spoliation of the Danish Duchies, which neither France nor

England nor Russia knew how to prevent.”¹ Such represents the view of all historians and politicians who have studied the history of Modern Europe. Meanwhile discontent with the governmental machine had showed itself in France. A general election held in May and June 1863 had resulted in the formation of an Opposition of some thirty-five members, among whom were Thiers, Jules Favre, Jules Simon, Ernest Picard and Berryer. Concessions were indeed made to the Opposition, which was far from being revolutionary, but the continual failure of the Emperor's foreign policy alienated an increasing number of men of all parties. Relations with England were strained, Russia had been alienated, the Danish question had been mismanaged. In a word, French prestige abroad had steadily declined. The criticisms of Thiers and Jules Favre on French foreign policy were unanswerable, and were justified by the events of 1866 and 1867.

The Convention of Gastein on August 14, 1865 postponed the inevitable struggle between Prussia and Austria, and Bismarck at once used the lull to secure the neutrality of France and the friendship of Italy. Thus when war broke out Austria would be isolated. In October Bismarck visited Napoleon at Biarritz and secured the neutrality of France in the event of an Austro-Prussian war. What actually took place at the interview at Biarritz is not known, but it would seem that Napoleon, influenced by the failure of the French expedition to Mexico, wished to strengthen his position by some success in foreign policy. The outbreak of war between Prussia and Austria, which latter he thought was the stronger of the two, would enable him to act as umpire, obtaining for his services some territory. Secured on the side of France, Bismarck arranged an alliance with Italy in April 1866. Napoleon then urged Italy, but in vain, to remain neutral during an Austro-Prussian war, and his proposal of a European Congress met with like failure.

On July 3 at Königgrätz (Sadowa) the Prussians won a decisive battle over the Austrians, and the Emperor Francis Joseph asked Napoleon to intervene, arranging to cede Venice. From this moment Napoleon's difficulties became serious. During the negotiations at Nikolsburg (after Königgrätz) between Austria and Prussia, Benedetti on behalf of France demanded Mainz and a portion of the left bank of the Rhine. On Bismarck's refusal war seemed not unlikely to break out. But with her best troops in Mexico, France had no army with

¹ *Quarterly Review*, April 1917, p. 399.

which to enforce her demands, which were accordingly waived. Nevertheless to satisfy public opinion in France Napoleon persisted in looking for some compensation. After the Italian War in 1859 he had secured Savoy and Nice: he therefore expected after the Austro-Prussian War to obtain some territory. But the position in 1866 and 1867 was very different from that of 1859. In 1859 he had contributed to the victory of Italy: in 1866 he had in a very indirect manner by neutrality aided Prussia in her contest with Austria. Moreover the national spirit in North Germany in 1866 was far stronger than that in Italy in 1859, and the question of sacrificing any German territory was unlikely to be entertained for a single moment.

The conclusion of the Peace of Prague on August 3, 1866 found all parties in France discontented with the late train of events. National jealousy of Prussia's successes was clearly apparent, and to many Germans an outbreak of war with France within the near future seemed certain. For the moment however Bismarck was anxious to postpone war with France, and he professed himself ready to negotiate with Napoleon regarding the acquisition of Luxembourg by France, or the union of Belgium to France as compensation for the attainment of German unity. Though the Belgium project was not persevered in a serious attempt was made to annex Luxembourg, "the road to Brussels in default of Belgium itself." As the negotiations proceeded the agitation in Berlin increased, and in April 1867 war seemed imminent between France and the North German Confederation. At this crisis Russia and Great Britain intervened, and a Conference met in London on May 7, 1867.

It was then agreed that the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg should be guaranteed, and that the Prussian troops should withdraw from the fortress-capital, the fortifications of which should be dismantled. Prussia therefore evacuated the fortress, and France withdrew her scheme for the purchase of Luxembourg—which was by treaty neutralised. Thus Napoleon's hope of "the friendly connivance of Prussia for an occupation of Luxembourg and an invasion of Belgium" had been rudely dispelled, as had been his earlier dream of the possession of Mainz and a portion of the left bank of the Rhine. These diplomatic failures were all in great measure due to the absence in Mexico of a large portion of the French army, which did not return to France till the spring of 1867. As it was, the Conference of the Powers in London in May established harmony between France and Prussia, and during May and

June the Tsar, the King of Prussia and Bismarck visited Paris, where the Great Exhibition had been opened. The events of the years 1866 and 1867 manifested the truth of the following: "Sans armée, point de diplomatique, point de succès, point d'honneur au dehors, point de sécurité au dedans."

Thus by the end of May 1867 and with the opening of the Paris Exhibition Europe could breathe again. But on June 30 the news arrived that the Emperor Maximilian had been shot at Querétaro in Mexico, and in the same month a Parisian jury practically acquitted the Pole Berezowski who had shot at the Tsar Alexander—their decision destroying Napoleon's hope of a renewal of close and friendly relations between France and Russia. Moreover in July the Prussian Government declined to consider Napoleon's proposal to discuss the position of the population in Holstein and Schleswig. For a short time however it seemed that a Triple Alliance between France, Austria and Italy might be formed, and Napoleon's visit to Salzburg in August to meet Francis Joseph, followed in October by a visit of the Austrian Emperor to Paris, justified the belief. The latter however made an alliance with Napoleon depend upon the inclusion of Italy. An alliance between France and Italy could however only be obtained by the abandonment by Napoleon of the cause of the Pope. In 1864, when Italy was the only possible ally for France in Europe, Napoleon had on September 15 concluded a convention with Victor Emmanuel II, arranging for the withdrawal of French troops from Rome within two years. That withdrawal was now accomplished in December 1866.

The September Convention of 1864 had led to an attack on the French Government by Pius IX, who was vigorously supported by the French Bishops and the French Catholics generally. Unfortunately for France, Garibaldi in 1867 seized the opportunity afforded by the departure of the French troops, and in September marched an army into the States of the Church. His action roused a violent explosion of anger among the French Catholics, and Napoleon bowed before the storm. French troops left Toulon for Italy in October and on November 3 inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon Garibaldi's army at Mentana, the victory being followed by a declaration on December 4 by Rouher, the French Prime Minister, that "Italy should never take Rome."

Simultaneously with the French expedition to Italy the power of the newly reconstituted Republican party in France manifested itself, and during the first six months of 1868 the

Press Law was simplified and public meetings were to some extent permitted. On May 30, 1868 the first number of *La Lanterne*, published by Henri Rochefort, appeared, and the existence of a strong and uncompromising opposition to the Empire had to be recognised. The elections held in May 1869 showed the rapid growth of the Republican party in France. But though he agreed to "the creation of a responsible ministry," Napoleon shrank from becoming a constitutional monarch, and continued to place his trust in Rouher. Had it not been for the moderating influence of the *bourgeoisie*, a revolution followed by the impeachment of the Emperor might have taken place. In January 1870 Emile Olivier formed a ministry which he hoped would prove a "barrier on the road to revolution." In May an appeal was made to the country, which by a large majority supported the Imperial dynasty. During the next ten weeks however foreign affairs occupied the chief attention of the Government, the importance of the formation of a Triple Alliance being recognised: for since 1868 the men at the head of affairs in both France and Germany had realised that war might break out at any time. During 1868 the anti-Prussian feeling in France had been as apparent as the anti-French feeling in Germany, where in some quarters the idea of the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine made itself felt. In December 1868 the French Government had endeavoured to secure control of two Belgian railways; but this project was openly opposed in the Belgian Second Chamber, and drew from the British Government a declaration that "the independence of Belgium was an object of the first interest to the British people."

XIV

THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE

(1870-1871)

TILL August 1870 there seemed a chance of an alliance being formed between France, Austria and Italy, for discussions with a view to such an alliance had proceeded during 1869, and it seemed possible that France, Austria and Italy might combine for the protection of Europe against Prussia. But Napoleon's refusal to withdraw from Rome wrecked all chance of a Triple Alliance, and the truth of M. de la Gorce's utterance

that in Italy the fate of the Second Empire was sealed was now apparent. That its grave was dug in Mexico is no less true, while by his alienation of Prussia over the Polish question and of England over the Schleswig-Holstein affair Napoleon had steadily weakened his position in Europe. In 1869 the negotiations between France, Austria and Italy had become known in Berlin, and Bismarck, in reply, supported the Hohenzollern candidate—Prince Leopold—in his candidature for the throne of Spain. The abandonment of that candidature at the instance of France was brought about by the influence of King William on July 12, and Olivier was satisfied that peace would be preserved. But Napoleon and Gramont demanded through their Ambassador Benedetti an assurance from the King of Prussia that he would not permit the renewal of the Hohenzollern candidature. The account of Benedetti's interview with the King and the history of the Ems telegram, fraudulently altered by Bismarck, are well known. Bismarck's opportunity had come, and on July 14 war was declared by France.

Napoleon and Gramont continued to expect the co-operation of Austria and Italy, while an offensive movement by French troops into Germany had been planned by Marshal Leboeuf. But Napoleon in July and even as late as August 1 refused absolutely to recognise the occupation of Rome by the Italians. All hope of an alliance with Austria and Italy had therefore to be abandoned, and France entered the war without allies.

The German army was ready—far readier than the French—and dealt France a series of crushing blows at Spichenen (August 6), Wörth (August 6), Mars-la-Tour (August 16) and Gravelotte (August 18)—the latter action driving back Marshal Bazaine with some 180,000 troops into Metz. Marshal MacMahon collected an army at Châlons, and marched to the relief of Bazaine; but he was driven northwards against the Belgian frontier at Sedan; and on September 2 Napoleon and MacMahon's army were prisoners in the hands of the Prussians.

The news of the capitulation of Sedan reached Paris on September 3, and on September 4 a Provisional Government of National Defence was formed which included Jules Favre, Gambetta, Jules Simon, Picard and General Trochu—the latter of whom acted as President of the Council of Ministers and Governor of Paris.

The People's War however had now begun, and continued for five months, much to the astonishment of Moltke, who had expected the early fall of Paris and little or no resistance in the Provinces.

On September 12 Thiers, who had refused to join the Government of September 4, left Paris to visit England, Austria and Russia in order if possible to secure European intervention. On October 21 he returned to Tours, having entirely failed in his efforts, only to find that Italy had refused to intervene, and that the situation in France was more serious than when he started on his journey. For the efforts of Jules Favre to secure an armistice had failed. Toul and Strasbourg fell before the end of September, and the fourteenth German Corps under v. Werder spread over Burgundy and Franche-Comté, taking Dijon and investing Belfort. Meanwhile the defence of Paris was being organised by Trochu, while owing to Gambetta's influence every available man was summoned from Africa, old soldiers were called up, and a *levée-en-masse* was decreed. The French nation was thoroughly roused, and in almost every province was to be found the nucleus of an armed force.

Unfortunately for France at this critical moment when the position of the Germans was strategically unsafe, Bazaine and the army of Metz capitulated on October 27, just at a moment when it was of the most vital importance to detain the German army around the walls of the town. Thus the 200,000 German troops who composed the first and second armies were released, and while the seventh corps of the first army marched to effect the reduction of Thionville and Montmédy, the second army marched to Paris.

Its arrival was, from the German point of view, most opportune, for Gambetta, who had escaped to Tours from Paris in a balloon on October 9, had organised an army of some 180,000 men which under Aurelle de Paladines and Chanzy had defeated von der Tann on November 9 at Coulmiers and had driven the Germans out of Orléans. But no important result followed, though an immediate advance on Paris might have compelled v. Moltke to raise the siege. Attempts by the French to relieve Paris failed on November 28 and December 2, and on December 4 the Germans, reinforced by the army of Prince Friedrich Karl, again occupied Orléans.

The last stage in the campaign now opened with the French Government established at Bordeaux. Gambetta still hoped to rescue Paris, but the organisation of the Army of the Loire had been broken up, though General Chanzy had succeeded in rallying a portion of the force at Beaugency, south of Orléans. Meanwhile a sortie from Paris organised by Ducrot on December 4 had failed, its failure coinciding with the fall of Orléans.

Nevertheless the efforts of Gambetta, ably seconded by de

Freycinet and Chanzy, never ceased. New forces were created, fresh plans of offence elaborated; Aurelle was dismissed, his place at the head of the forces south of the Loire being taken by Bourbaki—at one time the Chief of the Imperial Guard—while Chanzy north of the Loire fought a series of indecisive battles—ending however with his retreat, owing to the failure of Bourbaki to prevent a German corps south of the Loire from menacing his rear. Nevertheless Chanzy remained determined to continue his attempts to reach Paris, and by December 20 he had placed his army in a strong position at Le Mans.

Meanwhile Faidherbe had advanced from the fortresses on the Somme, and after an indecisive battle on the Hallue, a tributary of the Somme, had safely retired into Artois. After a pause in the theatre of war Chanzy urged that the three provincial armies under Faidherbe, Bourbaki and himself should make a simultaneous attempt to relieve Paris. According to his plan, while he moved towards Saint-Germain, Faidherbe was to advance to Saint-Denis, and Bourbaki from above Orléans against the German forces on the south and east of Paris. This plan, whether it succeeded or not, was true strategy and illustrates the military ability of Chanzy. Gambetta however, as he did after the battle of Coulmiers, again interfered, would not adopt Chanzy's advice, and determined to send Bourbaki's army south to relieve Belfort. In this fatal decision Gambetta had been supported by Freycinet and Serres, a young civil engineer, and in the battle of the Lisaine, January 15-17, "the fate of France was sealed."

The design of Gambetta was in many ways an attractive one—the relief of Belfort and an attack on the German communications in Alsace. But Bourbaki's army was unequal to the task, while its departure south enabled Prince Friedrich Karl and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to unite and attack Chanzy and Faidherbe in turn. On January 12 the German armies defeated Chanzy and captured Le Mans, and on January 19 inflicted a severe defeat near Saint-Quentin upon Faidherbe.

The fall of Paris was now inevitable, and after a last sortie on January 19 nothing remained but surrender. On January 28 the Germans granted a local armistice of three weeks, during which the National Assembly might be elected and decide on peace or the continuance of the war.

During those three weeks France suffered her final disaster in the field, for early in January v. Manteuffel at the head of a strong army had marched south and joined Werder, then

in pursuit of Bourbaki's broken army. At this crisis Clinchant, who, owing to Bourbaki's illness, had succeeded to the command of the French troops, found himself in danger of being surrounded by the German armies, and on February 2 his army, now reduced to 90,000 men, reached neutral territory across the Swiss border. One writer has happily termed this catastrophe "the Sedan of the second part of the war."

The German triumph in the war was largely due to the decision, energy and scientific skill of Moltke, to the marked ability shown by Prince Friedrich Karl and to the masterly strategy of Manteuffel. Had Bazaine held out for but a few weeks longer the difficulties of the Germans would have been enormously increased. Gambetta would have had time to organise a national rising in France, and Chanzy, who, like Wellington, showed such a remarkable genius for defence, would, with the assistance of able generals like Faidherbe, have at any rate secured for France far easier terms than she obtained at Frankfort.

Meanwhile on January 18 King William of Prussia had, in the Galerie des Glaces at Versailles, been proclaimed German Emperor. Paris had surrendered, the city only escaping a German occupation by the payment of a heavy sum of money. At Bordeaux Gambetta fiercely demanded a continuance of the war, but finding little support he resigned and departed to Spain.

The elections showed unmistakably that the country desired peace, and Thiers, who was on February 17 appointed Chief of the Executive, met Bismarck at Versailles on February 21. As a result of the negotiations the Germans obtained Alsace and German Lorraine with Metz, but, largely owing to the efforts of Thiers, France retained Belfort. She had however to pay an indemnity of £200,000,000 and to allow the German occupation of that quarter of Paris known as the Champs Elysées until the terms had been ratified.

This ratification was executed by the Assembly on March 1, and the Champs Elysées quarter was only occupied by German troops from March 1 to March 3. It was not till May 20 that the definitive Treaty of Frankfort was signed by Jules Favre and Pouyer-Quertier on behalf of France. The terms of that Treaty were more severe than those of the Preliminaries of Versailles, and this increase of severity was due to the situation in Paris—of which Bismarck took full advantage. For from the beginning of March Paris had been the scene of a violent Communist rising, and early in April Paris was again

besieged—but this time by the French Government. The Revolutionaries were headed by Delescluze and Félix Pyat, the Hôtel de Ville and the Tuileries were destroyed, the Archbishop of Paris was murdered, and numerous other atrocities were committed. It was not till May 28 that the insurrection was entirely suppressed and the Communist leaders shot. The suppression of the Commune and the Treaty of Frankfort left France free, it is true, to establish a stable government and gradually to recover her position in Europe: but the days of Monarchy were over, and the future was dark.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC

XV

THE FORMING OF THE REPUBLIC

(1871-1875)

THE position of France after a disastrous war and a peace dictated by the enemy was bound to be distressing. She had lost two of her richest provinces: events were to prove that they were infinitely richer than was supposed in 1871; for the vast mineral wealth of Lorraine and Upper Alsace was not fully realised till some years after the Peace of Frankfort. This was fortunate for France; for it is hardly likely that Germany, in the hour of victory, would have left her enemy in possession of the larger portion of what was to become the most important ironfield of the world had she been aware of its potential value.

With Alsace and Lorraine France had lost a million and a half of population. Her direct loss of men during the war—by death, wounds and sickness—was not short of half a million, while her indirect loss was considerably greater. The pecuniary cost of the war could not be reckoned at less than 500,000,000 sterling, and France had further agreed to pay to Germany a war indemnity of five milliards of francs. Her military system was dislocated and discredited as a result of the war, and the state of her finances was alarming. Such was the material damage. Great as it was however the moral damage inflicted on her was even greater. The military operations had been uniformly disastrous to her, and had shattered her tradition of military prowess and grievously wounded the national self-esteem. The episode of the Commune had revealed internal weakness, and was an ugly display of dissension in the face of the enemy. If she looked abroad France could find no comfort. Napoleon III's schemes for alliances had proved unavailing; no friendly hand had been stretched out to France in her calamity; not even diplomatic pressure had been brought to her assistance. She had been, and remained, completely

isolated in Europe. Finally the internal position was obscure. In 1815 France after her defeat had accepted a Government which—whatever its faults—had commanded respect in the European Chancelleries, and was in point of fact the special *protégé* of the Powers. In 1871 it was soon to become clear that no such restoration was possible; and for years France did not even dare to apply a name to the form of government set up. The ambiguity of the constitutional position, the doubts and difficulties with which that question was beset, were destined to hamper the process of recovery and to detract from the European prestige of France for a good many years to come.

Such was the dark side of the picture; but it was not without its balance of light. The loss of the Rhine-lands was no doubt a grievous moral and material injury to France; yet it may be questioned whether their acquisition was not an even more serious injury to Germany. The failure to recognise the potential value of the French-Lorraine orefields made her unsuccessful even in her familiar rôle of robber, and allowed France, in spite of her defeat, to become the greatest iron-producing country of Europe. The material damage to wealth and population was certainly great; but the war had been a short one, and in a sense the rapidity and completeness of her defeat had been a positive advantage to France. A long-drawn-out struggle might indeed have secured a more favourable treaty; but the material strain would have been much greater. As it was, and comparatively speaking, the damage was such as might be quickly repaired. The economic machinery of the country was injured indeed, but not dislocated, with the result that the recovery was rapid, and that France was not prevented from taking a conspicuous part in the period of industrial and inventive progress which was about to open.

Such a period was indeed a specially favourable one for a country whose need was recuperation and restoration. This in turn implied that, while the financial situation might be anxious, it was not beyond repair. As for the fighting forces, France had her great military traditions, and these, though rudely affronted by her defeat, were so deeply rooted that the re-establishment of the army might be regarded as a foregone conclusion. Even for wounded self-esteem there were some salves; France could console herself with the heroic incidents of the People's War; there were even many who argued that Germany might have been worn down had the French resistance been prolonged. The disasters of 1870 could be attributed to

the blunders of imperial policy and the treason of Bazaine. Properly governed and led, Frenchmen could, and the majority probably did, argue that France remained invincible, and this encouraged the hope that in the end the tables would be turned. Even the episode of the Commune, which was not likely in any case to weigh heavily on the heart of a people nurtured in civil dissensions, could be attributed to an excess of zeal, a refusal—mistaken perhaps, but glorious nevertheless—to accept defeat.

As to European isolation, that was indeed a sufficiently disturbing fact and one which long paralysed the foreign policy of France. But it was natural to hope that the Powers would soon recognise the necessity of restoring European equilibrium, and that they would be as averse from a German ascendancy as in the past they had been from a French one. Finally, the question of internal government and of the Constitution which was yet to be made, though certainly a thorny one, and one which for almost a decade divided French politicians and paralysed the Assembly, left one ground on which all parties were agreed. They were united in their determination to restore France internally and to recover for her her place in Europe. Much has been written—and rightly written—of the factious and the fatuous behaviour of parties in the years immediately succeeding the Peace of Frankfort; it has not, perhaps, been sufficiently recognised how profoundly, in spite of their divisions, the men of 1871 were united in their determination to rescue their country from the depressed condition into which she had fallen.

Setting the good against the bad, it is possible to conclude that, while France had suffered grievous damage morally and materially, there was no reason for despair. It was fortunate for her that she had placed her destinies in the hands of a statesman who never thought of despairing. Thiers, who had been appointed Chief of the Executive at Bordeaux on February 17, 1871, and assumed the title of "President of the Republic" on August 31, 1871, and who was practically Dictator until his overthrow in May 1873, can hardly be sufficiently praised for his determined optimism, as well as for his clearness of head and singleness of purpose during this critical period. It is easy to ridicule the vanity and the foibles of this wonderful septuagenarian, but it is not possible to deny him the credit of the essential steps which led to the emancipation of France and set her on the road of recuperation. He was splendidly equipped both in character and ability for the daunting task

which, with characteristic alacrity and self-confidence, he had accepted.

Thiers, on taking office, had surrounded himself with thoroughly efficient ministers. A ministry which included Favre at the Foreign Office, Dufaure at the Ministry of Justice, Jules Simon at the Ministry of Education, Fine Arts and Public Worship, Ernest Picard at the Ministry of Interior, and Pouyer-Quertier at the Ministry of Finance did not lack distinction. In May and June a number of offices changed hands. Favre was replaced at the Foreign Office by de Rémusat ; the Ministry of the Interior passed from Picard to Lambrecht, and subsequently to Casimir-Perier and Lefranc in turn ; while General le Flô was succeeded by General de Cissey at the War Office. Pouyer-Quertier retained the Finance portfolio, but was subsequently replaced by de Goulard. The marvellous activity of Thiers however enabled him to control all the departments of State, so that the talented men who called themselves ministers were little more in practice than chief clerks occupied in carrying out the decisions of the Chief of the State.

The primary object of Thiers' policy, to which all else was subordinate, was the removal of the incubus of the German Army of Occupation, and in this his success was rapid and complete beyond the most sanguine dreams. On October 12, 1871, 1,500,000,000 francs of the war indemnity was paid, and six Departments were evacuated in accordance with the terms of the Treaty ; on June 29, 1872 a further evacuation took place ; finally on May 15, 1873 a Convention was signed arranging that the last instalment of the indemnity should be paid on September 5 next following, and that meanwhile Germany should be restricted to the occupation of Verdun. The evacuation was actually completed on September 16, 1873. Thiers had been driven from office in the previous May, before the final steps had been taken ; but the entire credit for the evacuation is his.

The rapid settlement of the indemnity and the liberation of French territory consequent on it were the core of Thiers' policy. Various expedients for meeting the financial crisis caused by the indemnity were suggested. Among them were proposals for a voluntary national subscription, and for a levy on capital of from $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 5 per cent. Thiers discarded both suggestions and proceeded by way of loan. Two milliards were borrowed in 1871, the stock being issued at $82\frac{1}{2}$. A loan of three milliards was offered in 1872 on terms equally favourable to lenders, and was subscribed thirteen times over. Thiers,

in fact, was so intent on his policy, and so determined that it should be successful, that he almost certainly offered terms too favourable to lenders. He has been reproached for this; but it was fortunate for France that she was guided by a statesman who knew his own mind and refused to haggle. What Thiers secured for France was worth paying for; and, if no provision has since been made for the redemption of these loans—a far more serious ground for reproach than the favourable terms on which they were floated—that is not his fault. Bismarck's position in face of the unexpectedly rapid recovery of France, as evidenced by the speed with which she paid the indemnity, was ambiguous. He wanted the indemnity, but at the same time he wanted to keep France in bondage. His violent outbursts of temper are proof of his embarrassment. From this time forward he was in constant fear of a rapid recuperation of the enemy, leading to a renewal of the war. No better testimony is wanted to the reality of the French recovery.

Next in importance to the evacuation of the territory was its security, and to provide for this Thiers, who prided himself on his knowledge of military matters, embarked on the reorganisation of the army. The Napoleonic organisation—the work of Gouvion Saint Cyr—had broken down in 1870. The principle of that organisation had been recruitment by lot. The war had proved the unwelcome necessity for universal service without exemption; and this it was now decided to impose. The crux of the problem was the length of the term of service, and between the two schools which advocated respectively professional and territorial armies, long and short service, Thiers steered a middle course. In the end it was only by a threat of resignation that he secured the five years' term which he considered essential. The Military Law of July 27, 1872 provided for five years' service in the active army, four years in the reserve of that army, five years in the territorial army and six in its reserve. A Committee of Defence was set up at the same time, and a system of "defensive curtains" was devised, by which provision was made for the defence of the new frontiers created by the Treaty of Frankfurt. The reorganisation of the artillery and *matériel* was also commenced, and a War Budget of half a milliard was imposed.

It was to these urgent matters of liberation and security that the activities of Thiers were mainly devoted. For domestic and even for foreign policy he had little time. Finance and

taxation however were bound to receive consideration. Thiers was a protectionist, whereas a majority in the Assembly favoured Free Trade. On the issue between a tax on incomes, which he vigorously denounced, and a duty on raw materials, which he advocated, he was defeated by 367 votes to 297; he at once resigned, but was persuaded to withdraw his resignation. Two laws of April 14 and August 10, 1871, on Municipalities and *Conseils généraux* of Departments, which extended the powers of the latter and created Departmental Commissions to assist the *Préfets*, were mainly directed against the ascendancy of Paris; Thiers, as the principal antagonist of the *Commune*, not unnaturally distrusted Paris and favoured decentralisation. These laws were steps in the direction of decentralisation, and it is significant that they met with vigorous opposition from the Extreme Left.

While these remedial and on the whole wonderfully successful measures were being adopted, one question, which in a sense dominated all others, remained in abeyance. France was still in the ambiguous position of having no Constitution or settled form of government. Thiers had been appointed with very vague powers to liquidate the past; but for the future no provision had been made, and the most baffling complications surrounded any attempt to make it. In order to understand the difficulties which beset the constitutional question some departure from the actual sequence of events is necessary. The majority of the Assembly was in favour of monarchical government: the Orleanists were in a relative preponderance over other groups, though they did not command an actual majority in the Assembly; there was a strong Legitimist group, and a very small group of Bonapartists. A powerful and as time went on an increasing minority, swelled by the Republicans steadily returned at elections, favoured a Republic.

The most serious complication of the constitutional question however was the fact that no less than three dynasties had claims on the vacant throne. The elder line of the House of Bourbon was represented by Henri Comte de Chambord ("Henri V"), grandson of Charles X; the Orléans claim rested in the Comte de Paris, grandson of Louis Philippe. Nor could the Bonapartes be wholly ignored. Napoleon III had not abandoned hope of a restoration, and, when he died on January 9, 1873, his claims passed to his son, the Prince Imperial. The French were not inclined to forget the tragic blunders of the Second Empire for which they were paying so dearly, and the recall of the Bonapartes would have been out

of the question but for the complete deadlock between the two Bourbon dynasties. This gave at certain moments a dangerous vitality to the Napoleonic claims.

At first sight it seems strange that an Assembly definitely monarchical in tone should not have set one or other of the Bourbon claimants on the throne, and astonishing that it should in the end have set up a Republic in spite of itself. To understand this puzzle it is necessary to examine the character and principles of the claimants. The Comte de Chambord is one of those characters to whose obstinate consistency it is impossible to refuse a despairing respect. In an aggravated degree the French "Henri V" resembles our "James III." He had certain convictions which it was impossible to shake. He would either be King by Divine Right, unhampered by charter or conditions, or he would remain an exile. As he himself remarked, he was either "a stout man with a limp" or the heir by Divine Right of an autocratic power. There were many men both in the Assembly and in the country who recognised Chambord as the legitimate claimant, but few who were ready to accept him on these terms. Those few, however, were numerous enough, in conjunction with the Republicans, to ruin the chances of the Orléans claimant. The supporters of the Orléans claim were actually the largest single group in the Assembly; and among them were many distinguished men, such as the Duc de Broglie, the Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier, Casimir-Perier and the Duc Decazes. They favoured an Orleanist restoration which would guarantee a liberal constitution.

But against the combination of the Legitimists with the Republicans they were powerless. To overcome this difficulty a compromise between the two branches of the House of Bourbon was proposed. This compromise, or "fusion" as it was called, was the more practicable in that Chambord was childless and now an elderly man. It should have been a simple matter for the two branches to agree, for the Orleanists to accept the claims of the Comte de Chambord, and for Chambord in turn to recognise the Comte de Paris as heir to the throne. The proposed "fusion" did indeed actually take place in August 1873, as the result of a visit by the Comte de Paris to his cousin at Frohsdorf, his place of exile; and an immediate restoration of the monarchy seemed imminent.

It was at this juncture, with the crown actually in his grasp, that Chambord re-emphasised his principles, and in so doing ruined not only his own chances but those of the House of

Orléans. He insisted, or reinsisted, on the supersession of the Tricolor by the White Flag. This implied a decision not to recognise either the Revolution or the Empire; a decision not indeed unnatural in the great-grandson of Louis XVI, but an attitude quite impossible for a King of France in 1872. To the vast majority of Frenchmen then living the epoch which Chambord proposed to wipe out was the very foundation of their liberties and fortunes, while to all Frenchmen it stood for the climax of national endeavour and national glory. Even a Legitimist so convinced as Marshal MacMahon regarded the suggestion with horror.¹

Rightly or wrongly, the Revolution had become to the majority of Frenchmen a tradition, bloodstained, no doubt, but heroic and colossal, while the Empire, which was essentially the sequel of the Revolution, in spite of the recent hideous calamity in which it had vanished, was not only filled with unparalleled glories and unparalleled sacrifices, but had actually given to France the institutions under which she was then living, and which experience had proved to be admirably suited to her national peculiarities. All this the "stout man with the limp" now coolly proposed to ignore. Many attempts were made to cajole, and even to entrap, the Count into a compromise; but he remained not only immovable but also disastrously frank and outspoken. Thus he threw away the crown for himself and threw it away also for the House of Orléans, brought for a moment a Bonapartist restoration within the bounds of possibility, and finally ensured the establishment of a Republic by a royalist Assembly.

The Orléans dynasty, whose head was the Comte de Paris, but whose outstanding figure was his uncle the Duc d'Aumale, a man of high character and popular personality, had quite other traditions and predilections. Louis Philippe had fought under the Tricolor, and his sons and grandson had no inclination to disavow that emblem. Not only so, but they were traditionally liberal, traditionally ready to accept conditions; a charter was no new thing to them; they stood for constitutional as opposed to arbitrary government. The reign of Louis Philippe was looked back to as prosperous; his downfall had been almost accidental; and the one thing lacking to his

¹ *Zevort*, ii, 33. The famous conversation between the Marshal and the Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier may be apocryphal. MacMahon was reported to have said that he would carry out his functions, but that "if the white flag was raised against the tricolour and was displayed at a window, while the other floated opposite, the chassepots would go off of their own accord," and that "he could not answer either for order in the street or for discipline in the army."

reign had been dignity. Now it seemed that an Orléans restoration might provide a happy solution for the constitutional problem. It was eagerly desired by a majority in the Assembly ; and, the "fusion" having collapsed owing to the obstinacy of Chambord, a strenuous effort was made to hold up the whole constitutional question until death should have removed Chambord and have cleared the way for the House of Orléans. The march of events, however, cannot be thus held up. France stood in need of something more than a provisional government of indefinite duration. The tide turned, even in the Assembly, in favour of a Republic, and so it came about that in 1875 the Republic was born.

Thiers, when he accepted office, had pledged himself to favour no party. This was an impossible pledge for anyone who proposed really to direct affairs, as Thiers most certainly did, or who contemplated being something more than a mere temporary liquidator, as Thiers even more certainly did. He was therefore obliged to take a side in the constitutional struggle above described. The aged statesman, with absolute self-complacency and confidence in his own powers, believed himself to be essential to France. He was therefore forced to descend into the constitutional arena. Thiers was an Orleanist by tradition ; but his alert mind quickly recognised the impossibility, under the conditions prevailing, of any monarchical restoration. Though not a Republican by conviction, he was driven to the conclusion that a Republic was inevitable. It was, as he phrased it, "the form of government that divides us least."

While Thiers accepted the idea of a Republic with some degree of reluctance, there were many who advocated it with conviction. The most prominent figure among these convinced Republicans was Gambetta, whose impulsive eloquence and dynamic energy made him a real leader of opinion. With such phrases as "A country should never hand itself over to one man," and "Clericalism ; there is the enemy !" he provided the cause with its war-cries. But while Gambetta at this period of his career desired a Republic that should move rapidly along the paths of social reform, and above all should break the choking bonds of ecclesiasticism, Thiers was sympathetic with the Church and developed the idea of a Conservative Republic. It was this idea that commended itself, when the time came, to a majority of the disappointed Monarchists.

It is necessary to understand that the Legitimist cause was

closely linked with that of the Church of Rome and to realise the consequences of that connection. The period was one of great religious, or more strictly speaking ecclesiastical, revival. The downfall of the temporal power of the Papacy had rallied devout Roman Catholics to the side of the oppressed Pontiff and had led to the extraordinary spiritual claims put forward and accepted in the Vatican Council of 1870. It seemed as if the faithful desired to compensate the Pope for his material losses by denying him no spiritual claim, however extravagant. This rally to the Pope was perhaps more emphatic in France than anywhere else.

Some of the French Bishops even petitioned the Assembly to intervene for the restoration of the temporal power. Such a step would have been in the highest degree impolitic, and might have embroiled France in a fresh war when she was still reeling from her recent experience. Thiers, while declaring that he would defend religion, repudiated the idea of intervention. Pious Roman Catholics attributed the woes of their country to the decay of religion and were roused to a fever-heat of fervour. An enormous basilica dedicated to the Sacred Heart, on the heights of Montmartre dominating Paris, was planned as a votive and expiatory offering. Had this revival been purely religious it would have aroused little opposition. But it was ecclesiastical and ultramontane even more than religious, and was an indication of the disastrous intention of the Church to throw itself into politics.

This intervention of the Church in politics was the cause of a wide cleavage of opinions, which, to her great sorrow, has divided France ever since. There was, in fact, far more at issue than purely religious problems. The Western World, it must be remembered, was entering on a period of unparalleled economic and intellectual development. Discovery and invention were about to revolutionise society, and under these circumstances education began to assume a quite new importance. There were those who blamed not the decay of religion but educational and intellectual sluggishness for the catastrophe of 1870-71. To them, as indeed to all unprejudiced and thoughtful minds, it was clear that, unless France threw herself whole-heartedly into the task of educational and intellectual development, that catastrophe must be final. If she was to take the place in the new Europe to which her traditions and national genius entitled her, she must do so by real achievements intellectual and moral, and these could only be attained

by the fullest acceptance of the need for a broad and liberal education.

Now, the ultramontane trend of ecclesiastical ideas, leaning on the decrees of the Vatican Council and the reactionary Syllabus, threatened to ruin these aspirations, because education was largely in the hands of the Religious Orders. France therefore seemed doomed to a permanent eclipse, and the question was thus raised in its full intensity whether she was to accept a non-national and obscurantist education at the dictation of Rome, or whether she was to go forward on national lines, a free competitor in the race for national efficiency. France, in fact, had her *Kulturkampf* as well as Germany. For her it was a life-and-death struggle; and the fact that the Legitimist dynasty was closely identified with Ultramontanism had a bearing on its failure and eclipse.

During the autumn of 1872 Gambetta made a great tour of the country, advocating in a series of eloquent speeches the dissolution of the Assembly which he maintained had no constitutional mandate, and the summoning of a constituent Assembly to establish a Republican Constitution. On November 13, 1872 Thiers, who had now definitely identified himself with the idea of a Conservative Republic, announced in a message to the Assembly that "events had founded the Republic." This unequivocal pronouncement implied a complete breach with the Extreme Right in the Assembly, and it was not certain that it would bring compensating support from the Left, where Gambetta's doctrine of a democratic Republic emanating from a Constituent Assembly was gaining ground. The Left Centre however, a mainly Orleanist group, rallied to the President, and a Committee of Thirty was forthwith appointed (November 29, 1872) to present a Bill "determining the attributes of the public powers and the conditions of ministerial responsibility." This Committee, which contained hardly any Republicans, was by a strange nemesis destined to be the author of the Republican Constitution. A kind of fatality condemned it to the part of Balaam.

Thiers, recognising the weakness of his position in the Assembly, now made overtures to the Right Centre, the stronghold of the uncompromising Orleanists and Bonapartists. On November 30, 1872 he reconstructed the Ministry by introducing some members of that group. By so doing he alienated the more robust Republicans who had hitherto supported him. He was in fact engaged in a game of trimming,

and one of the most delicate nature. He was so far successful that he obtained permission for the introduction of a Bill for a Republican Constitution.

The issue was now between a Conservative Republic as proposed by Thiers and Gambetta's scheme for what he called a "Republican Republic." A Ministry of liberal Republicans was formed under Dufaure, and the preparation of constitutional Bills was commenced. But Thiers' fragile majority broke in his hands. The alliance with the Right Centre collapsed. The out-and-out Orleanists, under the leadership of de Broglie, decided that Thiers must go. At first there was an idea of setting up the Duc d'Aumale as a candidate for the Presidency; but this was discarded, and it was decided to concentrate on Marshal MacMahon. On May 24, 1873 the blow fell: Thiers was placed in a minority of thirteen and tendered his resignation.

The fall of Thiers caused indignation and some alarm in Europe. It was felt, and not without reason, that the venerable statesman's great services to France warranted better treatment than he had received; and indeed he had deserved well of his country. He had raised her to a position for which no one could have dared to hope when he assumed power. He had liberated the soil of France, had reorganised the army in defiance of the strong protests of Germany, had baffled Bismarck's efforts to pick a fresh quarrel with France, had re-established French credit and had successfully inaugurated an era of great material progress. Agriculture and industry were prospering; wages were rising; and technical instruction had been established on a firm basis. This material prosperity was not of course wholly, or even primarily, due to Thiers; it was part of a great European movement in which the national genius of France gave her a share. But it was due to Thiers that she had been sufficiently revitalised to play her part.

It was in foreign policy that Thiers' success had been least conspicuous. Here he had been content, or had been forced, to mark time. Nothing had been done, perhaps nothing could have been done, to break the isolation of France. Her indeterminate constitutional position was a powerful contributory factor to this continued isolation. Thiers had done his best to avoid everything that might give offence to any of the Powers. To avoid giving offence to Italy was a matter of special difficulty by reason of the Ultramontanism of the majority in the Assembly. Thiers, as we know, had withstood

the pressure brought by the Bishops for intervention against the overthrow of the temporal power, but he had not been able to withdraw the French cruiser which was maintained at Civita Vecchia as an indication of the French *liaison* with the Vatican.

This was, of course, a cause of grave offence to the kingdom of Italy; it helped to push that country into the arms of Germany, then engaged in her *Kulturkampf*, and thus to sow the seed which was later to spring up in the Triple Alliance. During the whole period of Thiers' Government, and indeed for long afterwards, French foreign policy was in fact in a state of paralysis. It was in part due to the absorption of Thiers in internal affairs of vast importance; and also to the fact that, so long as the constitutional question remained unsettled, a definite foreign policy was impossible, and that, so long as the majority in the Assembly was bound to the Pope, France was compelled to fight her diplomatic battles with one hand tied behind her back.

Thiers' successor—chosen by 390 votes out of 391 cast—was Marshal MacMahon, the victor of Magenta, the vanquished of Sedan. MacMahon was sixty-five, descended from a family of Irish extraction. Somewhat stiff and tactless, and troubled with a very bad memory, he was essentially not a politician but a soldier, with the scrupulous honour and loyalty of the best type of soldier. A convinced monarchist and an even more convinced Catholic, he was acceptable to the monarchist and ultramontane majority in the Assembly, and was regarded by them as a stop-gap who would hold matters in suspense until a monarchical solution of the constitutional question could be obtained. Nothing can be more certain than that MacMahon would at any time in his presidential career have willingly retired in favour of a legally appointed King. But it soon became clear that his punctilious respect for law made it equally certain that he would never allow himself to be made an agent in any attempt at a *coup d'état*.

It was, in truth, not as a monarchist but as an ultramontane that MacMahon was dangerous to France; for in this direction he was able to gratify his convictions without doing violence to his conscience. He and his *entourage* announced themselves as the apostles of what they called "Moral Order"—the euphemism employed to indicate the acceptance of the full yoke of the Roman Church. This policy, favoured by MacMahon, was developed by his Chief of the Cabinet (or Vice-

President of the Council ¹), the Duc de Broglie. De Broglie was the son of Louis Philippe's minister and the grandson of Madame de Staël, a man of great culture and distinction, who had recently served as ambassador in London. In conviction he was a strict, if liberal, Catholic and an Orleanist; in character he was strong and silent; of great ability, the master of a mocking and incisive eloquence, he was shy and reserved and somewhat over-subtle; a great parliamentary leader, but not a man to sway the masses or influence opinion.

The main objects of his policy were to settle the constitutional question in a monarchical sense, and to bring about a national return to Catholicism. At first it was hoped that, by means of the "fusion" of the two branches of the Bourbon dynasty, the need for temporisation might be avoided; but, after the Frohsdorf visit (August 1873) and the reiteration by the Comte de Chambord of his insistence on the white flag, and the failure of all attempts to get over or round his decision, de Broglie recognised the need for procrastination, and, in the hope of keeping the ground clear for an eventual restoration of the House of Orléans, proposed an extension of the period of MacMahon's term of office. MacMahon was avowedly a monarchist, and could moreover be trusted not to cling to power for personal reasons, for he was quite devoid of political ambition. He was therefore the best possible stop-gap. In ten years—the period at first proposed—the probability was that Chambord might be dead and the field clear for the House of Orléans.

Such in broad lines was the scheme conceived by de Broglie. At this juncture Chambord himself came secretly to Versailles in the hope of influencing the Marshal, and doubtless with the intention of executing a *coup d'état* with his assistance. Monarchist as he was, MacMahon had the courage and honesty to refuse to receive the Count, who quickly returned to exile. On November 20, 1873 a Bill extending the Marshal's term of office to seven years was carried by a majority of sixty-eight. This "Septennate," as it was called, sealed the fate of the Legitimists, and seemed, while postponing, to secure the ultimate restoration of the House of Orléans. But much may happen in seven years, and it is as impossible to suspend as to foretell the march of events.

¹ The Chief of the Cabinet had to be content with the humble title of Vice-President of the Council until 1876, when Dufaure assumed the title of President of the Council. The President of the Republic was *ex officio* President of the Council and even after 1876 availed himself of his privilege. Grévy exercised considerable influence over his numerous ministers by his skilful chairmanship.

In spite, and partly because, of this success de Broglie found himself obliged to reconstruct his Cabinet (November 26, 1873), to eliminate his Legitimist colleagues, and to take a step toward the Left. The most important ministerial change was the introduction of the Duc Decazes as Foreign Minister. It is a curious and in some ways a fortunate characteristic of French public life that when a Cabinet falls many of the ministers often retain their posts in the succeeding Cabinet. Decazes survived many changes of ministry, and was able to give a certain continuity to French foreign policy until his fall in 1877.

It was no easy task that had fallen to Decazes. The vehement religious propaganda patronised by de Broglie with the support of the majority in the Assembly had not only affronted Italy but had roused the indignation of Bismarck. Decazes temporised as best he could, and looked anxiously to England for support. A relaxation of the tariffs imposed by Thiers, the exemption of raw materials from duties and the abolition of flag-dues had enabled France to offer tariff concessions, and an economic treaty with England (July 23, 1873) was the first indication of a *rapprochement* with that country. It was the personal intervention of Queen Victoria, the Prince of Wales and the Tsar that forced Bismarck to adopt a less threatening attitude. This intervention was repeated in April 1875, when Germany was on the point of demanding the disarmament of France.

The alteration of the fiscal system was an item in the Budget of 1874, the work of Magne, the Minister of Finance. Magne was confronted with a deficit of 134,000,000 francs, to meet which new taxation was necessary. As the Conservative majority in the Assembly would not hear of the taxation of land, funded wealth or income, the only resource was to find the necessary money by indirect taxation, including taxation of food. This policy, which France has ever since been reluctant to abandon, amounted to an economic revolution. But, even so, it was impossible to balance the Budget, and an appreciable deficit remained.

On October 6, 1873 the trial of Marshal Bazaine on a charge of treason was opened before a Council of War over which the Duc d'Aumale presided. After a hearing which lasted for two months the accused was found guilty on December 6, and condemned to death with military degradation. But, on the representation of the Court which passed this sentence, it was commuted into twenty years' detention, without degradation.

Making every allowance for his personal courage and the distinguished services which he had previously rendered to his country, no unprejudiced person can exculpate Bazaine; as the Duc d'Aumale pointed out, he forgot France, of all crimes the most unpardonable in a Frenchman. The exaction of the extreme penalty might have had a salutary effect. Yet it is possible to rejoice that it was not thought necessary to inflict it. Bazaine escaped a few months later from his place of detention,¹ fled to Spain, and died in Madrid in extreme destitution.

De Broglie had alienated the Extreme (Legitimist) Right by his "Septennate" policy; he was confronted moreover with a decided trend of public opinion towards Republicanism. The bourgeois classes, reassured by Thiers' return to public life and his advocacy of a Conservative Republic, were becoming more and more reconciled to that solution. De Broglie was driven to the dangerous expedient of leaning on the Bonapartist group, and this in turn drove more moderate men into the Republican camp. The Ministry was tottering; and the repressive and autocratic measures which, in pursuance of its ecclesiastical policy, it now introduced hastened its downfall. The Law of January 30, 1874, for instance, which gave to the President power to appoint and dismiss Mayors, was wholly reactionary and quite foreign to the spirit of the times.

The Extreme Right had now definitely cut itself adrift from de Broglie, and began to demand a definition of the constitutional situation which should indicate that the door was not closed against Chambord. The Republicans on their part also pressed for a definition, but one which should show that the door was closed against every form of monarchy. A definition was just what de Broglie could not provide. The whole strength of his position lay in its indefiniteness; to define meant ruin. Not all the Minister's dialectical skill availed him in this dilemma. There was in fact no definition which would satisfy a sufficient number of the political groups to ensure a ministerial majority. The existing form of government was "either a provisional Republic or an expectant Monarchy"; and whichever definition de Broglie adopted, he was bound to alienate such a body in the Assembly as would put him in a minority. The defeat of the Government was inevitable, and on May 16, 1874 de Broglie was placed in a minority of sixty-four votes; a result due to the union of the Right and Left Centres.

In the eclipse of Legitimists and Orleanists the Bonapartists

¹ The island of Sainte Marguerite, off Cannes.

had raised their heads. They had been prominent in de Broglie's reconstructed Cabinet; and in that of General de Cissey, which now (May 24) took its place, they were even more prominent. The de Cissey Cabinet was the weakest of combinations. It did not command a majority either in the Assembly or in the country, where its Bonapartist tinge aroused general dismay. It only existed by the most strenuous self-repression. As M. Hanotaux remarks, "it only just breathed and vegetated noiselessly." Only the fear of a dissolution and a possible appeal to the country inspired the Assembly, in the interests of self-preservation, to retain it in office.

De Broglie's Government had been defeated over a question of priority between two Bills, the Parliamentary Elections Bill and the Municipal Elections Bill. It was now decided to proceed with the latter; and, after some debate, the franchise in municipal elections was given to every male French citizen over twenty-one years of age in the *Commune* in which he resided. This indicated a strong drift towards extreme democracy.

The Assembly was thus advancing slowly towards a Constitution. Gambetta, with that pliant adroitness which afterwards gained him the name of "opportunist," had veered round to the conclusion that the Republic he desired could be extracted from the Monarchist Assembly, and no longer maintained that the latter had no constitutional mandate. But the Extreme Left could not divest itself of suspicion of the Monarchists and continued to demand a dissolution. The march of the Assembly towards a Constitution was a painful one. Every step was taken with infinite reluctance and the majorities were very small. The nature of the Constitution thus came to depend on the votes of a few open-minded men, and especially on a small Left Centre group which followed the distinguished publicist, Léonce de Lavergne. Casimir-Perier, the son of Louis Philippe's Minister and a prominent member of the Left Centre, introduced a motion on June 15, 1874 for the organisation of the Republic under a President with two Chambers, and "Urgency" for this motion was carried by four votes; a fresh, if narrow, victory for the union of the two Centres, which had already been successful in overthrowing de Broglie. General de Cissey resisted a motion for the definition of the existing form of government, and kept a majority.

But the Marshal was constrained by the attitude of the Left Centre to promise regular institutions, and on July 20, 1874

to dismiss the Bonapartist members of the Ministry. The Assembly was then prorogued until November 30, and it was only in January 1875 that the task of creating regular institutions was begun. In the last days of December the Marshal, who was much embarrassed, summoned a number of members of the Left Centre to confer with him on the Constitutional question, and on January 9, 1875 vaguely invited the Assembly to set up a Senate. On January 25, by a large majority, the principle of a Second Chamber was adopted.

The last days of January were critical days. Laboulaye, a distinguished professor, Chairman of the Left Centre, proposed the following clause: "The Government of the Republic consists of two Chambers and a President." This was too definite for the Majority and was rejected by 359 votes to 336 (January 30); M. Wallon intervened with a somewhat less definite proposal: "The President of the Republic is elected, through the suffrages of the majority, by the Senate and by the Chamber of Deputies convened in the National Assembly. He is appointed for seven years and may be re-elected." This modification was sufficient to bring about a miniature landslide of Left Centre votes, and his clause was carried by a majority of one vote—353 to 352 (January 30, 1875). The importance of this vote was that for the first time it put the idea of a Republic into words. January 30, 1875 has ever since, though not without some stretch of imagination, been regarded as the birthday of the Third Republic, and the mild student who devised the clause as its founder.

A further law of February 1, 1875 enacted that the President should obtain the consent of the Senate before dissolving the Chamber; and a clause establishing ministerial responsibility was passed on February 3. The next question was the composition of the Senate, and election by universal suffrage was carried by twelve votes. This was too much for the Marshal, and the Government declared that it could not accept the clause. Everything was in confusion; some demanded a dissolution; others an adjournment; others again, a change of Ministry. A compromise was evidently the only way out. The Marshal abandoned his right of appointing Life Senators in return for the abandonment of the principle of universal suffrage applied to the Senate.

On February 24 the following clause was passed: "The Senate consists of 300 members, 225 elected by the Colonies and Departments and 75 by the National Assembly. . . . The Senators elected by the National Assembly are irremovable."

On the following day it was decreed by a majority of 170 that the Chamber of Deputies should be elected by universal suffrage. Thus the essentials of a Republican Constitution were accepted by a Monarchical Assembly. The outstanding constitutional questions were decided during the course of the year. On July 16 a law on the mutual relations of the various branches of the Executive was passed; on August 2 the electoral machinery for the appointment of Senators was defined; and on November 2 it was decreed that the deputies to the Chamber should be elected by what was called *scrutin d'arrondissement*. Over this last question there had been considerable difference of opinion between *scrutin de liste* and the method actually adopted. In *scrutin de liste* the election is by Departments, and every elector may record as many votes as there are members: in *scrutin d'arrondissement* the subdivisions of the Departments known as *arrondissements* are the units, and the elector may only record a single vote. It was held, and not without some justification, that *scrutin d'arrondissement* gave what we should call a "parochial" basis to elections and lent itself to corruption and the domination of petty interests, whereas *scrutin de liste* directed the minds of the electors to larger interests, and was more likely to secure the election of men of wide views.

The Constitution of 1875 has stood for over forty-seven years with remarkably little alteration. It has thus been by far the most enduring of the many Constitutions of France. When the conditions under which it was created are remembered this seems a remarkable result. For the Constitution was not the work of a single brain or of any school of thought. It was throughout a bargain and a compromise between reluctant groups, none of whom were enthusiastic for it and most of whom were sceptical of the wisdom of some at least of its provisions. It had involved sacrifice of cherished convictions from all its authors, and wholly commended itself to none of them.

The strength of the Constitution probably lay in this very fact. Anything which exacted such an infinity of difficulty and compromise to build would not be built at all without compelling necessity. Nor must it be supposed that its authors failed to profit from the mistakes enshrined in the long line of abortive Constitutions that lay behind: experience was their guide. Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the Constitution was its boldness; it embarked without hesitation on the sea of universal suffrage which to many seemed dark

and limitless ; it put aside the idea of Directory or Consulate and placed at its head a single man : it accepted the principle of revision which was a protection against revolution, but also evidence that the authors of the Constitution of 1875 were by no means convinced of the merits of their handiwork. In this diffidence they compared favourably with earlier Constitution-makers. The subsequent troubles of France have frequently been attributed to the mistakes of the Constitution of the Republic ; but it is only fair to point out that not infrequently they were due to breaches of it.

XVI

EARLY STRUGGLES

(1875-1882)

THE establishment of the Constitution of 1875 placed both the President and the Assembly in difficult and ambiguous positions. MacMahon was essentially a legalist. There was therefore never any doubt that he would accept the Constitution and endeavour—according to his lights—to be loyal to it. But he was also firmly determined to take no step which would lead in the direction of secularist government. He remained the apostle of “Moral Order” ; and sooner or later the two ideals were bound to clash. Indeed they began to clash almost at once. The Marshal was suspicious of, and even antagonistic to, the democratic forces which had been mainly responsible for the establishment of the Constitution and to whose leaders the task of putting it into operation should have been entrusted. It has been argued with undeniable force that under these circumstances his proper course was to resign. Such a course would not have been personally distasteful to him. But he was convinced that he alone stood between France and extreme Republicanism and secularism and was therefore necessary to the country.

And, if MacMahon was placed in an ambiguous position, so also was the Assembly, the majority of which was also hostile to the democratic forces which had triumphed in the Constitutional debates ; the majority in fact, curiously enough, was, broadly speaking, antagonistic to the Constitution which it had just helped to carry. The Assembly was visibly out of touch

with the country ; dissolution hung over its head, and with it inevitable eclipse for many of its members. The Right was eager, before the Assembly passed into oblivion, to secure for the Church the control of Higher Education. Monseigneur Dupanloup cleverly cloaked clerical reaction under the guise of liberalism, and on July 12, 1875 a Bill was passed which rejected the claim of the State to the exclusive right of conferring degrees. In thus seeking to entrench themselves against the inevitable advance of liberalism the Clericals over-reached themselves. A little later they were to suffer for their adroitness, and when the time comes to examine the rights and wrongs of the anti-clerical measures of the Third Republic it must not be forgotten that it was the Clericals who, in this Bill of 1875, had flung down the challenge.

On the resignation of the de Cissey Cabinet on February 26, 1875, just at the most critical moment of the constitutional debates, MacMahon had had considerable difficulty, and had also, it must be acknowledged, displayed considerable ineptitude, in dealing with the ministerial crisis. Finally, on March 10 a Buffet Cabinet was constituted. The choice of Buffet for Chief of Cabinet was unfortunate ; for he embodied in his person just those fears and reserves which typified the feelings of the majority in the Assembly. He was visibly uncomfortable in office, and indeed temperamentally unsuited for it. He was also uncomfortable with his colleagues, some of whom, it is fair to note, had been forced upon him by the Marshal President. He did not see eye to eye with Wallon, or Dufaure, or Léon Say. Seldom has a minister had a more unhappy term of office. It was under the guidance of the Buffet Ministry that the final touches were given to the Constitution. In particular the Ministry gave vigorous support to the policy of *scrutin d'arrondissement*. The final act of the expiring Assembly was to appoint 75 Senators according to the constitutional provision : of these 27 were from the Left Centre, 25 of the Left ; 3 of the Extreme Left ; 9 of the Extreme Right ; 7 of the Lavergne group ; 1 Independent, and 3 only of the Right Centre. On December 31, 1875 the Assembly was dissolved.

The elections for the Chamber of Deputies ensued. The President and Ministry adopted a policy of open hostility to the Republican candidates, and in a sense the election resolved itself into a struggle between Gambetta and MacMahon, and emphasised the complete cleavage between the two men and their ideals. And between the weapons they used also ; for, while

Gambetta made full use of his magnetic eloquence and showed himself a real leader, MacMahon and his agents did not scruple to employ the administrative staff to influence the elections. The result was a total defeat for these indefensible tactics (which savoured of the most autocratic days of the Empire), and a resounding Republican victory. The Republicans in the new Chamber outnumbered the Right by nearly two to one. Within the Republican ranks a subsidiary victory had also been won by the extreme or convinced Republicans. It was a complete turnover of the political world, and the opening of a new chapter. Buffet, who had descended to the most unworthy methods in order to control the elections, was driven ignominiously from public life.

On the advice of de Broglie the Marshal, more and more embarrassed as the Republican victory became more pronounced, had tried to take the wind out of the sails of the Extremists by appointing his Ministry before he met the new Chamber. Dufaure, a veteran of seventy-eight, who had been Vice-President of the Council under Thiers and was a moderate Republican of liberal inclinations, was entrusted with the formation of the Cabinet, with the title of President, not as heretofore Vice-President, of the Council. The Marshal reaped little advantage from this manœuvre, for the Dufaure Cabinet was both feeble and short-lived. The position in relation to the Chamber of any Cabinet which would be tolerable to MacMahon was in fact dubious. To retain the support of the Extreme Left was under the new conditions essential; but measures calculated to secure that support would inevitably arouse the opposition of the Marshal.

Two laws were carried, repealing the Higher Education Act of 1875 which had been the great triumph of the defeated Ultramontane majority in the recently dissolved Assembly, and repealing the Mayors Act of January 20, 1874. Both these repeals were undoubtedly justified. The question of an amnesty for those involved in the insurrection of the *Commune* was long debated in both Chamber and Senate; and on December 1 the ministerial proposals were defeated in the Senate, and Dufaure handed in his resignation. The only wonder was that he had been able to carry on the Government for nine months.

MacMahon was in a more difficult position than ever. His first idea was to call de Broglie to office; his next to insist on the withdrawal of Dufaure's resignation. Neither of these expedients proving practicable, after ten days' hesitation he

sent for Jules Simon (December 12, 1876), an old personal antagonist and a free-thinker whom MacMahon greatly distrusted but who would, he hoped, be willing to carry on Dufaure's policy and make it acceptable to Parliament. Simon, much gratified by his appointment, served the Marshal loyally. He continued Dufaure's pathetic attempts to go far enough to satisfy the Republican Left without going further than was acceptable to the Marshal, and like Dufaure he failed. He never succeeded in overcoming MacMahon's distrust. His acceptance of a motion denouncing ultramontane intrigue—at that time specially rife owing to the senile activity of Pius IX—wounded the President in his most tender part; but the final breach was caused by Simon's acquiescence in the repeal of certain press restrictions and in a Bill sanctioning the sitting of municipal councils in public.

MacMahon was convinced that restrictions and repression were necessary in order to secure the triumph of "Moral Order," and on May 16, 1877 he addressed a letter to Simon which left the latter no alternative but resignation. On May 17 de Broglie, who had always been at MacMahon's side as his adviser, took office at the head of a Cabinet of Bonapartists and Orleanists which was in truth nothing more nor less than an Ultramontane Cabinet: the Marshal had embarked on the experiment of governing without the support of a parliamentary majority. Parliament was immediately prorogued for a month, and on its reassembly de Broglie appealed to the Senate, when he felt sure of a majority, to sanction a dissolution. By a majority of nineteen votes they did so.

There ensued a very determined effort on the part of the Government to influence the elections: an enormous number of functionaries convicted or suspected of adherence to Republican views were dismissed; the Marshal even stooped so low as to make a direct appeal to the army. The clergy joined in the fray, the Bishops publishing special charges. On the official notices MacMahon's supporters announced themselves as "Candidates of the Government." The result was total defeat for the reactionaries. In spite of all the unjustifiable means that had been employed they scarcely made an impression on the Republican majority. A transfer of forty seats and of 700,000 votes of a total of 7,000,000 voters was the net result of all this activity. The Republicans returned with a clear majority in the Chamber of more than 100.

Confronted with this hostile majority, the result of a direct appeal to the electorate, the Marshal made one more despairing

effort : he called on General Rochebouet to form an extra-parliamentary Cabinet. It is difficult to see what benefit he expected to derive from this step. The Rochebouet Ministry was completely paralysed, the Chamber even refusing to vote supply : it only held office for three weeks (November 23—December 15, 1877). MacMahon was now obliged to recognise his defeat ; but he still refused to send for Gambetta, the real victor in the recent crisis, and recalled Dufaure, who formed a Republican Left Centre Ministry. The special *protégés* of the Marshal, who had reappeared in all his ministries, now disappeared : of these the most important was Decazes, who had remained at the Foreign Office for four years. His place was taken by Waddington, a learned and enlightened man, a Protestant of English extraction and upbringing.

Dufaure's Ministry commanded a majority in the Chamber, and its actions were those of a constitutional ministry. It seemed that the Marshal was resigned to accept the constitutional rôle to which the failure of the *Seize Mai* had reduced him. The return of a Republican majority of about sixty in the Senate at the sensational elections of 1878 put one more temptation out of his way. MacMahon presided with dignity over the International Exhibition which was held in Paris in the spring of 1878, and it seemed likely that he would conclude his septennate without further difficulties. But when he found that the Dufaure Ministry were determined—in response to the demand of the Republican Majority—on the removal of certain officers and functionaries to make room for Republicans, and when he was pressed to supersede highly-placed army officers whose only fault as he conceived it had been their fidelity to him, he determined to resign (January 30, 1879).

MacMahon's presidency had been a troubled one. His strong ultramontane leanings, and his horror—perfectly genuine and frankly avowed—of a secularist republic, had done much harm : abroad it had helped to alienate Italy and to provoke Germany ; at home it had placed the honest soldier in the hands of the unscrupulous politicians who surrounded him and took advantage of his political ineptitude. His part during the crisis of the *Seize Mai* had been forced on him : rather than play it he should have resigned. Nevertheless MacMahon's presidency had been of real value to France. The prestige of his name and the dignity with which he performed his high duties had commanded a respect in the Chancelleries of Europe which would have been extended to no other living Frenchman. Even his leanings towards Monarchical institutions and

his hostility towards Republicanism—obstructive as they had been at home—had had their value abroad, where a more rapid and complete transformation of France into a Republic might well have led to disastrous complications. Personally MacMahon was always honoured and respected during his term of office, and this honour and respect followed him into private life.

The retirement of MacMahon marks the close of one epoch and the opening of another. The would-be Monarchic Republic gave place to the "Republican Republic"; in 1879 therefore a new era opens, and it is proper to take stock of the international position of France during the era that closed on January 30, 1879. During the last year of the MacMahon Presidency Waddington had been at the Foreign Office, but during the four years immediately preceding that office had been continuously occupied by the Duc Decazes. A certain continuity had thus been given to French foreign policy. Decazes was a man who moved in half-lights and carried self-effacement to extreme lengths, so much so that it is difficult to detect in his policy any definite trend save that of the line of least resistance. It would be rash to assert that this policy or lack of policy was ill-advised, or that France, in the ambiguous and dangerous position in which she had been left by the Treaty of Frankfurt, could have adopted a more self-reliant attitude or pursued a more active policy. The embarrassments with which she was confronted were immense, and not least among them was the indeterminate character of her Government. The Powers were shy and reluctant to enter into close relations with a country which seemed to be halting between a Republic and a Monarchy.

The ultramontane leanings of the President and the Majority in the Assembly of 1871 created even greater difficulties. A Legitimist restoration, which was never impossible so long as this Assembly endured, would have completely alienated Italy and might have heralded a renewal of war with Germany. The Decazes period was therefore of necessity an inglorious one. Even in the colonies such movement as there was seemed to be retrograde. In Africa France appeared to be abandoning her foothold; in Indo-China, where the exploration of the Red River by Jean Dupuis presented an admirable access for the penetration of Southern China, no move in this direction was made; but by a treaty with the Court of Hué (March 15, 1874) Annam accepted a disguised French Protectorate and cut herself off from China; while on August 31, 1874 a further

treaty secured to France commercial privileges on the Red River. In Egypt it was Decazes who took the first steps which led to the exclusion of France from that country. The Suez Canal was a French enterprise ; but Disraeli's celebrated *coup* (December 1875), by which the Khedive's shares passed *en bloc* to the British Government, gave to the latter a predominating interest in the canal. France made no move to anticipate, prevent, or protest against this transaction, which implied her ultimate exclusion from Egypt. Meanwhile however the financial administration of that country was placed under an Anglo-French *condominium* (1876).

In 1875, just when France was in the throes of the constitutional struggle, the Near Eastern question was brought to a fresh crisis by the revolt against Turkey of Hercegovina, which revolt subsequently spread to Bosnia, roused Serbia and Montenegro to action and prompted the intervention of Russia in Balkan affairs. The three Imperial Governments, divergent as their interests were, attempted joint action, and France followed humbly in their wake. In 1876 England attempted mediation, and again France acquiesced. She was in fact in the embarrassing position of having to choose between England and Russia, and there was undoubted wisdom in her reluctance to declare herself.

On the resignation of MacMahon, Jules Grévy was at once elected to the Presidency by 563 out of 670 votes cast. Inasmuch as he had no international reputation or prestige he was a complete contrast to his predecessor. Jules Grévy was a sedate leader of the Bar, whose political career had been distinguished by unflinching common-sense. Homely in character, he was ill-fitted for the social and ceremonious duties of the high office to which he had been raised, and as he grew older his homeliness degenerated into parsimony. In spite of this drawback Grévy had high qualifications. He was wholly constitutional and, although by his skill in presiding over the Council of Ministers he exercised considerable influence on politics, he never attempted to strain the powers conferred on him as President of the Republic, and his influence was always on the side of peace and good sense. Grévy was a proved Republican, and with his accession to the Presidency France stood before the world a Republic, naked and unashamed.

The natural consequence of this would have been the establishment of Gambetta, to whom the Republican victory was mainly due, as head of the Government. But Gambetta was personally distasteful to Grévy ; and his elasticity, his readiness

to be inconsistent provided he could attain his major ends, was rendering him suspect to the more unyielding Republicans of the Extreme Left. He was therefore appointed President of the Chamber, while Waddington was entrusted with the reconstruction of the Ministry. Waddington was possibly the least distinguished man in his own Cabinet, which included such men as Jules Ferry, de Freycinet and Admiral Jauréguiberry, all of whom were destined to leave their mark on public affairs. At the Ministry of Public Works Sadi Carnot, afterwards an esteemed President of the Republic, took office as an Under-Secretary. It is interesting to note that three of the ministers were Protestants. The Waddington Ministry was genuinely Republican, but the recent elections would have warranted a ministry of full-blooded Republicanism, rather than one which took its tone from the Left Centre. Its weakness—for it proved to be a weak ministry—proceeded from the rivalries of the many strong men within it, also from the size of the Republican majority, but mainly from this fact—that it did not truthfully represent the prevailing shade of Republicanism.

In spite of this the Waddington Cabinet accomplished some useful legislation. The question of the amnesty for those involved in the insurrection of the *Commune*, which had long been a subject of controversy, was at length settled, an all-but-complete amnesty being granted. The return of the Legislature from Versailles to Paris was also voted in face of considerable opposition in the Senate. The administrative *personnel* was thoroughly purged and republicanised, while, under the vigorous control of de Freycinet at the Ministry of Public Works, an enormous programme of canals and railways was undertaken. But the most important measures of the Waddington Cabinet were the Education Bills introduced by Jules Ferry as Minister for Public Instruction: the first steps in a complete reform and expansion of education which was to cover a period of several years.

Having provided, in a preliminary measure, for higher education in Algeria, Ferry introduced two Bills, the first of which eliminated from the Higher Board of Public Instruction all ecclesiastics and privileged nominees of vested interests. In his Second Bill he made over to the State the collation of University Degrees, and reduced independent educational establishments to the status of "free schools." The Bills were introduced by Ferry in reasoned speeches of great power. He openly avowed that the Government was attacking the Jesuits, but disavowed all intention of attacking the Catholic Church.

“That,” he said—free-thinker though he was—“would be a great and criminal folly ; we do not need a *Kulturkampf*.” The resistance to Clause VII was led by Jules Simon, himself an academic free-thinker, on the sophistical ground that the Bills were an attack on liberty. In spite however of considerable opposition they were passed into law.

Waddington occupied the Foreign Office both during his own ministry and that which had preceded it. His tenure of this portfolio involved no change of policy ; he continued the work of Decazes. The war between Russia and Turkey, which had begun in 1877, was terminated by the Treaty of San Stefano (March 9, 1878). But the Powers decided that the whole question of the Near East must be reviewed by a European Congress, and on June 13, 1878 this Congress assembled at Berlin. Waddington attended it in person, and was approached by Lord Salisbury with the offer of a free hand in Tunisia in return for French sanction of the proposed British occupation of Cyprus. The French Foreign Minister referred this overture to his colleagues, who decided to pay no attention to it. France thus returned from the Congress empty-handed. The policy of self-effacement had reached its climax.

The Waddington Ministry, without having suffered a parliamentary defeat, perished of inanition in December 1879, and was remodelled under the leadership of de Freycinet, who, though a more lively and energetic man than his predecessor, was too supple and undulating to be a really good Prime Minister. During his tenure of the Ministry of Public Works in the Waddington Government 18,000 kilometres of railways and canals had just been either completed or projected. De Freycinet, in fact, was a great administrator rather than a great statesman.

At the moment when he formed his first Cabinet Gambetta overshadowed the whole arena of politics, and was the real “power behind the throne.” His exclusion from the leadership to which his paramount influence and great services to the Republic entitled him was the greatest mistake made by Grévy, and was largely responsible for the disquieting instability of ministries which characterised the period of the latter’s Presidency. It was under the de Freycinet Government that Ferry’s educational decrees were put into force. The Jesuits were expelled, and anti-clerical feeling ran high. It was owing to the suspicion that he was attempting a compromise with the Holy See that de Freycinet lost the confidence of the Chamber, and on September 19, 1880 he sent in his resignation.

Once more passing over Gambetta, Grévy sent for Ferry, and for the third time the portfolios were shuffled. Ferry was probably the most effective minister produced by the Third Republic. He had for one thing the faculty, rare in Republican France, for retaining office. This implied other faculties : he had enormous energy, great decision of character and unfaltering persistence ; finally he was an ardent patriot and a real enthusiast for the causes he had chiefly at heart—educational progress, and the reassertion of France as a Power which counted in Europe.

Ferry's reputation has greatly suffered from the attacks made on him by the Church, which accused him of aiming at the subversion of religion. Ferry was not a believer, but neither was he an enemy of religion. What he attacked was not religion or even the Church, but the endeavour—so fatal to the Church and so injurious to the State—to introduce religion into politics ; anti-clerical he was, but not anti-religious. With the co-operation of Paul Bert, a much more vehement opponent of clerical claims, Ferry now pressed forward further educational reforms. On December 21, 1880 a comprehensive scheme for the secondary education of girls was passed into law ; and on June 16, 1881 two further important educational measures were promulgated ; between 1879 and 1886 the entire educational system of France was in fact modernised. Whether he was chief of the Cabinet or not, in office or out of office, the inspiration of all this legislation came from Ferry. To him and to his wisely chosen subordinates the entire credit for the erection of this great fabric is due.

Nor was there any lack of other liberal and emancipating measures. A law of June 30, 1881 established the right of public meeting, and a law of July 29 of the same year repealed all the restrictive legislation which had hampered the Press.

But Ferry has another and perhaps even higher claim on the gratitude of his country. To him, first among practical statesmen, it became a prime object of policy to restore France to her proper position in Europe. She was drifting steadily towards the position of a second-rate Power, and indeed was regarded and treated in many quarters as such. Ferry and his friends perceived that, in order to secure an outlet for those activities which they recognised as still extant in France, they must seek an arena outside Europe ; and by degrees the policy of colonial expansion which marks his period was conceived and put into operation.

France already had large interests overseas ; and it was

necessary to decide whether they should be pressed forward or abandoned : a prolonged stationary policy was impossible. The most important of these interests were in Indo-China, in West and Equatorial Africa, in Madagascar and in Algeria. There was also the French interest in Egypt, where the financial *condominium* between England and France still existed. In this quarter however the position of France was becoming exceedingly difficult ; for England was beginning to realise the vital importance to her Empire of control of the isthmus of Suez, and was becoming more and more reluctant to share that control with any other Power.

In Tongking trouble arose with China over the interpretation of the Treaty of March 14, 1874 between France and Annam. Le Myre de Villers, the Governor of Cochin China, acting on instructions from home, had pursued a forward policy in this region with a view to forestalling China ; and on April 30, 1881 he was ordered to establish a definite French Protectorate. In Equatorial Africa Stanley's Congo Expedition, which began in 1877, came as a challenge to France. Savorgnan de Brazza set out on an expedition designed to rival that of Stanley, and in September 1880 reached the River Congo.

In Northern Africa schemes of a more grandiose nature were afoot. De Freycinet had planned a great trans-Saharan railway, which however came to nothing, a prospecting expedition being massacred by the Tuareg in 1881. But it was in Tunisia that the most important developments took place. Algeria, where France had long been established, was invaded by Tunisian bands (March 30, 1881) ; and, encouraged by England, and even by Germany, Ferry took prompt and effective measures. The Tunisians were defeated, and on May 12, 1881 the Treaty of the Bardo was signed with the Bey. Turkey and Italy, which both had interests, and the latter ambitions, in Tunisia, resented this action, which no doubt helped to drive Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria.

The two Germanic Powers had already entered into a Secret Treaty on October 7, 1879 ; this was the nucleus round which the Triple Alliance was to be built, and that Alliance was brought definitely nearer by France's vigorous action in Tunisia. Ferry's colonial policy was fiercely denounced by politicians like Clémenceau, who saw in it nothing but grave risk in return for valueless tracts of desert and jungle. This opposition was encouraged by the outbreak of an insurrection in Tunisia, which involved France in further commitments, and was only repressed after the capture of Qairwan on October 28, 1881.

It was in fact his colonial policy, since recognised as brilliant and statesmanlike, and as the first breath of French revival, that was the direct cause of Ferry's downfall on November 14, 1881.

In May of that year, in preparation for the dissolution which was impending, a proposal for the substitution of *scrutin de liste* for *scrutin d'arrondissement* had been brought forward, and carried by a narrow majority in the Chamber, only to be rejected in the Senate. This was a victory for Grévy, who was opposed to the change, over Gambetta, who had vigorously advocated it. In the summer the term of the 1877 Chamber expired and on August 21 the elections of deputies for a new Chamber began. They resulted in an increased majority for the Republican party. They returned 467 strong while the Reactionaries were reduced to 90. This election combined with the increasing unpopularity of Ferry's colonial policy to make a Gambetta Ministry a certainty.

President Grévy recognised the inevitable, and on the resignation of Ferry at once sent for Gambetta. He had been forced by circumstances to do what should have been done two years before. For a moment Gambetta thought of constructing a ministry of "all the talents"; but he found this impossible, and the Ministry of November 14 ("*Le Grand Ministère*" as it was called in sarcasm) contained few conspicuous names. Gambetta himself retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. But though it was not a ministry of "all the talents," it was a combination of thoroughly efficient public men; above all, unlike its predecessors, it was homogeneous. It was no deficiency of *personnel* that made Gambetta's Ministry so brief. Rather it was the jealousy and suspicion that had long been gathering round the great tribune. His judicious moderation of his earlier demands had alienated many of the extreme Republicans on whom he was bound to rely for support. For some he went too far; for others—the newly-formed Radical group for instance, which included Clémenceau, Ribot, Pichon and Millerand—he did not go far enough.

He had already announced his programme. He demanded a democratisation of the Senate, if necessary, by means of a revision of the Constitution; he proposed the reduction of the term of army service to three years, but on the understanding that service was to be compulsory and universal; he advocated also the—always unpopular—imposition of a tax on incomes, and the strict enforcement of the *Concordat*. In foreign policy he stood for firmness without aggression. He

had given vigorous support to Ferry in his colonial policy, and one of his first acts as President of the Council was to confirm the Treaty of the Bardo. All this was statesmanlike. Gambetta had learnt statesmanship. He was no longer the "raving lunatic" of whom Thiers had been so scornful; but all the same, his fiery past was not forgotten.

The foolish catchword went round—"Gambetta, c'est la guerre!" and quiet men trembled. Gambetta was in fact surrounded with suspicion and himself recognised that his Ministry was bound to be ephemeral. It stood, as events turned out, for no more than sixty-three days. The weakness of the Ministry was not slow to display itself. The substitution of *scrutin de liste* for *scrutin d'arrondissement* remained a principal item in Gambetta's policy. He had been baulked of this reform by the action of the Senate; logic thus dictated a reform of the Senate, and this in turn involved revision of the Constitution. This aroused the instinct of self-preservation in both Senate and Chamber, and on January 31 the Ministry was defeated and Gambetta resigned.

Gambetta was thus deprived of the opportunity of leaving his impress on internal legislation or on foreign affairs. In the latter however he had one opportunity of showing his intentions. The Arabi Pasha crisis in Egypt was at its height during his Ministry; Gambetta was fully alive to the importance of Egypt and alive also to the even greater importance of conciliating England. His policy was quite definite. France must associate herself with England in Egypt, must support her if necessary with money and arms. This was the tenor of the communications that passed from him to Lord Granville.

They were however somewhat coldly received in that quarter; nor did this policy commend itself to public opinion in France, adverse as it was at the moment to further oversea commitments. These overtures are interesting, not for any success that attended them but as evidence of Gambetta's long vision and sane wisdom. They were interrupted by the overthrow of the Ministry. Eleven months later the great Frenchman was dead (December 31, 1882). The task of government fell to lesser hands and shorter visions. It is the great tragedy of the Third Republic that, possessed of this gigantic figure, developing into a statesman as powerful as he had been as tribune, she first deprived herself of his services and was then deprived of them by death.

XVII

THE REPUBLIC IN BEING

(1882-1894)

ON Gambetta's fall de Freycinet was recalled to office. His Cabinet was a very distinguished one : Ferry at the Ministry of Public Instruction, Léon Say as Finance Minister, and Jauréguiberry at the Marine. It has been described with some justice as "*Le grand Ministère sans le grand ministre.*" Never had a greater number of distinguished ministers been brought together ; never, on the other hand, had there been a Cabinet less coherent ; and de Freycinet was the last person competent to remedy the defect. Its period of office was consequently ineffectual, and was redeemed from sterility only by the resumption of educational reform under the guidance of Ferry.

The law of March 28, 1882, which made primary education both compulsory and secular, was the most important of all the Ferry laws. A Bill to bring private secondary schools under Government control was introduced but rejected by the Senate. Ferry has been denounced as the enemy of God. Both he and his coadjutor Bert were free-thinkers ; yet neither desired to attack religion. Ferry in particular repeatedly repulsed this charge with unanswerable eloquence, and emphasised the distinction between religion and clericalism. The Church, it was impossible to deny, was the great obstacle to efficient and systematised education ; it was ready also to prostitute education for its own propagandist ends. It is difficult to argue that those who attacked it on these grounds were worthy of blame. But the Church possesses, and has seldom scrupled to use, a terrible power of defaming its enemies ; and Ferry's name was long execrated, even by sensible and respectable men, as the enemy of religion, while his services to education, which saved France from falling behind in the great European struggle for efficiency, were forgotten.

De Freycinet's mind was of a much less definite cast than that of either Gambetta or Ferry, and this difference was visible in his conduct of foreign policy. On May 28, 1882 the Treaty which is known as the Triple Alliance was signed between Germany, Austria and Italy ; but its existence, though suspected, was not revealed till two years later. It was to some extent the result of the forward colonial policy of France in recent

years. Already the wisest Frenchmen were alive to the need for a *rapprochement* between France and Russia and England.

But such an event seemed still very remote. Gambetta had hoped to propitiate England by close co-operation in Egypt. The landing of English troops in Egypt to deal with the Arabi revolt was unwelcome news, and made the position more difficult. De Freycinet's policy was hesitating. He fumbled with the question. When England proposed a Conference he did not acquiesce; when the British fleet bombarded Alexandria the French fleet lay idle; all that de Freycinet could persuade himself to propose was the landing of a few troops for the protection of the Canal, a proposal so timid that even French public opinion revolted and brought about the downfall of the Ministry. In this feeble fashion the French interests in Egypt, already compromised by Decazes, were thrown away by de Freycinet. That they were fated to be lost is no doubt true, for the reason that the importance of Egypt to England is vital; but they might have been abandoned in a franker fashion; they were a counter in the diplomatic game, and this counter de Freycinet failed to use. What he did was to lose Egypt without either conciliating England or securing compensation elsewhere. A bolder and clearer policy might have hastened the *Entente*; as it was, not only was Egypt lost but England was alienated.

Duclerc, who succeeded de Freycinet as President of the Council, was a capable man of the second rank who had been a close ally of Gambetta. He held office from August 1882 till January 28, 1883, when ill-health caused him to resign, and his colleague, Fallières, carried on the Ministry for three weeks. A bolder colonial policy marked this change of Government. Credits were asked for strengthening the French forces in Indo-China, at the risk of a breach with China. French interests in Madagascar were also vigorously pressed, while in Equatorial Africa de Brazza's treaties with native chiefs were officially recognised, the Loango region was occupied, and on January 10, 1883 the French West Central African dominions were consolidated under the governorship of de Brazza. King Leopold of Belgium, whose Congo territories were threatened by de Brazza's establishment on the River Congo, was conciliated by the grant of a right of passage through French territories. As to Egypt, England was inclined to encourage a renewal of the French financial interest in that quarter. But Duclerc recognised that there the die was already cast, and did not respond to the overtures.

The opening days of 1883 were overclouded by the recent death of Gambetta and rendered uneasy by a manifesto which Prince Bonaparte,¹ taking advantage of the intense feeling aroused by that event, published on January 15. The political world was at once plunged into heated debates by proposals for the expulsion of the royal princes ; the Ministry, deprived by illness of its chief, and by resignation of several of its members, could make no headway in the storm thus aroused, and on February 21 resigned. On the same day Jules Ferry was recalled to power. He was obviously the man best calculated, now that death had removed Gambetta, to bring together a homogeneous ministry. His courage, industry and capacity had already been proved, with the result that, in spite of a certain grumbling opposition from the Elysée, he was able to maintain himself in power for the unusual period of two years. This was of incalculable importance in his region of foreign and especially colonial policy, to which Ferry was able to give a definite direction ; and it is for its vigorous colonial policy that the Second Ferry Ministry is celebrated rather than for its conduct of internal affairs, where it was content in the main with a firm administration of existing laws.

The world-wide interests of France were daily becoming more complex. Sooner or later, if actively pressed, they were bound to bring her into contact and possibly into conflict with other European Powers, and this was clearly recognised by Ferry. It required some courage at this particular moment to press French colonial interests ; for the alliance of Italy with the Germanic Powers had just been revealed (March 1884), and the isolation of France seemed more absolute than ever. Ferry however did not hesitate ; and in every quarter of the globe where France had interests the years of his ministry were years of advance. On June 8, 1883 a French Protectorate was definitely set up in Tunisia ; advances were made in Senegal, and French posts were established on the Niger. The French foothold on the Red Sea at Obok was secured, and fresh action was taken in Madagascar against the irreconcilable Hovas. In Indo-China concessions had been made to China during the Duclerc Ministry ; these were now repudiated, and the French Minister at Peking who had made them was withdrawn. The death (April 19, 1883) in a sortie from the town of Hanoi, where he was besieged by Annamites and " Black Flags," of Rivière, the French commander in Indo-China, further complicated matters. Admiral Courbet and General Bouët were despatched

¹ Prince Napoleon (Jérôme) Bonaparte, generally known as " Plon-Plon."

with strong reinforcements, and on August 25, 1883 a treaty was imposed on Annam which established a French Protectorate, increased the French territory in Cochin China and brought Tongking under French control. China however refused to recognise this treaty, and English susceptibilities were aroused by an attempt on the part of France to arrange a treaty with Burma.

The policy of colonial activity was reaching its inevitable consequences; France was coming into contact with the great European Powers. It was in Equatorial Africa however that this result was most evident. There the situation was complicated by the ambiguous position of King Leopold's amorphous Congo Association, a mere commercial concern with no juridical international existence. Portugal and England both looked askance at King Leopold's venture; and on February 26, 1884 a treaty between these Powers established Portuguese sovereignty at the mouth of the Congo. Leopold appealed to Paris and was accorded a right of access to the Congo basin by way of the Niari Valley, in return for which he gave to France the right of pre-emption over the vast area controlled by his Association.

At this juncture (April 1884) Germany took the first steps in the policy which made her a colonial power by annexing Togo and the Cameroons, and simultaneously put out feelers to France for a colonial understanding. An understanding with Germany presented obvious advantages to France, especially if it could be made general and not exclusively colonial. Ferry at once made overtures for such a general understanding, but Bismarck did not desire anything more than a colonial agreement. Ferry then suggested a European Conference. This was a discreet move, as it was calculated to gratify England. Bismarck agreed, and the result was the Berlin Conference of 1884, the Final Act of which was dated February 1885. France was obliged to agree to the inclusion in the "Conventional Area" of large French territories, and these were to be free and open for the trade of all countries. On the other hand, she profited by the opening of the Niger, the mouth of which river was controlled by England. Her direct profit however from the Berlin Act was not equivalent to the sacrifices she was compelled to make. What she did secure was the acquiescence of Germany in her activities in other parts of the world. It was not in Equatorial Africa but in Indo-China and elsewhere that she was to reap her harvest.

By this wise and subtle policy Ferry had definitely secured

to France a large colonial empire, without a rupture with other colonial Powers, and without disproportionate sacrifice. He had also—and this was an even more important matter—recovered for France her self-esteem. In doing so however he had risked his own popularity. The more timid politicians were terrified at the vigour of his actions, the more factious denounced the colonial advance as both costly and contemptible. The value of colonies was at that time but vaguely understood, and the public mind was easily convinced that money was being spent, blood spilt and risks of European complications run for objects which did not justify these sacrifices. Ferry's internal policy, in particular his educational measures, had been open to misinterpretation, but it was not these that brought about his fall; on the contrary, it was his colonial policy, which now appears his principal claim to the gratitude of his fellow-countrymen, that drove him out of office.

The military and naval forces of France in the Far East had acted with great vigour and success. Negotiations for a treaty with China, by which that Power should accept the Convention of 1883 and abandon her claims in Annam, were practically completed when distorted news of a French reverse at Langson reached Paris (March 29, 1885). This was the signal for the outburst of the animosity which had been gathering round Ferry. Parisian public opinion, always fierce and vengeful, drove the great Minister from office with execrations on the following day.

Ferry, when he took office, had undertaken to deal with the question of constitutional revision, and from May till December 1884 parliamentary activities were concentrated on this subject. Eventually the clauses regulating the election of Senators were withdrawn from the Constitution, so that the matter could be dealt with by simple legislation. Legislation was then introduced; the principle of nomination of Senators was abandoned, the Senate thus becoming purely elective. The number of municipal delegates to the electoral college was increased, and in this way representation of the smaller towns in the Senate was considerably increased at the expense of the rural *Communes* (December 9, 1884).

A prolonged crisis followed the fall of Ferry, but finally Brisson was prevailed upon to form a Cabinet. A disinterested, conscientious and dignified Republican, he was probably the best choice that could have been made. His Cabinet however was far from being homogeneous. De Freycinet went to the Foreign Office, Allain-Targé took Finance and Goblet Public

Instruction, Public Worship and *Beaux-Arts*. Both the latter were adherents of the Extreme Left. But the Cabinet also included Carnot (Public Works), Legrand (Commerce), Cavaignac (War Office) and Rousseau (Colonies), who were avowed supporters of Ferry. Obviously no emphatic line of internal policy could be expected from a Cabinet which was little more than a group of distinguished public men, especially as its parliamentary majority was very uncertain.

Brissou, with commendable courage, announced his determination to carry through the colonial policy of his predecessor, and pronounced himself in favour of the "conservation of the national patrimony." On June 9, 1885 the Treaty of Tientsin brought the hostilities with China to an end. The Chinese evacuated Tongking, France abandoning the naval conquest of Admiral Courbet in Far Eastern waters. In Madagascar annexation seemed the only solution; but de Freycinet was opposed to a step so vigorous, and the Treaty of December 5, 1885 with the Hovas went no further than the reimposition of the French Protectorate. On December 24, 1885 a Treaty was signed with Germany, which, if it made valuable cessions to that Empire, at any rate defined the frontiers of the French and German Colonies in West Africa. But when Russia and England seemed to be drifting into a crisis over affairs in Afghanistan, and Bismarck made overtures to France, de Freycinet made no response. The Brissou—de Freycinet Cabinet, in fact, seems definitely to have rejected Ferry's idea of closer relations with Germany; and, since relations with England were growing worse rather than better, and nothing seemed to come of overtures made to Russia, the isolation of France was as complete as ever.

The term of the Third Republican Legislature was drawing to an end, and, in anticipation of the elections which were due to take place in the autumn of 1885, the Government introduced a measure substituting *scrutin de liste* for *scrutin d'arrondissement*. This was to some extent a posthumous tribute to the memory of Gambetta, who had ardently championed the reform. The Bill was passed into law on June 8, 1885. This measure has been compared by its enthusiastic admirers to the English Reform Bill. Judged by results it was certainly nothing of the kind. That it was not without its dangers was shortly to be demonstrated, and in face of the coming Boulanger crisis *scrutin d'arrondissement* was hurriedly reimposed; an episode which gave to a caustic critic of French parliamentary institutions the opportunity to remark that "the most conspicuous

achievement of the elect of *scrutin de liste* was to restore in a moment of panic *scrutin d'arrondissement*."

The elections of the new Legislature took place in October 1885; they were the first to be decided by *scrutin de liste*, and a great turnover of votes in an anti-Republican and reactionary direction was the result: 4,327,162 votes were recorded for Republican candidates, and 3,541,384 for their opponents.¹ This was very significant and even alarming. On December 28, 1885 Grévy's term of Presidential office expired; he was re-elected—though by a very much reduced majority—for a further period: and on December 29 the Brisson Cabinet resigned. President Grévy sent for de Freycinet, who thus for the third time became President of the Council (January 7, 1886). De Freycinet kept his Foreign Office in his own hands, retained Carnot at the Ministry of Finance and Goblet at the Ministry of Public Instruction. But, as events proved, the most important appointment in this strangely incoherent Ministry was that of General Boulanger, a successful soldier who had also proved himself a highly capable administrator, to the Ministry of War. The somewhat wanton ejection of the Princes of the Blood from the army, which was carried out under Boulanger's directions, brought the General into the public eye. The acclamation with which he was received when he appeared at public functions indicated a revulsion of feeling. That part of the French national character which demands something showy and gallant, and which had before this made it an easy prey to a military adventurer, had long been starved and silent. But the sudden enthusiasm awakened by Boulanger implied something more than this. It implied that patriotism and self-esteem were once more awake. They concentrated themselves feverishly on an unworthy object. But the cheers that greeted Boulanger were not wholly sinister in their significance.

De Freycinet's Third Cabinet was not of the kind that leaves a mark. Apart from the rise of Boulanger its sole claim to fame was the educational legislation of Goblet, who built worthily on the foundations that Ferry had laid. The Ministry was placed in a minority on a question of credits for Tongking

¹ Votes cast for Republicans and Reactionaries, 1876-85:

		<i>Republicans.</i>	<i>Reactionaries.</i>
1876	.	4,028,153	3,202,335
1877	.	4,367,202	3,577,882
1878	.	5,128,442	1,789,767
1885	.	4,327,162	3,541,384

and resigned on December 11, 1886. Grévy experienced great difficulty in finding a successor for de Freycinet, and it was only after many prominent men had been approached that he decided to send for Goblet, who had distinguished himself as Minister of Public Instruction in the retiring Government. Goblet retained nearly all the retiring ministers in his Cabinet, including Boulanger, whose popularity went on increasing until he completely eclipsed his colleagues. So much obloquy has been justly heaped on this unsuccessful upstart that it is proper to remember that he was not devoid of attractive qualities, above all an irresistible charm of manner and considerable proved ability. He inspired confidence, especially in the rank and file of the army. The danger, if it were a danger, was a real one. So at least thought Bismarck, who made use of the alarm created in Germany by the prospect of a French military dictator to influence the Reichstag in favour of his scheme for a seven years' military service. Simultaneously great activity was displayed on the frontier. The arrest on the frontier by the German authorities of a French functionary, M. Schnæbelé, provoked great indignation, and Grévy's composed treatment of this affair procured him considerable unpopularity (April 1887).

The Cabinet was much weakened by these alarms and had quite failed to bring together a working majority in the Chamber: on May 17, 1887 it found itself in a minority over the Budget. Grévy once more experienced great difficulty in finding a successor to Goblet. Twice he appealed to de Freycinet; but, as that statesman insisted on the retention of Boulanger at the War Office, and the Senate, which had ranged itself definitely against the General, refused its support to any Cabinet that included him, it was necessary to look elsewhere; and finally Rouvier, who had been a member of Gambetta's Ministry, stepped into the breach. His Cabinet had a distinct inclination towards the Right, and Rouvier's appointment did much to alienate the more advanced Republicans from Grévy. The Cabinet had at least one great merit. It did not include Boulanger. Its conduct of affairs was dignified and efficient. The balancing of the Budget, thanks to rigid economies, was no mean feat, and a considerable and valuable scheme of army reform was carried out by General Ferron, the War Minister.

The decline in the prestige of President Grévy has already been noted. The disclosure that his son-in-law, Wilson, had been engaged in traffic in the insignia of the Legion of Honour brought it to a head. Grévy gradually recognised that he

could not stand against the popular clamour, and, after many undignified hesitations, sent in his resignation (December 1887). "Peu de chutes," says a historian of the Third Republic, "ont été aussi lugubre que celle de ce vieillard qui rentrait dans la foule, par une froide matinée de Décembre, avec une fortune augmentée et une réputation amoindrie." Grévy had been a respectable, wary Chief of the State, a worthy representative of one side of the national character; thrifty, pacific, unostentatious, and above all constitutional. But old age had made him grasping. He clung to office and to the spoils of office. He shut himself up in the Elysée, and failed to carry out many of the obvious duties of a President. His sobriety and parsimony came to be a reproach to him; for another side of the French character was now uppermost, and his drab establishment was contrasted with the ostentatious glitter of Boulanger. A more serious accusation against the retiring President was that of having completely failed to secure anything like ministerial stability. His great blunder had been his reluctance to trust Gambetta. He had attempted to govern through incoherent groups of distinguished men, and the result had been nine Cabinets in seven years. It is largely to Grévy that France owes the most sinister feature in her parliamentary life. "The evil that he did lived after him."

None of the more conspicuous figures in public life had much hope of election to the Chief Magistracy. Both Ferry and de Freycinet had made too many political enemies, and the choice of the Congress fell on Sadi Carnot, a quiet, inconspicuous public man, who had done good work in several Cabinets, and was the grandson of the celebrated "Organiser of Victory." Chosen for his complete insignificance, Carnot proved himself an efficient, conscientious and dignified Chief of the State. Cold and austere, but not unkindly in his demeanour, his behaviour was always correct, and he was free from all taint of self-seeking; the fact that he stood somewhat aloof from the main currents of party politics made it possible for him to display more detachment than his predecessors. The change of President may therefore be reckoned an advantage to the Republic.

Carnot assumed the functions of Chief Magistrate in difficult times. The presidential office was discredited; the Republican Constitution was itself threatened by the dazzling tinsel figure of Boulanger, while the Assembly was crumbling into rival groups which made continuity of policy difficult, were a continual menace to ministerial stability, and at times threatened to make Government impossible. With the accession of Carnot,

in fact, we enter on a period when parliamentary life stagnated ; no legislation was possible which might offend any of the manifold groups on which a government depended ; no ministry could calculate on any but the briefest term of office. Under these circumstances it was more and more on the President that fell the task of government as well as that of maintaining the dignity of public life. Carnot's sterling qualities enabled him to acquit himself with credit in this difficult task. He at once embarked on presidential activities, and soon demonstrated that his office was something more than the lucrative sinecure into which under his predecessor it had degenerated.

The Tirard Cabinet, to which on December 12, 1887 Carnot had entrusted the Government, was at once confronted with the necessity of dealing with Boulanger. The General, from his position as Commander of the XIII Corps, was attempting—contrary to discipline—to intervene in public life. The Cabinet ordered an examination by a *Conseil d'Enquête*, which promptly placed him on the retired list. This roused all the Parliamentary Boulangists, and, aided by Clémenceau, who was beginning to establish his sinister reputation as a wrecker of Governments, they succeeded in placing Tirard in a minority (April 3, 1888). The Radical Ministry under Floquet which succeeded that of Tirard was committed to the policy of revising the Constitution—which was also a plank in the platform of Boulanger. The Ministry was in fact tinged with Boulangism and played into the General's hands. He was elected by large majorities for the Dordogne and the Nord, and pressed his vague policy, with the support of Royalists of all shades of opinion. *Scrutin d'arrondissement* was reimposed on February 11 ; but his proposals for a revision of the Constitution were thrown out and the Ministry fell on February 22, 1889, giving place to a second Tirard Ministry. To this Ministry belongs the credit of finally dealing with the Boulangist danger. Profiting by the parliamentary paralysis, the General had defined his programme to the extent of demanding an increase of the presidential powers on American lines. On January 29 he had been vehemently acclaimed by the Paris crowds. A *coup d'état* seemed imminent ; but the Ministry, under the courageous influence of Constans, the Minister of Interior, grasped the nettle. The "League of Patriots," a hot-bed of Boulangism, was prosecuted ; and on March 29 the Senate, which had steadily set its face against Boulangism, was constituted a High Court for the trial of offences "against the security of the State." This was enough for the General, who fled

incontinently to Belgium (April 1), and thence (April 24) to London.

This was the real end of the conspiracy against the Republic, which, in spite of its levity and the *vaudeville* atmosphere in which it had been carried on, had been a serious danger. The General and his principal lieutenants were tried by the High Court in their absence, and condemned to deportation and confinement in a fortress (August 14); but Boulanger never returned to France. This happy end to an ugly menace was due to the firm measures of the Tirard Cabinet, and especially of Constans, and to the determined line taken by the Senate.

The most important legislation of the year 1889 was the Military Law of July 18, which organised the system of three years' service. Every French citizen was made liable to three years in the active army, ten years in its reserve, six years in the territorial army and six in its reserve. But a great many categories of men were partially exempted, and made liable to one year only. The military peace-strength of the Republic under this law was brought up to 557,000 men.

The term of the Legislature elected in 1885 was reached in the summer of 1889, and the elections for the new Legislature took place in September and October. Boulangism made a last effort, but was utterly routed, and the result—359 Republican deputies to 211 reactionaries—was a great triumph for Republicanism and a confirmation by the electorate of the actions of the Tirard Cabinet, which retained office until March 1, 1890.

During this long period of crisis the reputation and popularity of Carnot had been steadily increasing. It had been fortunate for him that his accession to office had been contemporaneous with the opening of a period of great material prosperity, the extent of which was demonstrated to the world in the great International Exhibition held in Paris in 1889, an event which gratified French self-esteem and helped to allay the sense of unrest that had characterised the prolonged Boulanger episode.

The fourth de Freycinet Cabinet, which held office from March 17, 1890 to February 27, 1892, and in which the President of the Council occupied the Ministry of War, included many eminent men; but its internal activities were inconsiderable. In the region of foreign politics its operations were epoch-making, for it was able to bring France—for the first time since 1871—into treaty relations with a European Great Power—Russia. It is sometimes, for this reason, known as the "Kronstadt Cabinet." A drawing together between these two Powers had for long been the aim of the wisest French statesmen.

There had been many acts of goodwill, but nothing resembling overtures for an alliance. In 1891 however the opportunity came. France was now accumulating wealth, while Russia was in great need of capital for the development of her vast natural resources; and it was by means of Russian loans floated in Paris that the first approaches were made to Russia. In July 1891 a French naval squadron was sent to Kronstadt and received with marked enthusiasm. Taking advantage of the authority conferred on him to negotiate treaties, Carnot clinched matters, and on August 27, 1891 a secret defensive treaty was signed between France and Russia. France thus emerged from her isolation, and stood on a level with the other Great Powers. She had ceased to be a leper. Moreover a great step had been taken towards the re-establishment of the equilibrium of Europe.

Meanwhile colonial problems were not being neglected. In West Africa Dahomey had been invaded and a treaty concluded (October 3, 1890). An advance had also been made down the Niger. In East Africa the British design for a Cape to-Cairo route was being evolved; this implied the conquest of the Egyptian Sudan, then held by the Mahdists, and ran counter to the Nilotic projects which France had long cherished, as well as to those of King Leopold. The latter sought to finance his grandiose projects by pledging the Congo territories to Belgium. This in turn affected France, because she had a right of pre-emption over those territories. In a treaty of August 5, 1890 an attempt was made to settle some of the questions outstanding between France and England. France agreed to the partition of Zanzibar; and the English sphere of influence on the lower Niger was defined, a step which made the French West African Empire a reality; England recognised the French Protectorate in Madagascar, and in this recognition she was followed by Germany.

This treaty marks a definite endeavour on the part of France to draw closer to England; not content with the *rapprochement* with Russia, her statesmen had the full development of the Triple *Entente* already at heart. But the treaty of 1890 was also significant for what was left unsettled. The Egyptian and Sudanese questions were untouched; and no attempt was made to adjust points which had long been at issue in Newfoundland and Oceania. Clearly therefore there still remained outstanding difficulties between the two countries.

The signature of the Russian Treaty at once eased the colonial situation, and a great era of French exploration opened.

French expeditions had already pushed up the Ubangi and the Sanga, northern tributaries of the Congo. Dybowski and Maistre explored the Logone, and Mizon the Upper Congo by way of the Niger (1891-3). The efforts of the celebrated French explorer Binger had already (1885-7) opened up the country between Senegal and the Ivory Coast; and in 1890-2 Monteil had made a wonderful march from the Sudan viâ the Niger to Tripoli. In 1892 Dodds subdued Dahomey, captured Abomey (November 17) and marched to the Niger.

The internal policy of the fourth de Freycinet Cabinet was of less moment than the external. It had announced itself as a religious peace-maker, and an easier religious situation was created when in January 1892 Leo XIII recognised the Republic. This was unfortunately marred by the marked anti-clericalism of the ensuing Ministry. On January 1, 1892 a new general tariff was introduced, which ranged France among the closely protected countries.

The fall of the de Freycinet Ministry, and the advent of M. Loubet to power on February 27, 1892, opened a period of considerable internal unrest, during which ministry succeeded ministry with bewildering rapidity, Loubet (February 27—December 6, 1892), Ribot (December 6, 1892—April 6, 1893), Dupuy (April 6—December 2, 1893) and Casimir-Perier (December 2, 1893—May 29, 1894), rising and falling in quick succession. Anarchist plots and dynamite explosions created much disarray, and the Panama scandals, which first came to light in 1892, undermined public life and caused the fall of the Loubet Ministry. The denunciation for corruption of men holding conspicuous positions in public life was bad enough; but it was worse that, with few exceptions, these men were never punished, and that the scandals were never properly cleared up. France sank into a despairing acceptance of the inevitability of corrupt practices in public life.

The appearance in parliamentary life, after the elections of 1893, of a compact group of Socialist deputies was a further embarrassment to the Government. Hitherto the activities of the Socialists had been extra-parliamentary. The extreme Marxist demands had met with resistance in the party itself, and a group of "possibilists," who advocated gradual advance rather than revolutionary upheaval, had broken away. Ministers, conspicuous amongst whom was Gambetta's colleague Waldeck-Rousseau, had legislated to satisfy Socialist demands. Trade Unions had been legalised, and Workers' Co-operative Societies sanctioned. In July 1890 advanced demands had

been put forward by the Revolutionary Labour Party and backed by the threat of a general strike. The Government had responded with legislation designed to improve the conditions of labour, providing for safety in mines (July 1890), creating a Supreme Labour Council (1891) and by preparing a plan for pensions.

These concessions provoked a certain reaction amongst the bourgeois, who turned to Carnot, Constans, Ribot and Ferry as moderate men. The Church, acting on a signal from the Pope, propounded a scheme of Christian Socialism, and by at last recognising the Republic re-entered—to some extent at least—the arena of constructive politics.

The anarchist outbreaks of the years 1893 and 1894 were not inspired by French Socialists, but tended to discredit Socialism. A climax was reached when President Carnot was assassinated at Lyons by an Italian anarchist on June 25, 1894. Carnot had by his quiet dignity and transparent honesty of purpose greatly added to the prestige of his high office, and his untimely death at the hands of a fanatic was universally and sincerely mourned.

These troubled years, during which the instability of ministries had been a perpetual hindrance to internal progress, had not been without external successes. Of these the most important was the military agreement with Russia, concluded on December 27, 1893. In Indo-China France had dealt rigorously with a threatened attack by Siam, and on July 29, 1893 had imposed terms on that Power. A further treaty with Siam (October 3, 1893) had established the River Mekong as the boundary between that country and French Indo-China. With England an agreement of July 31, 1893 arranged for a neutral zone between the possessions of the two Powers, where they met north of Siam. In Africa the seizure of Dahomey in December 1892 had been followed by its erection into a colony (March 1893). Early in 1894 Bonnier and Joffre led an expedition to Timbuktu. The exploration of the Rivers Benue and Ubangi and of the Lake Chad district had continued, and treaties defining boundaries had been concluded with Liberia (December 8, 1892), and with Britain as to the Gold Coast and Ivory Coast (July 12, 1893).

The extension of the French Congo seemed however to be threatened by the several activities of Britain, Germany and King Leopold. Britain and Germany had concluded a treaty on November 15, 1893, which extended the German sphere of influence between the lower Niger and the Bahr el Ghazal.

King Leopold's ambitions were also drawing him in the direction of the Nile. France thus began to feel herself hemmed in in her Congo colony, and negotiations were opened with Germany and with King Leopold. The latter were unsuccessful; but on May 15, 1894 Germany and France agreed as to the eastern frontier of the Cameroons, France obtaining definite access to Lake Chad. King Leopold meanwhile had been negotiating with England, and a treaty of May 14, 1894 had given to the King personally a lease for life of the Lado *enclave*, and to the Congo State a lease of part of the Bahr el Ghazal, England receiving a strip of territory between Lakes Albert and Tanganyika, essential for her Cape-to-Cairo enterprise. At the same moment an Anglo-Italian agreement was published which placed Abyssinia in the Italian sphere of influence. These treaties constituted an encirclement of the French colonies in two vital directions. Much more was involved in this than mere delimitations of spheres of influence in the wilds of Africa. By cutting France off from the Bahr el Ghazal, England deliberately challenged the aspirations long cherished by France of reaching the Upper Nile, and thus reopened the Egyptian question. This in turn reacted on the much larger question of European alliances.

The French alliance with Russia had not fully restored the equilibrium of Europe. The most far-sighted of French statesmen, such as Thiers and Gambetta, had long recognised that this restoration would only be effected when England identified herself with Russia and France. The question was now posed whether the colonial differences between France and England admitted of a solution or whether they must drive France into the arms of Germany. Clearly the decision would have to be taken: whether it was worth while to abandon the idea of an English alliance for the sake of the French Nilotic aspirations, or whether a solution could be found whereby French susceptibilities might be satisfied by compensation elsewhere, and the alliance consummated which alone could give to Europe equilibrium and to France the sense of security she was always seeking. These were questions which admitted of no cut-and-dried solution; for long they hung in the balance; and they produced two schools of diplomacy in France, the first—identified with the name of Hanotaux, who became Foreign Minister in the Second Dupuy Ministry (May 29, 1894)—regarding accommodation with England as impossible, and consequently drawing towards Germany; and the second, whose champion was Delcassé, refusing to reject the hope of a

satisfactory solution of the Anglo-French colonial problems and clinging to the idea of the triple *Entente*. It is this conflict of persons and ideas that constitutes the interest of French diplomatic history during the ensuing nine years.

XVIII

DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY

(1894-1900)

CASIMIR-PERIER, who succeeded Carnot as President of the Republic on June 27, 1894, was a distinguished man and came of a distinguished family. In many respects his election was a new departure. He was a young man, who, apart from a recent brief period at the head of a ministry, had not played a specially conspicuous part in political life. He was also notoriously a strong man with pronounced views, little likely to content himself with a position of powerless dignity. He was also a capitalist, with large interests in coal-mines, and his family had long been engaged in business; his election was therefore a strong indication of the *bourgeois* reaction against socialism. Endowed with many fine qualities, Casimir-Perier lacked just those demanded for the position he was now called upon to occupy. He was sensitive, impatient of criticism and eager to make a mark on public life, ill-adapted therefore for the routine of dignified and tedious functions to which Carnot had applied himself with industrious patience.

He was at once venomously attacked by the Socialists; to such an attack his position as a capitalist and a large employer of labour rendered him specially vulnerable. The anti-anarchist measures of the second Dupuy Ministry, which held office from May 1894 to January 1895, were used as a weapon against him, and denounced as an attack on liberty. Receiving little protection from his ministers, despairing of making his office effective, and not unreasonably indignant at the gross attacks to which he was subjected, Casimir-Perier resigned the Presidency six months after he had accepted it (January 15, 1895).

The choice of the Congress assembled to elect a successor to Casimir-Perier fell upon Félix Faure—at that moment Minister of Marine—a successful business man from Havre. Faure had

few great qualities, but occupied the Elysée until his death in 1899. Though a *bourgeois* by extraction, as was his predecessor, he was quite willing to accept the legend that he had risen from the position of a working tanner. There was as much truth in this as there would have been in the assumption that Carnot had been a working carpenter. Both men had learnt trades as part of their training. But the fiction enabled Faure to escape the unpopularity which had overwhelmed his predecessor. The years of Faure's presidency were most critical and troubled, and it is difficult not to suppose that a President of more character, one such as Carnot or even such as Casimir-Perier, would have brought France through with less loss of dignity and self-esteem.

The Ribot Cabinet, to which Faure entrusted the government, held office from January to November 1895, Hanotaux retaining the Foreign Office portfolio, which he had assumed in May 1894, and foreign policy being definitely directed towards an understanding with Germany. On Ribot's fall an avowedly Radical Ministry under Léon Bourgeois assumed office, in which Hanotaux was not included. This Ministry was short-lived. Any Radical Cabinet was bound to introduce proposals for a tax on incomes, and France has an ineradicable dislike to the prying into private affairs which such a tax involves. Consequently when the Léon Bourgeois Ministry proposed this tax it committed suicide (April 1896) and was replaced (April 29) by a Cabinet presided over by Méline.

The period from May 1894 to April 1896 saw the development of a new policy in Africa. Hanotaux conceived that the Egyptian and Nilotic questions between France and England could not be allowed to go on drifting, that it would be more profitable to bring them to a head. Therefore when, in September 1895, a French captain of Marines, Marchand, asked permission to lead an expedition from the Gabun through the heart of Africa to the Nile, the Foreign Office favoured the idea in spite of opposition from the Colonial Office. It was by the Bourgeois Ministry, in which Berthelot was Foreign Minister, that permission was given for the expedition to start (February 24, 1896), and by this time the positions had been reversed, the orders proceeding from the Colonial Office, while the Foreign Office remained indifferent. Almost at the same moment (March 12, 1896) Kitchener received his orders to march on Dongola. The length and difficulties of the march of Marchand's small band on the one hand and the necessary slowness of the advance of a large army on the other, involved a long pause before the issue

could be actually joined; but from the moment when the orders were given to Marchand to advance, an eventual clash between England and France on the Nile was inevitable. The English expedition was one of conquest and occupation, that of France was a mere diplomatic move. The Italian defeat at Adua (March 1, 1896) gave an opening for a tiny supplementary French expedition towards the Nile by way of Abyssinia; but this came to nothing.

Meanwhile—and pending the bursting of this carefully prepared storm—relations with England were not unfriendly. On January 15, 1896 an agreement between the two countries for the delimitation of frontiers in Nigeria and Indo-China was arranged. Almost at the same moment France took a decided step in Madagascar, the French Protectorate giving place to actual possession of the island, though the word “annexation” was for the time being carefully repudiated.

In the Méline Cabinet, which came into power on April 29, 1896, and held office for the unusual period of two years, Hanotaux resumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. This period saw important movements in the Far East. France embarked on a policy of development in Indo-China; and the opening up of Yunnan and Southern China began. This at once brought France into rivalry with other European Powers, and the process of exacting concessions from China soon became general. In March 1898 Germany landed troops at Kiaochow, and obtained a lease of that place from China; Russia and Britain replied by seizing Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei respectively; and on April 10, 1898 France obtained Kwangchow.

In Madagascar the ambiguous *prise de possession* was converted into a definite annexation on May 30, 1896; Galliéni landed in September and deposed the Queen. In West Africa also there was a renewal of activity. On July 23, 1897 a Treaty with Germany defined the frontiers of Togo, while on June 14, 1898 the boundaries of the Gold Coast and Nigeria were further defined in an Anglo-French Agreement.

In Europe itself the intimate relations between France and Russia were emphasised by an interchange of visits between the Tsar and President Faure (October 1896 and August 1897); an easier situation was established between France and Italy; while relations between France and Germany became decidedly warmer. Hanotaux may have contemplated a real agreement with Germany directed against England; but just at the critical moment the Méline Cabinet fell (June 14, 1898), and Delcassé replaced Hanotaux at the Foreign Office.

Méline was chiefly identified with agriculture and protective duties, and has been called the "French Mackinley." But his period of office was completely overshadowed by the terrible *Affaire Dreyfus*, the greatest of the many scandals that have afflicted the Third Republic. As the Panama scandals demonstrated the appalling corruption of public life, the Dreyfus scandal demonstrated the lamentable indifference of public men to truth, honour and justice when political considerations and religious prejudices were involved; and the saddest thing of all was that it demonstrated the obliquity not only of politicians—of whom obliquity was by this time expected—but also of highly-placed officers of the army—of whom it was not.

The clerical reaction, the early stages of which have already been noted, was developing fast in 1894, and had taken a most unfortunate direction. Anti-Semitism had been one of Boulanger's cries; it was taken up by the Church and obtained a stronghold on the country. In December 1894 a Jewish officer of the General Staff, Captain Dreyfus, had been condemned by a court-martial, degraded, and, by a special law passed on February 9, 1895, imprisoned on a rock off the coast of French Guiana. The charge against him was that of communicating military secrets to Germany. It was not generally recognised that the trial had been most irregular, and that documents tending to establish the guilt of Dreyfus had been privately communicated to the judges by the War Office. In 1896 the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the War Office, Colonel Picquart, discovered evidence of treasonable relations between a certain Major Esterhazy and the German Military Attaché, and was startled to find that the writing of Esterhazy closely resembled that of the famous "*bordereau*" which had been the principal evidence against Dreyfus. Picquart urged his superiors to reopen the question, but was advised by them to let sleeping dogs lie. He was then despatched on a mission to Tunis (November 1896), and letters forged in the War Office and designed to compromise him were addressed to him there.

Various wise and honourable men were by this time convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, amongst whom the most conspicuous was Scheurer Kestner, Vice-President of the Senate. Scheurer Kestner approached his friend General Billot, then Minister for War, without success. During the whole of 1897 the most unscrupulous warfare was carried on against all who demanded the reopening of the case, and forgery became an everyday employment of certain officials of the War Office,

amongst whom was Colonel Henry, Picquart's successor as Chief of the Intelligence Bureau.

In January 1898 Esterhazy was tried by court-martial and acquitted, while Picquart was imprisoned. On January 13 the famous author Zola published an article accusing officers of the War Office of gross offences against honour and justice. He was tried and condemned to one year's imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 francs, but the verdict was annulled. Méline had stubbornly sided with the War Office, declining to "bring before a jury the honour of the chiefs of the army," and refusing to say whether documents had been communicated to the Dreyfus court-martial without the knowledge of the accused. On June 14, 1898 his Ministry fell, leaving France in a condition of complete internal demoralisation.

The Radical Ministry of Brisson which took office ordered a revision of the trial, but Cavaignac, who had become Minister for War, declared his belief in the guilt of Dreyfus, reading in the Chamber as conclusive evidence a document which was afterwards found to be a forgery of a certain Fleury. The second Dupuy Ministry, which replaced that of Brisson on November 1, 1898, was anti-Dreyfusard, and encouraged obstruction, so that by the beginning of 1899 no definite step had been taken. In the midst of this turmoil President Faure died (February 16, 1899). Faure had failed to extract the country from the hideous entanglement of the *Affaire Dreyfus*, and had done nothing to increase the prestige of the presidential office.

During the last seven months of Faure's presidency the Foreign Office had been occupied continuously by Delcassé. He was at once confronted with the important question whether the policy of *rapprochement* with Germany which Hanotaux had pursued should be continued or abandoned; for a German Note had just reached the Quai d'Orsay in which France was invited to agree with Germany on the subject of the Portuguese African colonies. Delcassé's failure to answer this Note signified a complete reversal of Hanotaux' policy. From that moment French diplomacy started on the road which ultimately led to the *Entente* of 1903.

The opportunity for a settlement with England was not long in coming. The clash on the Nile which had been so long impending occurred in the autumn of 1898. On September 2 Kitchener won the battle of Omdurman, and a few days later found himself confronted with Marchand at Fashoda. In this crisis Delcassé did not hesitate to take the unpopular but wise and indeed inevitable course of bowing to *force majeure*, and on November 4,

1898 Marchand was ordered to withdraw. By this withdrawal Delcassé removed the one vital obstacle to friendship with England. The question of Egypt once out of the way, the obstacles that remained, though numerous, were none of them beyond the powers of diplomacy. Such was the international position when President Faure died and Émile Loubet, an inconspicuous but sincere Republican, was elected to succeed him.

France was still in the throes of the *Affaire Dreyfus*; but fortunately a wave of returning sanity now set in; men were beginning to realise not only that they had been deceived over the Dreyfus case but also that France was suffering grave discredit in consequence of it in the eyes of the world. A fresh start, a liquidation of the *Affaire* and a revival of governmental stability became therefore the main object of patriotic Frenchmen. It was to carry out this design that, after a brief Dupuy Ministry (November 1, 1898—June 22, 1899), Waldeck-Rousseau, who had taken little part in public affairs since his short tenure of the Ministry of Interior in Gambetta's Cabinet, was called to preside over a government in which men of widely different political opinions were included. Such a composite ministry was only too common in France; but Waldeck-Rousseau's Ministry had this advantage, that its members and supporters were united in a determination to make an end of the Dreyfus trouble. Waldeck-Rousseau was a barrister of conspicuous ability, endowed with a cool head and a judicial impartiality rare in French statesmen; he kept his motley Cabinet together for three years, dissipated the Dreyfus nightmare and restored to France the prosperity which she was losing and the prestige which she seemed already to have lost.

Orders for the re-trial of the Dreyfus case had been issued in August 1898; but it was only after a year's delay that the convict was brought before a fresh court-martial at Rennes. Intimidated by the presence and testimony of distinguished officers, this court-martial once more condemned Dreyfus, but this time only by a majority of five to two. The Ministry then intervened, and invited the President to use his prerogative of mercy. On June 13, 1900 Dreyfus was pardoned, and a general amnesty decreed. It was a somewhat shameful ending to a shameful episode; but the *Affaire* had got so far out of the regions of justice and into those of politics, and had so inflamed passions and divided the country, that this was probably the best, perhaps the only, solution.

France had greatly degraded herself in the eyes of the world,

and had lost much of her self-reliance ; and, when people realised how insane their conduct had been, the Church, which had certainly played a most unworthy part in the scandal, was made the scape-goat. In particular a strong set was made against the Jesuits, and against Religious Congregations in general, and Waldeck-Rousseau was forced by public opinion to introduce legislation to put the law with regard to Associations—lay and religious—on a more definite footing. To understand what followed it is necessary to realise that France has always looked askance on Associations of all kinds, and that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic legislation had, with very few exceptions, refused to give legal recognition to Associations. The vast ramification of religious orders in France had thus for the most part no legal existence, and lived on sufferance, liable at any moment to dissolution. Waldeck-Rousseau's law of July 1, 1901 gave a recognised legal status to all Associations, with certain necessary exceptions, on condition that they declared and registered themselves ; it also imposed certain restrictions on the amount of property they could hold, and provided that they could be dissolved by the Council of Ministers. The law of 1901 was essentially a liberating as well as a regularising measure, and one which had the approval of a large majority of Frenchmen. A clause (xiv) was introduced into the Bill by Parliament, forbidding members of unauthorised Congregations to take part in teaching.

The concordat between all shades of Republicans that Waldeck-Rousseau had been able to bring about, and the consequent stability of the Government, had a salutary effect on every branch of public life. Valuable measures strengthening the navy and organising a colonial army stabilised the international position of France. A high pitch of internal prosperity was reached. The opening up of colonial markets, thanks to the consolidation of the Colonies and to a great increase in the mercantile marine, gave encouragement to trade ; wealth increased ; and foreign policy, under the firm and experienced guidance of Delcassé, who held office continuously from June 1898 till June 1905, advanced with sure steps along definite lines. The Alliance with Russia was strengthened by the visits of the French Foreign Minister to St. Petersburg in 1899 and 1901, and in the latter year the Tsar was tumultuously acclaimed in Paris.

In the Colonies great activity was displayed in West and Equatorial Africa. The French West African Colonies were consolidated by a decree of October 17, 1899 ; and on June 27,

1900 France and Spain came to an agreement as to the frontiers of Rio Muni and Rio d'Oro. The only frontier that remained undefined in this quarter of the globe was that of Morocco, and there sporadic anarchy prevailed. Delcassé was not slow to perceive that it was in Morocco that compensation might approximately be found for the injury France had suffered in Egypt at the hands of England. He therefore adopted a stiffer attitude in this quarter. Spain and Italy were the Powers most directly interested; Spain's attitude seemed conciliatory, and Italy agreed not to interfere in Morocco if France would leave her a free hand in Tripoli. In June 1901 an arrangement was made for mixed commissions to assist the Sherifian Government in keeping order. The accession of Edward VII (January 1901) to the English throne led to an immediate improvement of the relations between England and France, and when in that year the Sherifian Government sounded the British Government as to the possibility of a British Protectorate over Morocco they were promptly referred to France. French expeditions meanwhile had been using the newly-completed railway from Oran as a base for the penetration of the southward oases, and had done so in conjunction with the Sherifian Government. This penetration was subsequently completed by General Lyautey in 1903.

In Asia French policy had been somewhat less successful. France had borne her share in the intervention in China consequent on the Boxer troubles of 1900. But the Anglo-Japanese treaty of January 30, 1902—directed as it was against France's ally Russia—was something of a set-back, and seemed to discourage the idea of the Anglo-French agreement which was the goal of Delcassé's diplomacy. On the other hand, England had adopted a distinctly conciliatory attitude over Siamese questions.

XIX

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY OPENS

(1900-1914)

WALDECK-ROUSSEAU's remarkable success in consolidating the Republican groups in support of his Ministry acted like a charm on the Legislature. Quite suddenly it entered upon a period of fruitful social legislation, most of which was inspired by

Millerand, the Socialist occupant of the Ministry of Commerce. A Labour Bureau was set up, and various measures regulating the hours of labour adopted, a ten-hours' day being finally ordained in 1904. Labour Councils were established (January 2, 1901) to deal with disputes between employers and employed; a Workshops Act was passed on December 29, 1900, regulating the conditions of labour, and measures dealing with the housing of the working-classes were also carried. The Ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau was thus abnormally fruitful, both at home and abroad. On June 3, 1902 however reasons of health obliged the President of the Council to resign, and power unfortunately passed to politicians of a much narrower type.

The wise and stable measures and administration of Waldeck-Rousseau had shown how quickly France responded to firm government. In three years the country had to all appearance recovered from the chaos and degradation into which it had been plunged by the Dreyfus scandal. It was now to be shown how quickly a feeble Government could revive all the troubles that seemed to have been dispersed. Combes, who succeeded Waldeck-Rousseau in June 1902, was a weak and acid man, and his Government proved to be the worst of the many bad governments the Third Republic had had to endure. This was not so much on account of any deliberate policy as because it submitted to the dictation of a Parliamentary Committee of the groups of the Left, which Combes allowed to come into being as a support to his Government, but which soon took the lead away from the Ministry and forced its hand.

The name of Combes is chiefly associated with the dispersal of the Religious and Teaching Orders. This was accomplished by stiffening and distorting Waldeck-Rousseau's law of July 1, 1901, the Government in this taking the orders of the Parliamentary Committee. On June 27, 1902 the Religious Associations which had come into being without permission since the enactment of the law were dissolved; and in the following month 3,000 Associations that had not registered themselves suffered the same fate. A law of March 1903 disposed of those that had applied for registration, and on July 5, 1904 the Teaching Orders were dispersed. Waldeck-Rousseau had intended peace, Combes had drawn the sword. The religious split in France was not only reopened but immensely widened, and the Catholic world and the Vatican felt themselves outraged. The death of Leo XIII on July 30, 1903 and the succession of the narrow and impolitic Pius X greatly accentuated the trouble. The visit of President Loubet

to the Quirinal in April 1904, necessary as it was in order to secure the valuable acquiescence of Italy in the Moroccan projects of France, then reaching a crisis, came at a most inopportune moment in the religious strife. Pius X refused to receive the President, and on May 21 the French Ambassador to the Vatican was recalled. The way to a complete breach with the Holy See was thus opened.

Combes however went too far in his subservience to the anti-clerical extremists, and brought about his own downfall by an excess of zeal. The discovery that through the Freemasons and the *préfets* and *sous-préfets* the Government was carrying on anti-clerical espionage alienated even those whom Combes was seeking to propitiate, with the result that on January 19, 1905 he was forced to resign.

Combes' Government had touched very great depths of degradation in its religious policy; but this had not been its only sinister activity. André, the Minister for War, had begun by his intrigues to undermine the military strength of the country, and he also introduced a measure for the reduction of the term of service to two years, a proposal which greatly prejudiced the policy of Delcassé, who at that very moment found himself challenged by Germany in Morocco. The Emperor William's theatrical visit to Tangier in March 1905 almost coincided with the introduction of André's proposals.

Curiously enough it was during the term of office of this despicable Ministry that the final steps were taken in the long march towards an agreement with England. Delcassé had remained at the Foreign Office, forgetful of the politicians and by the politicians forgot, and had continued to weave the strands of his long-considered policy. The accession to the British throne of Edward VII and the change of ministry in England in July 1902, which brought Balfour and Lansdowne into power, had greatly assisted him in his task. On May 1, 1903 King Edward visited Paris; and the result of his visit was the signature, in October of that year, of a treaty by which Britain and France agreed to submit to The Hague Tribunal all differences that might arise between them on certain specified classes of subjects. In April of the following year a series of agreements embracing practically all the questions outstanding between France and England was made public. These treaties covered Siam, where both Powers repudiated the idea of annexations and agreed as to zones of influence; the New Hebrides; Madagascar, where England withdrew her objections to French tariffs in return for the

French acceptance of the English schemes with regard to Zanzibar; Newfoundland, where France abandoned the fishing privileges which had been secured to her by the Treaty of Utrecht; West Africa, where England agreed to modifications of the Gambian and Nigerian frontiers and abandoned the Îles de Los. Finally, the Egyptian and Moroccan questions were set off the one against the other; England—with certain reserves as to Spanish interests—agreeing to countenance French projects in Morocco provided no commercial restrictions were imposed, while France agreed not to interfere with England in Egypt.

Thus the long-drawn-out policy of *rapprochement* with England, on which the security of France and the equilibrium of Europe depended, and which had at times seemed quite hopeless, was at length accomplished. It was a signal triumph for the patience and determination of Delcassé. It meant far more than the establishment of France in Morocco and the completion of her Empire across the Mediterranean—and indeed it was soon to be demonstrated that this latter end had not yet been reached—it meant the definite establishment of an adequate counterweight in Europe to the menace of the *Triple*. For, though there was no definite treaty of alliance, France now felt—the events of 1914 showed how nearly she was wrong in her judgement—that, in the event of a European crisis, she could rely on Britain as well as on Russia.

The *Entente* was almost at once subjected to a very severe strain by the outbreak in 1904 of the Russo-Japanese War and the North Sea incident, when the Russian fleet fired on some British fishing-craft, mistaking them for enemy torpedo craft. But it stood the test; France acted the part of mediator between two Powers which cherished traditional enmity but with both of which she was friendly. The matter was submitted to an international Court at Paris and amicably settled; a great triumph for international good sense and for the newly-established *Entente*, which may very probably be credited with the avoidance of a European conflagration in 1904.

Germany however was by this time fully aroused to colonial ambitions, and not inclined to accept a French domination of Morocco. She was aware of the agreement between England and France, and of a further agreement between France and Spain (October 1904), by which the zone of Spanish influence in Morocco had been considerably reduced. She was aware also that France had despatched a mission to Fez and was about to take active measures for the restoration of order in

Morocco. She proceeded therefore to strew the path of France with difficulties, and in March 1905 William II visited Tangier and ostentatiously greeted the Sultan as an independent sovereign. Pressure was brought to bear on that distracted potentate, and he was persuaded to appeal to all the Powers which had been parties to the Madrid Conference in July 1880. Delcassé, who had retained office in the Rouvier Cabinet that had replaced the Cabinet of Combes, with great courage and determination advocated resistance to this demand. He believed in the sincerity of British goodwill; he knew that Italy would not support Germany if matters came to a head; and he did not believe that Germany would press the Morocco question to the extremity of war. The Rouvier Cabinet however—alarmed no doubt at the weakness betrayed by Russia in her conflict with Japan—did not support the Foreign Minister, with the result that on June 6, 1905 Delcassé resigned. His services to France had been incalculable. By coolness, patience and persistence he had accomplished what had seemed impossible, and Europe may well recognise in him the statesman who was chiefly instrumental in building up the combination which saved the world from German domination in 1914. For the moment he had failed, and France had to submit to the humiliation of dismissing a minister practically at the nod of the Kaiser. Many things had combined to bring about this incident: the collapse of Russia at Moukden (March 1905); the effect on the French army of André's reduction of the term of service to two years (March 17, 1905); the wave of pacifism and internationalism that was sweeping over France; above all perhaps Delcassé's own detachment and the consequent want of solidarity in the Cabinet.

Rouvier himself took up Delcassé's work at the Quai d'Orsay. He accepted Germany's suggestion of a Conference on Moroccan affairs, and endeavoured—at first unsuccessfully—to persuade her to come to a preliminary agreement with France. Ultimately (July 8, 1905) Germany agreed not to cross the interests of France in Morocco provided the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions were not impaired. This did not prevent her however from embarking on a commercial and financial penetration of Morocco, which was in itself a threat to French interests.

On January 16, 1906 the Moroccan Conference assembled at Algieras. France did not enter it without the advantage of powerful support. Russia and the Mediterranean Powers grouped themselves around her; England, in virtue of her

recent agreement with France on the subject of Morocco ; Russia (now, by the treaty signed at Portsmouth, U.S.A. on September 5, 1905, clear of her entanglements in the Far East), as a treaty-bound ally ; Spain, because as a Power in possession—like France—of territories contiguous to Morocco, her interests in that country were akin to those of France. Moreover Spain had on September 1, 1905 signed a treaty with the latter in which mutual support at the Conference was stipulated. Finally, Italy welcomed the free hand in Tripoli which had been guaranteed her, and was drawing away from the incongruous allies to whom she was bound by the *Triple*. The United States was also represented at the Conference and, partly because she had no interests of her own in Morocco, played a very important part as pacificator.

In a high degree the Conference of Algeciras was thus a diplomatic duel between the Triple Alliance, with a rather less than lukewarm Italy, and the Triple *Entente*, supported by Spain, with the United States as “honest broker.” The combinations of 1915 were very nearly foreshadowed. The urgent questions in Morocco were those of the Police and of the new State Bank which it was proposed to set up. Germany made overtures to Spain, offering her the control of the Police behind the back of France. Spain refused to be seduced. Then Austria formulated proposals which included the distribution of eight Moroccan ports among the Powers. Just at this moment (March 7, 1906) the Rouvier Government fell, and France was in the dangerous predicament of having to deal with critical problems at a European Conference, while the political situation at home was in a state of flux. Fortunately there was a patriotic rally, and Léon Bourgeois, who went to the Quai d’Orsay in the Sarrien Government which replaced that of Rouvier, maintained a firm hand ; so that no hitch in policy occurred.

The United States now intervened. President Roosevelt, through the American delegate at the Conference, riddled the Austrian proposals with criticism ; and, as Germany was at that moment particularly anxious to stand well in the eyes of the United States, they were withdrawn, and on April 7, 1906 the Final Act of the Conference of Algeciras was signed. It was an ambiguous document of more than questionable utility. While ostensibly guaranteeing the integrity and independence of Morocco, it placed the finances, tariffs, public works and to a great extent the police, of that country under international tutelage. But, owing to the proximity of France and Spain

to Morocco, it was inevitable that the police duties should fall on them. The Algeiras Act was in fact little more than an injury on paper to French interests ; in practice things remained much as they were. The Act was no doubt irritating, and in a sense humiliating to France ; but the real humiliation had been in the forced acceptance of the Conference and the fall of Delcassé at German dictation. This was all the more humiliating in that Germany had no real interests in Northern Africa. The consoling feature was that the *Entente* had stood firm under a severe test and that Germany had completely failed to accomplish her design of embroiling the Powers and tearing up the earlier Moroccan agreements. These survived the Conference.

The change of ministry which had for a moment seemed likely to endanger French interests at Algeiras had been brought about by religious troubles. Since the breach with Rome in 1904 it had become increasingly obvious that the relations between Church and State in France stood in need of modification. To the logical French mind it was an absurdity that the State should continue to recognise and pay a body which owed allegiance to a Power with which France had broken off relations. The law of December 9, 1905, for the separation of the Church from the State, removed this absurdity.

Its principal provisions were as follows : While recognising in its opening words complete liberty of conscience, it withdrew all recognition, and—after a period of grace during which gradually decreasing salaries were to be paid—all subventions by the State from all religions. The salaries of chaplains in public secondary schools, prisons and hospitals were however to be paid by the State, and pensions not exceeding 1,500 francs (£60) a year were provided for the aged clergy. An inventory of all ecclesiastical property was to be taken, so that its legal ownership might be ascertained. Such of this property as legally belonged to the churches was to be transferred to the *Associations culturelles* provided for in the Act. These Associations were to be set up in every *Commune*. The property belonging to the State or to other civil corporations was to revert to its rightful owners, subject to certain obligations on their part. All religious edifices were left to the Associations ; but presbyteries, seminaries and episcopal palaces were to revert to their rightful owners after the expiry of five years.

The Associations were permitted to raise funds but not to accumulate them beyond a certain figure, their accounts being liable to inspection by the Ministry of Finance. Churches were

to be used exclusively for religious purposes. Bell-ringing and religious ceremonies outside the churches were subject to the discretion of the Municipalities. Religious instruction was only to be given outside school-hours. Ecclesiastics were dispensed from military service. Sunday and the four great festivals of the Church were retained as public holidays.

This far-reaching law, marred as it was by a certain anti-religious bias which distinguished some of its provisions, may be regarded as the inevitable corollary of the breach with Rome. It was of course a serious blow to religion, and an illustration of the impossibility of dispensing equal justice between religion, which is positive, and unbelief, which is negative. But the Church was not wholly a loser, and—given tolerant administration of the Act—she even stood to be a gainer. She lost practically all her State subventions, it is true, and the pensions provided were somewhat niggardly, especially in the case of dignitaries, who for this purpose were placed on a level with the humblest *curés*. On the other hand, she gained a modicum of freedom—the power for instance to appoint her own Archbishops and Bishops, and the right to hold Synods. The Act even included provisions which were calculated to safeguard the Church of Rome, and to give it a privileged position as against schismatic religions. The abrogation of the Concordat was perhaps a misfortune; but mainly so because it left France officially a non-religious State, and put it into the power of groups of malicious or prejudiced persons to harass their religiously-minded neighbours. On the whole, considering the factious opposition that the Church had offered to the Republic, and the uniformly unfortunate nature of its interventions in politics, it cannot be maintained that it suffered unreasonably by the Act of Separation.

Considerable spasmodic resistance was made to the Inventories; but this appears to have been hardly spontaneous. It was sufficient however to cause the downfall of the Rouvier Cabinet, as already recounted (March 7, 1906). In the previous month Loubet's term of Presidential office had expired, and Armand Fallières was chosen to fill his place. Sarrien, who had succeeded Rouvier, was replaced on October 25, 1906 by his colleague Clémenceau with a reconstructed Cabinet, which included the Socialist Briand. Briand it was who presided over the application of the Law of Separation. He was not of the stuff of which persecutors are made, and very sensibly left the recalcitrant clergy, who after all were acting under orders from the Vatican, in possession of their churches. He also—in

the face of violent opposition—passed two supplementary laws which legalised this administrative concession. In this way he deprived the Church of that valuable weapon a concrete grievance, and greatly eased the religious situation which, in less tolerant hands, might well have become a danger to the State.

Clémenceau's Ministry was a reconstruction, but it included one Minister whose appointment was a notable event. General Picquart became Minister for War. Picquart had been the ablest and most strenuous advocate of Dreyfus, and had done more than any other person to expose the intrigues and malpractices of the War Office. As a consequence he had suffered imprisonment, and was subsequently retired from the Army. His appointment to the War Office was thus a sign that at last the *Affaire* was wound up. The Cour de Cassation had quashed the verdict of the Dreyfus Court-Martial on July 12, 1906, and both Dreyfus and Picquart were reinstated; an amnesty for all concerned was then decreed, the ashes of Zola, who had shared with Picquart the honourable obloquy of having sought justice for a Jew, were transferred to the Pantheon, while Picquart, who was a man of signal ability, was gratified with this ministerial appointment.

The Clémenceau Cabinet found itself confronted with grave difficulties. Not only was there keen opposition from the Socialists, who cried out for the full Marxist remedy of Communism and scoffed at any democratic legislation which fell short of that ideal, but government was becoming very difficult owing to the constant interference of constituencies with their representatives, and to the impossibility of placing reliance on the solidarity of parliamentary groups. The Ministry could not depend from day to day on its majority, and felt that at any moment it might be swept from office. Clémenceau put forward a very uncompromising programme of reform. He set up a Ministry of Labour with Viviani at its head, advocated the nationalisation of the railways and actually took over the *Ouest*, while Caillaux, the Minister of Finance, introduced proposals for a graduated tax on incomes. But all this did not satisfy the Socialists; and their spokesman, Jaurès, continued to denounce all proposals that did not answer to the touchstone of Marxism. Strikes and disturbances, at times attended with bloodshed, occurred with increasing frequency, and seriously injured France. She was at that time playing a critical diplomatic game, and played it with her hand grievously weakened by these domestic troubles.

In the Near East, where the Central Powers were threatening an advance in two vital directions—towards Baghdad and towards Salonika—France played a secondary part. All she was called upon to do was to give diplomatic support to her ally Russia. In Morocco, on the other hand, in spite of the Act of Algeciras, her part was, by mere force of circumstances, that of a principal. There was much delay in the ratification of the Act, which did not come into force until the end of 1906. It did nothing to ameliorate conditions in Morocco, where anarchy continued to prevail, with the result that France and Spain, the countries contiguous to the disturbed area, were continually under the necessity of making naval and military demonstrations. Theoretically since the Act of Algeciras the task was an international one, in practice it fell exclusively to the contiguous Powers. The promised internationalisation of Morocco was soon seen to be no more than a paper provision, to a great extent incapable of execution.

While affairs in Morocco were developing in this way, France continued her sagacious policy of seeking solutions of the various problems which still stood between her and the Powers whose friendship she desired to retain. On October 20, 1906 a treaty with England had set the New Hebrides trouble at rest; on March 27, 1907 the outstanding questions with Siam were settled. More important than these treaties however, because it removed a serious anomaly which might have prejudiced the *entente* with England, was the Franco-Japanese Treaty of June 10, 1907. The two Powers mutually guaranteed each other's Asiatic possessions and the integrity of China.

Of almost equal importance was the agreement signed by France, England and Italy recognising the *status quo* in Abyssinia. It was a sign that Italy was not bound hand and foot to Germany and Austria, but was inclined to independent action. If not an actual breach in the Triple Alliance, it showed that such a breach was practicable. Finally, on December 13, 1906 and May 16, 1907 treaties were signed with Spain by France and England respectively, the object of both of which was the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and Morocco. This important group of treaties has been well described by a recent French historian as a general "making friends with other people's friends." And the most important of all was the understanding between England and Russia on August 31, 1907. This was the real birthday of the Triple *Entente*, the reward of many years of patient diplomacy. The natural corollary of this great event was the visit of President

Fallières to London, which was followed by a visit to the Tsar at Reval.

Germany, under these circumstances, seemed momentarily inclined to make overtures to France, with the result that in April 1908 an agreement was made between the two Powers, adjusting the frontier between the Cameroons and the French Congo; and when fresh and more vigorous intervention in Morocco on the part of France became necessary owing to the conflict between the Sultan Abd-el-Aziz and his brother Mulai Hafid, Germany made no protest. Considerable protest was made, however, by the politicians at home. Jaurès fulminated against a costly and dangerous entanglement; and even men like Ribot denounced the forward policy in Morocco. In point of fact France observed scrupulous neutrality as between the rival claimants to the Sultanate, and confined her activities to keeping order and protecting life and property so far as that was possible. It was Germany that plunged in and demanded the recognition of Mulai Hafid. A slight incident that occurred at Casablanca, in which some deserters from the Foreign Legion were arrested by the French authorities, raised excited protests from Germany; and, as both France and Russia were at the moment involved in serious domestic troubles, it required some courage on the part of Clémenceau to refuse the demand for an apology and to insist on the reference of the matter to the arbitration of The Hague Tribunal.

The real danger to France at this juncture was not external but internal, from her internecine dissensions and her factious politicians, and in particular from her economic and financial troubles. French finance since 1871 had, generally speaking, been reckless; the national debt had gone on mounting up, and no attempt had been made to create a sinking fund for its redemption. The Third Republic did not produce a single great finance minister, but it had never produced so bad a one as Caillaux, who held the office in Clémenceau's Ministry. A decline of trade was setting in, and Caillaux did what, under similar circumstances, all unscrupulous politicians are prone to do: he cut down the votes for the fighting services. It was a just nemesis that overtook Clémenceau when in July 1909 the denunciations which Delcassé brought against him for sacrificing the navy drove him from office.

Briand, who succeeded Clémenceau as President of the Council, was the first Socialist to be head of a French Government. He was a man of large views and a strong sense of responsibility. He recognised the danger to France of a

continuance of faction in politics, and he made a determined attempt to eliminate party. He sought also to widen the outlook of French parliamentarians and draw them away from parochialism and corruption by employing Gambetta's remedy and reimposing *scrutin de liste*. Further, in the face of serious strikes of seamen and railwaymen in 1910 and of troubles amongst the vine-dressers in 1911, he vindicated the right of the Government to govern. His firmness quickly alienated the extreme wing of the Socialists; the Radicals had been already alienated by the adoption of *scrutin de liste*. The policy of government without party broke in Briand's hands, and on February 27, 1911 he resigned. Monis took office, with Caillaux once more at the Ministry of Finance and Delcassé at the Marine.

In foreign policy Briand had followed Clémenceau. The Balkan crisis of 1908, the Young Turks' Revolution, the declaration of Bulgarian independence, the transfer of Crete to Greece and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina had profoundly upset the Balkan equilibrium and had overset the Treaty of Berlin. France was concerned chiefly as the ally of Russia and played a subordinate rôle. On the whole the Balkan crisis was a rebuff to the *Entente* and a success for the Central Powers.

In January and February 1909 an attempt was made to reach an understanding with Germany about Morocco; a declaration of February 6, 1909 renewed the guarantee of independence and integrity for Morocco and economic equality for all nations in that quarter, Germany declaring that her Moroccan interests were purely economic and commercial. Shortly afterwards the Near Eastern crisis was ended by the Russian acceptance of Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Once again the diplomatic victory had gone to the Central Powers. For the moment it seemed that, at the cost of some sacrifice, France was about to adjust the various differences between herself and Germany. In May 1909 an attempt was made to extend this policy to Equatorial Africa by the establishment of a Franco-German commercial *consortium* in the Congo. It was at this moment that Briand succeeded Clémenceau. He retained Pichon at the Foreign Office, so that there was no break in foreign policy. But the plans for joint economic and commercial operations by France and Germany in the Congo and Morocco made no headway.

The accession to power of Monis was soon followed by a renewal of disorders in Morocco; and on May 21, 1911 French

troops were despatched to Fez, whereupon Spain took alarm and landed troops at Larache. This double movement aroused Germany; and the gradual drift which had been in progress towards a general Franco-German colonial *consortium* quickly ebbed away. An attempt on the part of Caillaux to negotiate a common Franco-German railway enterprise in the Congo and Cameroons behind the back of his Foreign Minister was stopped by the latter, and this further irritated Germany, who at once began to show her teeth. A German man-of-war was sent to the Moroccan port of Agadir (July 1).

This was undisguised and flagrant intimidation; and it created a very critical international situation, all the more so because Caillaux had just succeeded Monis (June) in the Presidency of the Council. Negotiations were opened at Berlin, France being strengthened by assurances of support from England. Germany demanded compensations in return for a withdrawal in Morocco, and indicated the Congo as an appropriate ground. The manœuvres at this juncture of certain French business men at Berlin, and those of Caillaux himself, who negotiated over the head of Selves, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, were injurious to French interests. Notwithstanding this, relations became very much strained, and there was a general feeling that Europe was on the brink of war. But to the Central Powers the moment seemed inopportune; for France was clearly not without allies, and Italy was involved in hostilities with Turkey over Tripoli, and inclined to favour the French pretensions in Morocco. The Wilhelmstrasse therefore determined to confine its activities to securing the best diplomatic bargain possible. The result was the Treaty of November 4, 1911, by which France obtained freedom to establish a Protectorate in Morocco, while Germany obtained very large territorial concessions in the Cameroons, which gave her access to the Rivers Congo and Ubangi.

The treaty of November 4, 1911 was greeted with a howl of execration in France, where public opinion bitterly resented the repeated surrenders to German arrogance. There was some talk of bringing Caillaux before the High Court on a charge of treason, and on January 11, 1912 the Ministry was driven from power. The position had greatly altered since a similar outburst had greeted Jules Ferry's forward colonial policy. Public opinion was beginning to see that the policy of continual surrender could only end in the complete subordination of France to Germany, and to recognise that war might be the lesser of two evils. A great awakening of patriotism and national self-

respect became evident, and the Poincaré Ministry of January 13, 1912 was a rally of the strong men of France in face of a situation which demanded the union of all patriotic forces. The combination of Poincaré with Briand (Keeper of the Seals), Delcassé (Minister of Marine) and Millerand (Minister of War) was a challenge in itself; it reflected the rally of opinion towards a firmer foreign policy and marked a great change in the spirit of France.

Poincaré had no choice but to ratify the unpopular treaty; and on March 12, 1912 the Sultan of Morocco accepted the French Protectorate. Supplementary conventions settled the frontiers of Dahomey and the Congo. Prolonged negotiations with Spain ensued, in which the area of her zones of influence, and the question of the control of a future Tangier-Fez railway, caused great difficulty. It was not till September 27 that a basis of accommodation was reached. The Ministry meanwhile had set itself to draw closer the strands of the Triple *Entente*, and Poincaré paid a personal visit to St. Petersburg in August, where—it has been conjectured—he learnt the nature of the Balkan treaties which had just been signed, and concluded that a European war could not long be averted. He returned to France the more intent on strengthening the country for a struggle which he recognised to be inevitable.

The Balkan War broke out in September, and the rapid collapse of Turkey was a surprise and embarrassment to the Central Powers. So alarming was the European situation that, when a Conference of the belligerents was summoned to London to discuss terms of peace, a Conference of Ambassadors was also summoned to seek a peaceful solution of Balkan questions (December 1912). These Conferences, the failure of the belligerents to agree on terms, the renewal of hostilities, the Second Balkan War and the Treaty of Bucharest, only served to emphasise the dangers which threatened the peace of Europe.

The election of Poincaré to the Presidency of the Republic, with a unanimity and enthusiasm which had not attended the election of any former President, signified that France realised the situation and approved the policy for which Poincaré stood. The Briand and Barthou Cabinets carried on this policy with great vigour. Naval and military affairs occupied them continually; and on March 4, 1913 Barthou passed into law a measure proposed by Briand which reimposed three years' service. This was a reply to the military and financial measures recently adopted in Germany. Both countries in fact were openly arming. This legislation, though it undoubtedly

reflected the feeling of the country, was not carried without opposition. The Radical-Socialists, led by Caillaux and Malvy, were loud in their outcries, and when, on November 14, 1913, Barthou proposed a loan to meet the increased expenditure on armaments, they succeeded in overthrowing the Ministry.

Doumergue, who took office in December 1913, included in his Cabinet Caillaux, Malvy and Monis—a somewhat sinister combination. This Ministry leaned for support on the Radicals, who had ranged themselves against the patriotic revival. The Socialists, protesting against capitalistic chauvinism, and against the “Three Years’ Law,” associated themselves with the Radicals. Against this pacifist “bloc” Barthou, with the aid of Briand and Millerand, organised a “Federation of the Lefts,” with a programme of electoral reform, and of national defence based on the Three Years’ Law. The moment was a dangerous one for France; Poincaré’s patriotic policy seemed to be compromised, the proposed loan was abandoned, the strife of parties became more envenomed than ever, and the Ministry cried “peace” when there was no peace, asserting, and possibly believing, that the diplomatic clouds were dispersing. It was fortunate for France that revelations, disclosing an old financial scandal in which Caillaux was involved, drove that dangerous and sinister figure into resignation (March 16, 1914).

In May there was a general election; but the Ministry formed by Ribot on June 9 to meet the new Chambers was defeated, and it resigned on the same day. Viviani stepped into the breach, and revived the Poincaré-Barthou policy, retaining the “Three Years’ Law” and reintroducing the proposals for a loan for national defence. To have got rid of the Doumergue Ministry was an escape for France; but, though the policy of Viviani was sound and patriotic, his Ministry was greatly hampered by the incoherence of the new Chamber. A series of scandals in army administration was exposed in the spring of 1914, which rudely shook the confidence of the country; so that when on June 28 the assassination of the Archduke gave the signal for the general conflagration, it seemed that France was destined to face the crisis of her fate with a weak Government and her military strength grievously impaired by maladministration. How she rose to the occasion, how the *Entente*, after a moment of great strain, held together, and how her military instinct triumphed over the difficulties which political ineptitude had strewn in her path, belongs to the history of the War.

XX

THE GERMAN CHALLENGE

(June to August 1914)

ON June 28, 1914 Europe was startled and horrified by the news of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian and Hungarian crowns, who, with his wife the Duchess of Hohenberg, was killed in the streets of the Bosnian town of Sarajevo. The crime was a political one, and its perpetrator was an Austrian subject. There seemed however good reason to believe that it had its origins in Serbia, and it was generally recognised that Austria-Hungary had a right to demand satisfaction from that country. For a month there ensued a complete silence, which, but for the fact that Austria encouraged the belief that her demands, when presented, would be such as Serbia could accept, might have been regarded as ominous. As it was, anxiety was allayed, and many European sovereigns, statesmen and diplomats started on their customary summer holidays. The Emperor Francis Joseph went to Ischl, the Kaiser started on a yachting cruise in Norwegian waters. Amongst others, M. Poincaré set off on July 15 on a tour of the Northern Courts. He was accompanied by M. Viviani, who was not only President of the Council but also Minister for Foreign Affairs. In Paris the interest of the public was concentrated on the sensational trial of Mme Caillaux, wife of the late French Finance Minister, on a charge of murdering M. Calmette, editor of the *Figaro*, who had been directing a newspaper campaign against her husband.

Such was the state of affairs when on July 23 the long-expected Austrian Note was presented at Belgrade. When its terms became known it was quickly seen that it was a document of the most critical nature. More grave even than the terms themselves was the time-limit imposed in the Note. Serbia was to reply within forty-eight hours, an interval clearly too short to admit of the action of diplomacy.

Neither France nor England had any direct interest in Balkan questions. But Russia was deeply interested in Serbia, and could not be expected to sit still and watch that State become the vassal of Austria; and France was bound to Russia by treaty—committed by honour and self-interest to support her

if she became involved in hostilities. Germany and Italy were similarly committed to Austria, though the Triple Alliance contemplated only a defensive war. Germany was generally credited—though her diplomats vigorously repudiated the suggestion—with having been privy beforehand to the Austrian Note, and might be counted on to give her full support to Austria. England, though associated with France by the *Entente Cordiale*, was not bound by treaty to support her. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance but a “diplomatic group.” England’s hands were therefore free, though there existed moral obligations which it was impossible for her to disregard. Clearly therefore, if the quarrel between Austria and Serbia could not be localised, it was certain to involve all the Great Powers of Europe with the possible exception of Italy. And the localisation of the quarrel was improbable. The situation was thus one of extreme gravity, and might rapidly lead to incalculable consequences.

On July 24 the terms of the Austrian Note were communicated by the Austrian Ambassador to the French Foreign Office, and at once repeated to M. Viviani, who with President Poincaré had just left Russia for Sweden. M. Bienvenu Martin was acting for M. Viviani as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and handled a most delicate situation with much firmness and good-sense. He pleaded in the first place that, in the event of Serbia accepting the main provisions of the Austrian Note, the door should not be closed on negotiations; he advised Serbia through the Serbian Minister to offer satisfaction on all points which were not irreconcilable with her dignity and honour, and to seek to escape from the clutches of Austria by offering to submit to arbitration. He also supported the request for an extension of the time-limit, and associated himself with Sir Edward Grey’s proposal for mediation by the four “disinterested” Powers—France, England, Germany and Italy.

On July 25 the Serbian reply to the Austrian Note was presented, and was generally acknowledged to be temperate and conciliatory. It accepted nearly all the Austrian conditions, and offered to submit outstanding points to the judgement of The Hague Tribunal. Still it did not accept—and indeed could not have accepted—the Austrian proposals in their entirety; and Austria refused to listen to anything but unconditional acceptance. Neither she nor Germany believed that Russia would risk intervention. Serbia—exposed as she was to Austrian attack—began to mobilise; and it rapidly became clear that Russia intended to take vigorous action should

Austria attack Serbia. The outlook was alarming in the extreme ; but France remained calm. The only demonstration was a revolutionary riot in Paris, which was dealt with by the police ; but the funds fell, and gold began to disappear from circulation.

It was at this juncture (July 26) that the German Ambassador, Baron von Schœn, approached the French Foreign Office with a proposal for joint Franco-German intervention at St. Petersburg, and suggested a communication to the French Press, in which reference should be made to the "pacific solidarity" existing between France and Germany. M. Bienvenu Martin scented in this proposal a covert attack on the Franco-Russian Alliance, very pertinently suggested that Germany might be more profitably employed in preaching moderation at Vienna, and declined to make any but a quite colourless communication to the Press.

Two days later (July 28) Austria declared war on Serbia, and on the 29th Belgrade was bombarded. On the same day MM. Poincaré and Viviani, who had cut short their tour, returned to Paris, and the latter at once resumed charge of the Foreign Office. The 29th was a critical day. It was at last realised in Vienna and Berlin that Russia meant business. It became a matter of first-rate importance for Germany to ascertain the intentions of England, and on the same day the Chancellor approached Sir E. Goschen, the British Ambassador, with a clumsy proposal intended to secure a promise of neutrality from England. "Provided," he said, "that the neutrality of Britain were certain, every assurance would be given . . . that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France." Asked if this guarantee would include the French Colonies, he said that "he was unable to give a similar undertaking." Sir Edward Grey returned a justly scathing and indignant answer to this humiliating proposal.

It was not only Germany that was interested in the attitude of England. It was a matter of the deepest concern to Russia and France. Russia had already urged England to declare her solidarity with the *Entente*, as the surest means of avoiding a general war ; but Sir Edward Grey had put the suggestion aside. On July 30 France made a similar representation. President Poincaré put it to the British Ambassador that if England would declare now her intention of supporting France it would almost certainly prevent Germany going to war. M. Cambon, the French Ambassador to Great Britain, at the same time invited Sir Edward Grey to say what England would do

"if certain circumstances arose." Sir Edward Grey was in a most difficult situation. The Triple *Entente* was a mere diplomatic group, but France had made certain dispositions, in particular the concentration of her fleet in the Mediterranean, in full reliance on the friendship between the two countries. The British Cabinet, however, was divided, and it was pretty clear that public opinion would not approve of armed intervention in a question where British interests and honour were not palpably at stake. After a meeting of the Cabinet Sir Edward Grey replied (July 31) to M. Paul Cambon—who had been pleading the cause of France with the utmost energy, and urging that if England failed to support her, British world-wide reputation for honour would be at an end—that the Government "could not give any pledge at the present time," but that the preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be "an important factor in determining our attitude." On the same day President Poincaré addressed a dignified personal appeal to King George, to which the latter made a sympathetic but guarded reply. Meanwhile however (July 30) Sir Edward Grey had warned the German Ambassador that Germany "must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances."

The partial mobilisation in Russia on July 29 had accentuated the crisis. Russia had exercised the greatest moderation and had repeatedly declared herself willing to accept any form of mediation. The one thing she could not permit was that Austria should do what she liked with Serbia; and the only way in which she could prove her sincerity and determination was to mobilise. Her mobilisation for the present was only on the Austrian frontier, but Berlin at once began to threaten, while France on July 30 declared that she would fulfil her treaty obligations. There was no alternative open to her. At the same time, in conjunction with England, she brought pressure on Russia to make concessions, with the result that on July 31 Russia undertook to "adopt a waiting attitude" if Austria would stay her invasion and accept European mediation. This move was unsuccessful; for on the same day Germany declared a state of "danger of war"—the immediate preliminary to mobilisation. General mobilisation was at the same time ordered in Austria, and Russia followed suit.

The German Ambassador in Paris now demanded from France (11 a.m. August 1) a statement of what her attitude would be in the event of war between Germany and Russia. The demand was almost insulting, and M. Viviani gave the curt

reply that "France would consult her own interests."¹ On the same day general mobilisation was ordered in Germany and France, though France in the Presidential Message which accompanied the mobilisation order was careful to point out that mobilisation did not mean war, and to state that there was still hope of a successful issue to the efforts of the diplomats. The order was received in France with the utmost calm. The assassination of M. Jaurès, the Socialist leader, on the previous day had no political significance, and served only to demonstrate the suppression of party feeling in face of the crisis, all parties uniting to denounce the crime and pay respect to the victim.

England now addressed to Germany and France an identical Note, requesting assurances from each Power that the guaranteed neutrality of Belgium would be respected. France at once renewed an assurance which, as she pointed out, had already been given several times; the German Secretary of State expressed doubt whether any reply could be given, on the ground that "it must disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing."

On the very day of the order for general mobilisation the frontiers of Luxembourg were violated by Germany. France had just given an assurance to the Government of the Grand Duchy that her neutrality would be respected. To justify her assault Germany put forward allegations of violation of German and Belgian territory by French aircraft. These were vigorously denied by France, who had been punctiliously anxious to give no ground for accusations of premature aggression, and with this object had withdrawn her advanced posts ten kilometres from the frontier. These German allegations were never supported by evidence, any more than the allegation that there was proof "on unimpeachable authority" of the intention of France to advance through Belgium. This was put forward as a justification of the German violation of Belgium, which took place on August 3.

On that day Germany declared war on France. M. Jules Cambon, who had worked for peace with admirable persistence at Berlin, was handed his passports. The circumstances attending his departure left an indelible stain on the German claim to courtesy and decency. The Embassy was mobbed, and during his journey to the Danish frontier the Ambassador was subjected

¹ It came out nearly four years afterwards (March 1918) that the Ambassador had even more insulting proposals to make in case France were to declare her neutrality: namely, that as guarantee of her neutrality France was to allow her strong frontier-fortresses of Toul and Verdun to be occupied by German troops.

to calculated indignities of the meanest kind. The departure from Paris of Baron von Schoen was carried out with a punctilious observance of the courtesies and formalities of diplomatic life which afforded a sharp contrast to the treatment of M. Cambon.

The invasion of Belgium by Germany simplified the task of Sir Edward Grey and ensured the solidarity of the Triple *Entente*. England had already given an assurance (August 2) to France that if the German fleet came into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet would give all the protection in its power. As, by mutual understanding between France and England, the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, England was bound in honour to give some such guarantee. The violation of Belgian neutrality however brought her fully on to the side of France, for England was bound by treaty to vindicate the neutrality of Belgium. An *ultimatum* was at once despatched to Berlin. On August 4 Sir Edward Goschen asked for his passports, and England was definitely ranged beside France and Russia.

THE GREAT WAR

XXI

MILITARY OPERATIONS (1914-1918)

(v. *Maps at end*)

(a) 1914

THE crisis of the end of July 1914 found France with a Government resolved to give Germany no pretext for forcing on a conflict, and with an army trained to look upon an immediate and resolute offensive as the only source of victory. This conflict between political defence and military attack proved at once to be embarrassing to those responsible for the conduct of the war. On the one hand the French Government issued orders that pending the formal declaration of war all the troops covering the mobilisation of the armies of France should be withdrawn to a distance of ten kilometres from the frontier, that no aircraft should fly over Belgian or German territory, and that no French soldiers should enter Belgium. On the other hand the French military plans prepared in anticipation and regularly revised by the Superior Council of War envisaged a prompt offensive into Alsace and Lorraine which it was hoped would anticipate the completion of the German concentration.

The precautions taken by the French Government to preserve peace even at the last hour materially assisted the Germans in screening their plans and in creating a fog of war which the French soldiers found difficulty in penetrating. Added to this the French Intelligence Department seriously miscalculated the number of troops which Germany could place in the field on the Western Front at the outbreak of war. The number of regular army corps which Germany possessed was known in every Intelligence Department in Europe, but it was uncertain how many reserve formations could at once reinforce the regular troops and what the state of their efficiency would be. In the French War Office it was anticipated that one division of reserve troops would be added to each regular army corps of two divisions, and it was not thought that these reserve

divisions could be comparable in efficiency with the regulars in the early days of the war. The German General Staff however for many years before the war had been secretly increasing the number and efficiency of their reserve troops. This work had been initiated in 1904 by v. Ludendorff when he was a colonel in the Great General Staff in Berlin, and when war came the Germans were able to add not one division but one army corps of reserve troops to each regular army corps. True, these reserve corps were not fully equipped with artillery, but they were none the less able to take their places in the battle-line.

The French had not developed either the training or equipment of their reserve troops in a corresponding degree, and these were at first markedly inferior in fighting capacity to the German reserve formations. Nor was this the only miscalculation made in the French War Office. The whole tendency of French military thought before the war had been to increase by training and precept the natural dash of the French infantryman. Not only was attack preached in and out of season, but in order not to hamper the rapid advance of the infantry the introduction of heavy artillery into the field army had been deliberately rejected, and reliance was placed upon the 75 field gun, a splendid weapon admirably served, but not powerful enough to prepare the way for attack even upon hastily-entrenched positions. The French staffs had not studied as closely as the Germans the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, and they did not fully appreciate the powers of resistance against direct attack which modern weapons confer upon a defensive position even when thinly manned. They believed that dashing infantry resolutely led and adequately supported by field artillery could, given a reasonable superiority in numbers, break through any defence.

It was upon this information and upon these principles that the French plan of campaign was based. This plan, prepared by the French Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre and known as Plan 17, envisaged the employment of 10 cavalry, 45 active and 21 reserve divisions organised in five armies, of which the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th in that order from right to left were drawn up along the frontiers of Alsace-Lorraine and of Belgian Luxembourg from the Swiss frontier to the neighbourhood of Mézières. The 4th Army was to have been in reserve behind the left centre of this line, between Verdun and Châlons. The plan provided for an immediate offensive into Alsace and Lorraine by the 1st and 2nd Armies, to be followed by a general offensive

on either side of the German fortified zone comprised in the fortresses of Metz and Thionville.

Upon August 1 Germany ordered general mobilisation and declared war on Russia. France thereupon ordered general mobilisation and her troops proceeded to move to the places allotted to them by Plan 17. Before they had all reached their positions a modification of the plan became necessary; a modification which had been foreseen as probable and for which provision had been made. On August 4 the Germans attacked Liège, and German cavalry appeared in Belgium west of the Meuse. The 5th Army was thereupon ordered to take ground to its left towards the Sambre and the 4th Army to take its place around Mézières. On August 7 the advanced parties of the British Expeditionary Force landed in France; Sir John French had been asked by Joffre to assemble his little army just south of the fortress of Maubeuge, where it would be on the left of the 5th French Army in its new position. The principles of Plan 17 remained unchanged; there was still to be an advance by the 1st and 2nd Armies into Alsace and Lorraine, to be followed by an advance of the 3rd and 4th Armies into Luxembourg, which had been occupied by the Germans, and into the Ardennes. The 5th Army and the British Army held a watching brief on the left flank and were to be ready to advance into Belgium, either eastwards across the Meuse or northwards towards Brussels. The French Staff had not overlooked so obvious a probability as the invasion of Belgium in force by Germany. The doubtful points in the problem were however how far north the German movement would extend and in what strength it would be made. The answers to these questions depended upon the strength of the armies which Germany deployed on the frontier of France and Belgium. This strength actually amounted to 10 cavalry, 44 active and 28 reserve infantry divisions; and of these no less than 5 cavalry, 20 active and 14 reserve divisions were destined to fall upon the French left flank. At French G.H.Q. however it was not anticipated that this latter force would exceed 3 or 4 cavalry and 22 infantry divisions. Therefore the indications of a German movement into Belgium west of the Meuse were received with equanimity, for it was considered that if the enemy were strong in that direction he would be weak in the centre, which the 3rd and 4th Armies would then break through, thus menacing the retreat of the Germans marching on Brussels; or, alternatively, it was held that if the Germans were strong in their centre they

would be weak west of the Meuse and their right flank would be destroyed by the 5th Army, with the Belgian and the British armies acting in co-operation.

The invasion of Alsace began then in accordance with Plan 17, on August 8, by an Alsace group which had been formed in the neighbourhood of Belfort under the command of General Pau. This group occupied Mülhausen on August 8, but was forced to evacuate that place two days later under German pressure. On August 14 the main invasion of Alsace-Lorraine was begun by General Pau's group, together with the 1st Army under General Dubail and the 2nd Army under General de Castelnau, a force altogether of more than 500,000 men. The French armies made steady if somewhat slow progress, and occupied Saarburg on August 18. The Germans awaited them in a carefully-selected and strongly-entrenched position, which was attacked on August 20 in the battle of Morhange¹-Saarburg. The French infantry of the 2nd Army attacked with splendid courage and dash, but being unsupported by any heavy artillery were unable to make a real impression on the German defences, and after the failure of this attack de Castelnau's right was counter-attacked and driven back. On the left of the 2nd Army the magnificent 20th Corps commanded by General Foch more than held its own at Morhange and secured the retreat of the Army which the defeat of the right had made inevitable. On Castelnau's right Dubail's 1st Army had been equally heavily engaged round Saarburg, which it had been forced to evacuate; but the success of the Germans was sensibly less than that which they had gained against the 2nd Army, and Dubail was prepared to renew the battle on the 21st when he received the news of Castelnau's retreat and was compelled to conform, carrying back with him Pau's group. The Germans, following up with more zeal than discretion and seeking to break through to Nancy, were met along the frontier, where a series of attacks delivered by them between August 25 and 27 were all repulsed. So ended the first French offensive.

Meanwhile the attack of the 3rd and 4th French Armies into the Ardennes had begun, and on August 21 the 4th Army under General Langle de Cary, advancing on the front Sedan-Montmédy, crossed the Semoy and with Ruffey's 3rd Army on its right opened the battle of the Ardennes. The French troops at once found themselves involved in very difficult, hilly and wooded country in which their artillery could give them little assistance, a country in fact, as the Germans had foreseen,

¹ Mörchingen.

admirably adapted for defence. Langle de Cary's centre was roughly handled owing to the Germans discovering a gap between two of his corps, and Ruffey could make no real progress. Such was the situation on the 23rd, when events further north at length opened the eyes of Joffre to the true situation.

The Germans had entered Liège on August 7, though, as the forts still held out, that fact was not known at French headquarters; but on the 18th the Belgian Army was attacked on the River Gette and driven back towards Antwerp, so that it was clear that the Germans had crossed the Meuse in considerable strength. The concentration of the British Army south of Maubeuge was now well advanced, and Joffre had ordered his 5th Army, which he had been strengthening at the expense of his right, forward to the Sambre on either side of Charleroi. Here it was attacked on the 21st before its concentration was complete by v. Bülow's 2nd Army, which drove in the French advanced troops and secured some of the passages of the Sambre. On the same day the Germans began to bombard the forts of Namur and the British Army to march towards Mons. During heavy fighting on the 22nd the French were forced yet further back, but de Lanrezac, having now gathered his whole army together and received an assurance that his left would be covered by Sir John French, who agreed to stand about Mons, was prepared to give battle on the 23rd. Before his plans could be developed he received the news that Namur, which was the pivot of Joffre's manoeuvre in the north, had fallen and, worse still, that the Germans had crossed the Meuse near Dinant in force and were menacing his line of retreat. He therefore determined to retire, a decision confirmed later by Joffre, who was at length aware of the German strength and now knew that the British Army of four divisions and a cavalry division, instead of being opposed by about an equal number of Germans as he had anticipated, were menaced by the ten divisions and three cavalry divisions of v. Kluck's 1st Army. The Germans had proved strong enough to check the two great French attacks on either side of Metz, and to march through Belgium, west of the Meuse, in great force. So the whole structure of Plan 17 came tumbling down, and the Allied left flank was suddenly and unexpectedly exposed to envelopment and destruction.

Joffre at once formed a new plan to meet this danger. He decided to swing back his centre and left pivoting on Verdun, and to constitute on his left a mass capable not only of checking the German advance but of outflanking and enveloping

the enemy's right. On the 25th he announced his intention of constituting this mass of his 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies, the British Army, and a new 6th Army to be formed in the neighbourhood of Amiens under General Maunoury of troops drawn from the French right flank and from the garrison of Paris. On the 26th however the British 2nd Corps was forced by Kluck to stand and fight at Le Cateau, where it was attacked by very superior numbers, and Sir John French, fearful of being caught in a trap, ordered a precipitate retreat across the Somme and behind the Oise. This retreat caused a big gap in the Allied front between the 5th Army and Maunoury's Army forming east of Amiens, a gap which became wider when on the 29th the 5th Army turned about and made a fine attack in the direction of St. Quentin, administering in the battle of Guise a severe check to Bülow's 2nd Army. On the 29th also Kluck, swerving away from the British front, attacked and drove Maunoury's troops back from the Avre.

The 5th Army was now in a very critical position; its right was endangered by the advance of v. Hausen's 3rd Army, its front was engaged with Bülow's 2nd Army, and its left, no longer covered by the British, was threatened by Kluck. An appeal to England from Joffre and from the French Government brought Lord Kitchener to Paris to modify the rate of the British retreat, and at a conference there on September 1 an agreement was happily reached, while on the same day the British forces succeeded in arresting the progress of Kluck's march against the left of the 5th Army. To protect the right of that Army Joffre had formed a new 9th Army, composed in the first instance of the left wing of the 4th Army placed under the command of General Foch. Despite these remedial measures it was clear that a prolonged retreat would be necessary to extricate the 5th Army sufficiently to enable it to take part in the great counter-offensive against the German right which Joffre had planned. On September 2 therefore the French Commander-in-Chief ordered a general retreat of his left towards the Seine and advised the Government to leave Paris, where General Galliéni had been installed in command. On the evening of the 2nd captured documents disclosed to Joffre that Kluck was marching not on Paris but against the left of the 5th Army, and the next day Galliéni, making the same discovery, proposed an attack by Maunoury's Army, by this time considerably strengthened and under his direction, and by the British Army, against Kluck's right. Joffre however desired not a local but a mass attack by the 4th, 9th, 5th,

British and 6th Armies, and for this he had to wait until the 5th Army had been extricated from danger. Not until the evening of September 4 did he decide that the moment had come. Then, on hearing both that Kluck had continued to plunge southwards, exposing his right flank and rear to Maunoury, and that the 5th Army had freed its flanks from danger, he turned to his staff and said, "Very well, gentlemen, we will fight on the Marne."

Ere the great retreat was ended Joffre had taken drastic action to improve the efficiency of his armies. Ruffey was removed from the command of the 3rd Army to be replaced by Sarraill, while Franchet d'Esperey succeeded Lanrezac in charge of the 5th, and a large number of corps and divisional commanders, who had not proved equal to the first severe test of war, were replaced by more energetic leaders. But before the crisis of the battle of the Marne was reached, away to the east in Lorraine there was fought out a battle the issue of which had great influence upon the outcome of the more vital struggle further west. On September 4 the Germans began another great effort to break through to Nancy, an effort met and defeated on the Grand Couronné, after three days' fierce fighting, by Castelnau's 2nd Army, weakened though it was by Joffre's withdrawal of troops from it to reinforce his left.

The battle of the Marne opened on September 5th with a collision between Maunoury's Army advancing eastwards towards the Ourcq and a single reserve corps which Kluck had left north of the Marne to guard his flank and rear. This German reserve corps was forced to fall back before Maunoury's superior strength, and Kluck, alive to the danger, ordered the two corps opposite the British Army back across the Marne to meet Maunoury, leaving his cavalry to delay the British. On September 6 the British Army and Franchet d'Esperey's 5th Army advanced towards the Marne, while on their right Foch's 9th Army attacked by the left of Bülow's 2nd Army, and Hausen's 3rd Army was pressed slowly back. During the 7th the battle raged fiercely on the Ourcq, and Kluck, finding it impossible to overcome Maunoury with the troops he had north of the Marne, ordered back his two remaining corps across the river, thus leaving a serious gap between himself and Bülow. On the 8th, while Maunoury was barely holding his own against Bülow's increasing strength, and while Foch, fighting a desperate defensive battle, was holding the French centre together by his indomitable will and refusal to admit defeat, the British Army advanced into the gap, and Franchet

d'Esperey overcame Bülow's left at the battle of Montmirail. Early on the 9th Bülow received information of the failure of the German attack on the Grand Couronné, of the advance of the British across the Marne, west of Château Thierry, and of the serious reverse to his right wing. Thereupon in consultation with a Staff Officer of v. Moltke's ¹ he decided to retreat, and sent this Staff Officer to Kluck to direct the 1st Army to conform and fall back towards the Aisne. These orders reached Kluck at the time when the 1st German Army was preparing to crush Maunoury ; but Moltke's representative (Lt.-Col. Hentsch) was peremptory, and the German 1st and 2nd Armies retired, carrying with them the 3rd Army, just at the moment when Foch, reinforced by Franchet d'Esperey, had begun to strike back at the enemy whom he had held in check during the three previous days. This retreat of the German right and right centre eased the situation in front of Langle de Cary, who had been fiercely engaged with the 4th German Army, and when on the 10th an attack by the German Crown Prince upon Sarraill was defeated the whole German line from Verdun westward became involved in the retreat. Thus the first great German plan of conquest in the west ended in failure.

The retreat of the German right was stayed on the Aisne. On September 13 the French reoccupied Soissons and Amiens, and on the 14th Reims. The battle of the Aisne then opened, the British right and left and Franchet d'Esperey's 5th Army getting across the river but being then held by the Germans, who received timely reinforcements by the arrival of the force which had been besieging Maubeuge, that fortress having fallen on September 7. The battle of the Aisne, which lasted until September 28, consisted of alternating attempts by the British and French to drive the Germans from the Chemin-des-Dames Ridge and by the Germans to force the Allies back over the Aisne. It ended in the deadlock of trench warfare and with no material change in the positions held when it began.

While it was raging, there was started that curious crab-like movement northwards of the opposing armies which has been called the "race to the sea." This race was the result of repeated attempts by each side to strike at the other's flanks. Maunoury with a mass of French cavalry and some territorial divisions on his left reoccupied Noyon and extended as far as the Somme, gaining possession of Péronne. On September 18 Castelnau's Army withdrawn from Lorraine began to reinforce the French left, and heavy fighting with indecisive results

¹ Chief of German Great General Staff.

followed in the neighbourhood of Roye and on the plateau of Lassigny. Towards the end of the month Castelnau, further reinforced, began an attempt to defeat the German right which brought about the battle of Albert (September 27-29). The Germans countered this movement by a more than corresponding strengthening of their right and regained possession of Noyon and Péronne, but Castelnau's men defied all the enemy's efforts to turn them out of Albert. The extension of the German right flank still continuing, Joffre at the end of September formed a new army in the neighbourhood of Arras under the command of General de Maud'huy. Simultaneously the French Commander-in-Chief agreed to the proposition of Sir John French that the British Army should be relieved on the Aisne and moved northwards into Flanders to seek the German flank; but before this movement had well begun, and before Maud'huy's concentration was completed, the pressure of the Germans in the neighbourhood of Arras appeared to be so menacing that Maud'huy proposed to fall back on the Somme. If this intention had been carried out the Germans must have inevitably secured possession of the Channel ports, with incalculable consequences to the Allies' cause in general and to Great Britain in particular. To avert this calamity Joffre sent Foch to Flanders to control the French armies in the north and to co-ordinate their operations with those of the British and Belgian Armies.

On October 2 the German attacks on Arras were beaten off on the very outskirts of that town, but as one crisis was averted another developed still further north. On October 3 German cavalry entered Ypres and Tournai, and pressing southwards through Flanders occupied Hazebrouck and approached St. Omer, to be met and driven back by the British Cavalry. On September 28 the Germans had begun to bombard the forts of Antwerp, where the Belgian Army had taken refuge, and on October 10 Antwerp fell, the remnant of the Belgian Army escaping southwards through Ghent to the Yser, where it joined hands with French marines and with a British force of one division (7th) and a cavalry division which had landed at Ostend under General Rawlinson. On October 13 Lille fell, the British right, which had swung round north of the La Bassée Canal and had occupied Neuve Chapelle, being just too late to save the French fortress. Then there developed a great battle from the La Bassée Canal to the shore of the North Sea near Nieuport.

The Germans, bringing up the besiegers of Antwerp and

a whole series of new reserve corps which had been formed since the outbreak of war, made a last desperate effort to break through to the Channel ports. Neuve Chapelle they recaptured from the British, but were held just west of the village. Armentières in British hands resisted their assaults, but they gained Messines and Wytschaete and flung their masses in repeated attacks upon the ridges east of Ypres, where Haig fought with the British 1st Corps, and against Dixmude stoutly held by the French. Yet further north the Belgians, following the example of their Dutch neighbours in the past, let in the sea and so brought the German attack on the line of the Yser to a stand. During all this fighting Foch, steadily reinforced by Joffre, and adding to these reinforcements the greater reinforcement of his unconquerable will, nourished the wavering line. On October 31 Haig's men after some hours of poignant crisis drove the Germans back from the ridges east of Ypres, while on their right the French repulsed the enemy swarming down from the Wytschaete Ridge, and on their left clung desperately to Dixmude. The arrival of the Indian Corps and of some battalions of British Territorials enabled Sir John French to send timely support to Ypres and to Messines, and so his hard-pressed troops were able to withstand the last German effort. On November 10 a great German attack drove out of the town the little band of French heroes who had been holding Dixmude for a month, but the exhausted Germans could gain no ground beyond, and the next day the Prussian Guard assaulted the British front in vain. After some further spasmodic attacks by the Germans the great battle died down on November 21, the Germans sending off to the east to meet the Russian danger every man whom they could spare. French troops relieved the weary British on the Ypres front, and the second great German effort in the west ended, like the first, in failure. The race to the sea was ended, and from the sands of Nieuport to the Swiss frontier was established the trench barrier which for close on four years presented a new and terrible problem to the military world.

(b) 1915

France had joined Great Britain in declaring war on Turkey on November 5, 1914. The extension of the war to Asia naturally affected her less directly than it did her ally; none the less there was more than the glamour of Napoleonic tradition to draw the eyes of Frenchmen eastwards, and

“partant pour la Syrie” embodied more than mere sentiment, for France had great commercial interests in the Levant and the shores of the Ægean and had backed those interests with substantial investments. The vital importance to France of maintaining uninterrupted communication with North Africa, whence came many of her best white and native troops, led naturally enough to a concentration of the French fleet in the Mediterranean which the French admirals, in friendly agreement with our sailors, in great manner controlled. For these reasons the British Government when it decided to attack the Dardanelles found ready offers of assistance coming from Paris. So not only did a considerable French fleet take part in the operations, the *Bouvet* going down with the *Irresistible* and the *Ocean*, when the naval attack failed on March 18, but at first one division and then two, organised as a complete army corps, shared the perils and trials of the land campaign on the peninsula.

But for France, with ten of her richest departments overrun and in the hands of an enemy established at Noyon within seventy-five miles of Paris, the essential problem was how to drive out the invader, or at the least reduce the menace to her heart. The enemy had succeeded in establishing himself in a position so favourable that a moderate success gained at one of several points on the long front line would enable him to clutch the vitals of the country. The perils of the position were brought home to Frenchmen very early in the year, when on January 8 the Germans attacked north of the Aisne near Soissons and drove the French back across the river. Owing to the transport of large numbers of German troops to the Russian front the Allies were numerically considerably superior in the west. This superiority would increase with the arrival of British reinforcements and the development of the manpower of France, but might be circumscribed if the Germans decided to adopt a defensive policy in the east and bring troops back to France. Further, Russia by her bold invasion of East Prussia had rendered priceless aid to France during the crisis of August 1914, and, now that the Germans were pressing her, Joffre felt himself impelled by moral as much as material considerations to reject a policy of passive waiting for reinforcements and the better equipment of his armies.

The French military world was no more ready than that of other countries for the conditions of trench warfare. The provision of heavy artillery was in a measure facilitated by the British fleet, which enabled France to draw upon her coast

defences, but the mass production of ammunition and trench stores had to be organised from the beginning. Mistakes in such circumstances were inevitable, and the overhasty manufacture of high-explosive shell by unskilled hands led in the early battles of 1915 to the destruction by premature explosion of a large number of the precious 75's. But France's plans for the mobilisation of her industries were quickly prepared and skilfully designed, and she first of the Allies was in a position to meet the vast demands of trench warfare on a 500-mile front.

Joffre, while awaiting supplies of men and material, engaged early in the year in a series of "nibbling" attacks in Flanders, Champagne and against the salient of St. Mihiel, which, if they yielded little visible result, were fruitful in experience of the new conditions of attack. He further arranged with Sir John French that as more British troops arrived Foch's men should be relieved in Belgium and sent into Artois, where, in conjunction with a British attack north of the La Bassée Canal, a great effort should be made to take the Vimy Ridge and disengage Lille. As a preliminary to this campaign the British attacked and captured Neuve Chapelle on March 10, but this success was more than discounted at the end of April, when the Germans loosed clouds of poison gas against the comparatively weak force of French troops whom Foch had left in the northern portion of the Ypres salient. The effect of the second battle of Ypres, which resulted, was to cripple very materially the power of the British to help Foch, and when on May 9 he attacked south and north of the La Bassée Canal our efforts to help him petered out for want of ammunition and men by May 25. Foch however had meantime gained considerable success in the battle of Souchez (opposite Vimy), and this encouraged him to continue his efforts to drive back the Germans from the Vimy Ridge, despite the desperate character of the enemy's resistance. All through June and well into July the struggle continued. In their last efforts Foch's men reached the summit of the all-important ridge, but were unable to maintain themselves there, and Joffre on July 13 was forced by the enormous losses which Foch's armies had suffered and the exhaustion of his supplies of munitions to call a halt. The losses suffered in this battle of Souchez impressed and shocked Frenchmen very much as the losses of the Somme later impressed the British, and the consequences of the two battles were in some respects similar.

The comparative failure of the summer campaign in no way

caused Joffre to alter his opinion of the necessity of keeping up pressure upon the Germans in the western theatre of war. Russia was more than ever in need of his help, and any long pause in the operations in France and Flanders might allow the Germans to increase their forces in Eastern Europe. Another ally, Serbia, was in an isolated position, and was threatened with attack; further, Italy had begun a great battle on the Isonzo, and it was important to prevent the diversion of German troops to help Austria. These reasons, together with the importance of forcing the German line further back from the vitals of France, decided Joffre to prepare for a further great effort in the early autumn. By that time the British Army would have grown considerably with the arrival of the first Kitchener divisions, while the development of the manpower of France would be approaching its maximum, so that relatively to the Germans the Allies on the Western Front would be in great numerical superiority. It was impossible to say how long that superiority could be maintained, for the Germans might elect at any time to call a halt in Poland, as they had in Flanders in November 1914, and to bring back their troops to the west. A careful study of the battles which had taken place since the trench-barrier had been completed had led the French Staff to the conclusion that given a sufficiency of guns and shells it should be possible to blow a great breach in the enemy's defences through which the infantry might pour to the assault. The activities of the French Ministry of Munitions had assured to Joffre a great increase in the number of his guns, particularly of those of heavy calibre, and an adequate supply of ammunition. The increase of the British Army permitted an extension of its front, and this would give Joffre more French troops for his battle. So it was arranged that the British should extend their right beyond the La Bassée Canal to the neighbourhood of Loos, where they came into touch with the left of Foch's group of armies.

Joffre planned two great attacks. In the north the British Army was to assault between the La Bassée Canal and Loos, while Foch to the south of Lens was to make another effort to secure the Vimy Ridge and to advance beyond it on Douai. Joffre's main battle was to take place in Champagne to the east of Reims, and there the greatest mass of troops which had yet been brought together on the Western Front was assembled. Both battles began on September 25. The British, using poison gas for the first time, captured Loos; but Foch's men, weakened and wearied by their long efforts in the battle of

Souchez, failed to capture the Vimy Ridge. This failure left the Germans in Artois free to concentrate their efforts upon the British, who were checked. The great attack in Champagne met with little better success. The first two German lines were overwhelmed and a large number of prisoners and guns were captured, but the enemy stoutly held his third line, and the high hopes entertained by France were far from being realised. The problem of penetrating the trench-barrier had not been solved. True, the bombardment had torn a great breach in the enemy's defences, but it had also so destroyed the surface of the country that the task of bringing up reinforcements at the right time and in good order proved insuperable, while the enemy, keeping his reserves out of shell-fire, was able to get them to the battlefield in time to prevent the disruption of his front.

While the battle in Champagne was still in progress the failure of the Dardanelles campaign had to be admitted, and a new danger in the Near East developed. The threatened attack by German and Austrian troops took place upon Serbia, and Bulgaria declared war and joined them. Against these overwhelming odds the collapse of the Serbian Army was necessarily rapid, and the problem for the Allies was how to save the remnant of that Army. In an attempt to solve this problem French and British troops were diverted from the Dardanelles early in October and landed at Salonika, and it was decided to transfer divisions of both armies from France to the same place. These troops were not in time to join the Serbians, but they succeeded in fortifying and holding an entrenched position covering the town and harbour of Salonika. The year 1915 therefore closed gloomily for the Allied cause. The Russians had lost Warsaw, Przemysl and Lemberg, and were woefully short of arms and ammunition. Serbia had been overrun, Italy could make no advance on the Isonzo, the adventures of the Allies in the east had failed and the barrier in the west had proved impenetrable. The bright spots in the picture were that at sea the Allies remained supreme, despite the depredations of the German U-boats, and that the military power of the British Empire had not yet reached its full development.

(c) 1916

M. Briand, who had succeeded M. Viviani as Prime Minister in October 1915, was sympathetic to the idea, which gained

more and more support in France, of attacking the enemy elsewhere than on the Western Front, and he vigorously supported the Salonika enterprise. In January 1916 the French occupied Corfu and undertook the reorganisation of what was left of the Serbian Army, while General Sarraill was appointed to command all the Allied troops in Salonika. M. Briand also worked energetically to obtain an extension of this principle of unity of command, but opinion amongst the Allies was not yet ripe for a practical solution of this problem. A beginning was however made by Joffre, who in December 1915 called a conference of Allied Commanders-in-Chief and Chiefs of the Staff to concert a combined campaign for the coming year. A scheme of action was agreed upon, but before it could be realised the Germans had intervened. Throughout January and the early part of February the enemy was very active, making local attacks in Champagne, Flanders, Artois, Picardy, on the Somme and in Alsace. The diversity of these efforts indicated that the German object was to distract attention from some larger enterprise, and on February 21 a great bombardment of the French lines on either bank of the Meuse in the Verdun zone disclosed the enemy's real intentions. The bombardment was followed on the right bank of the river by an infantry assault in mass, which gained an alarming degree of success, the Germans breaking through the field-defences and pushing their way forward to the outer line of the permanent forts of Verdun. On February 25 the position was highly critical. By an accident Fort Douaumont, one of the chief of the outer forts, was left without a proper garrison, and an adventurous party of Germans found their way into the work. For a time it appeared probable that it would be necessary to abandon Verdun, but that calamity was averted by the courage and judgement of Castelnau, who had become Joffre's chief assistant and had been sent by the Commander-in-Chief to the post of danger. Castelnau reorganised the command, regulated the arrival of reinforcements and energetically applied Joffre's instructions forbidding any retreat. On the 26th the Germans were repulsed in attempting to issue beyond Douaumont; and Castelnau's immediate task completed, he returned to Headquarters, leaving the command at Verdun in the hands of General Pétain, who had been steadily winning his way to the front from the day when as a colonel he, in August 1914, took a prominent part in defending the right flank of Lanrezac's Army in the battle of Charleroi.

In order to shorten the front and to economise troops for use

at more important parts of the front, the French troops holding the plain of the Woëvre had been drawn back to the heights of the Meuse in the early days of the battle. But Joffre foresaw from the first that the Germans were in deadly earnest, and that a vital and prolonged struggle had begun. He desired therefore to effect far more considerable economies and to accumulate large reserves. He therefore requested Sir Douglas Haig, whose army was growing in strength, to relieve all the French troops north of the Somme, a measure which placed an entire army at his disposal. Thus assured of reserves, the French Commander-in-Chief directed the minds of his subordinates towards counter-attack as the one sure means of exhausting the enemy and bringing him to a stand. Thinking in terms of the whole front, and not merely of the situation at Verdun, he planned in addition to a number of local attacks, to be delivered as and when opportunity offered, a general counter-offensive, and for this he asked Sir Douglas Haig to prepare on the Somme front, promising to support him as his means admitted when the calls of the battle of Verdun had been met.

So the long struggle continued. The German Crown Prince, always hoping that one more effort would gain him the prize he sought, redoubled his efforts, now on the right bank of the Meuse, now on the left, sometimes on both sides simultaneously. On the other side Pétain, supplied by Joffre with reinforcements, as the need arose, nourished the defence and struck back when he could, while further north Haig was busy preparing for a great counter-blow. On March 1 a great German attack on Fort Vaux was repulsed and, the battle extending to the left bank of the Meuse, an attempt to capture the Mort-Homme Hill also ended in failure. Bombardment and attack followed each other in quick succession, the Germans usually gaining just sufficient ground to encourage them to another effort. At the end of March they gained a footing on the summit of the Mort-Homme, but a great attack delivered by them on April 10, by which they hoped to win the whole of this important hill, was repulsed. A very gallant attempt by the French to retake Douaumont which followed met with a like fate. During May the battle surged fiercely on the left bank of the river, for the Crown Prince found that the French fire from the heights on that side prevented the progress of his men on the right bank. Repeated attacks on the Mort-Homme were beaten off by the French, but on May 21 they were at last successful, and the whole of the blood-soaked ridge was in

their hands. This was the prelude to further German attacks on the right bank, and on June 7 these yielded them the possession of the wreck of Fort Vaux.

On the 23rd Thiaumont also fell, and Joffre was aware that he could not ask the defenders of Verdun to endure more. A little more progress on either bank of the river and Verdun must have fallen, while the strain of four months of defensive battle was sapping the strength of the French Army. Haig was ready north of the Somme, and, despite all the calls of Verdun, Joffre had been able to supply Foch with enough men and material to co-operate with the British south of the river; and so, while the situation at Verdun was still critical, a great Anglo-French attack on July 1 began the battle of the Somme.

Joffre had attained his object. Verdun was still in his hands, and he had been able to wait till the last possible moment, that is until the enemy had endured the maximum of exhaustion from his prolonged efforts, before ordering the great counter-offensive which had long been prepared. The Germans, thinking that the French would have little to spare from Verdun for a battle elsewhere, were not prepared for Foch's attack south of the Somme, which gained a great success and drove the enemy from the greater part of the angle of the river west of Péronne. The British, north of the river, met with stouter resistance, and had to fight their way doggedly up the slopes of the chalk down, gaining ground always, but slowly and at great cost. None the less the battle of the Somme had the immediate effect of relieving Verdun, for the enemy had to transfer at once men and guns to meet the Anglo-French attack. Towards the end of June a great Austrian attack in the Alps which the enemy had hoped to combine with the fall of Verdun petered out, and the Italians striking back retook the positions of Arsiero and Asiago which they had lost. Away in the east the Russians, acting under Joffre's advice, had in the same month begun a great offensive in the Ukraine and Bukovina. In the latter Brussilov was particularly successful, and the Austrians were driven back into the Carpathians. Towards the end of July the Serbian Army, reconstituted under French supervision, came into action on the Salonika front, and Joffre had secured the definite promise of Russian and Italian reinforcements for the Allied army in Macedonia. In Italy Cadorna was preparing another great attack on the Isonzo, an attack which developed early in August and resulted in the capture of Gorizia.

Joffre's counter-offensive was therefore planned on no mean

scale. The enemy were being pressed simultaneously on the Somme, in the Alps, on the Isonzo and in the Carpathians, while Sarraïl at Salonika was ready to do his best as opportunity offered. Never again until the closing phase of the war was such complete unity of action attained on the Allied fronts. But Joffre, not satisfied with this great achievement, was eager to extend the front of attack, and bring in another ally. Romania had for a long time, like the poor cat in the adage, been "letting I dare not wait upon I would." Joffre, through his Government, brought every possible pressure to bear to hasten her into the field, so that she should strike while the Austrian armies were reeling back along the northern frontier before the blows of Brussilov. Unfortunately Romania hesitated too long. She did not declare war until August 21, by which time the impetus of Brussilov's drive through the Bukovina had died down. The Austrians had rallied, and the Germans, now directed by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, summoned by the Kaiser to Great Headquarters to extricate Germany from the dangers which threatened her on every side, had managed to get together a reserve to meet the new enemy.

During September, though it was already obvious that the results of Romania's intervention would not be so great as had been expected, the affairs of the Allies seemed in good case. The British had captured Ginchy, Combles and Thiepval, and were well-established on the Somme downs. Sarraïl, flinging his left forward in Macedonia, had occupied Florina, and the Italians on the Isonzo were still making slow progress. In October however Romania, attacked by Germans and Austrians on her northern front and by Germans and Bulgarians in the Dóbruja, had to yield everywhere, and it became clear that one more small Power must inevitably fall a victim to the skill with which the Germans used the advantages of their central position. But on the Western Front there were compensations. The Germans had been forced by the British advance up the Somme ridges into a very uncomfortable position in the valley of the Ancre, while on the Verdun front Nivelle, on October 25, began a brilliantly-planned attack which drove the Germans out of Fort Douaumont, and a few days later gained possession of Fort Vaux.

In the middle of November, when it had become evident that the conditions of the weather and the exhaustion of the British troops would bring the battle of the Somme to a close, Joffre and Haig met at Chantilly, to decide on further plans.

It was agreed that, despite their success in Romania, the Germans were in great difficulties, but Joffre, realising what the defence of Verdun had cost his army, insisted that during the campaign of next year the brunt of the work must fall upon the British Army, which was to be further reinforced both from Egypt and from home. Haig entirely agreed, and was ready to keep up pressure on the Germans during the winter on the Somme front, and to prepare for a combined attack with Joffre as early as possible in the spring. There were however influential soldiers in the French Army and influential politicians at Paris who regarded it as a slur upon France that the supreme effort in what they hoped would be the final stage of the war should fall to a foreign army. There had been many active critics of Joffre, who held that the defences of Verdun had been inadequate, and that the Germans ought never to have gained there the advantage they had won. It was said that Joffre was past his best and was worn out by the great burden of responsibility which he had borne for so long, while Foch too was supposed to be in much the same condition; and there were many who did not forgive him the heavy losses which his unsuccessful assaults upon the Vimy Ridge had cost. The outcome of discussion and intrigue was that M. Briand reorganised his Cabinet; Joffre was made a Marshal of France and placed on the shelf; Foch was retired on half-pay, and General Nivelle, the hero of the most recent French counter-attacks at Verdun, became Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies. The plan drawn up by Joffre and Haig went into the waste-paper basket, and a fresh scheme for the campaign of 1917 was drawn up.

(d) 1917

By an arrangement come to between the British and French Governments in February 1917 the British Army was placed under the general direction of Nivelle for the forthcoming campaign. The essential difference between Nivelle's plan and that agreed upon by Haig and Joffre was that the part to be taken by the French Army was much more important. Nivelle, using his own troops for the purpose, proposed to attempt to break clean through the German defences on a wide front in one supreme effort. It was in fact an application of the same principle as had governed Joffre's attack in Champagne in 1915, but on a much larger scale. The plan commended itself to the statesmen of Paris and London because it promised a

quick decision; success or failure would be determined in a short period, and there would be no repetition of the long struggles of Verdun and the Somme with their terrible casualty lists. To obtain the French troops required for the execution of this plan, Nivelle requested Haig to make a considerable extension of the British line and at the same time to co-operate with his main effort by an attack on the Arras-Bapaume fronts. In order to relieve the French troops on his right, and at the same time prepare for battle, Haig had to await the arrival of further divisions, which he knew were coming to him, and to reduce very considerably the pressure which he had agreed with Joffre to maintain upon the Germans on the Somme battlefield during the winter. The consequence of this was to postpone the projected date for the new offensive, and to leave the Germans free to get themselves out of the difficult position in which the battle of the Somme had left them. Joffre and Haig had planned to be ready on February 1, but Nivelle's offensive could not begin until April 9, when the 1st and 3rd British Armies carried the Vimy Ridge and made considerable progress east of Arras. This two months' postponement had a disastrous effect upon the whole campaign of the year, for the subsequent British offensive in Flanders was grievously hampered by the rains of an unusually wet summer and autumn, and before the last British blow could be delivered in November a German-Austrian offensive in Italy had deranged the Allied plans. Further, while Nivelle's battle was in preparation Ludendorff skilfully withdrew from his entanglements on the Somme into a formidable series of defences which he had prepared during the winter, to become famous as the "Hindenburg Line."

This withdrawal began at the end of February and was not completed until early in April. It affected a considerable part of the front which Nivelle had been preparing to attack, and necessitated a hasty recasting of plans, while Ludendorff on a shorter front and in better defences was able to reduce the number of troops in the line for the benefit of the reserves. Nor were these the only difficulties which Nivelle had to face. M. Briand's Government fell early in March and was succeeded by one formed by M. Ribot with M. Painlevé as War Minister. Painlevé had no great belief in Nivelle's plan of breaking through in one great rush, and these doubts were shared by many of Nivelle's own generals, notably by Pétain. These difficulties were however not known to the French Army at large, nor to the French public, and the success of the British

Army at Arras and particularly the capture of the Vimy Ridge, which had for so long resisted Foch's efforts, aroused the highest expectation of what the French Army would do. The strength of that army was at its greatest and on April 1 amounted to 2,905,000 men, a figure which was never again attained. The disillusionment was therefore great when the armies of Franchet d'Esperey, who had succeeded Foch in command on the British right, failed on April 14 to make any impression upon the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin; and it became profound when Nivelle's great effort on the Aisne, instead of bursting through the German trenches in one great bound as had been hoped, was, after the first German lines had been carried, brought to a standstill by the German machine guns. Following the British example large numbers of tanks had been prepared, and were tried for the first time on a large scale. But the French tanks were a grievous disappointment. The infantry had not been trained to co-operate with them, they proved to be much slower in their movements over the shell-torn ground than had been anticipated, and as they were expected to advance to a great distance they were overloaded with petrol—which burst into flames under the enemy's fire. On the evening of the first day of the battle of the Aisne it was clear that Nivelle's plan had failed. There was some acrimonious discussion between the French Government and the French Command as to whether or no the operations should be continued on a modified scale, and in fact they were so continued until May 20. Five days before this date the Government removed Nivelle from the supreme command, which was given to Pétain, who at the end of April had been made Chief of the Staff in Paris. Pétain was succeeded in this appointment by Foch, recalled from semi-retirement.

As wise old Joffre had foreseen in the previous winter, the long strain of war had told upon the French Army. The enormous losses which it suffered had weakened its power of resisting misfortune, while into the disappointed and weakened army there came from the interior an increasing volume of defeatist propaganda, which had found a ready reception amongst certain classes of the war-weary people. The result was that at the end of May a formidable series of mutinies broke out, which for a time completely crippled the French Army. This was the more serious, seeing that in March revolution had broken out in Russia, the Tsar had abdicated, and it appeared very probable that the Eastern European front

would collapse altogether if the enemy were given time to press the Russians while the latter were in process of organising a new *régime*. In these circumstances Pétain appealed to Haig to keep up the utmost possible pressure upon the Germans in the west, and the British Army accordingly began on June 7 its campaign in Flanders by capturing the Messines Ridge. On July 31 the British attacked on the Ypres front and, with a French Army under General Anthoine on their left, fought their way very slowly up the ridges to Passchendaele.

Ere the third battle of Ypres had begun, the entry of the United States into the war had been followed at the end of June by the arrival of the first American troops in France, an event which went far to counterbalance the depressing news from Russia, and helped Pétain materially in his task of restoring the *moral* of the French armies. Another encouraging event which took place about the same time was the abdication of Constantine, the advent of M. Venizelos to power at Athens and the declaration of war by Greece upon Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey. The situation of the army at Salonika was much eased when it had at its back a certain friend instead of a possible foe.

By intense personal energy, by wise concessions in such matters as leave, and by carefully regulating the length of time spent in the front-line trenches, Pétain, while Haig was doing the fighting, was bringing back the French Army to its old confidence in itself. To complete this work he planned with great care a series of attacks with limited objectives, which promised important results at the smallest possible sacrifice of life. The first of these attacks began at the end of August on the left bank of the Meuse, in the Verdun sector, and was a complete success, the whole of the famous Mort-Homme hill being wrested from the enemy, who was driven back to the positions from which he had started in February 1916. This success was followed on October 23 by a similar attack on the Aisne front entrusted to the army of General Maistre, who gained possession of the whole of the important Chemin des Dames Ridge and compelled the Germans to retire across the Ailette. With this brilliant success Pétain's immediate task was ended. The French Army was again ready for any task which war might bring to it. On November 6 the third battle of Ypres ended with the British on the Passchendaele ridge, and a fortnight later, on November 20, the British made their surprise attack with tanks at Cambrai. But before this the battle of Caporetto, which began on the

Italian front on October 24, had confronted the Allies with a new crisis. It became necessary to hurry French and British reinforcements to Italy; six French divisions were quickly on the way, while Foch himself left for Italy to superintend the disposition of these reinforcements. More important still, the crisis brought about the conference of Rapallo on November 6, at which was established (November 9) the Supreme War Council for the better co-ordination of Allied policy and strategy, while, as an aftermath, M. Painlevé resigned office on November 16 and was succeeded as Premier by M. Clémenteau. The Italian Front was steadied, but the year closed gloomily for the Allies, for just before Christmas peace negotiations between Russia and Germany opened at Brest-Litovsk. It had for some time been obvious that the Germans would be free during the winter and spring to dispose of the bulk of their troops now on the Russian Front, and already at the end of the year there were indications of a great movement from east to west. It was certain that the American troops could not reach France at a corresponding rate, and that the Allies in the west must therefore be thrown for some time on the defensive and be ready for a supreme effort by Germany.

(c) 1918

At a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at the end of January 1918 the position of the Allies was reviewed and plans for the future were considered. The immediate outlook was not satisfactory. The French Army had been declining steadily in strength from the maximum which it had reached in April 1917. No less than 700,000 men had been withdrawn from the colours to the fields and factories, for the depredations of the German U-boats and the consequent shortage of Allied shipping made it necessary that France should be, as far as possible, self-supporting in food and munitions. The divisions had therefore been reduced in strength, and then, as their maintenance even on a reduced scale became impossible, certain of them had to be broken up. The British Army was in a very similar condition, for the British Government declared itself unable to find more men, and therefore the British divisions had to be reduced in size. At the same time the French Government insisted that with its reduced establishments its army could no longer be responsible for so large a proportion of the Western Front as it had been holding, and the British Army had therefore to take over a considerable

proportion of the line south of the Somme. On the other side German divisions from the Eastern Front were arriving in France and Belgium at the rate of from ten to twelve a month, and it was clear that in the spring the Allies would be in a considerable numerical inferiority, which the influx of American troops could hardly redress before August. In these difficult circumstances the Supreme War Council was forced to consider seriously the question of unity of command on the Western Front. The political and military difficulties which stood in the way of a practical solution of this problem however appeared insuperable, and an unsatisfactory compromise resulted. It was agreed to form a general reserve to be composed of contingents supplied from each of the Allied armies on the Western Front and from the Italian Army, and to place the reserve under an executive committee of the Supreme War Council, composed of Allied generals with Foch as chairman. This measure was faulty in that a committee is never a satisfactory medium for the exercise of executive military command, while a committee composed of generals each responsible to his own Government and dependent for his information on different armies and War Offices contained an aggravation of the defects of committees in general. Further, the measure divided responsibility, since it left the commanders-in-chief responsible for their respective fronts but placed the reserves in other hands. The Executive Committee had in fact a very short life, for both Haig and Pétain decided early in March that they, in view of the accumulation of German troops on their fronts, could not meet the demands made upon them by Versailles for divisions for the General Reserve; and that Reserve was never formed.

On March 21 the blow fell upon the 3rd and 5th British Armies. Haig and Pétain had previously worked out plans for the mutual reinforcement of their respective fronts, and in accordance with these plans General Pellé's Army Corps came to the help of the right of the 5th Army on March 22, to be followed by Humbert's 3rd Army and Debeney's 1st Army, both placed under the command of Fayolle, who assumed control of all troops, both French and British, between the Somme and the Oise. These reinforcements however did not suffice to stop the German advance. Pétain felt himself too weak to maintain touch with the British Army and at the same time close the road to Paris, while Haig had no more men to spare to cover Amiens. The danger that the enemy would drive a breach between the British and French Armies was

imminent, and in this emergency an Allied conference summoned at Haig's instance met at Doullens on March 26, and charged Foch with the mission of co-ordinating the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front. Foch at once issued orders that the connection between the two armies was to be maintained and hastened the rate of the arrival of reinforcements at the danger-point. Michelin's 5th Army was withdrawn from the Champagne front, and four divisions of Maistre's 10th Army were brought back to France from Italy, while reinforcements were hurried out to the British Army from England and British troops were ordered to France from Italy, Salonika and Palestine. Thus assured of reserves, Foch, having brought the German advance south of the Somme to a standstill, was preparing a counter-offensive when on April 9 the British front in Flanders was driven in, and a new crisis had to be faced. French reinforcements were at once sent north, and the second great German attack of the year was checked on April 29, but not until Kemmel Hill, which French troops had taken over on their arrival, had been captured by the Germans.

The second German attack having been definitely stopped on April 29, Foch again turned his mind to counter-attack, the special object which he had in mind being the freeing of the important Paris-Amiens Railway, the main lateral artery of communication between the British and French Armies. This plan had the greater importance in his eyes as he expected that the next German attempt would be another effort to win Amiens. Instead, on May 27 the enemy began a great attack upon the Chemin des Dames position, part of which was occupied by British divisions, weakened and wearied by the earlier battles. The Germans brought off a very complete surprise, broke through the defences with extraordinary rapidity, forced their way across the Aisne and advanced to the Marne between Dormans and Château Thierry. Here they were checked by the timely arrival of the 2nd American Division, followed almost immediately by the 3rd, the American troops being supported later by the transfer of French reserves from Flanders. So the third German offensive was checked, but not before the enemy had established himself on the Marne within forty miles of Paris. With the opening of this offensive the Germans had begun to bombard Paris with a long-range gun, nicknamed Big Bertha, and the alarm in the French capital caused an exodus comparable to that which took place in August 1914.

This German victory was a terrible shock both to France in general and to the French Army in particular. It had been

possible to attribute the earlier failures of the Allies to the weakness of the British Army and to the absence of effective unity of command, but here were the Germans breaking through one of the strongest French positions with Foch in supreme control. But if the French public were shaken, neither M. Clémenceau in Paris nor Foch at his headquarters despaired. The latter saw that the Germans had made a serious error in turning away from the British Army and leaving it time to recover, and that the pronounced and narrow salient which they had driven into the Allied front had placed them in a dangerous position. The British Army relieved from pressure was recovering rapidly and was daily receiving reinforcements. At the time of the Doullens Conference Pershing, the American Commander-in-Chief, had placed all his troops at Foch's disposal, at that time amounting to four divisions, of which two were ready to fight. Now the number of American divisions fit to go into the line was steadily increasing, and would increase. Ludendorff despite all his success had failed to gain a decisive victory, and the time within which decisive victory was possible for him was slipping away. Like Foch he saw the dangerous position of his troops in the Marne salient, and his next effort was meant to improve that position. On June 9 *v.* Hutier attacked Humbert's 3rd Army on the Noyon front with the object of gaining Compiègne and linking up the Marne salient with the salient made towards Amiens in the battles of March. Hutier, after gaining some preliminary success, was counter-attacked by Mangin's Army, which recovered much of the lost ground. The Germans did not reach Compiègne, and the Marne salient remained as pronounced as ever.

Early in July it became evident that the enemy was preparing for other battles on the Marne and in Champagne. General Gouraud, who commanded the 4th Army on the Champagne front, was peculiarly well informed of the German preparations and was fully prepared for the blow when it fell on July 15. The German attack to the east of Reims was shattered, and this failure alone doomed Ludendorff's plan, which was to cut out Reims by great attacks on either side of the city. But worse was to come for the Germans. Their attack to the west of Reims at first met with some success; but on July 18 Foch struck against the Marne salient the blow for which he had been awaiting the opportunity. Mangin, who now commanded the 10th Army and had been reinforced by American and British divisions, launched more than 300 tanks, which

since their *début* in the previous year had been much improved, against the German lines and, following these up with his infantry, drove so deeply into the western flank of the Marne salient as to imperil the communications of all the Germans within it and to hasten and prolong the retreat which Ludendorff had already ordered upon hearing of the failure of the attack upon Gouraud. Foch, who had conceived this counter-attack, twice intervened in its execution, once on July 16, when the cautious Pétain wished in view of the weight of the German attack to limit its scope, and a second time on the 18th, when he was disposed to advise Mangin to be content with what he had done. Foch had no intention of holding his hand while a single German remained in the Marne salient. Therefore as soon as Mangin's success was certain Degoutte's 6th Army, with its strong contingent of American troops, followed the enemy across the Marne, pushing northwards, while Berthelot's 5th Army strengthened by British divisions forced in the eastern face of the Marne salient, from which the Germans were driven back across the Aisne by August 4. Three days later on August 7 a grateful Government conferred on Foch the title of Marshal of France. On April 24 he had been formally appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western Front, and now in all the countries of the Allies his genius and courage were recognised as placing him in a position of unchallenged authority.

As soon as it was certain that the second battle of the Marne would end in a great victory for the Allies, Foch on July 24 assembled Haig, Pétain and Pershing at his headquarters and expounded to them his plans. He had not then made up his mind that victory in 1918 was possible; but as the German forces had passed their climacteric and were dwindling, while 250,000 American troops were landing in France every month, he had determined that the time had come to accelerate the exhaustion of the Germans while conserving the strength of the Allies, and he proposed to do so by delivering a series of attacks with definite but limited objectives. Thus he would avoid a long-drawn battle such as that of the Somme with its inevitable tale of heavy losses, while he drew in and used up the enemy's reserves. The first of these attacks was the continuance of the Allied offensive on the Marne until the Germans were driven over the Vesle and the Aisne, and the railway connecting Paris and Verdun was freed. The second, which, as has been mentioned, Foch had long had in mind, and for which Haig was already preparing, was designed to free the

Paris-Amiens Railway. The third was to be in Pershing's charge and was intended to free the line connecting Verdun and Nancy. The fourth was to drive the enemy from the Béthune-Lens coalfields, and the fifth to remove the danger to Dunkirk.

The first of this series of operations having been brought to a brilliant conclusion on August 4, Haig began the second on the Amiens front on August 8 with Rawlinson's 4th Army, Debeney's 1st Army co-operating on his right. Rawlinson effected a complete surprise and bit deep into the Amiens salient, and when, on August 9, the front of battle was extended by the intervention of Humbert's 3rd Army on Debeney's right, that salient began to disappear as had the salient of the Marne. On August 12 Haig, finding the German resistance stiffening in front of Péronne, switched the battle northwards, and on August 21 Byng's 3rd Army began the battle of Bapaume. It was now evident that the Germans were undertaking a retreat comparable in extent to that which they had carried out in 1917, but this time under far greater pressure from the Allies. The British reoccupied Merville on August 19, Bapaume on the 29th and Bailleul on the 30th, while on that day too Humbert's 3rd Army entered Noyon. Ludendorff was endeavouring to shorten his front in Flanders and at the same time further south was in full retreat to the shelter of the Hindenburg line, losing heavily in killed, wounded, prisoners and guns. On September 2 Horne's 1st Army hastened this retreat by breaking through the northern extension of the Hindenburg line, known as the Drocourt switch, a success which went far towards freeing the coalfields, and while Rawlinson, Byng and Horne were pressing back the retreating enemy on September 13 Pershing attacked the St. Mihiel salient upon both sides and in forty-eight hours had obliterated it.

In two months Foch's successive blows had effected a complete change in the balance of power. The Germans, unable to replace their heavy losses, had to break up some of their divisions to keep the remainder at strength, and whereas in June they had 207 divisions on the Western Front, in September the number had fallen to 185. In July Haig had 53 divisions fit to take the field, in September he had 59, Pershing could give Foch 25, each double the strength of a German division, and there were more to come, so that with 102 French, 12 Belgian and 2 Italian divisions the Allied superiority in numbers was great, and in material it was even greater. Even so it was questionable whether it was wiser to attack the formidable

Hindenburg line at once or to wait for the certain reinforcement which America would send. In this the heaviest task would fall upon the British Army, and the answer therefore depended upon Haig's decision. Haig had absolute confidence in his men and gave his vote for a determined effort to secure victory in 1918. So towards the end of September the word went forth for a general offensive along the whole front. This offensive was not confined to France and Belgium, for on September 15 Franchet d'Esperey, the successor of Sarraill in command in Macedonia, began a general attack on the Bulgarians, who collapsed with dramatic suddenness and sought an armistice on September 25. On September 19 Allenby launched his troops against the Turkish lines in Palestine, and eleven days later British troops entered Damascus. On October 24 Diaz took the offensive in Italy, and three days later the Austrian Government was suing for terms.

But on the main front the Germans, though sorely pressed, were far from beaten, and in order to beat them Foch began the decisive battle on September 26 with a great attack by Gouraud's 4th Army and the American 1st Army on either side of the Argonne. On the 27th Byng's and Horne's Armies broached the Hindenburg line in the neighbourhood of Cambrai, while on the 28th King Albert of Belgium in command of the Belgian Army, Degoutte's 6th Army, which Foch had sent up to Flanders, and Plumer's 2nd Army advanced and drove the Germans from the Houthulst Forest and the ridges east of Ypres. Then on the 29th Rawlinson's 4th Army with Degoutte's 6th Army on his right attacked the Hindenburg line on either side of St. Quentin and forced their way through and beyond its formidable defences. In the centre Humbert's 3rd Army, Mangin's 10th, and Guillaumat, who had succeeded Berthelot in charge of the 5th Army, pressed the enemy as he fell back and so the whole front from Dixmude to Verdun was ablaze. The Germans forced out of the Hindenburg line prepared to stand behind the Schelde, the Selle, the Upper Aisne and east of the Argonne, and on October 10 Foch issued instructions to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief for a fresh combined effort. Gouraud and the Americans were directed upon Mézières and Sedan, the British Armies upon Mons and Avesnes and King Albert upon Ghent, while the French Armies of the centre followed the Germans as they gave way in consequence of the pressure on their flanks. On the 14th King Albert renewed his advance and caught the Germans before their plans for withdrawal behind the Schelde were complete,

while on the 16th Gouraud crossed the Aisne, the Americans capturing Grand Pré the same day, and by the 24th Haig had forced the line of the Selle. Laon, Ostend, Lille, Zeebrugge and Bruges were taken in quick succession, and it became clear to Foch that Germans could not make an effective stand west of the Meuse.

Knowing that rapid pursuit by the Allies, where roads and railways had been thoroughly destroyed, would not be possible, and that the enemy might gain time to rally behind the river, the Generalissimo on October 18 directed Pétain to prepare a new venture which should turn the Meuse by an advance into Lorraine and Luxembourg, on either side of Metz. For this movement the 2nd American Army and a group of French Corps placed under Mangin were preparing, and the first advance had indeed begun when the course of events elsewhere made it unnecessary to open a fresh campaign. From the North Sea to Metz the Germans, unable to replace their huge losses in men and material, and therefore growing every day weaker, gave way more and more readily before the advance of the Allies. On the right wing of the great drive the Americans, gathering momentum, broke through the last German defences and in a rapid pursuit entered Sedan on November 6. On the 10th Gouraud occupied Mézières and Guillaumat on his left Charleville; on the 9th the British entered Maubeuge, on the 11th Mons. But the collapse in the interior of Germany was even more complete than that on the front, and on November 7 the German Government had decided to send emissaries to negotiate an armistice. On November 11 Foch imposed upon them terms which left them militarily helpless and were a clear acknowledgement of their defeat.

Five days later, on November 16, French troops entered Alsace and Lorraine, again united to the motherland. On the 19th Foch and Pétain led their soldiers into Metz, and on the 25th into Strassburg and across the Rhine. The victory was complete, but France had had necessarily to bear the brunt of the struggle and had paid a terrible price for her triumph: 1,300,000 of her sons had fallen, and more than 700,000 had lost sight or limb. From the North Sea to Switzerland there stretched an unbroken belt of devastation through some of what had been the richest industrial and agricultural districts of France; 590,000 houses had been destroyed, and whole villages had been so completely obliterated that there was less trace of them than of many a Roman Camp. In Reims, a town of more than 100,000 inhabitants, not a house was left

intact. In a great part of the principal weaving, sugar and coal areas of France all the factories had been destroyed. Such is the burden which France, with the prime of her manhood gone, and after more than four years of war waged on her own soil, has had to take upon her gallant but weary shoulders.

XXII

FRANCE BEHIND THE WAR-ZONE

(1914-1918)

(a) THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

FRANCE, when war broke out in August 1914, must have appeared to Germany to be an easy victim. The new Three Years' Military Service Law had not then produced its full effect, and the whole material and moral reorganisation and re-equipment of the army which it involved had not even been begun. Debates in the Senate had laid bare to the whole world the deficiencies of the French army in artillery, and particularly in heavy guns. Even the defensive system of the eastern and northern forts had been woefully neglected.

Internal politics seemed to be on the point of bursting into one of those periodical conflagrations with which France had the habit of delighting her enemies and disheartening her friends. All the rowdy elements of partisanship had been mobilised during the last few months of peace to fight for or against Caillaux, the leader of the Radical Left, who for years had preached the gospel of *rapprochement* with Germany, and whose wife, after an amazing trial, was acquitted on the eve of war of the charge of having murdered Gaston Calmette, editor of the *Figaro* newspaper and one of her husband's most bitter political opponents. While Germany was secretly mobilising her millions of field-grey fighters the gangs of the *Jeunesse Républicaine*, representing the fighting elements of the Left, were nightly scrimmaging along the Paris boulevards with the Royalist bands of the *Action Française*, and the streets rang with the contending cries of "Vive Caillaux!" "À bas la guerre!" "À Berlin!" and "Vive l'Armée!" The President of the Republic, M. Poincaré, and the Prime Minister and

Minister of Foreign Affairs were absent on a visit to Russia. The moment seemed to the German to be ideal.

Yet even the political acquittal of Madame Caillaux of the murder of which she tearfully acknowledged the guilt, even the assassination of the Socialist leader and idol Jaurès, by a crazy Royalist, failed to prevent the essential unity of France from reasserting itself when the blow of war fell.

The Mobilisation Order, placarded throughout France on August 1, first intimated to the nation that peace was at an end. It swept all recollection of Lefts or of Rights from the minds of the country, which with remarkable enthusiasm responded to the appeal made in the Presidential message to Parliament three days later for the establishment of the *union sacrée*. The discipline of patriotism alone ruled. Men such as Gustave Hervé, who in one of his infamous anti-militarist speeches had "hoisted the flag of France on a dunghill"; men such as Anatole France, who throughout his life had preached against war, rallied to defend the rights of their country. Revolutionaries who in the years of peace had drawn up plans for the *sabotage* of French mobilisation in the event of war now did their share to make of the first concentration of French troops an unqualified success. The operation was carried out with quiet efficiency, and there was an almost complete absence of the jingo spirit of "à Berlin!" which had marked the opening of "l'année terrible." The noisy patriotism of the few only threw into relief the stillness of the capital, which emptied as though by magic of its male inhabitants. The usual difficulties attendant upon the draining of man-power from workshop and field, from mine and railway, were surmounted with little friction. The expedient of a moratorium settled the financial panic which threatened. Food supplies were well maintained, and the orders of the Government were obeyed without a murmur. A rigid censorship was imposed, and France prepared in August to wait in curious stillness for news from the front.

It reached the capital only in rumour; communiqués were singularly reticent. The first news was good, and told of a success in Alsace. It was followed by silence, and it was not until the German was well advanced on his march to Paris that the War Office finally allowed the people to know of the disastrous battles of Charleroi and Namur, and the fighting retreat. The arrival of thousands of refugees within the walls of Paris had preceded the communiqué and prepared people's minds for the worst, while the railway stations

were filled with women and children hastening from the capital.

Steps were taken by the Government to give itself a representative political character. On August 26 M. Viviani, having resigned, was requested by the President of the Republic to form a fresh Government. In this new Cabinet Millerand replaced Messimy at the Ministry of War, and for the first time Socialists, in the persons of Marcel Sembat and Jules Guesde, took office. Delcassé, the veteran political opponent of Germany, took over again the department of Foreign Affairs from which the menaces of Germany had driven him at the time of the Moroccan crisis. The new Government as its first step issued a declaration which in sober and elevated language called upon the country to prepare for the stern struggle which lay ahead. The appointment of that doughty fighter General Galliéni to the post of Military Governor of Paris, and the arrival of German aircraft over the city, were further indications that the capital was about to be called upon to defend herself.

Almost the first decision to be taken by the new Government was to leave Paris, where the military chiefs felt that its presence, and that of the President of the Republic, could but have a cramping effect upon the execution of the military operations for the defence of the capital. After much discussion it was decided in the late days of August to remove the seat of the Government to Bordeaux, in spite of the memories of disaster aroused by recollection of the sojourn in the western capital of the Government during the Franco-Prussian War. The move was prepared in great secrecy, in order to avoid any increase in the panic of the city. During the last week of August most of the ministries and embassies were packed up. The Government itself left on the night of September 2, and the news of its departure was intimated to Parisians the following day in a stirring manifesto, in which the President of the Republic called upon the people of France to "endure and fight" for the freedom of their country.

There followed days of agonising suspense; then the first signs, and finally the certitude, of victory on the Marne.

The Marne gave France the breathing-space necessary for her to put her war effort upon a proper scale and foundation. Her war industries completely lacked organisation. While to Great Britain the sea gave security and time for properly measured effort, France had to keep on fighting with her whole strength, and it was only little by little, after trench war had begun along the Aisne, that any programme for the future could

be envisaged. The country had been within an ace of disaster, and salvation lay only in unrelenting toil, in maintaining unrelaxed the discipline of patriotism and in keeping intact the *union sacrée* which had put an end to internal political strife and ambitions in the first few weeks of war.

Historically it is perhaps useless to speculate as to what might have happened politically had the Germans captured the capital. But the Government clearly had preoccupations of a political character when it appealed to all members of Parliament to follow it in its exile to Bordeaux. The Paris deputies naturally remained behind, and formed a committee for dealing with public affairs which for a day or two had some appearance of being a second Government, a character which was effaced after the visit of M. Briand, the Minister of Justice, to the capital. In Bordeaux itself politicians were of course no less talkative than they had been in Paris, and their discontent was great when, with the approval of the general mass of the people, the Government decided to adjourn Parliament.

(b) THE MACHINE BEHIND THE FRONT

The real Government of the country during these early months of the war was at General Headquarters, and nothing but dismay would have been caused by any formal resumption of Parliamentary activity. The responsibility of Government however remained the burden both of ministers and of Parliament, and during the Bordeaux exile the demand of deputies for information, and their claim to exercise the constitutional right of controlling the acts of the Executive, became more and more pressing. When Parliament reopened in Paris on December 22 the Premier, M. Viviani, outlined the war aims of his country, declaring: "France, in accord with her Allies, will not lay down her arms until she has avenged outraged right, regained for ever the provinces ravished from her by force, restored to heroic Belgium the plenitude of her material prosperity and her political independence, and broken Prussian militarism."

Deputies soon showed that they intended to be very freely consulted as to the methods by which these aims were to be attained, and that they also intended their criticisms upon Government action during the Bordeaux period to be tantamount to retrospective control. It was with the administration of M. Millerand, Minister of War, that most fault was found. The inefficiency of the Army Medical Service had,

thanks to the pen of that great journalist M. Clémenceau, become a public scandal of vast dimensions. Lacking either modern organisation, equipment or *cadres* at the beginning of the war, it was reduced to chaos by the pressure put upon it by the tremendous casualties of scientific warfare. Nothing was done at Bordeaux to remedy this state of affairs, which affected every family of France that had one of its number at the front.

Far more important were the defects in the War Office revealed by the early fighting of 1915, when it became tragically apparent that the administration, in its haste to reply to the army's clamour for guns and shells, had adopted methods of manufacture which led to an abnormal number of premature shell-bursts and to the destruction of a perilously high proportion of French guns in action.

These were the real and tangible causes of discontent with the Government; but they concealed the beginning of a struggle of principles which continued unremittingly throughout the war until the ruthless energy of Clémenceau stifled all criticism. It was the fight inevitable in a newly-established democracy such as that of France, with its living memories of the Empire and the Commune and the formation of the Republic, and natural to a people with traditions of military glory, and with politicians suspicious of and dreading the possibility of *coups d'état* and other manifestations of the militarist spirit.

Beginning with a feeling of personal grievance that the Government and the Army were ignoring the part rightfully to be played by the Chambers in the conduct of the war, deputies soon discovered the great principle at stake, that of the right of Parliament as representing the people to control the Government and, through the Minister of War, the general treatment of military policy by the Commander-in-Chief and his Headquarters Staff. The ministerial crises which troubled France during the war were almost without exception due to some manifestation of the tussle between the Executive and the Army on one side and Parliament on the other. It was therefore inevitable that coincident with a political crisis there should have been on each occasion criticism of the Higher Command of the army.

M. Millerand, the Minister of War, obstinately withstood all attacks made upon him and, at a time when even his fellow Cabinet Ministers were praying for his resignation, declined to leave office. Developments in quite another field—in the Near

East—brought about the resignation of M. Delcassé, who was in disagreement with the Salonika policy; and shortly afterwards, on October 29, M. Briand, who had been Viviani's Minister of Justice, succeeded him at the head of a government in which M. Millerand was replaced by General Galliéni at the War Office, but which otherwise differed but little from its predecessor.

"Through Victory to Peace" was the declared motto of the New Ministry, and one of its first concerns was to work for that unity among allies, both in action and in counsel, which the events of the first year of war had shown to be essential to victory. In the past co-ordinating machinery had been practically confined to the ordinary liaison services of the armies and the navies, while important matters of policy and strategy were superficially discussed at meetings hastily convened at Calais, Folkestone, London or Paris as occasion arose. There was no Allied mechanism entrusted with the duty either of framing plans for the future or of forging weapons for their execution.

The first requirement was an Allied Military Council. The steady extension of the war and the interdependence of all the scattered fronts made such an organ indispensable. The first steps towards the establishment of Allied War Co-ordination were taken in France when the Government appointed Joffre from the command of the French armies of the North and the East to the command of all French armies, whether operating on the Western or on the Eastern theatre of war. But national and personal *amour propre* stood in the way of progress, and it was again events which shaped policy and not policy which shaped events. The sudden crisis at Salonika brought Allied military leaders into an elastic organisation which however was far from meeting the real need of a supreme inter-Allied General Staff. This question nevertheless made real if slow progress in the first half of 1916. Not only were meetings for the consideration of Allied military and political problems of greater frequency, but the desire for co-ordination was also shown in the economic field.

The first properly-organised Allied Conference was held in Paris on March 27, 1916. It was attended by Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Kitchener and Lord Bertie on behalf of Great Britain. M. Briand and the French military and naval leaders represented France. Italy, Russia, Japan, Serbia and Portugal were also represented at the deliberations, which covered every phase of the war but which

had, as a matter of historical fact, but a slight influence upon the shaping of events.

M. Briand throughout his ministry had to juggle with all his dexterity with these two great questions of Allied co-ordination and parliamentary control over the armies. No sooner had some satisfaction been given to popular pressure on the one point than he had to face political clamour on the second. Naturally the more critical the position at the front appeared, the more vociferous did Parliament become in its desire for control.

The battle of Verdun stilled all in France save the voice of the politicians. That storm burst on February 23, 1916. It filled the world with its thunder until the battle of the Somme. Throughout that period the position of the French Ministry grew steadily less secure. General Galliéni, the gallant and impetuous Minister of War, resigned office on March 16, partly owing to ill-health but mainly on account of the stubborn refusal of General Headquarters to accept either reform or control. In the white heat of Verdun the demand for a discussion which should range from details regarding effectives to the responsibilities of general officers commanding in the field became so great that M. Briand capitulated and agreed to a secret sitting of the Chamber of Deputies. Although elaborate precautions were taken to ensure exclusion of the public from the proceedings, there was no method by which the chatter of the Deputies themselves could be checked, and as one cynical but truthful wit remarked, when the Secret Sitting was agreed to, "At last the Government is going to take the whole country into its confidence."

It was quite clear that no Parliament, however dissatisfied it might have been with the eloquent evasions of M. Briand, could have assumed the responsibility of adding a political crisis to the agony of Verdun. The Government obtained in a vote of confidence a large majority, which however each successive onslaught reduced. Neither the military successes of Verdun and the Somme nor the diplomatic vindication of M. Briand's Salonika policy represented by the entry into the war alongside the Allies of Romania did more than mark a check in the rapid crumbling of the Ministry's prestige. By December remodelling of the Cabinet became necessary, and with it changes in the Higher Command of the army. Then the difficulties with Greece and the disappointment attendant upon Romanian intervention bore their full fruit, and added to them came a fuller realisation of the terrible cost of victory

at Verdun and on the Somme. In prolonged secret sittings Parliament had been placed in possession of facts and figures, and when M. Briand's new combination faced the Chamber it was clear that any vote of confidence would be extremely limited in its credit. The House refused to be stirred into enthusiasm by the appointment of General Lyautey as Minister of War, or by the inclusion of a number of extra-Parliamentary business men of ability in the Cabinet.

General Nivelle succeeded Joffre, who was appointed Marshal of France, in the command of the armies in France. This general reshuffle in no way weakened opposition to M. Briand, and when General Lyautey resigned, after an open quarrel with Parliament over the old question of Parliamentary control in the field, Briand found it impossible to patch up his Ministry again. He resigned on March 17, 1917, and was succeeded by his Minister of Finance, M. Ribot, who made but one alteration of importance in the Cabinet, in asking an advanced Radical, M. Painlevé, to accept the all-important post of Ministry of War. M. Painlevé was a mathematician of considerable reputation, and a politician of some vanity. He was known to have his own views about war, and to disapprove very thoroughly of the spring plan of campaign prepared by the Commander-in-Chief General Nivelle. This distrust soon showed itself in the appointment of General Pétain as Chief of the General Staff on April 30, when the April offensive had failed, and subsequently on May 15 as successor to General Nivelle, with Foch as Chief of Staff at the War Office entrusted with very wide powers.

In many ways the spring and summer of 1917 were the most critical periods in the history of France throughout the war. The country was very weary. It had suffered so terribly at Verdun and the Somme that even the first arrival of American troops amounted to nothing more than a temporary tonic. Economic problems had been bungled. Living was excessively dear. There was great industrial discontent. The Socialist element in the country had been profoundly shaken by the Russian Revolution and by the proposed International Meeting of Socialists at Stockholm. Both German and American peace offensives had aroused false hopes of peace. German propaganda had become intensified and, as was shown in a widespread mutiny among French troops during and after the April offensive, had found fertile soil even at the front.

There was moreover a party of malcontents, with M. Cailaux as their chief, who were prepared to find any way out

of the war, who openly declared that France had suffered too much, and that a "white peace," i.e. a peace without victory, was the best she could hope for. It was obvious that vast sums were being spent in the French press for German propaganda, but the high position of many of those implicated protected them for a time, and it was only in July that the attacks upon the Ministry were delivered frontally in the Senate by M. Clémenceau. No history of France during the war would be complete without a full account of the intrigues which centred upon M. Caillaux and M. Malvy, the latter of whom, as Minister of the Interior, represented the extreme Radicals in the Cabinet from the outbreak of war until he was driven from office by Clémenceau. It was in the struggle against them that Clémenceau earned the gratitude and trust of France, and gathered the strength which was later to impose him as a kind of Parliamentary Dictator upon the country.

Clémenceau's first assault brought about the fall of the Ribot Ministry. The old gang however neither died nor surrendered. M. Painlevé, an ineffective leader and Parliamentarian, succeeded to M. Ribot and the sea of internal trouble rising round him. M. Painlevé formed his Cabinet on September 12. By November 13 the Chamber, alarmed by the growing clamour of the country that the traitors should be swept away, and dismayed by Painlevé's failure to display any qualities save those of timidity and irresolution, turned out the Ministry and thus opened the window through which the north wind of Clémenceau's uncompromising will swept tumultuously.

(c) THE RETURN OF CLÉMENCEAU

In reviewing the political history of France during the years of the war there are practically only two ministries which call for anything like detailed treatment. Briand's term of office was notable for its length and for the fact that during it the first steps towards Allied unity were taken. The Ribot Ministry which succeeded that of Briand was formed on March 20, 1917. It was formed in circumstances of great political difficulty, and fell in September of the same year, when the grave public uneasiness with regard to feebleness of government leading both in military matters and in dealing with enemy propaganda in France had become too strong to be ignored. Painlevé, who succeeded Ribot at the head of affairs, represented the last

hope of the Caillautists and Malvyists in the defence of their positions against the ferocious attacks of the old Jacobin Clémenceau and the Royalist spy-hunter Léon Daudet. Painlevé was able to keep up the pretence of being Prime Minister of France until the middle of November, when an adverse vote in the Chamber mercifully put an end to a ministry which at the best had led a twilight-sleep existence.

By this time the *Bonnet Rouge* scandals had grown ripe. Almereyda, the editor of that defeatist organ, had committed suicide in prison; Malvy was accused; Bolo, the German agent in the purchase of the *Journal*, was in the hands of the examining magistrate. The country was profoundly disturbed by the activities of preachers of discontent, and by the fact that the five ministries in France since 1914 had, throughout their existence, talked of the necessity of vigorous war-leading and of unified command, without producing any results.

The atmosphere of the *Union Sacrée* had completely vanished, and the old party feuds had become as fierce as ever. Parliament made a deplorable impression upon a country at no time very respectful of its majesty. In fact the time had come, either for the acceptance of defeat, or for a Man. Clémenceau, who was destined to be that Man, in an article published at the beginning of the ministerial crisis, under the heading of "Wanted, a Governor," indicated the requirements of the hour. He saw in the feebleness of the Government in dealing with treason the chief reason for its fall, and without going so far as to accuse ministers of a desire to let the guilty escape, he declared that it was abundantly clear that the hands of Justice had been fettered. "The time has come," he wrote, "for the Government to come into the open. That is the first condition of the Republican régime. Our stoical people has passed without faltering through the severest trials in a history filled with bad days. It is ready still to endure, for it means to achieve victory. But it is no longer willing to be stuffed up with all sorts of trashy versions of the truth, the object of which is to make the people believe in the infallibility of leaders who have only led them from one quagmire to another. Frankness and openness are the two primary conditions of republican government in France."

Caillaux and his supporters, having failed to prevent Clémenceau's arrival at the head of affairs, did their utmost to frighten the country with the bogey of the Republic being in danger, Clémenceau in his early days having been for a time a supporter of Boulanger, and the Royalist Léon Daudet being

associated with him in the exposure of the treason scandals. The country was asked by Caillaux and his pacifist friends to believe that a *coup d'état* was in preparation. One appeal issued sufficiently indicates the passionate nature of French politics at this period. It ran: "Arise, Republicans who remain in the rear! Raise, for the sake of the Republic, the flag of which is drenched with the blood of your sons and brothers! Can we tolerate that the partisans of a past which refuses to disarm—the Royalists and the Boulangists—shall belittle the Republic and rule France?"

All this political flummery made no impression whatsoever on the country. Clémenceau was carried into power on a tremendous wave of popular determination to drop politics and to win the war, and of faith in the hard-hitting capacities of the greatest figure in French politics. Parliamentarians had no reason to love Clémenceau. With his cruel cynicism he had created more political enemies for himself than any other man in the country. Politicians knew that he would be a hard task-master, but they had to bow before the evident determination of the country to have Clémenceau at whatever cost. Characteristically he formed a Ministry mainly with men who were but little known to the public, some of whom were not even parliamentarians. The Victory Cabinet was:

MM. CLÉMENTEAU	.	Prime Minister and Minister of War.
NAIL	. . .	Justice.
PICHON	. . .	Foreign Affairs.
PAMS	. . .	Interior.
KLOOTZ	. . .	Finance.
GEORGES LEYGUES		Marine.
CLÉMENTEL	. . .	Commerce.
CLAVEILLE	. . .	Public Works.
LOUCHEUR	. . .	Munitions.
LAFFERRE	. . .	Public Instruction.
SIMON	. . .	Colonies.
COLLIARD	. . .	Labour.
JONNART	. . .	Blockade.
BORET	. . .	Supplies and Agriculture.

Clémenceau went before the Chamber with this Ministry on November 20, 1917, and read a vigorous declaration of ministerial policy, prefacing his remarks with the following words: "Gentlemen! we have assumed the task^{of} of government in

order to prosecute the war with redoubled effort so as to obtain a better yield from all our energies. We come before you with but one thought—war, nothing but war. We would like the confidence we ask you to give us to be an act of conscience towards yourselves, an appeal to the historic virtues which have made us French.” He appealed to the nation for unity in all its branches, for sympathy with the *poilu* and the sacrifices he was making, for support of the hard-worked toilers in industry and especially in agriculture; and finished up by denouncing the enemies of the country behind the lines and assuring his hearers that they should have but short shrift. “War! nothing but war!” he concluded; “our country shall not be caught between two fires! our country shall know that it is defended.”

Clémenceau lost no time in carrying out his promise to put a speedy end to the campaign in the interior of France which for over a year had been sapping the nation's trust in itself and its faith in victory. His intervention as a private senator had already led, before he became Prime Minister, to the arrest of some of the lesser suspects. By the end of 1917 the Chamber had authorised the prosecution of M. Caillaux; the trial of M. Malvy began on January 21 following, and a fortnight later Bolo appeared before the over-worked court-martial of Paris. The case of Caillaux was by far the most important of this batch of treason-trials, for although it led to the imposition of but an insignificant punishment, the verdict of guilty given against him was in effect a condemnation of a whole school of political thought and was destined to destroy in the subsequent general elections all the old ascendancy of extreme French Radicalism. It was however only in the course of the investigations into the Bolo-Humbert case that the authorities were able to discover sufficient proof to justify direct action against Caillaux.

Amongst the numerous victims of Clémenceau was Senator Charles Humbert, who was charged with having bought an important Paris newspaper, *Le Journal*, with money supplied by Bolo from sources the enemy nature of which was known to him; but he was acquitted. As a result however of police investigation into these journalistic matters of *Le Bonnet Rouge* and *Le Journal* more and more people became involved.

One after the other they were arrested without distinction of person. Indeed so fast and furious became this business of nipping treason in the bud that a special Under-Secretary of Military Justice was appointed to deal with all the treason

cases. He was a respecter of no person. The purge was applied everywhere and with a completeness which showed how thoroughly Clémenceau had realised the necessity of cutting away all the undergrowth of doubt and faint-heartedness which had clogged the patriotic if unavailing efforts of his predecessors in office to achieve victory. Clémenceau declared in his ministerial statement before the Chambers that he had but one idea in his programme. He intended to fight the war, to go on making war, and to continue to wage war. Anything or anybody which in any way threatened to interfere with the carrying out of this single-minded policy had to be, and was, swept ruthlessly away. Injustices were no doubt committed. That did not matter. Clémenceau brought with him to his task some of the feeling of the old revolutionaries of whom he was a direct political descendant, i.e. that they were the grim and implacable servants of fate, and as such had to do not a little wrong if right were to prevail in the long-run.

Malvy, the once all-powerful Minister, was brought before the High Court of the Senate, and before appearing there was given an opportunity of appreciating the fate of several of the men with whom he had been associated. Bolo, the man who tried to buy the *Journal* with German money, was shot at the traitor's stake at Vincennes, and his associates were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. He was the first of many to make that sorrowful pilgrimage in the drear hour of dawn. Duval of the *Bonnet Rouge* followed shortly afterwards, and his friends either committed suicide in gaol or saw themselves condemned to transportation to French Guiana or New Caledonia. Malvy escaped with a term of banishment. Caillaux spent two years in gaol and lost his civil rights. The sentences in these cases did not really matter very much. What was all-important to Clémenceau was that he should have all these representatives of "defeatism" under lock and key while he made his great bid for victory.

Not even in the days of the great Emperor did France know a rule so despotic as that exercised by Clémenceau; and never was power more clearly based upon the general approval of the country. The army in France at all times has represented the country, and this was never more true than at this period of the war, when every available man had been swept into its ranks. With the soldier there was no figure so popular as that of the "Tiger" on his visits to the front, clad in knickerbockers and gaiters and wearing an almost impossibly disreputable felt hat. Clémenceau announced when he took office that he

intended to live with the *poilu* and to make the rest of France behind the lines live and suffer with the men in the trenches. The secret of his power was to be found in the army. He soon showed that he realised this, and the first few months of his term of office were marked by his more or less constant presence in the war-zone. Trusting absolutely the robust patriotism of the soldier he did not hesitate to strike hard at any labour manifestation which appeared in any way to jeopardise the security of the army in its rear.

He had a short way with strikes and strikers. The political sections of labour had no love for Clémenceau. As Minister of the Interior in a peace-time Cabinet he had dealt hardly with labour. Strikers had been ridden down by cavalry at Villeneuve St. Georges; blood had been spilled at Draveil. Personal recollections combined with political animus to make him unpopular to the Socialists who politically were wedded to the fortunes of the Radical Socialists, whose two leaders, Caillaux and Malvy, Clémenceau was bent upon destroying. There were strikes and labour demonstrations. They were repressed by the police and by the troops with a firmness and a brutality which the higher ends alone could justify. The police were given instructions to hit a head whenever they saw one, and they obeyed their orders with all the gusto that comes to a man when he is allowed to hit back at an opponent.

We have described above, in a few words, the result of the "Treason Trials"; but in view of their importance and the interest which they aroused it will be advisable to give a few details regarding the deeds of the chief culprits.

The arrest of M. Caillaux marked the beginning of the last phase of the struggle between two policies which had been in presence throughout the war; on the one hand the desire to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, on the other the temporising policy which sought to negotiate with the enemy and bring about a peace of *rapprochement*. Since the Morocco incidents in 1911, when M. Caillaux, the Prime Minister, had shown his desire to effect a reconciliation with Germany at the expense of the *Entente Cordiale*, M. Clémenceau had been his bitter political enemy. Caillaux emerged from the storms of Agadir more than ever committed to the policy of Franco-German *rapprochement*, towards which both his habits and his interests as a financier naturally inclined him.

At the beginning of the war Caillaux was given a semi-military post in the Army Pay Department; but he was soon sent by the Government to South America and elsewhere on a

financial mission. On his return he took little part in parliamentary debates ; but his propagandist activity in the Press in the direction of conciliation, and his doings and conversation abroad, aroused vague suspicions at home. As long however as his friend Malvy was in charge of the Ministry of the Interior, nothing could be done.

Caillaux believed that his policy was near its triumph in 1917 after the failure of the Nivelle offensive. The *moral* of the country certainly touched its lowest point at that period. "Defeatism" was rampant behind the lines, where nothing was done to put a check on the many journalistic and political sowers of pessimism ; mutinies broke out in no less than sixteen different army corps in the front zone. This disaffection was put down by General Pétain with a strong hand, and confidence was gradually restored ; but much mischief had been done. Papers subsequently found in Caillaux' possession showed that had he returned to power he contemplated entrusting the chief command to his political sympathiser, General Sarrail, and setting up a dictatorship for himself in the capital.

On January 14, 1918 Caillaux was arrested in Paris. The preparations for his trial were intentionally spun out, and it was not until the spring of 1920 that he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment—a sentence he had already served whilst awaiting trial.

Of the lower-class adventurers who were drawn into the wide-flung net of military justice, Bolo "Pasha" was perhaps the most striking. A Marseillais of low birth, he commenced his career in his native town by ruining the partners in the small business with which he was associated, and running off to Spain with the wife of one of them. Both here and in South America he got into trouble with the police ; but after ruining his first wife financially, he married, at Lyons, a second one, who was possessed of a considerable fortune, and proceeded to "cut a dash" in the shadiest of French society, with disastrous results to the fortune. It was at this moment that, through the ex-Khedive of Egypt, who in Switzerland was acting as one of the chief German agents, Bolo got into touch with the enemy secret service, from whom he received nearly £400,000. Of this sum over one-half was used by Bolo in purchasing shares in M. Humbert's newspaper, *Le Journal*, Humbert having suspected that his partners, Lenoir and Desouches, were acting in enemy interests, and being anxious to free himself from their control. Further sums were also

invested in other newspapers, and an attempt was made (but in vain) to purchase a controlling interest in certain high-class periodicals.

The trial ended on February 14, 1918, in a verdict of death upon Bolo and of three years' imprisonment upon his tool Porchère. He was executed on April 17 following.

A fortnight later the *Bonnet Rouge* trial began. Seven persons were in the dock, including the editor, Duval, and Leymarie, the secretary of M. Malvy; they were charged with complicity in commerce with the enemy. Overwhelming evidence to this effect was produced, it being proved that Duval had received about £40,000 from the German agent and banker Marx, with whom he had several times confabulated in Switzerland. Duval was condemned to death, and followed Bolo to Vincennes; the others received sentences varying from two to ten years.

Duval's execution was followed at once by the opening of public proceedings against M. Malvy, who, from the outbreak of the war until the summer of 1917, had filled the extremely important post of Minister of the Interior. The charges made against Malvy were numerous, but stripped of their legal verbiage they amounted to an accusation that by guilty negligence in the discharge of his office he had favoured the cause of the enemy by weakening the control of the activity of enemy agents in France and thus encouraging the incitement of mutiny among the French troops. The state of affairs at his Ministry had been almost incredible. This showed itself chiefly in connection with the actions of the police and in the antagonism between the military and the civil police services. Largely owing to M. Malvy's association with M. Caillaux and his somewhat doubtful friends the former had taken the line of protecting certain suspicious characters against the activities of the military police: even Almereyda, Duval and Goldsky, of *Bonnet Rouge* fame, became *protégés* of the Ministry of the Interior for the time being. The results were disastrous. By the end of 1916 a formidable defeatist press was everywhere at work, preaching discontent and destroying *moral*. The army leaders, who had their own police in the field, became increasingly urgent in their representations to the Government that something must be done to put an end to this deliberate undermining of the soldier's confidence in himself and his leaders. The first big fruits of this state of affairs showed themselves in the mutinies of 1917 already referred to above.

In the end Malvy was found guilty of having done nothing

to combat the plan which existed (and of which he was aware) to destroy the moral fortitude of the country and the discipline of the army; the judgement further proclaimed that he had been too friendly with the *Bonnet Rouge* gang and that he had interfered with the police watch upon Caillaux' visitors; and finally, that he had betrayed his position as Minister. The Court condemned him to five years' exile; and Malvy left France for Spain, protesting his innocence.

The rapidity and determination with which Clémenceau dealt with these many traitors and defeatists was not the only tonic he administered to the war-worn country. Scorning to imitate his predecessors by dosing public opinion with the soothing syrup of optimistic platitude, he painted the situation in the sombre colours of truth. Russia had dissolved into anarchy. American effort had not had time to make itself felt upon the battlefield. The economic state of the country was bad. Labour and Socialism had been profoundly stirred by the Russian Revolution and International Pacifist propaganda. The army called ever for more men.

Such was the effect of Clémenceau's personality and of his will to win the war that he obtained amid applause fresh sacrifices from every class of the community. While his weak predecessor M. Painlevé had felt himself forced to release men from the colours by the pressure of opinion, Clémenceau not only called them back to the army but mobilised further men, and instituted a fresh and drastic comb-out in all Government offices and in private and State factories and workshops.

Steps were also taken, but without complete success, to enforce a rigorous rationing system. The history of civilian France in this respect was not above reproach. Families who supported stoically the loss of father or son refused to recognise the urgent necessity of food economy, and the average town-dwelling Frenchman, and especially the Parisian, displayed immense resources of tact and ingenuity in circumventing the various edicts of the Food Controller with regard to meatless days and other restrictions. In the face of this determination on the part of the country not to observe alimentary discipline, the lot of the successive Food Controllers was not a happy one. No definite plan or policy of control or restriction was followed for more than a few weeks at a time. Many of the regulations were never put into force; contradictory edicts followed one after the other with a bewildering variety which made respect of them almost an impossibility.

The first few months of 1918 were particularly trying to the

civilian population. For, added to growing difficulties with regard to food and coal, events at the front were unhappy and full of menace to the capital. Paris received her first shell from Big Bertha, from a distance of seventy-two miles, on March 23; and with the beginning of the big guns' activity air-raids were intensified.¹ Indeed there were not a few Parisians who felt acutely that Clémenceau was perhaps pushing too far his policy of making the civilian realise the real meaning of war. Nevertheless the general *moral* of the country and much-tried temper and nerves of the capital remained staunch, and those Socialist elements who with a weak Government might have yielded to the temptation to cause disturbances, found no such encouragement under the iron rule of "The Tiger."

On the whole however it is no exaggeration to state that from the time that the German offensive first burst upon the Allied front in March 1918 until the triumphant counter-offensives of the summer brought victory in sight France had no internal history or preoccupations save those provided by the treason trials.

¹ Bombardment of Paris :

	<i>No.</i>	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>
Aerial projectiles . . .	746	266	603
Bertha shells . . .	303	256	620
Total . . .	1,049	522	1,223

PEACE AND AFTER

XXIII

PEACE

THE Malvy trial came to an end while the last great struggle was being fought out in the field. Behind the lines the country nursed in silence the growing hope of victory as the armies of liberation pressed on to the Rhine. It was not until the terms of armistice had actually been signed that the people felt themselves at last free to give voice to their pent-up happiness.

The terms were well received in Parliament, where Clémenceau received the first of the many ovations which were to reach their culminating point on the Terrace at Versailles after the signature of the Treaty of Peace; and the closing days of November were filled with the triumphal return of the victorious French troops to the cities of Alsace and Lorraine, whilst on November 21 the French Academy paid the tribute of the intellectual world to Marshal Foch and Clémenceau by electing them as members.

A week later King George made a brief official visit to Paris. He was followed by King Albert; but it was not until well on in the month of December that any serious progress could be made in the preparations of the Allied Peace Conference which was to draft terms of the peace to be presented to Germany.

It is not within the scope of this work to examine, or describe as a whole or in detail, the vast mechanism of peace created by the world's representatives in Paris, the nature of the problems as they affected every State represented, or to probe into the histories and characters of the delegates and the policies they represented. But any history of France would be incomplete indeed did it omit a full statement of the reparations and the guarantees France sought at the hands of the Paris Peace Conference, or fail to describe the men who were the instruments of her policy, and in what spirit they approached their task and met their fellow delegates at the green table.

France suffered more during the war than any other Allied country, and the arguments timidly put forward that the Conference should meet in any other capital than that of France, or the final treaty be signed anywhere save at Versailles, were easily dismissed. The existence of the English Channel made London impossible as a meeting-place. Brussels was too small, Rome too distant. Paris was easy of access for the delegates of all the Allied countries. Her hotels and palaces were capable of absorbing the huge peace army which was to be mobilised. She was the centre of the European system of communication. There were practical as well as sentimental reasons which made her selection imperative; for in her walls, or at Versailles, already existed the Inter-Allied military mechanism which was bound to play such an important part in the discussions.

One big hotel after another was requisitioned for the housing of the delegates and their staffs. There were not only the representatives of twenty-seven Allied nations to be accommodated. From every part of the earth there came men with axes to be ground or with injustices to be redressed by the Conference, and the Champs Elysées and the Boulevards became thronged with people of strange races, speaking little-known tongues, wearing outlandish garments. Ethnical experts themselves became bewildered when they heard of the Wends and the Sudetians sending their delegates. Zionists, Bolsheviks, Koreans, Armenians, Tatars, Georgians, Persians, all had their headquarters. There were Irish Republicans and Egyptian Nationalists. Men from every part of the British Empire, Syrians, Maronites, Arabs, strange sages from the East, all found their way to the Mecca of Peace, hoping to be heard by the Conference or to be able in some way or other to influence its decisions. The Press by itself sent some hundreds of correspondents, and for them too a Palace was requisitioned in which they could hold their meetings and bear their part in the general insanity of the period.

The Congress of Vienna was marked by the brilliance of its social gaieties. In Paris private entertaining was noticeably absent. There was hardly a big family which was not in mourning, and none of the big hostesses opened their doors to peace junketing. Neither health nor inclination led M. Clémenceau or his Foreign Minister to entertain. The Elysée kept purposely aloof from the Conference, and the French felt that in view of the undoubted hardships of life in Paris for the working-classes at that moment a display of official jollity

would be out of place. Life among most of the foreigners was insensate in its luxury. Clémenceau did not encourage any French participation in this general folly. He continued his austere mode of life in the back courtyard of his unpretentious dwelling at Passy. M. Pichon remained on as before in his modest flat near the Luxembourg, and seldom took part in any of the countless public dinners of the time.

Such was the moral atmosphere in which the Peace Conference met. Politically, from a French point of view, what was the situation? Who were the delegates of France, and what was their attitude towards the World Peace they were called upon to make?

The French, a strange mixture of Rhetoric and Idealism, had given to President Wilson's fourteen points their adherence. When Wilson arrived in France on the eve of the Conference he was hailed as the bearer of a new idea. He and his country were the saviours of Europe. He was the preacher of a new Gospel. The League of Nations was the one certain way of preventing future wars. Paris gave him a welcome equalled only in fervour by that given to the Russians when the Franco-Russian Alliance was concluded. It was Wilson, Wilson, everywhere. Much of this popular sentiment was sincere; much of it was due to the influence of the Press, which had its instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to put down the loud pedal. In the public gaze nothing he could say or do was, or could be, wrong. Yet together with the Rhetoric and Idealism the French manage to combine the saving, critical qualities which come from Logic and Realism. Not a few of those who were foremost in print or on the platform in belauding the League of Nations to the sky were, in private, more than sceptical about its benefits, and feared that in the hands of the idealists who were spreading gospels it might become a source not of strength but of weakness, and, in later years, even an instrument subversive of French interests. There were many who could not see why the world, having failed for nearly two thousand years to accept the teachings of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, should be prepared to bow before the revised version produced in America by President Wilson for European consumption.

These critics of the League of Nations more solidly represented the real, considered judgements of the French and the needs of the hour than did the emotional crowds which greeted the President on his first visit to France. What was the political outlook? France was victorious, but she had paid dearly

for her victory. Germany, beaten but not crushed, still was a force to be reckoned with in the future. Napoleonic experiments in the disarmament of Germany had been a failure. The French had their own experience after 1870 to remind them how quickly a defeated nation can recover her economic power. The conduct of the war by the Germans had not been of a nature to reassure the French as to the sincerity of their rapid conversion to democracy and all it means. There was the threat of a Teutonic-Slav combination in the future. Against all these menaces the French had to seek safeguards, and they preferred to find them in military and economic facts rather than in the vague and shadowy paper promises of a "League of Nations Utopia." A people which for nearly fifty years had lived under the shadow of defeat next door to its arrogant conqueror had some excuse for adopting this attitude. No other people in Europe had suffered from so many opportunities of getting to know German mentality and its manifestations. If they went no further back than the war which had just ended, they found their cities ruined, their departments devastated, their factories gutted, their fields destroyed and their compatriots enslaved and maltreated in every zone of the territory occupied by the Germans. But not only in war had the Germans governed by force and by intimidation. In the twilight between war and peace which prevailed in Alsace-Lorraine throughout the forty-seven years of German occupation the same brutal methods were employed. Throughout the whole course of the troubled history of the Franco-German diplomatic struggle over Morocco Germany had employed the tactics of the bully, and only gave way when she found herself threatened with the united strength of France and Britain. How, many Frenchmen asked themselves, could the League of Nations provide security for France against such a mentality in a neighbour still strong in population, resources and science?

Foremost among the critics of the League was Clémenceau. He, like many another public man, felt himself forced by expediency to do it lip-service from time to time, but he was too honest intellectually to conceal his scepticism from understanding eyes. He saw no objection to the League if Wilson, Lord Robert Cecil and Léon Bourgeois wanted it. Let them have it. But the promises of the League could not be allowed to replace the tangible guarantees of French national safety which he considered it necessary to obtain in the Treaty. For he, like the bulk of his countrymen, was sure in his heart and mind that the German had never bowed, and would never

bow, to any god but strength. He had, besides, the conviction that the German was by birth dishonest, that the plighted or the written word meant naught to him once he felt himself strong enough to deny it. Clémenceau was not only a cynic but he was also a cold and brutal realist. No means could be neglected if the end were to be reached. No honour, no principle, no man was sacred to him if it stood in the path to his goal. He had no faith. All these destructive and negative qualities were however redeemed by his intense love of country, by his glowing wish to leave France greater, stronger and freer than she had been. France was his religion. He made of his country his faith. There have been great Europeans. Clémenceau was not among them. He was a great Frenchman, and throughout the Peace Conference French interests alone could arouse him.

The chief of those interests was security. The French viewed the problem of their internal safety from a point of view which could completely ignore any peril from the West. America was in no way to be feared. All the possible perils of France lay on her eastern frontier. There she had to consider the situation very carefully. Right upon her doorstep she had the German whom, with just cause, she deemed to be defeated but not crushed, sorry but not repentant.

The French had learned in their own history what reliance could be placed upon treaty provisions in dealing with Germany when those provisions were not supported by the weight of arms. They knew that the process of disarmament would be not only slow but also imperfect. They realised that whatever might be done in the Treaty to reduce the number of trained troops in Germany no treaty provisions could, in the long-run, prevent the establishment of some camouflaged system of military training through Boy Scouts, Military Veterans or Security Police Organisations. They therefore sought from the Paris Peace Conference the utmost possible measure of security for their frontiers : and their military heroes were clamorous upon this point.

One way of ensuring the safety of French frontiers in the East was obviously to insist upon a prolonged and extensive occupation of the Rhenish provinces of Germany. Such a method would have deprived Germany of the spring-board from which she has throughout history launched her invading armies into France. The civilisation of peace alone could not explain or justify the inordinate spread of German railways towards the Rhine bridges in peace time. Still less could it

excuse the tremendous development of railway lines, store-houses and barracks on the left bank of the river. The possession of the Rhine bridges and of the jumping-off ground on the left bank alone could have led Germany to feel that she was sure of triumph when she launched her legions upon France. French possession, or neutralisation, of those regions was therefore the first aim of the French delegates at the Peace Conference ; and by the end of April the Supreme Council had so far met French views that the military frontiers of Germany were set back 50 kilometres east of the Rhine, and her army was reduced to 100,000 men.

Inter-Allied occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and of the bridgeheads was accepted for a period of fifteen years, and treaties were signed whereby, in the event of United States ratification, both America and Great Britain bound themselves to come immediately to the assistance of France should she again be the object of the aggressor. But American failure to ratify the Peace Treaty relieved Great Britain of her contingent undertaking, and France, deprived of her chief military guarantee against Germany, sought a substitute in military alliance with Belgium and in the vigorous execution of all the disarmament clauses.

The military requirements of France in the Peace Treaty were clear, and were obtainable by clear-cut methods. Economically the situation was much more complex.

Notwithstanding the advance of French industry, agriculture still absorbs about 60 per cent. of the country's economic effort. The effect of war upon it was calamitous, and spread far beyond the zone of war into every village, hamlet and farm. Mobilisation affected agriculture just as heavily as it did industry in the first two months of the war, but the paramount importance of arming the armies led to the return of considerable numbers of artisans and skilled workmen to the factory, while it was not until very much later that efforts on a much smaller scale were made to give the farmer some of his much-needed labour. Farm-work was crippled also by the requisition of most of the horses and cattle. Manures were lacking, and artificial manures were almost unobtainable. The effect of this upon the acreage under cultivation and upon livestock was immediate.¹

It is also calculated that the war-zone had an area of 4,844,000 hectares, of which about 3,500,000 were the best-farmed land in France, supporting the large agricultural industries of sugar,

¹ *Vide* pp. 266 etc. for details.

distilling and brewing. The French estimate of the agricultural reparations value of the damage done here by war is £800,000,000. The actual fighting-zone of intensive destruction covered about one and a quarter million hectares, of which over one-tenth was completely devastated, with nothing but a few shattered tree trunks and an occasional cluster of powdered ruins left of all the labour given to the soil.

The area ruined in lesser degree within the bombardment zone and land in close proximity to the front, or in German occupation which suffered from bad methods of cultivation, and the damage attendant upon the presence of large armies, brought the total agricultural area ruined up to 2,800,000 hectares. In all the region in occupation of the Germans agricultural machinery and tools had been removed; dykes, roads and boundary limits were destroyed. Industrial production suffered in the same way from the effects of shell-fire, both Allied and enemy, and by the systematic stripping by the Germans of all metal in the great factories of the North. Almost all the great coal-mines of the North were rendered sterile for many years to come. The wealthy textile industries of Lille and Roubaix were brought to a standstill. Moreover the whole arterial system of the North and East of France was terribly damaged. Thousands of kilometres of railways and canals were destroyed, and many hundred bridges and viaducts had been blown up. The number of houses destroyed too had run into several hundreds of thousands.

At the outbreak of war the charge of the National Debt per head of the population was 861 francs. By the time peace was signed it had risen to 4,487 francs.

Another economic factor of vast importance which had to be borne in mind by the French peace-maker was coal. France in 1913 had to import 20,000,000 tons of coal. After, and during, the war these heavy requirements of her industry were swollen by the stoppage of supplies from the war-crippled fields of the North, and by the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, which itself was some 7,000,000 tons short of its necessities.

These coal requirements had to be met by the Treaty of Versailles, which laid down that Germany during the first five years had to deliver to France 20,000,000 tons of coal annually to make good the war losses, and to deliver 8,000,000 tons during each of the next five years. Moreover for a period of fifteen years the exploitation of the coal-fields of the Saar Valley with an annual pre-war output of 18,000,000 tons was handed over to France.

Guarantees against future aggression and reparation of damage done were the two chief aims of France in the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles with her allies. Those negotiations were long-drawn-out. Before the day of signature public attention had wearied of their details. Clémenceau still enjoyed the confidence of the country as a whole, and when the German delegates entered the Hall of Mirrors on June 28 to sign the Treaty there was too much relief at the completion of the long task of peace-making for criticism to make itself heard.

XXIV

1919-1921

IMMEDIATELY after the signature of the Peace Treaty the economic and labour discontent due to Bolshevist agitation and to the failure of the Clémenceau Ministry to deal with the ever-increasing cost of living showed itself in a series of partial strikes in which such varied classes as theatrical workers, municipal servants, dockers and coal-miners were affected. There was however no response to the call for a general strike, and the whole attitude of labour was sound. In Parliament this justifiable discontent was used as a lever to try and oust M. Clémenceau from power before the general elections, but without success.

When the treaty however came before the Chambers (September 1919) for ratification, fault-finders were not wanting who declared that it was conceived in a spirit of old-world harshness, but yet lacked the necessary guarantees for its performance; that Clémenceau had allowed Wilson and Lloyd George between them to outmanœuvre the French negotiators; that the Treaty was unworkable, and that it deprived France of all she could justly have expected from her victory.

The elections were of unprecedented importance, for before the end of 1919 the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, Municipal and Provincial Councillors had to be renewed, and one of the first duties of the new Parliament was to elect a successor to M. Poincaré in the Presidency of the Republic. The election campaign however was devoid of any speculative interest, for it was abundantly clear that any party or group of parties whose candidates bound themselves to work solidly at the

real business of France, and would refuse to waste their time in political bladder-beating bouts among themselves, would be assured of a large majority. M. Clémenceau was quick to realise this, and mainly with the help of M. Millerand, then High Commissioner of the Republic in Alsace-Lorraine, an electoral phalanx was formed under the name of the "bloc national." Its programme was defined by Clémenceau in a great speech at Strasbourg on November 4, when he appealed to all moderate men who desired to work in peace and order at the reconstruction of the country to vote against all Bolshevik candidates throughout the country. Polling took place ten days later, and for the first time the electoral reform law instituting the principle of Proportional Representation was put into practice. Nearly everywhere the Clémenceau-Millerand ticket triumphed, and the discomfiture of the advanced Socialists was so complete as to destroy their importance as a party in the new House, which, consisting of 626 members, comprised no less than 369 men new to Parliament. Their neighbours, the Radical Socialists, fared but little better, and the Left bloc, which had formed the centre of power with 288 votes in the old Parliament, found itself reduced to 168 votes. The balance of power was shifted away to the moderate Centre and the Conservative Right.

The National Assembly for the Presidential Election was held at Versailles on January 17, 1920. M. Clémenceau, who had been over-persuaded by his friends to submit his name, was defeated in the Republican Caucus ballot which preceded the official vote, and M. Paul Deschanel, President of the Chamber of Deputies, was elected with practical unanimity. On the following day the Clémenceau Ministry, the most famous in French history, resigned, and Clémenceau retired (*soi-disant*) definitely from public life.

M. Millerand was called upon to form the new Cabinet. His choice of collaborators showed that he was more concerned with having men of practical experience at the head of affairs than politicians of brilliance or subtlety. Politically his combination did not get an enthusiastic welcome from Parliament, but the determination with which M. Millerand set himself to obtaining, in conference with the Allies of France, the application of the feasible terms of the Peace with Germany soon won for him the confidence of Parliament.

In spite however of that determination, the results of the successive Allied meetings at Boulogne, Spa and Hythe were not deemed satisfactory, and Parliamentary discontent might

have found direct expression had it not been for two events—the serious illness of President Deschanel following a fall from the presidential train in May, and the brilliant success of French policy in giving assistance to the Poles in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. The first event rendered ministerial stability extremely desirable, and the second made it sure to such an extent that when M. Deschanel was forced to resign M. Millerand was the only possible successor. He entered upon his term as President of the Republic on September 23.

The Briand Ministry which followed accomplished nothing of great importance either at home or abroad. M. Briand, from the outset of this term of office, had to struggle with the opposition and criticism of Conservative elements in the Chamber of Deputies and with the growing influence of M. Poincaré throughout Parliament. Dissatisfaction with the working of the Treaty of Versailles and distrust of British policy were the main forces behind M. Poincaré. The Pacific Conference at Washington (December 1921 to January 1922) weakened M. Briand's position, for it was felt, not without reason, that France in that great Conference played but a very minor part, and that the only result of her delegation's activities was to widen differences between France and Great Britain.

XXV

1922

WHAT Washington had begun Cannes¹ completed. There it became abundantly clear that M. Briand with his conciliatory tendencies in the treatment of European affairs could do nothing against the uncompromising Nationalist majority in the Chamber, which viewed all negotiations with Soviet Russia with disgusted alarm, and desired to treat Germany with Draconian severity in all matters arising from the Treaty of Versailles. Scandals brought to light by the failure of the Banque Industrielle de Chine, in which M. Briand's right-hand man at the Foreign Office was implicated, had also helped to sap M. Briand's position. While he was at Cannes intrigue inside the Paris Cabinet came to a head. M. Briand abruptly left the Conference, and after a stormy debate in the Chamber resigned office. M. Poincaré at once stepped into his place.

¹ January 6-12, 1922.

Among the liabilities he took over from his predecessor were the Cannes Resolutions and the Genoa Conference. French policy was immediately tightened up, and it became clear that M. Poincaré was bent upon challenging the ascendancy of Mr. Lloyd George in European councils. The French Premier announced that he did not believe in conferences and would return to the old methods of negotiation between Foreign Offices. He admitted himself bound to Genoa by Briand's signature at Cannes, but did his utmost to prevent the meeting of Genoa. When that Conference did assemble¹ M. Poincaré remained aloof in Paris and sent M. Barthou as the chief delegate of France. Throughout the deliberations French action and counsel were obstructive and tended to emphasise Franco-British differences. The French at the outset by insisting upon the exclusion of disarmament and reparations from the list of problems to be discussed had deprived Genoa of the chance of achieving more than a moral result. The prospect of German default on June 15, 1922 in her reparations payments weighed heavily upon Genoa, and the threat made at Bar-le-Duc by M. Poincaré while Genoa was still sitting that France would, if necessary, take separate action in enforcing her claims upon Germany, in no way improved matters.

Moreover, as the year advanced it became clear that M. Poincaré's action as office-holder fell very short of his declarations as opposition critic. He had announced his distrust of conferences, but, besides meeting Mr. Lloyd George at Boulogne in February, he was soon hurrying to London to attend a Conference on the subject of Reparations—and a Conference which proved resultless. He took in his pocket a scheme for compelling Germany to pay, which included the temporary seizure of her fiscal mines and State forests as "productive pledges." His visit to London, however, rather unfortunately followed upon the publication by the British Government of the "Balfour Note" (August 1), wherein Lord Balfour, acting Foreign Secretary, laid down the principle that only so much of the Allies' debts to Britain would be claimed as would suffice to enable Britain to discharge her debt to America; but that, inasmuch as our American debt had been incurred simply in order to finance Allies whom America had not been willing to finance directly herself, it would be unreasonable for Britain to pay back America while remitting the sums owed to her by Europe. This logical thesis was received with disfavour in France, and contributed to sterilise M. Poincaré's

¹ April 10 to May 19, 1922: chiefly on Russian relations.

proposals, which linked the Reparation problem with the settlement of inter-Allied debts.

Nor can M. Poincaré have been encouraged by the reception accorded to his policy when it did assume in act the severity which he had advocated in his writings. Clearing houses had been set up in Paris and Strasbourg for the recovery of German private trading debts; and on the failure of the Strasbourg office to obtain more than 289,000,000 marks out of 2 milliards claimed the French Government expelled 500 German residents from Alsace and Lorraine (August). Their expulsion evoked cries of protest from all quarters, not least from Alsace-Lorraine, and M. Poincaré had to suspend his forcible measures. This action had, indeed, run counter to a growing realisation in France that great advantage was to be derived from admitting German co-operation in restoring the devastated areas.

Meanwhile the Reparation question made little or no progress. The sum determined by the Reparation Commission in May 1921 as due from Germany (£6,600,000,000), already deemed too low by the majority of Frenchmen, is judged by many persons in this country to be considerably larger than Germany can possibly pay; and the plan of occupying the Ruhr district in order to enforce payment has been as popular in France as it is unpopular in Britain. The year (1922) closes, therefore, with a definite and serious divergence between two Allies who are both impressed by the need of cordial collaboration.

Such collaboration, it was believed, might have been promoted by the conclusion of a Pact between the two countries, designed to replace the original Convention of 1919 which lapsed owing to America's non-participation (see p. 233). Certain proposals were therefore made by Mr. Lloyd George to M. Briand at Cannes (January 6-12). M. Briand fell from office, and the negotiations were continued by M. Poincaré through the ordinary diplomatic channels. He objected to the proposed terms on the ground that they were unilateral, putting France in the position of appearing to ask the aid which her ally did not require of her, that it was offered only for a period of ten years, and that there was no military guarantee. Mr. Lloyd George, on his part, made his signature dependent on the previous elimination of Franco-British differences in Tangier and the Near East. His firm refusal to bind Britain to specific military intervention was enough in itself to make the Pact unacceptable to France, and Britain's offer was refused.

Events in the Near East exhibited at once the need and

the difficulties of close Allied co-operation. France, who had by the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) been entrusted with the mandates over Syria (including the Lebanon) and Cilicia, had throughout shown herself more favourably disposed towards Turkey than had Britain, and early advocated a revision of the Treaty, which admitted the Greek claim to administer Smyrna and the adjacent district of Ionia. In this she was supported by Italy, both Powers being driven into a more strongly anti-Greek attitude by the return of King Constantine to Athens. They afforded some embarrassing aid to the Turkish Nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal, who, defying alike the Allies and his own Government in Constantinople, opposed the execution of the Sèvres Treaty by force of arms, and soon established a "rebel" Government at Angora. With him France actually concluded an accord that facilitated her withdrawal from Cilicia. Britain, on the contrary, continued to lend Greece moral, if not material, support, and in the hostilities which continued intermittently through the years 1920, 1921, and 1922 Britain was really on one side, and France and Italy on the other. An inter-Allied Conference in Paris (March 1922) brought outward harmony to the policy of the three Powers, who there agreed to the evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks and the restoration even of Eastern Thrace to Turkey; Allied troops were to be left in occupation of Gallipoli, but withdrawn from Constantinople.

What Allied diplomacy decreed Turkish arms effected. A sweeping Turkish victory at Afium Qarahisar (August 26) drove the Greek army westward in headlong rout, and Smyrna was entered by Turkish cavalry a fortnight later. When in mid-September a Turkish force approached the Straits it became a momentous international question whether the Allied troops who were quartered on either side of them (in accordance with the Armistice terms of October 1918) should or should not defend them by force if necessity arose. Britain decided that she would. Mr. Lloyd George announced her intention to the world at once, without previous consultation with France. France was discomposed, and withdrew her forces to the European side of the Straits. Her example was followed by Italy, and an awkward situation arose. Britain despatched reinforcements to Sir Charles Harington, commanding Allied forces in the Near East. He met Turkish Delegates in a conference at Mudania which had been arranged by Lord Curzon's diplomatic intervention in Paris. At Mudania Allied unity was with difficulty maintained, but on October 11 an Armistice

was signed, wherein the concessions made to Turkey in March, now slightly enlarged, were confirmed, and Greek troops were ordered to evacuate all Thrace east of the Maritsa river. Thenceforward the Nationalist Government of Kemal superseded for all practical purposes the Government of Constantinople.

The Allies' vacillations of four years had brought disillusionment to Greece and triumph to the Government which defied them. The lesson was tardily appreciated, and at the subsequent Conference of Lausanne, which met in November to discuss final peace terms, a more whole-hearted unity prevailed between Britain, France, and Italy than for many months before. Harmonious co-operation between France and Britain was perhaps made easier by the resignation of Mr. Lloyd George, who had come to be distrusted in France, and by the consequent latitude enjoyed by Lord Curzon, whose diplomatic qualities were allowed full play by the new British Prime Minister. France supported Britain throughout in the questions of the new Turkish frontier, the protection of minorities, and the freedom of the Straits.

It only remains to add that, as regards France's other main interest in these regions, her mandate over Syria had not, during the last two years, been entirely successful. Her policy of *divide et impera* aroused much discontent, and at the end of 1922 the population was still in a state of partial unrest.

XXVI

SOCIALISM AND LABOUR DURING THE WAR AND AFTER

FRANCE before the war was an open field for the sowing of anti-militarist seed. All advanced sections of the Socialists and Communists professed to have a burning hatred of the word "patrie" and the whole system of nationality. Using the army as the nursery of the revolutionary force of the future they sought by propaganda in every form to teach the young revolutionary idea how not to shoot, but how, by the destruction of bridges, to ruin mobilisation plans on the outbreak of a war, and thus, by mutiny in the face of the enemy, to make war impossible. When war did come the whole of the previous campaign was as though it had never been, and men who in peace had planted the flag on the dunghill moved off to the frontiers waving the tricolour high over their heads.

Labour in France was spared at the outset the demoralising influence of recruiting-campaigns, Derby schemes and Exemption Boards. So great was the need for men in France for the first few months, so universal was mobilisation, that even the workmen from the State arsenals had to go. The political and corporate life of labour therefore ceased for many months, and was only taken up again on the conclusion of Peace.

French socialism had been in many respects a "bogey-man" in Europe for ten years before the Great War. It had undoubtedly a great Parliamentary mustering. But the figure of its representation was in many cases due to the fact that if, after the first ballot of an election, those other anti-Republicans, the Catholic-Monarchists, saw that their man had no chance, the flock of the faithful was instructed to vote for the candidate of the Social Revolution, in order to prevent—at any cost—the return of a true Bourgeois Republican.

The party lacked discipline to such an extent that many of its elected deputies failed to pay their subscriptions to the Party Funds. Discipline, organisation, numbers such as were known with the British Labour and Trades Union movement were unknown in France. Thus it was that since only the extremist is willing to pay his party subscription, and since only one who has done so has a vote, the extremists were able at Party Congresses to win the day. Thus is explained the apparent contradiction between the fact of the official Socialist party becoming steadily throughout the war more revolutionary and the elections of 1920, when the Socialists in Parliament and their allies of the advanced Left, the Radical Socialists, found their numbers reduced from a sturdy party to a handful of malcontents.

At the beginning of the war the Socialist party in Parliament, tragically deprived of its leader Jaurès, for some considerable time played no real part in affairs. Its chance came when, after long discussion, it was decided that Albert Thomas, Marcel Sembat and Jules Guesde should be allowed to enter the Ministry. M. Albert Thomas, who had made himself conspicuous as a moderate Socialist with a special competence in the essential, as apart from the political, claims of labour, became Minister of Munitions and had the task of organising the industrial war effort of the country (1915). He alone of the three Socialist ministers made his mark. In the face of inevitable military opposition he got the necessary workmen back from the army into the workshops and accomplished, but on a smaller scale, for French output of war material what the

War Office and Mr. Lloyd George did for British industry. For a time, while the Briand Ministries lasted, he was in fact, but not in name, the chief Socialist in the Chamber.

Then came the Russian Revolution. Albert Thomas was sent to Russia in the vain hope that he might save Russia as an Allied Power. He laboured there, but unavailingly. Then came the invitation to an international meeting of Socialists at Stockholm (April 1917). That Frenchmen of any party, hue or complexion should meet Germans in any place save on the front was an idea that could not be swallowed by the country at large. No French Government which had dared to give passports to French citizens for such a purpose would have lasted an hour. Stockholm, and all its possibilities of premature peace, became the official doctrine of the Socialist party. Passports were refused time after time after angry debates in the Chamber of Deputies, and each successive discussion showed more clearly that this question would make impossible further Socialist participation in ministerial responsibility. These sittings of the Chamber of Deputies, while they were made memorable by many an eloquent appeal to the spirit of France, were rendered odious by the frank avowal of more than one Socialist member that the country was tired of butchery; that Capitalism, French, German and British, had made the war; that responsibility for carnage was equally shared.

The majority of the Socialist party was far from agreement with these views. But it became apparent that the Socialist "stop the war" section was making great progress. It had as its leader M. Jean Longuet, a man of complete sincerity, who had succeeded M. Renaudel in the leadership of the party. But his idealism fitted badly to the hard needs of a country's struggle for life. For a brief moment Longuet and his followers obtained control of the Socialist party machine. Just as Marshal Foch believed that the victory ought to have been achieved in 1917, so did Longuet and his followers sincerely believe that peace was possible, through the efforts of the proletariat, at the same date.

The Russian Revolution was welcomed by Longuet at its birth. But as time went on, and the dictatorial excesses of that vast upheaval became more and more apparent, so did his faith in Soviet methods shrink. And as it shrank so did his power diminish.

He was gradually edged out by the professed Bolsheviks Marcel Cachin and Frossard, who had been to Soviet Russia; but even so the Bolshevik doctrines did not permeate the

Socialist body as a whole. The result of the elections of 1919 came to them as a staggering blow, and their importance in parliamentary affairs began to fade. Their power in the country too grew less and less; quarrels between the different sections became intensified as time went on, and eventually the split in the party was made definite at the Tours Congress of 1921. For the time being their influence in the political world may be regarded as almost negligible.

When we come to deal with the combination between Socialism and Labour, we find that Parliamentary Socialism is in fact divorced from the Labour movement of the country much more than is Labour from Trades Unionism in Great Britain. Labour in France is much better and more numerously represented by the General Confederation of Labour—a Syndicate of all the Trades Union in the country. That body has by an overwhelming vote refused to follow the “official” Socialist party in its path to Moscow.

Labour is in fact sound in the country. There is not in France the agrarian incitement to Bolshevism that exists in Russia, Rumania, Hungary and other countries in Europe. Land is on the whole fairly distributed. There is a closer co-operation between workmen and employers and a keener appreciation on each side of the difficulties of the other. There is above all—and perhaps it may be the deciding factor of wisdom—the knowledge that the richest provinces of France have been laid waste by the Hun, and that the effort of every individual in the community, the mutual sacrifice of “patron” and of “ouvrier,” is necessary if France is to live.

FRENCH CIVILISATION AND CHARACTER

THE Revolution of 1789, which brought democracy with a rush into Europe, altered all European countries, but in France the change was more sudden and drastic than elsewhere. France was educating her citizens in democratic ideals at a time when the word democracy was elsewhere regarded precisely as is Bolshevism to-day. Neither the first Empire nor the restoration of the Bourbons shook the hold of those principles on the French mind, and France is to-day the most conservative of democracies. But nowhere in Europe is there less acceptance for the idea that wealth should be pooled and an equal ration handed out to everybody.

Yet, though France is fiercely individualist, the unit for France is the family. The rights of property are sacred to the French; but property in their view belongs to the family; and this view is consecrated in the article of Napoleon's code which enacts that property at the owner's death must be distributed among the kindred, so that equality of opportunity is established in the family. Again, the Napoleonic law, enforcing the custom of this conservative people, gives to the family great power over its members: each marriage is an affair for the family, closely connected with property; and the head of the family can forbid the marriage of a minor almost in all cases. Thus the idea of authority is preserved among this democratic people in its most primitive form; and in two relations it is applied rigorously by the State. First, education has been compulsory as well as free since 1850; every parent, rich or poor, has to comply with regulations in this regard. Secondly, military service is exacted from all males equally. Thus, so far as law can impose them, there is equality of opportunity and equality of sacrifice.

The conflict of authority with liberty, and the inequality which results from inequality of powers where equal opportunity is provided, make the fundamental problem for modern European States. Some compromise has everywhere to be arrived at, and in France this has been the more difficult because of the character of the French mind, which pushes

all reasoning to its logical conclusion. Yet the instinctive conservatism, which is equally in their character, teaches them to guard what really they value most. Their Revolution was a tremendous break with the past ; but when they made it they possessed as a nation the most developed civilisation in Europe, and the purpose of the revolution was to extend the benefit of it to the nation at large. The nation at large was ready to profit by the chance. There was no art, craft, or science in which the French were not eminent ; industry and thrift were the national characteristics of their common people ; and they had what they still have supremely, pride in their work and attachment to it. But the caution, which was an aspect of their thrift, indisposed them to large speculation.

As a consequence, France was slow to be affected by the other great change which divides the modern world from the old order. The industrial revolution, mainly led by Britain, reached her very gradually. The French used modern mechanical invention rather for perfecting manufactures than for mass-production of cheap goods ; and therefore the grouping of population in huge industrial centres was a comparatively late development among them. Even to-day, France has more than half of her people employed on the land : she has only fourteen towns of over 100,000 inhabitants as against forty-seven in Great Britain. But the country towns, such as Orléans, or even much smaller places, retain a distinctive life and urban character of their own ; and everywhere the small establishments survive. At the top there are survivals of privilege ; the old nobility remain as a picturesque feature of French life ; but their ranks are thinned by the disappearance of some families and the impoverishment of others, and the *haute bourgeoisie* of banking, speculation, and great enterprises takes its place among them and buys their ancestral châteaux or builds new ones.

The State, however, is stabilised by three facts : First, the provision of thoroughly good education, available for every one, makes access to the lower rungs of the ladder easy where there is talent. Secondly, outside the *bourgeoisie*, yet possessing all the conscious pride of ownership, is the growing class of peasant proprietors, who with their dependents make one-fourth of the entire people. With them rank the great multitude of small independent artisans, who retain a large proportion of the work which in other countries is monopolised by capitalised concerns. Thirdly, and finally, is the wage-earning class of manual labour. The habit of thrift is so widespread that vast

numbers of them, men and women, own savings which education has taught them to invest, and which State policy has encouraged them to invest in bonds of their own Government. They are a nation of small investors; capital is extraordinarily diffused; and it is mainly so invested as to give citizens a money interest in the State's stability.

As a nation, the French own a very large tract of Europe in proportion to their numbers. The population of France is 73 to the square kilometre; that of England 239; that of Belgium 252: certainly not because France is less rich or fertile than these neighbouring lands. They have therefore much to defend: their own way of life, their conception of liberty, which they asserted by the sword against Europe five generations ago; and a rich national estate, the land on which they live and which they exploit mainly for themselves alone. They are little bound up with the economic life of other lands. France imports very little but raw materials, and exports very little but luxuries. She has also in the last decades made great acquisitions overseas, which ensure to her coveted supplies of the raw material which she needs.

Such a position is naturally coveted, and ever since 1870 the fear of foreign invasion has driven this land of liberty to impose on all its citizens the extremest sacrifice of personal freedom. The army is the most complete and characteristic expression of France. Every man has to pass through the ranks, except the small number of officer candidates specially trained at St. Cyr; nothing but physical disability secures exemption. Every Frenchman has for two years of his life to be the messmate of every other kind of Frenchman; and this association makes for solidarity and reconciles democracy to the existence of wide social differences. Again, in every Frenchman the tendency to resent interference is modified by the universal experience of a strict discipline. Another consequence is physical: the French system of education is very exacting and leaves little room for games; but it is followed by a period in which the male citizen is trained in the hardest form of physical labour, that of marching under a heavy pack.

Since the army is the nation, troubles which affect the nation affect the army also. France has been divided since the Revolution between clerical and anti-clerical, and the division grew more acute than ever under the Third Republic, largely because of the growing importance attached to education. Clerical France claimed, according to the universal tradition of the Roman Church, the right of Catholic parents

to have their children educated in a Catholic atmosphere, under the supervision of priests. This claim was firmly resisted by the anti-clericals, who based themselves on the ground that such education was neither enlightened nor enlightening. But a more definite motive operated. The old aristocracy, Catholic and monarchical, withdrew itself from all forms of the public service, except the military; but a very large proportion of its sons became professional soldiers. The strength of this element was considered a danger to the Republic, because this class as a class was monarchist, and its tendencies were held to be accentuated and directed by the great clerical organisation. A series of legislative and administrative acts were directed against the influence of the clergy in education; and this course of repression, amounting almost to persecution, found acceptance in France at large, through fear lest the army should be seduced from its Republican allegiance. Estrangement between citizens resulting from this political strife was so bitter that men of opposite camps could hardly be induced to act together for any common purpose, even in the least controversial matters. But when the war came, to preserve what was dearest the French closed their ranks. One cannot say that the army united France, because the army was France; but the fact that Marshal Foch, a devout Catholic, was no less essential to the final victory than M. Clémenceau, an extreme anti-clerical, is a symbol. The Republic, having triumphed in this ordeal, may be regarded as definitely established; but to France as a whole, the Republican system is little more than "the plan which divides us least," accepted as a means to preserve what Frenchmen unanimously hold to—the traditional life of France.

That way of life seeks after extreme individual freedom, under which prosperity and happiness are pursued by a people of extreme intelligence, perseverance, and economy, yet resentful of organisation. The Frenchman who accepts organisation readily is, as a rule, deficient in energy, and, as a rule, he enters one of the Government departments, which are, as a rule, the least admirable things in France. The Frenchman who has energy desires to express himself personally in his work; he works like an artist according to his own conceptions. This individualism is a danger. In the war, opposed to an enemy vastly superior to them in organisation, they won, in so far as they did win, by the brain-power of individuals; but they know how narrowly they escaped defeat.

Since the war they see a new menace to their way of life

in the growing collectivism of industry ; and they, as a nation of individual workers and of small capitalists, are in reaction against communism on the one hand and international trusts on the other. Their traditional policy seeks at creating a State large enough to be economically self-contained ; finding within its own borders the material for its industry and the markets for its products. They desire to exclude the cheap products which are the result of highly organised mechanical production ; and also, as against the syndicalist tendencies, they desire to preserve the freedom of the individual workers. Liberty, equality, and fraternity do not mean internationalism to them. Yet their nationalism is hospitable : it welcomes the individual foreigner as a fellow worker or fellow student among them ; they are keenly observant of foreign thought, ready in adapting it, yet putting their own accent on whatever they do ; progressive, yet intensely conservative ; wedded to their own way of life ; the least emigrating people in the world ; desirous to be free in order to remain French.

But they do not feel secure in their freedom. A nation of soldiers, they know what war means far too well to be militarist ; but they are trained to think as soldiers. Twice in living memory they have seen their country overrun. The very completeness of Germany's defeat renders them certain that desire for vengeance will bring a renewal of the struggle. Her own *revanche* has left France dreading the counterstroke, almost from the moment of victory.

But the first danger was economic, not military. The huge damage of war in France was not limited to the effect of military operations. The whole plant of industry, even to the growing fruit-trees, was destroyed by the retreating Germans in order to cripple an economic competitor. France has restored the land to culture with astonishing speed ; but the re-equipping of great mining and industrial centres is a slow task. By the Treaty of Versailles it was laid down that re-equipment of devastated France should be at the cost of Germany. Yet all the cost of the reparation so far accomplished has been borne by loans raised in France. Germany has paid no more than a fraction and declares her inability to pay more, unless she is given time to recover. Meantime the German industrial equipment is intact,¹ and the French fear lest vanquished Germany may secure such a mastery of the markets as shall turn military defeat into economic victory.

Having themselves paid a stupendous indemnity after the

¹ Written just before the French occupation of the Ruhr, Jan. 1923.—ED.

war of 1870, they regard Germany as wilfully dishonest, and French opinion has tended to demand such pressure on the debtor nation as France suffered fifty years ago. But the policy of France sees no prospect of security unless through maintaining alliance with Great Britain, and the interests of the two allied Powers diverge. Great Britain soon wrote off as a bad debt all hope of a share in the German reparations; her interest looks for a general revival of trade in Europe, which cannot be, if Germany's power to buy and sell is destroyed. On the other hand, all the financial arrangements of France since the war have been made on the assumption that Germany would pay, and bankruptcy stares her in the face, unless Germany can be made to pay. It would be bankruptcy, not like that of Russia at the expense of foreign investors; France's creditors are the whole body of her own people; and the lending of all savings to the State has, during the war and since the war, been preached and practised as a national duty. At present the French Government can only meet the interest on the loans due to its own citizens by fresh borrowings from the same source. Failure to meet these obligations would go far to destroy that disposition of all the people, down to the maidservant in a cheap lodging, to bring all savings into a common national fund, which has been for a century the main strength of France.

There is therefore a feverish determination to make Germany pay what she owes. In this determination France is solid: a nation of small investors standing on guard lest France should make default of the vast loans from innumerable petty savings. The only arguments which can affect the mind of France had to show that by insisting on the full sum of her demand she risks losing all; and that she could better afford to delay than to urge her claim.

Economically and politically France could probably afford to wait. A nation of small producers, having thrift ingrained into them, the French put by a profit even in periods when nations whose industry is mainly in great enterprises are working at a loss. Peasant-proprietors cut down their own wages, that is to say, they spend less on themselves, when a pinch comes; they do not go out of employment; production goes on. The social order, too, is strongly established: no nation has less cause to fear revolution than one where ownership is so widely diffused.

But the willingness of France to wait, rather than to force an issue by ruthless pressure, depends on her conviction that

after a period she will maintain her present strength. The balance of numbers goes against her with delay; for thrift and the diffusion of property are closely bound up with the practice of limiting families. Arguments and appeals, whether from Church or State, have little effect against these causes: the birth-rate is shrinking faster since the war than before it. A tentative remedy has indeed been applied: all persons employed by the State receive a subsistence allowance of 330 francs a year for each child under sixteen; if there are more than two children, the allowance is 480 francs for each child after the second. But even the higher rate, at present value, is scarcely equal to seven pounds, and to raise the birth-rate the subsidy must be universal and lavish. On the other hand, many able French thinkers hold that the strength of a State lies in increasing the quality, not the quantity, of its citizens. A system of education and of training, by which every man will be a picked man as compared with the general level of humanity, is their ideal; and it is probable that the French have already the most efficient population in Europe, whether for war or peace.

But in modern war a superiority of two to one is decisive when equipment and training are approximately equal, and France never loses the thought of having to face that. During the late war she found a resource on which few had reckoned—in her African levies. Their proved valour has converted what used to be the doctrine of a group into an accepted national policy. France is now inevitably committed to become a great African power. She holds more than half of the Mediterranean coast of Africa; and that France should make French citizens of her Arab subjects is quite possible: especially because the French are very much less impeded than the British have been, not only in Africa, but among the ancient civilisations of the East, by the sense of a colour bar. The great difficulty which France has to surmount is the rigidity of Mohammedanism in its resistance to the habits and discipline of Western Europe; on the other hand, Islam has proved an extraordinary capacity for introducing civilisation among the natives of Central Africa. If it creates a difficulty for those who would Europeanise, it has already also done much pioneer work in civilisation over regions which France now controls. For south of the Mediterranean belt lies the French Sudan, in great part inhabited by well-clad Mohammedan peoples, possessing a high degree of culture, skilful and industrious, and, moreover, at once capable of fighting and amenable to

discipline. France has made her own of most of these peoples. In her dominions she has stopped the perpetual slave-raiding, which for many centuries arrested development ; she has made the ways safe. Now, with her control of Morocco, she has gained a new and fertile country, no less fit than Algeria for her own colonists, and possessing a population like that of Algeria, which has in it many individuals almost of the Southern European type.

The extension of French power in Africa may well prove to be a phenomenon of even greater significance than the empire of Britain in India. It touches Europe more nearly ; it carries menace as well as hope. But whatever be the result, France, which before was tentatively embarked on it, is now tied to persist, because she solves in a measure her problem of man-power in war.

Those who value European civilisation will be anxious as to the result of any great change in French policy. But under repeated revolutions in the type of its government, and through incredibly frequent changes of administration, France has remained itself ; a country of contradictions ; stable in perpetual flux ; avid of new ideas, yet obstinately conservative of proven usage ; retaining the utmost provincial diversity under the most highly centralised machinery of government in Europe ; intensely proud of its capital, yet intensely jealous of it. Paris has less preponderant power in France than it had before the development of communications, but it is more apart than before from the rest of the country, owing to its increasing cosmopolitanism. Yet it remains French ; for it is France that makes Paris, not Paris that makes France. The essential France is France of the country and of the country towns, with its 1,800,000 peasant proprietors and 1,200,000 independent artisans and petty manufacturers and contractors who stand out against the collectivism of modern society, the excessive regimentation and excessive production which is the triumph of mechanical development ; yet who are, for all that, progressive. You may find a little farmhouse in a village of little farmhouses where the life and the house seem absolutely rude and primitive ; yet there is electric light in the cow-byre and an electric threshing-machine in the barn. And you may find the son of such a farmer passing easily into the Parisian world as an artist, an aviator, a scientist, a field-marshal, and bringing into it the power of endurance which comes from a peasant stock. The most characteristic expression of France is perhaps to be found in towns : it is an urban

civilisation like that of Rome; but, unlike the Roman, it has succeeded in avoiding divorce from the soil. French civilisation, more than any other civilisation in Europe, springs from the individual effort of French citizens on the whole body politic; its advantages, and the appreciation of them, are distributed more evenly on the whole body politic than in any other state. Culture has spread wider and struck deeper in France than elsewhere in Europe; and for that reason the welfare of Europe is bound up with the welfare of France.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES

- 800. Coronation of Charlemagne.
- 814. Death of Charlemagne.
- 843. Treaty of Verdun.
- 845. The Vikings sack Paris.
- 877. Death of Charles the Bald.
- 885. The great siege of Paris by the Northmen.
- 911 (or 921). The Treaty with the Northmen of Clair-sur-Este.
- 956. Death of Hugh the Great, Count of Paris.

The House of Capet, 987-1328

- 987. Accession of Hugh Capet to the French throne.
- 1000. Beginning of a great religious revival.

Henri I, 1031-1060

- 1054. Battle of Mortemer. Victory of William of Normandy
- 1056. Battle of Varaville. Victory of William of Normandy.

Philippe I, 1060-1103

- 1066. Conquest of England by William of Normandy.
- 1095. Council of Clermont. Beginning of the Crusades.

Louis VI, 1100-1137

Louis VII, 1137-1180

- 1147. Louis VII sets out on the Second Crusade. Suger left in charge of the kingdom.
- 1152. Louis divorces Eleanor of Aquitaine.

Philippe II (Auguste), 1180-1223

- 1190. Philippe sets out on the Third Crusade.
- 1204. Philippe conquers Normandy, Maine, Anjou.
- 1206. Philippe conquers Poitou.
- 1211-1213. Defeat of the Albigenses (Battle of Muret, Sept. 12, 1213).
- 1214. Battle of Bouvines, Philippe wins a decisive victory.

Louis VIII, 1223-1226

(Saint) Louis IX, 1226-1270

- 1226-1233. Blanche of Castile Regent.
- 1249. Louis is captured at Mansura.
- 1259. The Peace of Paris between Louis and Henry III.
- 1270. While on a Crusade Louis dies at Carthage.

Philippe III, 1270-1285

Philippe IV, 1285-1314

- 1299-1303. Struggle between Philippe IV and Boniface VIII.
- 1302. Meeting of the States-General; Defeat of Philippe by the Flemings at Courtrai.
- 1304. Philippe defeats the Flemings.
- 1305. Clement V at Avignon.
- 1312. Abolition of the Templars.

Louis X, 1314-1316

Philippe V, 1316-1322

- 1317. Adoption of the Salic Law.

Charles IV, 1322-1328

- 1324. Invasion of Guyenne.

The House of Valois, 1328-1589

Philippe VI (of Valois), 1328-1356

- 1336. Arrest of English merchants in Flanders.
- 1337. The Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) begins.
- 1346. French defeated in the Battle of Crécy (Aug. 26).
- 1347. The French lose Calais.

Jean, 1350-1364

- 1356. Battle of Poitiers (Sept. 19).
- 1358. Etienne Marcel organises a revolution in Paris.
- 1360. Peace of Calais (Oct. 28).

Charles V, 1364-1380

- 1369. War with England.
- 1370. The Massacre of Limoges.
- 1375. English naval defeat off La Rochelle.
- 1375-1377. Truce with England.
- 1381. Truce for six years with England.

Charles VI, 1380-1422

- 1382. Battle of Roosebeek.
- 1389. A thirty years' truce with England.
- 1392. Charles becomes insane.
- 1410. Civil war in France.
- 1412. Jean sans Peur, Duke of Burgundy, is supreme.
- 1415. Battle of Agincourt (Oct. 25).
- 1419. Murder of Jean, Duke of Burgundy.
- 1420. Treaty of Troyes (May).

Charles VII, 1422-1461

- 1423. French defeated at Cravant and Verneuil.
- 1429. Jeanne d'Arc raises the siege of Orléans.
- 1431. Execution of Jeanne d'Arc.
- 1435. Treaty of Arras between Burgundy and Charles VII.
- 1438. The Pragmatic Sanction drawn up at Bourges.
- 1439. A permanent tax and a Standing Army established by the States-General.
- 1439-1440. The Praguerie.
- 1453. End of Hundred Years' War.

Louis XI, 1461-1483

- 1465. The League of Public Weal.
- 1467. Accession of Charles the Bold to the Burgundian dominions.
- 1474. Charles the Bold plans the formation of a Middle Kingdom.
- 1475. Treaty of Pecquigny (August) between Louis XI and Edward IV.
- 1477. Death of Charles the Bold, whose daughter Mary marries Maximilian, son of the Emperor.

Charles VIII, 1483-1498

- 1483-1491. Regency of Anne of Beaujeu.
- 1491. Marriage of Charles VIII to Anne of Brittany.
- 1492. Treaty of Étaples with England.

- 1493. Treaty of Barcelona with Spain, and Treaty of Senlis with Maximilian.

The Beginning of Modern Times, and of the Italian Wars

- 1494. Invasion of Italy by Charles VIII.
- 1495. Entry of Charles into Naples (Feb.); Battle of Fornovo (July).

Louis XII, 1498-1515

- 1499-1500. Louis takes Milan.
- 1508. Louis joins the League of Cambrai.
- 1511-1513. War of the Holy League.

François I, 1515-1547

- 1515. Battle of Marignano.
- 1516. Concordat between François and Leo X.
- 1520. François meets Henry VIII at the Field of Cloth of Gold.
- 1521. Definite beginning of the Wars between France and Austria; French invasion of Navarre.
- 1525. Battle of Pavia (Feb.); François taken prisoner.
- 1528. The French receive from Suleiman trading privileges in Egypt.
- 1541-1544. Wars with Charles V, ending with the Peace of Crespy.

Henri II, 1547-1559

- 1547. Henri marries Catherine de' Medici.
- 1552. Henri gains Metz, Toul, Verdun and Cambrai.
- 1557. French Army defeated in Battle of St. Quentin (Aug.).
- 1558. Capture by French of Calais (Jan.); marriage of the Dauphin François to Mary Queen of Scots.
- 1559. Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (April 3).

François II, 1559-1560

- 1560. The Conspiracy of Amboise.

Charles IX, 1560-1574

- 1562. The Vassy Massacre: opening of the French Civil Wars.
- 1572. Massacre of St. Bartholomew (Aug. 24).

Henri III, 1574–1589

- 1580. Death of Anjou. Reorganisation of the League.
- 1585. Outbreak of the War of the three Henris.
- 1588. Murder of the Duke of Guise at Blois (Dec.).

*The Bourbon Kings, 1589–1793 and 1814–1830**Henri IV, 1584–1610*

- 1589. Henri IV defeats Mayenne at Arques (Sept.).
- 1590. Battle of Ivry.
- 1593. Henri IV adopts Roman Catholicism.
- 1598. The Edict of Nantes (April); the Peace of Vervins (May).
- 1610. Murder of Henri IV.

Louis XIII, 1610–1643

- 1614. Civil War; meeting of the States-General.
- 1618. The Thirty Years' War opens.
- 1624. Richelieu becomes Minister; marriage of Henrietta Maria to Prince Charles arranged.
- 1627. Huguenots revolt; siege of La Rochelle.
- 1635. France definitely enters the Thirty Years' War.
- 1638. Birth of the Dauphin (later Louis XIV).
- 1642. Death of Richelieu.

Louis XIV, 1643–1715

- 1643. Mazarin becomes First Minister.
- 1647. Treaty of Ulm with Bavaria (May).
- 1648. Defeat of Bavaria by Turenne at Zusmarshausen (May); insurrection of the Fronde and victory at Lens (Aug.); the Peace of Westphalia (Oct. 24) ends the Thirty Years' War.
- 1649. The Peace of Rueil (April) ends the First Fronde.
- 1650. Outbreak of Second Fronde.
- 1653. End of the Second Fronde.
- 1654. Coronation of Louis XIV.
- 1656. Pascal writes his "Provincial Letters."
- 1659. The Treaty of the Pyrenees (Nov. 7).
- 1660. Louis' marriage with the Infanta (June).
- 1661. Louis XIV rules; Colbert Chief Minister.

- 1667–1668. The Devolution War.
- 1668. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (May).
- 1670. Secret Treaty of Dover (June).
- 1672. Invasion of Holland (April–Aug.).
- 1674. At war with the Emperor, German Princes, and Spain.
- 1678. The Peace of Nimeguen (Nijmegen).
- 1679–1681. The Chambres de Réunion secure territory.
- 1681. Seizure of Strassburg by Louis XIV.
- 1685. Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
- 1688–1697. War of the League of Augsburg.
- 1697. The Peace of Ryswick (Rijswijk).
- 1698. The First Partition Treaty.
- 1700. The Second Partition Treaty (March); Louis accepts the will of Charles II of Spain (Nov. 16).
- 1701. French troops occupy the Barrier Towns (Feb.); Louis recognises the son of James II as King of England (Sept. 6).
- 1702. War declared against France and Spain by England, Holland and the Emperor (May 4).

The Spanish Succession War, 1702–1713

- 1704. Battle of Blenheim (Aug. 13).
- 1706. Battle of Ramillies (May 23).
- 1708. Battle of Oudenarde (June 30).
- 1709. Peace negotiations at The Hague (Feb.–May); battle of Malplaquet (Sept. 11).
- 1710. Destruction of Port Royal (monastery); Peace Congress at Gertruydenberg (Feb.–July).
- 1712. Philip renounces his claim to the French throne (July).
- 1713. Peace of Utrecht (April).
- 1714. Peace of Rastatt (March), and Peace of Baden (Sept.).
- 1715. Death of Louis XIV.

Louis XV, 1715–1774

- 1715. Orléans is appointed Regent.
- 1717. The Triple Alliance (France, England and Holland).
- 1718. Suppression of Councils formed in 1715.
- 1719. France at war with Spain till 1720.

1723. End of Regency; deaths of Dubois and Orléans; Bourbon First Minister (Dec.).
 1725. Marriage of Louis XV to Marie Leszczyńska.
 1726. Fleury First Minister.
 1729. Birth of the Dauphin (Sept.); Treaty of Seville (Nov.).
 1731-1732. Quarrel between the *Parlement* of Paris and the Crown.

The Polish Succession War,
 1733-1737

1733. Treaty of Turin (Sept.); War with Austria declared (Oct.); Treaty of the Escorial (Nov.).
 1737. Third Treaty of Vienna, France secures the reversion to Lorraine.

The War of the Austrian Succession,
 1741-1748

1743. Death of Fleury (Jan. 29); Battle of Dettingen; Second Family Compact with Spain (Oct.).
 1744. Declaration of war against England (March).
 1748. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.
 1752-1756. Struggle with the *Parlement* of Paris.
 1753. Duquesne occupies the Valley of the Ohio.
 1754. Recall of Duplex from India.
 1756. The First Treaty of Versailles (May).

The Seven Years' War, 1756-1763

1757. The Second Treaty of Versailles (May); Prussians defeat French and Austrians at Rossbach (Nov.).
 1758. Choiseul Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 1759. Death of Montcalm (Sept.); loss of Quebec.
 1760. Defeat at Wandewash (Jan.); surrender of Montreal.
 1761. Third Family Compact with Spain (Aug.).
 1762. Rousseau's *Contrat Social* published.
 1763. Peace of Paris (Feb. 10); ends the Seven Years' War.
 1767. Expulsion of the Jesuits.
 1769. Birth of Napoleon in Corsica.
 1770. Marriage of the Dauphin to Marie Antoinette (May); fall of Choiseul (Dec.).

1771. The Government of the Triumvirate; overthrow of the *Parlements*.
 1772. French support given to the revolution in Sweden.

Louis XVI, 1774-1793

1774. Maurepas First Minister; Turgot Controller-General; Vergennes Minister of Foreign Affairs; Recall of the *Parlement* (Aug.).
 1776. Dismissal of Turgot (May).
 1778. French Alliance with Americans (Feb.); war with England (March).
 1782. Treaty of Versailles (Sept.).

The French Revolution

1789. Meeting of the States-General (May 5); fall of the Bastille (July 14).
 1791. The flight to Varennes (June); dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (Sept. 30); meeting of the Legislative Assembly (Oct. 1).
 1792. Declaration of war against Austria (April 20); against Prussia (July 8); the fall of the Monarchy (Aug. 10); the September Massacres; victory at Valmy (Sept. 20); victory at Jemappes (Nov. 6); decrees of Nov. 19 and Dec. 15.
 1793. Execution of Louis XVI (Jan. 21); declaration of war on England and Holland (Feb. 1); and on Spain (March).
 1793. Overthrow of the Girondists (June 2); formation of the Great Committee of Public Safety (July).
 1794. Fall of Robespierre (July).
 1795. Treaties of Basle.

The Directory, 1795 (Nov.)-1799

1796. Bonaparte's successful Italian campaign.
 1797. Revolution of 18th Fructidor (Sept. 4); Treaty of Campo Formio (Oct.).
 1798. Expedition to Egypt; defeat of the fleet in the Battle of the Nile (Aug. 1).
 1799. War of the Second Coalition; the French lose Italy; revolution of the 18th Brumaire (Nov. 9).

The Consulate, 1799-1804

- 1800. Battles of Marengo (June 14) and Hohenlinden (Dec. 3).
- 1801. Treaty of Lunéville; failure of the Armed Neutrality; Concordat with the Pope (July); evacuation of Egypt.
- 1802. Peace of Amiens; Bonaparte becomes First Consul.
- 1803. Renewal of war with England (May 18).

The First Empire

- 1804. Napoleon Emperor of the French (Nov. 6), 1804-1814.
- 1805. Battles of Trafalgar (Oct. 21) and Austerlitz (Dec. 2); Treaty of Pressburg (Dec. 26).
- 1806. Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples; Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland; the Confederation of the Rhine (July 12); the Holy Roman Empire comes to an end (Aug. 6); battle of Jena (Oct. 14); the First Berlin Decrees (Nov. 21).
- 1807. Treaties of Tilsit (July); entry of Junot into Lisbon (Nov.); the Milan Decrees (Dec.).
- 1808. Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain; capitulation of Baylen (July 21); Conference in Erfurt (Oct.); Napoleon in Spain (Dec.-Jan.).
- 1809. Battle of Corunna (Jan. 16); War with Austria (April); Treaty of Vienna (Oct. 14).
- 1810. Napoleon marries Marie Louise of Austria (April); Alexander partially withdraws from Continental System (Dec. 31).
- 1812. The Moscow Expedition.
- 1813. The War of Liberation; Napoleon wins the battles of Lützen (May 2) and Bautzen (May 20); armistice of Pleswitz (June 4); French defeat at Vittoria (June 21); reopening of hostilities (Aug. 12); battle of Leipzig (Oct. 16-19); invasion of France by the Allies (Dec. 31).
- 1814. A series of battles (Feb., March); abdication of Napoleon (April 6).

Louis XVIII, 1814-1824

- 1814. Louis XVIII enters Paris (May 3); First Treaty of Paris (May 30).

- 1815. Napoleon lands in France; battle of Waterloo (June 18); abdication of Napoleon (June 22); is sent to St. Helena; Second Treaty of Paris (Nov. 20); the White Terror in the South of France.
- 1816-1818. Richelieu heads a Ministry.
- 1820. Assassination of the Duc de Berry; Richelieu again Prime Minister (Feb.).
- 1821. Death of Napoleon (May 5); Villèle, Prime Minister.
- 1822. Laws passed restraining freedom of Press.
- 1824. Death of Louis XVIII (Sept.).

Charles X, 1824-1830

- 1827. New elections go against the Government.
- 1828. Formation of the Martignac Ministry.
- 1829. Formation of the Polignac Ministry.
- 1830. The Revolution of "Three Days" (July 27, 28, 29).

Louis Philippe, 1830-1848

- 1830. Independence of Belgium recognised (Nov.).
- 1846. The Spanish marriages.
- 1848. Revolutionary outbreaks in Paris (Feb.); abdication of Louis Philippe (Feb. 24).

The Republic of 1848

- 1848. Revolutionary outbreaks in Paris suppressed (June); Louis Napoleon President of the Republic (Dec.).
- 1851. Napoleon carries out a *coup d'état* (Dec. 1-2).
- 1852. Napoleon proclaimed Emperor (Dec. 2).

Napoleon III, 1852-1870

- 1853. Napoleon marries Donna Eugenia de Montijo.
- 1854. France enters the Crimean War (March).
- 1856. The Peace of Paris (March).
- 1858. Orsini attempts the life of Napoleon (June 16); meeting of Napoleon and Cavour at Plombières (July).
- 1859. War with Austria (May); Treaty of Villafranca (July).

1860. France secures Savoy and Nice (May).
 1861. Expedition to Mexico.
 1863. Napoleon demonstrates in favour of Poland.
 1865. Meeting of Napoleon and Bismarck at Biarritz (Sept.).
 1866-1867. French troops withdrawn from Mexico.
 1867. Napoleon fails to obtain Luxembourg; French troops defeat Garibaldi at Mentana (Nov. 3).
 1870. France declares war upon Prussia (July 19); catastrophe of Sedan (Sept. 2); Napoleon capitulates.

The Third Republic, 1870-1922

- 1870-1871. Siege of Paris.
 1871. The Commune (March); Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10); Thiers President of the Republic (Aug. 31 to May 24, 1873).
 1872. Military Law; five years' service; Thiers pronounces for a Republic (Nov. 13); appointment of Committee of Thirty (Nov. 29); reconstruction of the Ministry (Nov. 30).
 1873. Fall of Thiers (May 24); MacMahon President of the Republic; First Ministry of de Broglie (May 25); final German evacuation of French territory (Sept. 5); trial of Bazaine (Oct. 6-Dec. 6); the Septennate Law (Nov. 20).
 1874. The Mayors Law (Jan. 30); Treaty with Annam (Mar. 15); fall of de Broglie (May 16); de Cissey Ministry (May 24).
 1875. Constitutional Legislation (Jan. to Nov.); the "Wallon Motion" carried (Jan. 30); the Constitution voted (Feb. 25); resignation of de Cissey (Feb. 26); Buffet Ministry (Mar. 10); Higher Education Law (July 12); dissolution of the Assembly (Dec. 31).
 1876. First Dufaure Ministry (Mar. 10); Ministry of Jules Simon (Dec. 12).
 1877. Period of Congo Exploration; Constitutional Crisis ("*Seize Mai*") (May 16); Second Ministry of de Broglie (May 17); Berlin Congress (June 13); Ministry of Roche-
 bouët (Nov. 23); Second Ministry of Dufaure (Dec. 15).
 1878. International Exhibition at Paris; Treaty of San Stefano (Mar. 3); Congress of Berlin (June 13).
 1879. Resignation of MacMahon; Jules Grévy, President of the Republic (Jan. 30); Ministry of Waddington (Feb. 4); death of the Prince Imperial in Zululand (June 1); First Ministry of de Freycinet (Dec. 28); Jules Ferry at Ministry of Public Instruction (Dec. 28).
 1880. Education decrees of Ferry; First Ministry of Jules Ferry (Sept. 23).
 1881. Further educational legislation; Treaty of the Bardo (Tunis) (May 12); law establishing right of Public Meeting (June 30); capture of Qairwan (Oct. 28); Ministry of Gambetta ("*Le Grand Ministère*") (Nov. 14).
 1882. Second Ministry of de Freycinet (Jan. 30); primary education made compulsory (Mar. 28); the Triple Alliance (May 28); Ministry of Duclerc (Aug. 7); death of Gambetta (Dec. 31).
 1883. Consolidation of French West African dominions (Jan. 10); Second Ministry of Jules Ferry (Feb. 21); French Protectorate in Tunisia established (June 8); Treaty with Annam (Aug. 25).
 1884. Admiral Courbet's successes in the Far East (Aug.).
 1885. Final Act of Berlin Conference (Feb.); French reverse at Langson (Tongking) (Mar. 29); Ministry of Brisson (April 6); *Scrutin de liste* introduced (June 8); Treaty of Tientsin (June 9); General Elections (Oct.).
 1885-1887. Explorations of Binger in West Africa.
 1886. Third Ministry of de Freycinet (Jan. 7); rise of Boulanger; Ministry of Goblet (Dec. 11).
 1887. The Schnabele Affair (April); Ministry of Rouvier (May 30); resignation of Grévy: Carnot

- President of the Republic (Dec. 3); First Ministry of Tirard (Dec. 12).
1888. Ministry of Floquet (April 3).
1889. *Scrutin d'arrondissement* reimposed (Feb. 11); Second Ministry of Tirard (Feb. 22); flight of Boulanger (April 1); International Exhibition at Paris (April 1); Military Law: Three Years' Service (July 18); condemnation of Boulanger (Aug. 14); General Election (Sept.-Oct.).
1890. Fourth Ministry of de Freycinet (Mar. 17); Monteil's march through Africa (1890-2); Social Legislation; Treaty with England as to Africa (Aug. 5); Treaty with Dahomey (Oct. 3).
1891. French squadron visits Kronstadt (July); Franco-Russian Treaty (Aug. 27).
1892. Dodds' expedition in Dahomey; the Panama scandals; Ministry of Loubet (Feb. 27); Ministry of Ribot (Dec. 6); Treaty with Liberia (Dec. 8).
1893. Dahomey constituted a colony (Mar.); First Ministry of Dupuy (April 6); Treaty with Britain as to Gold and Ivory Coasts (July 12); Anglo-French Treaty as to Indo-China (July 31); Treaty with Siam (Oct. 3); Ministry of Casimir-Perier (Dec. 2); military Treaty with Russia (Dec. 27).
- 1893-1894. Anarchist outbreaks.
1894. Expedition of Bonnier and Joffre to Timbuktu; Franco-German agreement as to frontier of the Cameroons (May 15); Second Ministry of Dupuy (May 29); assassination of Carnot; Casimir-Perier President of the Republic (June 25); condemnation of Dreyfus (Dec.).
1895. Resignation of Casimir-Perier (Jan. 15); Faure President of the Republic; Ministry of Ribot; Ministry of Léon Bourgeois (Nov.).
1896. Anglo-French Agreement as to Nigeria and Indo-China (Jan. 15); Ministry of Méline (April 29); annexation of Madagascar (May 30); visit of the Tsar to Paris (Oct.).
1897. The Dreyfus struggle; Treaty with Germany as to Togo (July 23); visit of President Faure to Kronstadt (Aug.).
1898. Trial of Esterhazy (Jan.); France obtains concessions in China (April 10); Treaty with England as to Gold Coast and Nigeria (June 14); Ministry of Brisson, Delcassé at Foreign Office (June 15); orders for rehearing the Dreyfus case (Aug.); Second Ministry of Dupuy (Nov. 1); withdrawal of Marchand from Fashoda (Nov. 4).
1899. Death of Faure (Feb. 16); Loubet President of the Republic (Feb. 16); Ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau (June 22); Second trial of Dreyfus (Aug.); consolidation of West African Colonies (Oct. 17).
1900. Dreyfus pardoned (June 13); Franco-Spanish agreement as to Rio d'Oro and Rio Muni (June 27); Workshops Act (Dec. 29).
1901. Labour Councils established (Jan. 2); Moroccan Agreement (June 1); Law of Separation (July 1); visit of the Tsar to France (Sept.).
1902. Ministry of Combes (June 31).
1903. Religious Associations dissolved (Mar. 1); visit of Edward VII to Paris (May 1); dissolution of teaching orders (July 5); Franco-British Arbitration Treaty (Oct.).
1904. Visit of President Loubet to Rome (April); recall of French Ambassador to the Vatican (May 21); Franco-Spanish Agreement (Oct.).
1905. Ministry of Rouvier (Jan. 21); visit of the German Emperor to Tangier (Mar.); the André Military Law (Mar. 17); resignation of Delcassé (June 5); agreement with Germany (July 8); Law of Separation (Dec. 9).
1906. Conference of Algeciras (Jan. 16); Fallières President of the Republic (Feb. 18); Ministry of Sarrien (Mar. 7); final Act of Algeciras (April 7);

- Cour de Cassation quashes verdict of Dreyfus Court-martial; Dreyfus and Picquart reinstated (July 12); Treaty with England as to Siam (Oct. 20); Ministry of Clémenceau (Oct. 25).
1907. Franco-Japanese Treaty (June 10).
1908. Franco-German Agreement as to the Cameroons (April).
1909. Guarantee of independence and integrity of Morocco (Feb. 6); Ministry of Briand (July 25).
1911. Ministry of Monis (Feb. 27); French Expedition despatched to Fez (May 21); Ministry of Caillaux (June); The Agadir Crisis (July 1); Franco-German Treaty as to Morocco and the Cameroons (Nov. 4).
1912. Ministry of Poincaré (Jan. 13); Sultan of Morocco accepts French Protectorate (Mar. 12); visit of Poincaré to Russia (Aug.).
1913. Poincaré President of the Republic (Jan. 18); Ministry of Briand (Jan. 21); Ministry of Barthou (Mar. 20); Three Years' Service Law (July 9); Ministry of Doumergue (Dec. 2).
1914. Ministry of Ribot (June 9); Ministry of Viviani (June 12); visit of Poincaré and Viviani to Russia (July 17-29); Diplomatic negotiations *re* war (July 24-31); French mobilisation ordered (Aug. 1); German troops enter France (Aug. 2); Germany declares War (Aug. 3); retreat from Sambre-Meuse line begins (Aug. 23); Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6-10); of the Aisne (Sept. 14-28); of Albert (Sept. 25-29); Arras (Oct. 1, 2); Flanders (Oct. 12 to Nov. 20).
1915. Second battle of Ypres (April 22 to May 24); Dardanelles (April 9 to Dec.); expedition to Macedonia (Sept. 21-Dec.); Allies attack in Champagne and Artois (Sept. 25-Oct.).
1916. Violent German attack on Verdun (Feb. 21-Aug.); Allied attack on the Somme (July 1-Nov. 19); Ministry of Briand (Dec. 11).
1917. Second battle of the Aisne: French failure (April 16, etc.); Allied attack in Flanders (July 31-Dec.); Treason troubles (Sept.); Ministry of Clémenceau (Nov. 15).
1918. Great German offensive (Mar. 21-April 29); *Bonnet Rouge* trial (April 29-May 25); third battle of the Aisne (May 27-June 2); Germans reach the Marne (May 30), and are driven back (June); second battle of the Marne (July 15-Aug. 4); second battle of Amiens (Aug. 8-12); general Allied advance (Aug. to Nov.); armistice (Nov. 11).
1919. Peace Conference sits (Jan. 18-June 28); Peace Treaty signed (June 28); ratified by President (Oct. 13).
1920. Deschanel elected President (Jan. 17); Clémenceau retires, succeeded by Millerand (Jan.); Deschanel retires, Millerand President (Sept. 23); Ministry of Leygues.
1921. Ministry of Briand (Jan.); troubles with Allies over German reparations (summer and autumn); Washington Conference (Nov.).
1922. Conferences at Cannes (Jan.) and Genoa (April-May); Ministry of Poincaré; troubles in Near and Middle East (autumn).

II. ECONOMICS

THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF FRANCE

INTRODUCTORY

IN estimating the resources* and economic situation of France it is necessary above all things to clear one's mind of the tendency to compare together two nations, so close in a geographical, and yet so wide apart in an economic, sense as are France and Great Britain. France is, broadly, a self-supporting country: Great Britain is dependent, above all things in the matter of food, on her merchant navy and the high seas; France is in the main agricultural, Great Britain industrial; France exports little but "luxuries," Great Britain's foreign trade-exports consist (with the exception of coal) almost entirely of manufactured goods; whilst, as regards the import of raw material, France absorbs it for her own consumption, whilst Great Britain very largely manufactures it into goods and exports it again abroad. Foreign trade, therefore, on the whole, means much less to France than it does to us; and she is much less concerned with the movements of commerce overseas than she is with her own internal production and consumption.

RESOURCES IN GENERAL

When we come to examine the resources of France, we find that her economic power depends above all on agriculture, which before the war had succeeded in supplying the bulk of the food-stuffs required within the country, in producing the raw materials for important branches of manufacture, and in exporting products the fine quality of which was due to the excellence of the climate and the attention devoted to them by the growers.

Under this heading is included the great production of wine—in which France occupies so pre-eminent a position—and of beet-sugar;

* NOTE:—[In the following pages many of the larger amounts have been reduced to the English equivalent. It must be remembered that:

1 million francs = normally £40,000.

1 milliard francs = normally £40,000,000.

1 kilogramme = 2.205 lb.

1 quintal métrique (100 kilos) = 220.5 lb.; i.e. about 10 quintaux (= 1,000 kilos) go to the English ton.

1 litre = 0.88 quart; 1 hectolitre = (about) 22 gallons or 2½ bushels.

8 kilometres = (about) 5 miles.

1 hectare = (about) 2½ acres.]

whilst forests, vegetables, flowers, cattle, leather and silk, as well as fisheries, all add a not unimportant quota to the wealth of the country.

The next most important source of production is that of the mines and quarries, which furnish large quantities of coal, stone and iron, in addition to a few other metals, such as zinc and aluminium; and in the exploitation and working of these must be reckoned the valuable water-power of the country, which is being rapidly developed.

The chief industries include the construction of machinery, iron and steel goods, motor-cars, chemicals and textiles on a large scale; whilst the manufacture of numerous other articles on a scientific and artistic basis gives employment to many thousands of hands and forms a large proportion of the goods exported from the country.

Nor must we forget the first-rate system of French roads, which may be termed the best and most compact one in the world: the railways, mostly run by the State, the navigable waterways, the ports and the mercantile marine—all of which, in addition to the air service, guarantee the rapid communications necessary to the development of a great country.

DAMAGE DONE BY THE WAR

The land of France has undoubtedly suffered very seriously from the war. That part of French territory which was the best cultivated and the richest in mines and factories became the main battle-field of the world, and owing to this fact has been subject to devastations the cost of which may be estimated at more than 4,000 million £. Hundreds of villages have been swept out of existence, many of the towns in the war-zone have been irretrievably damaged, the ground mangled and the woods and orchards levelled by the hurricanes of artillery bombardment; the countryside has been filled with miles of tangled and rusty barbed wire, with unexploded shells, iron and wooden débris, the ruins of trenches, and in short the terrible lumber of a battle-field which has been the scene of a murderous conflict lasting for more than four years. Mines have been blown in and destroyed, their valuable machinery wrecked or carried away, whole mining-villages razed to the ground and all the complicated mechanism of industrial districts, factories, communications, everything, ruthlessly destroyed.

But it must not be forgotten that, whilst France has suffered intensely as regards her agriculture, industries and mines in a portion of her richest territory, the war-zone itself extends over but a very small proportion of the whole country. The rich wine-growing districts of the east, south and south-west, the silks of the Rhône valley, the cider and vegetables of Normandy and Brittany, the corn-fields of the Loire, the great ports of Marseille, Toulon, Saint Nazaire, Bordeaux and the rest, the fisheries of the three seas, as well as the normal agricultural production of the remainder of the country—all

these were mainly affected by the war only in so far as the dislocation of trade and man-power was concerned. No great towns or centres of industry have been destroyed, with the exception of the above-ground works of the coalfields of the north-east: and these are rapidly reviving—for the coal is still there. Some fourteen-fifteenths of France are still untouched, and responding to the energy and industry of their inhabitants; whilst the "devastated regions" are being brought into order again, rebuilt, repopulated and re-created with a speed that is truly marvellous and representative of all that is best in the French character.¹

Whilst, therefore, France is inclined to point pityingly to her recent severe wounds and to claim the sympathy of the entire world for her heavy losses in the war, while pleading poverty among the nations of Europe, we see that the wonderful recuperative power of her people is rapidly bringing her back to a state of comparative prosperity. The finances of her Government—as will be explained in the next chapter—are, it is true, in an unstable condition, and her exchange is, at the moment of writing, in a parlous state: but the wealth of the country is still there; the people are individually well off; taxes are light; there is practically no unemployment; and as long as the peasant and the artisan continue their characteristic habits of thrift, and lay by in their stockings every sou that can be spared, there need be no anxiety about the economic future of the country.

We will now consider the production in somewhat greater detail.

(a) AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

In the schedule of National Revenue drawn up in 1912 agriculture took the first place, with landed property estimated at 3,200 million £. For the development of this property the owners had at their disposal working capital to the amount of 800 million £. The annual value of the raw produce was estimated at 800 million £; that is, 560 million for vegetable and 240 million for animal produce.

Cereals formed the most important crop, with a yield of nearly 160 million £; then came the fodder crops, 132 million £; wine, 48 million £; potatoes, 40 million £. This mass of produce was almost entirely devoted to national consumption, since exports scarcely reached a total of 40 million £. As regards at least the

¹ [Recent figures from the French Ministry of Finance show that, whatever be the state of the Treasury, the people are not by any means suffering from a want of money. Even when taking into account the high wholesale-price index-number (345 for France), the wealth per inhabitant comes to well over 6,500 francs, only about 5 per cent. less than that of the average Englishman—whilst over 3,000 Frenchmen are the possessors of 15 million francs or more. Comparative figures may perhaps be misleading, but it may be of value all the same to point out that whilst the British National Debt has since the war been multiplied by six, that of France has been not quite trebled; and that whilst the taxation in England (corrected by index values) comes to £12 per head, in France it is not quite £5½.—ED.]

essential products France had very nearly realised the ideal of a protectionist policy—to be self-supporting; for purposes of exportation she reserved her more delicate products, “vintage” wines, brandies, fruits and early vegetables.

The material damages to agriculture in the invaded regions have been estimated by M. Louis Dubois, President of the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission, at 800 million £, but far more important are the injuries inflicted upon the agricultural production of the whole of France by the consequences of a war extending over more than four years. Owing to the shortage of both labour and manure, the soil itself has suffered and can only recover its vitality as the result of strenuous exertions. Out of eight million men mobilised in succession, the rural classes supplied five million soldiers, and it may be said that they have to deplore the loss of one-fifth of this number. For more than four years the laborious task of the cultivation of the land has been in the hands of old men, women and children. The land, formerly fertilised annually by three million tons of chemical manure, has during this period had no more than two hundred and fifty thousand tons. Not only was the soil impoverished, but millions of hectares remained uncultivated. In 1918 the number of acres of arable land under tillage amounted to just over 52 millions, as against 59 millions in 1913. On the other hand the area of moorland and uncultivated land increased from 9½ million to nearly 14 million acres.

The lamentable state of affairs brought about by the war is made clear by statistics which show at the same time a considerable deficit in production, a serious increase in imports and an alarming decrease in exports.

Below we give a table showing the fall in production within a period of five years :

PRODUCTION

—	1913.	1918.
	Tons.	Tons.
Wheat	8,691,905	6,143,584
Rye	1,271,475	734,986
Oats	5,182,601	2,561,976
Barley	1,043,760	598,200
Maize	543,075	247,907
Potatoes	13,585,961	6,519,722
Sugar-beets	5,939,335	1,142,412
Beets for distilling	2,050,145	341,764
Flax	21,971	6,854
	Gallons.	Gallons.
Alcohol	64,985,976	18,298,676

In order to cover this enormous deficit France has been obliged to a great extent to have recourse to foreign countries, and to depreciate her exchange. As regards the mass of food-stuffs from 1912

to 1919, imports increased in amount from 46 to 70 million quintals, and in value from 1,817,579,000 to 8,629,461,000 francs.

Whilst imports were increased in value more than fourfold, exports were reduced by half. From 1913 to 1918 the export of food-stuffs fell from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ million tons, and in value from 838 million to 419 million francs.

Thus much for the appalling effects of the war. But the recuperation was equally marvellous: for the exports of food-stuffs in 1919 amounted already to 1,200 millions of francs, and by 1921 had more than doubled themselves in material, though, owing to the fall in prices, not in value.

As will be seen by the above table, *wheat* forms the most important cereal produced. By means of protective measures (customs barriers) against wheat obtained at a low price from the virgin soil of America, and by the increase of home production, the country has been enabled more and more to increase the supply of its own requirements without having recourse to foreign lands. This economic independence was almost realised upon the eve of war; for at that period, with an average annual production of nearly 9 million tons, the country consumed barely a quarter of a million tons more. The average yield came to nearly 14 quintals per hectare (20 bushels per acre); but although this amount compares unfavourably with Germany (20 quintals) or Denmark (30), some departments, such as the Oise (24) and Seine-et-Marne (20), produced much more. Though the price of bread rose during the war from 2d. to 6½d. per lb., production was largely increased immediately afterwards, and by 1922 it was practically equal to the pre-war figure. Wheat-growing has regained its position as a leading branch of national agriculture, and with a yield increased by modern methods of cultivation it may be enabled not only to provide for all home requirements but also to contribute to the supply of the neighbouring great industrial States.

Rye has for some time steadily been giving way to wheat, and the production is now not sufficient for home consumption; formerly Germany and Russia used to supply the deficit. *Oats* and *barley* are rapidly recovering their former importance, but *maize*, *buckwheat* and *millet* are falling off in production and are likely to be replaced by more valuable crops.

Before the war *potatoes* were grown annually to the extent of 13 million tons (about 3½ tons per acre); and the present production is rapidly reaching that figure. As regards *vegetables* and *fruits* Brittany specialises in the former for export, and Provence and Roussillon in the latter, between 20,000 and 24,000 tons of each being despatched in the year to England alone. Provence also cultivates *flowers* to an amazing extent, a large proportion being absorbed in the manufacture of scents; before the war the value amounted annually to about a million £, and it has now again almost attained that figure.

The *forests* of France are, however, not so flourishing as before the war. Nearly one-fifth of the country was then under timber, but well over a million acres of it were destroyed in the war, and the urgent necessity for building houses, etc., has caused an immense amount of felling—which it will take some time to replace. Meanwhile the colonies of West Africa and French Congo are supplying valuable material in the shape of woods of all kinds—notably for the manufacture of railway-sleepers.

Sugar-beet lost heavily in the war. Owing to modern methods of extraction the quantity of sugar obtained from the roots rose to 12 per cent. in the years before 1914; but unfortunately the departments chiefly concerned with this crop: the Aisne 14 million quintals, the Pas de Calais 11 millions, the Somme 10 millions, the Oise 6 millions—that is, 41 out of 60—suffered most severely from the continuous fighting which laid waste the soil for four years. Thus this crop, which makes great demands upon both labour and manure, will be slow in recovering its former prosperity, though it reached 24 million quintals in 1920. Sugar-beet for distillery, being localised about the same regions, also suffered severely. *Flax*, *hemp* and *hops* are decreasing in extent; but *tobacco*, grown chiefly in the Dordogne, Lot-et-Garonne and Gironde, is doing well, with an output of some 18,000 tons a year.

With her temperate climate in the north, and ranging through warmer latitudes to the sun-blessed lands in the south, France is *par excellence* the country for the production of wines, spirits and alcohols of every degree. The orchards of Normandy and Brittany vary considerably in the production of *cider* according to the apple harvest and are controlled to a surprising extent in their output by the weather: e.g. they produced nearly 30 million hectolitres in 1917 and only 1½ millions in the following year; but whatever the harvest, the cider is consumed in the country, and practically none is exported. *Wine*, on the other hand, from the northerly fields of Champagne and Burgundy to the rich southern lands of the Bordelais, Garonne, Aude, and Provence, forms the normal drink of the country and is, besides, exported abroad in huge quantities. In 1875 the output from 6¼ million acres was at its greatest, amounting to over 83 million hectolitres (1,800 million gallons); but the crisis caused by the phylloxera in the last twenty years of the last century was a terrible blow to the cultivation of the vine. Thanks, however, to the labour of scientists and the energy of the growers, this particular branch of agriculture was largely reconstituted, and by 1913 the production had again risen to about 53 million hectolitres, culled from 4¼ million acres. The present produce (1,300 million gallons) amounts to about the pre-war figure, whilst the value of wine exported in 1920 reached to over 531 million francs (28 million gallons), of which Great Britain was the consumer of a large proportion. Since, however, the North American and Russian markets are now practically closed to French wines, it is not likely that the export will increase to any

extent. *Brandies*, of which England, consuming 260,000 gallons a year, is France's best customer, are chiefly produced in the Cognac and Gers districts of Charente ; whilst *liqueurs* have a large sale, and *alcohol* and other spirits are distilled from beetroot, molasses and wine-lees in Burgundy and the north-easterly departments of the Nord, Pas de Calais and Somme ; these are also the regions where *beer* is chiefly produced.

Under the heading of agriculture, too, comes the question of *live-stock* and their products. 1913 was the highwater-mark of the breeding industry, with about 15 million cattle and 16 million sheep in the country ; but the war played havoc with the numbers, and in 1922 the herds were still very sensibly decreased, whilst the increase of meat-eating among the working-classes and peasantry had caused a large rise in the import of fresh and frozen meat. France is also a large producer of *butter* and *cheese*, much of the latter commodity being exported ; but the Southerners appear to be changing their tastes, and consume large quantities of butter in place of the previous oils and fats, with the result that little butter now leaves the country.

As regards food industries, though there are some 20,000 small water- or wind-mills dotted about the land, most of the *flour* supply comes from the big cylinder-mills of Marseille, Meaux and Corbeil, whilst the *biscuit* industry is in the hands of a dozen or so firms in Paris, Nantes, Bordeaux, Dijon and Nîmes. *Sugar*, *chocolate*, *jam*, *Italian pastes* and *confectionery* are recovering their pre-war position in production and export, whilst the *olive-oil* and *tinned foods* industries have never been seriously threatened. The latter include large quantities of sardines and other fish, whilst the valuable *fisheries* include not only cod from Iceland and Newfoundland, but herrings and mackerel from the Channel, sardines and tunny from Brittany and the Mediterranean ports, and other fish and oysters to the amount of some 70 millions of francs.

THE EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY

In spite of the grievous toll levied by the war upon the rural population and the temporary decrease in the fertility of the soil during the period of hostilities, French agriculture has passed triumphantly through the prolonged and formidable crisis in which its energies have been strengthened. It was possessed of latent forces which enabled it to emerge victorious from this trial and to encounter successfully the economic contests following upon those of warfare. Doubtless these forces consisted, first of all, in the fecundity of the women and the labour of the men, but their full value is developed only as a result of the system of ownership : the productivity of the land increases in proportion to the free and individual tenure of the soil.

Whilst in industry we note a progressive concentration, and find the artisan transferred to the factory and so dispossessed of the

instruments of his labour, French agriculture is subject to special laws: property of moderate superficial area, sufficient to ensure a rational system of cultivation, develops to the prejudice of the large or the very small farm. Moreover the owner and the cultivator or worker on the soil are gradually ceasing to be two distinct persons; the worker on the land becomes its owner. Thus is formed a peasant democracy, economically independent, and a powerful factor in favour of social stability. In Europe, thrown out of balance as it is by the abnormal increase of the industrial proletariat, agricultural France forms the rampart behind which traditional civilisation will continue its beneficent course of evolution and progress.

In contrast to the mass of workers concentrated in the towns of Belgium, England and Germany, nearly 60 per cent. of the population of France are passionately attached to the soil, from which they derive, in addition to their food, their physical and moral strength. Amongst this rural class, which includes 23 million men, the preponderating section is that of land-owners who cultivate their own property. Eighteen million hectares (45 million acres) are worked by 5 million heads of families. In 1913 there were still 350,000 *métayers*¹ cultivating 3,500,000 hectares and 1 million farmers developing 12 million hectares. The next census will certainly show the results of a peaceful revolution, comparable to that of 1789-99, which created 500,000 new buildings taken from the property of the nobility and clergy; at the present time we may certainly state that several hundreds of thousands of farmers and *métayers* have become owners.

During the course of the war the position of the cultivator of the soil was strengthened and improved at the expense of the owner. The enormous increase in the value of agricultural produce not only cleared from debt the holdings burdened with mortgages, but was also the cause of a very great number of transactions in connection with landed property, tending to establish the independence of holdings which had been subject to the payment of ground-rent to the owner of the soil.

This redistribution of landed property has specially strengthened the class of owners whose property is of moderate extent, since it has worked to the prejudice of large estates worked by farmers, and the very small holder had not at his disposal the capital required for purchase. Already between 1890 and 1910 large holdings had decreased by 2,309,144 hectares, to the advantage of those of medium and small extent. As regards the last, the equal division of inherited land had led to excessive subdivision or rural holdings, the disadvantages of which will be obviated by a system of regrouping facilitated by law.

The number of rural workers, whether resident or day-labourers, living upon the sale of their labour was gradually diminishing: 3,500,000 in 1880, 3 million in 1900. The war will have hastened

¹ Small farmers, working on the system of dividing profits with their labourers.

the disappearance of the wage-earner. The intermittent nature of rural labour, dependent upon season and climate, will allow of the movement of large numbers of workers, organised by the Agricultural Labour Office.

Thus the peasant proprietor, living by and upon his land, has emerged victorious from the greatest storm in history; and whilst he was risking his life to win the war, the labour of his family, who remained upon the land that he was defending, prepared for him the means of equal success in time of peace. He is in a fair way to gain his independence; but, dominated by the conditions of international markets, which have forced agriculturists to adopt industrial and commercial methods, he will have to give up his plan of isolated work, form syndicates and co-operative societies, and replace small and scattered efforts by a co-ordinated and methodical system, which will yield tenfold results. He will not fully realise his hereditary ideal of being his own master unless he makes use of the independence so dearly bought, for the purpose of taking part deliberately in the complex system founded upon community of interests, both national and international.

(b) INDUSTRY

Before the war French manufactured goods were heavily handicapped in appearing on the world-market—for the average cost of coal in France was some 40 per cent. more than in England, and 20 per cent. more than in Germany. It is too soon to gauge the effect that the French occupation of the Ruhr and of the Saar coal-fields will have on the augmentation of her industry: but meanwhile attention may be called to the development of her *water-power* and her increasing use of *liquid fuels*.

Regarding the former, France has fortunately the best supply in Europe of waterfalls available for industrial purposes. Her water-power is estimated at 8 million h.p., half of which comes from the Alps and the other half from the Pyrenees and the central mountain-ranges. By the end of the war nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ million h.p. were in operation, and 2 million more are shortly expected to be available. This motive-power corresponds to a saving of some 10 million tons of coal, and is devoted mainly to the transmission of power, lighting and the electrification of railways. As regards liquid fuel, the adoption of internal-combustion engines on a large scale has very greatly increased the consumption of petroleum and petrol: this indeed was quadrupled between 1913 and 1919, and it is still increasing (nearly 300 million gallons imported in 1920, worth 540 million francs). The national carburant of France is, however, alcohol; and it is expected that within a short period this will to a great extent be substituted for petrol.

Coal

Before the war France produced only about 40 million tons annually to meet her consumption of 62 millions—the difference coming from England (12 millions), Germany and Belgium. Nearly three-quarters of the French coal came from the mines of the Nord and the Pas de Calais ; and with most of these in possession of the enemy the supply fell to an alarming extent. England kept up a supply of 18 millions during the war, and the local production was by strenuous efforts brought up to 29 millions in the last year ; but the systematic destruction carried out by the Germans has ruined the Northern fields to such an extent that it will be another ten years before they can produce as before. Meanwhile the contribution from the Saar is not likely to exceed $9\frac{1}{2}$ millions a year. The coal industry is therefore passing through a difficult period, and is not much relieved by the import of only some $15\frac{1}{2}$ millions (of which only $6\frac{1}{2}$ from England and 6 from Germany in 1921) from abroad, and by French efforts to develop inferior beds of coal, lignite and peat within the country. Much is of course expected from the occupation of the Ruhr : but it is too soon to prophesy, and statistics are not yet available.

Metals

It was only at the beginning of this century that France began to develop her iron. After the United States with 62 million tons and Germany with 27 millions, France with 22 million tons stood third in 1913 amongst the principal countries producing *iron ore*. The Treaty of Versailles, by transferring to France the 21 million tons obtained from the annexed district of Lorraine, gave her the first place in Europe.

When the situation has become normal France will produce 43 million tons, without taking into account the mining districts of Normandy and Anjou, which are capable of extensive development. As her consumption will scarcely exceed 25 millions, this will leave a surplus of 18 million tons, which will easily be taken up by Germany and England. But the advantages resulting from the Peace Treaty will only gradually become effective : for the moment, France is still engaged in repairing the ravages of war.

Nine-tenths of the ore was produced from the district of Briey, in the invaded area ; and consequently during the war very little indeed was forthcoming. Even now Briey, though recovering, only yields $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons ; but the reannexed district of Lorraine supplies over 7 millions, and the remainder of France makes up the production to over 14, whilst a third of that amount is, in addition, imported from abroad.

The production of *cast iron* rose rapidly in the first decade of this century, its main centre being of course the department of Meurthe et Moselle. But at no time did it reach a supply equal to the

demand, and barely $3\frac{1}{2}$ million tons are now produced, more than half of which comes from the Saar. Electric furnaces are now being employed in the process. On the other hand, the supply of *steel* before the war (over 5 millions in 1913) exceeded the demand ; two-thirds were obtained by the Thomas process, used especially in the east and north, whilst the Martin process, used especially in the centre, provided the remainder. Owing to the enemy's devastations only 3 millions are now produced, over a third of which comes from the Saar.

For *copper* and *lead* France looks to the United States and North Africa respectively, whilst *tin* she imports from Bolivia, Great Britain and Indo-China. Of *zinc* she produces a little, and is chiefly supplied by her colonies of Tongking, Tunisia and Algeria. But with *aluminium*, or rather bauxite (the ore) she is well furnished, and before the war produced 310,000 tons, almost all of which was found in the southerly department of the Var. The war, however, changed the position of France as the main source of the world-supply of this metal, and the progress made by the United States, Canada and Norway has for the moment left her in the rear. In the same way, though her distant colony of New Caledonia produced immense stores of *nickel* ore before the war, she has fallen far behindhand in the supply of this metal. As regards *antimony*, she is, next to China, the greatest producer of the ore—chiefly from La Vendée and the Haute Loire ; but the demand for the metal is not very great, and though capable of producing perhaps 15,000 tons a year, she exports but little.

Mechanical Construction

Before the war mechanical construction, on the whole, showed that national production was in general very inadequate. But the war, involving the installation of an enormous amount of plant, marked the opening of a new era of endeavour. The adaptation to ordinary manufactures, however, of appliances suitable to the purposes of war is not accomplished without great difficulties, and France has not yet surmounted all of them. Raw materials are expensive and not always to be had, and industry has not yet emerged from the difficult period of transition and reorganisation.

Every confidence may be felt in the prospects ; but for the time being the increase of imports makes it clear that the crisis of adaptation has not yet come to an end. The imports of every kind of machinery, for example, including *locomotives*, *agricultural implements*, metal work of all sorts, *sheet iron*, etc., amounted in 1919 to over five times the value of similar exported articles ; but things are improving, for although the proportion of values is now about the same, the quantity exported is reaching equality. The increase in *motor-car* construction is one of the most hopeful signs, whilst the output of electrical and chemical industries is advancing at a steady rate.

Textiles

The chief centres of *cotton* manufacture—the raw material coming mostly from the United States—are: for spinning—the Vosges and Meurthe et Moselle, and for weaving the northern towns of Amiens, Rouen, Lille, St. Quentin, Roanne, etc., in addition to the above-named departments. The outbreak of war, of course, resulted in a serious fall in production, but from the time of the Armistice the position improved rapidly, the increase being especially marked in woven fabrics. A similar improvement was visible in the *wool-combing* factories, which exist chiefly in the Roubaix-Tourcoing district, and in the *cloth* factories at Sedan, Reims, Vienne and Elbœuf. French production of wool (35,000 tons) only represents one-sixth part of the consumption, most of the foreign article coming from Australia and Argentina, as well as from the Cape, Uruguay and Central Europe. Now that these countries are open again to French trade the woollen industries show a vigorous vitality, which is likely to increase considerably in the near future.

Owing to its geographical situation—Lyon (with 32,000 looms) being the commercial centre of the manufacture—the *silk* industry did not suffer from the ravages of war. It was, however, hampered by shortage of labour and of raw material: for the latter is chiefly obtained from Japan, France only producing one-tenth (500 tons) of the quantity required. In spite of a high rate of output, a constantly growing demand has led to the importation of tissues; but exports are rapidly rising, and amounted in 1920 to a value of nearly 2 milliards of francs.

As but little *flax* and *hemp* is grown in France—and that a decreasing amount—the country is dependent for those materials, and to a great extent for linen and hempen goods, on imports from abroad. The linen industry, which used to employ 570,000 spindles, was concentrated especially in the Lille-Armentières district and was consequently almost annihilated by the war; but it is recovering. The hemp industry was not so seriously affected. *Jute* is another material which is imported—entirely from British India. The mills were, again, situated in the Nord and Somme departments, and consequently suffered heavily from the war.

Other Industries

Of other industries, *paper-making* has fallen on evil days—chiefly owing to a serious shortage of pulp and rags from abroad, and a terrific rise of price in consequence: e.g. in 1920 the production of less than half the usual quantity caused the value to be more than quadrupled; and there are but few signs of improvement visible since then. Recourse is now being had to broom and, in the colonies, to alfa grass, bamboo, sorghum, etc., as substitutes for paper-making

—but the supply is not yet very large. The *leather* and *rubber* trades, on the other hand, are doing well, and the *plate-glass* industry, which formerly supplied 57 per cent. of the material used in Europe, is slowly recovering; the *glass* and *china* trade is, however, on the whole not very prosperous. But in industries connected with art and luxury the French are of course pre-eminent, the articles produced in the way of *fashions*, needlework, furs, *perfumery*, *jewellery* and gold- and silver-smiths' work being in great request all over the world. Much loss was caused to France by the high duties imposed by many States on "fancy" goods and articles of luxury during and since the war; but an improvement in this direction is now being anticipated.

Development and Organisation

In one way the War has been of immense service to French industry. French pre-war manufacturing methods were in general a long way behind the times; but the necessity for the supply of first-rate munitions of every kind and the energetic spirit evolved under the stress of war gave an immense impetus to industry, and caused the installation of modern and up-to-date machinery and methods which not only enabled vast quantities of munitions to be turned out during the war but have acted in a most beneficial manner ever since that period.

An important feature in French industries during the war was that of organisation. The scientist and the manufacturer began to collaborate; under the influence of the Minister of Commerce laboratories and technical institutes were established. Finally, and this is a real sign of the times, a new section was opened in the Academy of Science—that of science applied to industry. The factories began to study the question of maximum output in minimum of time, and many improvements were introduced. But the methodical organisation of labour depends upon uniformity of types, that is upon standardisation, which alone permits of serial construction and specialisation. For this purpose the Minister of Commerce appointed in 1917 the Permanent Commission on Standardisation. The labours of this Commission have already yielded very satisfactory results.

Technical unions were also requested by the Minister of Commerce to form groups in accordance with their affinities, and did so, forming a federation of twenty-one groups. These were to co-operate with the Government in co-ordinating their efforts with a view to combined action in markets either national or foreign. Besides this, the Minister of Commerce advocated and has succeeded in putting into force a system of economic localisation which invigorates productive forces connected by their geographical situation and by natural affinity. The federation of local institutions will, therefore, show the nation in working order; and with the assistance of the (143) Chambers of Commerce great results are expected.

(c) COMMERCE

It is of interest to note, as bearing out our statement on p. 265, that in 1919 the value of international commerce in France was not quite 40 milliards of francs, whilst internal commerce amounted to over 400 milliards. It is, however, foreign trade which shows how far the country is able to supply its own needs: and it is towards this that we shall direct our remaining remarks.

Foreign trade is regulated by the *Customs* system; since 1892 the French scale of duties, which has developed in a direction common to all the States of Europe excepting England and Holland, has assumed a definitely protectionist character.

The law of January 11, 1892 established a double tariff—a maximum scale, applicable to the majority of foreign countries, and a minimum—sufficiently protectionist in amount—granted by agreement for a limited period to those countries which allow equivalent preference to French goods. There is an average difference of 50 per cent. between the general and the minimum scale.

By successive agreements the advantage of the minimum scale was extended for the whole of their consignments to thirty-one States, including all European countries. Those remaining entirely subject to the general scale were only: Australia, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Peru. A third set of States had obtained the advantage of the minimum scale only in respect of certain specialties, e.g. China, for pure silk goods; or for a large group of products, as in the case of Canada and the United States of America. The system was slightly modified in 1910, but the war disclosed certain weak points in it, and the Government is now authorised to negotiate intermediate rates between the two scales.

Further, on April 23, 1918 the French Government, in full agreement with the countries of the "Entente," decided upon the denunciation of commercial agreements which contained general clauses referring to the most-favoured nation or to consolidated scales; that is, of all commercial or maritime treaties of such a nature as to impede the application of the new commercial regulations under which France intends to proceed. A year's notice had to be given, and as in 1919 prices in France had risen to 380 per cent. of the pre-war figure, and thus largely nullified the *ad valorem* rates, the French Government, acting on its own initiative, enforced higher rates on certain articles. It may be mentioned that Customs dues have brought in a revenue rising from 105 millions of francs in 1871 to 779 in 1913 and 1,883 in 1919; 2,706 were estimated for in 1922.

Before the war, if we take into consideration the difference in the numbers of the populations of Great Britain, Germany and the United States—46, 70 and 100 millions respectively as against 38 in France—we may consider as satisfactory an advance which increased the value of foreign trade from 5,609 million francs in 1870 to 8,805 in 1900, 13,406 in 1910 and, lastly, to 15,301 in 1913.

In 1912 France drew her supplies chiefly from Great Britain, representing 1,046 million francs, Germany 999 millions, the United States 890, Belgium 540 and Russia 432. Her best customers were, in the same year, Great Britain with 1,361 millions, Belgium 1,141 millions, Germany 821, the United States 431 and Switzerland 405. The war, of course, completely upset these figures. Exports were reduced from nearly 7 milliards in 1913 to less than 5 in 1918, and imports increased from 8 milliards to over 30 in the same years. In 1921 they nearly balanced, the imports amounting to 23½ and the exports to 21½ milliards.

French production has thus given evidence of great energy, which has already yielded remarkable results ; and it only remains to give a short table (in milliards of francs) of the latest imports for home use and exports of home goods with the chief countries in 1920 and 1921 :

	IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
	1920.	1921.	1920.	1921.
Great Britain	10·3	3·2	4·2	3·3
United States	10·8	3·6	2·2	2·0
Belgium	3·3	1·8	4·5	4·0
Germany	2·7	2·5	1·5	2·3
Switzerland	1·0	·3	1·8	1·2
Italy	1·3	·5	1·2	·8
Argentina	3·0	·8	·4	·2

(d) TRANSPORT

The excellence of the *road* system in France needs no description ; but it may be noted that of the six great *railway* lines one is under State management, the others being privately owned. They give employment to over 360,000 persons. Considerable progress has been made in electrification and, in addition, the Government is "standardising" them by the creation of a common fund, unity of management, and provisions for giving the employees an interest in the working.

The navigable *waterways* do much in the way of carrying goods (42 million tons in 1913). Few new canals have been cut, but they have been improved and deepened to such an extent that between 1871 and 1913 the traffic quadrupled itself. Paris, Rouen and Dunkirk are the chief centres of this traffic ; but besides the facilities given by the northerly rivers and canals we must recognise that by way of the Rhône, the Saône and the Rhine, France connects Marseille with Antwerp, Rotterdam and Strasbourg, thus effecting a junction between the North Sea and the Mediterranean ; whilst by way of the

Loire, the Seine and the canals of the east, she unites the Atlantic Ocean with Central Europe.

The five greatest ports of France (in order of importance) are Marseille, Rouen, Bordeaux, Dunkirk and Le Havre (and besides these there are forty-nine others). Their capacity was strained to the utmost during the war; but it has now reverted to its previous level. A very extensive programme of reorganisation and unification has been drawn up by the Government; and it is hoped, by a heavy expenditure, to increase their combined capacity to 100 million tons.

Before the war the French commercial fleet took the fifth place in the world. The *mercantile marine* proved insufficient to meet the needs of the country in war-time; but since the Armistice a great effort was made, and by 1920 the tonnage was brought up to nearly 3 million tons. By the end of 1923 it is expected to reach 5 millions.

(e) CONCLUSIONS

In 1914 the economic life of France was normal and healthy; the country showed steady and regular progress, and there was general confidence in the strength of her position. The war led to disastrous losses, forced national finance to depend upon the repeated issue of loans, brought about a general crisis of under-production at home, and necessitated purchases abroad which are rendered burdensome by the unfavourable rate of exchange.

Moreover, hardly had France, exhausted by the war, begun to enter the convalescent stage, when a new world-crisis arose—a crisis of over-production by countries whose industries were still intact—e.g. the United States, Great Britain and Japan. And this whilst Russia was still effaced from the international economic map, whilst Central Europe was, owing to the depreciation of exchange, incapable of paying for its purchases, and whilst Germany was actually deriving fresh strength from her refusal to carry out the conditions of the Peace! The development and solution of this crisis still depend upon national and international decisions which have yet to be taken.

Meanwhile, whatever may be the results of this crisis, France has been preparing by means of orderly labour for her economic and financial reconstruction; the results already obtained, which have been recorded in our statement, are reassuring for the future. In striving to attain economic recovery she has not waited for the reparation due from Germany nor for the assistance which she considers she might have expected at critical moments from inter-Allied co-operation. In spite of the financial troubles of her Government, she is forging steadily ahead; and as in the past, so in the future will her prosperity depend on the thrift, the business capacity and the sturdy energy of her sons.

FINANCE

(a) PAST

FRANCE, in finance, as in her history generally, has manifested a line of development closely comparable with that of the other countries of Western civilisation. Just as the political power was centred in the hands of the nobility, to be then concentrated in the hands of the Crown, to be wrested finally from the Crown and vested in democratically elected assemblies, so it has been with the finance of the country. In the Middle Ages and even up to so late a period as the reign of François I there was no real differentiation between the revenues of the State and those of the King, but all the same it is possible to trace certain general tendencies. In the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, for instance, when the feudal régime was passing away, France, like other countries, went through the phase in which the people began to attempt to assume a control of the moneys paid to the Crown and the principle gained recognition that the persons paying taxes should vote them. St. Louis in the thirteenth century made a definite effort to organise accountancy and institute a system whereby the revenues should be brought thrice a year to the capital and strictly accounted for thrice a year. The Royal domain was placed definitely under the control of *baillis* and *sénéchaux* who were the King's agents. Under Philippe le Bel the effort at centralisation was continued, and a definite official, a *sous-intendant*, was placed in control of the King's finances. In his time (1300) there were two distinct treasuries, the *Trésor du Temple*, where current expenditure was liquidated, and the *Trésor du Louvre*, which was responsible for the liquidation of debt and for expenditure in connection with war and foreign policy. The reign was notable also from the standpoint of finance, for in it the practice of borrowing from Jews and Lombard bankers came into fashion, a practice that resulted in the centralisation of public finance. Under Louis X the separation between the two treasuries was abolished, and in 1329 the famous Declaration of Antwerp was passed whereby the Crown constituted itself the principal creditor of all debtors.

The Hundred Years' War constituted an important epoch

in the history of French finance. Inevitably a heavy strain was placed on the Treasury, and public dissatisfaction was voiced freely. "Partout," a chronicler of the period writes, "furent exigées très grandes finances, très mal dirigées et en bourses particulières comme on dit, et non mises au frais de la chose publique." The States-General repeatedly complained, and in voting grants again and again insisted on reforms in the administration and control of funds. A *Chambre de Comptes* was instituted and given the power of control over the King's *agents du Trésor*. The period was responsible also for the development of a system of special subsidies and from the fact that as the towns became emancipated from feudalism they were frequently called upon to lend direct to the State, the latter being a phenomenon that curiously enough was repeated in the recent war.

The reign of François I was responsible for deplorable extravagance and for most inefficient control of finance, and as a result State credit was pledged in all directions. Sales of offices became a current abuse. Loans were issued through the Hôtel de Ville de Paris, the principle of lottery loans was introduced from Italy, and the practice of *acquits du comptant* or borrowing by the Crown on note of hand was inaugurated. Despite this however a serious attempt was made better to systematise the collection of revenue, and in 1542 the vast army of bailiffs and *sénéchaux*, who previously had collected and paid into the Treasury the various dues, were replaced by sixteen *receveurs généraux*. François' successors paid dearly for his extravagance, and when Henri IV came to the throne a comprehensive policy of retrenchment and reform was brought into existence by Sully. He reduced the number of officials, cancelled many of the wasteful contracts made by his predecessors, founded the revenue on economic lines and instituted a real system of accountancy. His reign at the Exchequer was notable however chiefly because of the institution by him of a Budget system. He arranged that the King in Council should decide in advance on the year's expenditure and revenue. The reforms, great though they were, were only partially successful, and in 1614 the States-General placed on record their protest against the abuses of the *Fermes généraux* and demanded the abolition of the *acquits du comptant*.

The development of autocracy as promoted by Richelieu is reflected in finance as elsewhere. It is true that taxes were brought before Parliament, but such was Richelieu's power that he insisted on fiscal measures being voted without the parliament

even knowing what they contained. He was determined however to prevent abuses, and he instituted a special chamber of justice for the punishment of offenders. The reign of Louis XIV presents several features of financial interest. With Colbert as his *intendant* the control of the finances was invested in five persons, the King, the *intendant* and three counsellors. Every month there was a definite balancing of accounts, and the Budget system was regularised, estimates being passed in October and the previous year's Budget being made final in January. The financial machine was worked to its full capacity. The system of loans, especially of foreign capital, was greatly extended, many of the Royal rights were alienated for cash, short-term loans were greatly increased, and there was a very considerable issue of paper in the form of treasury-bills. In order to facilitate borrowing a special *caisse des emprunts* (abolished in 1715), the predecessor of the savings bank, was set up in 1674. Colbert acted as a restraining influence, but after his death disorder and extravagance reigned. Money was necessary to satisfy the royal appetite and was raised by every possible means. Gifts were demanded from the towns, the provinces and the clergy. Loans of all sorts were raised, and even the money standard was altered. The reign of Louis XV saw no improvement. Interest on loans was unpaid, or was only paid after long delays. Royal bills were dishonoured, and even the troops failed to receive their salaries.

Then under Philippe d'Orléans came the amazing phenomenon of Mr. Law. The South Sea bubble is a child in comparison with Law's projects. The Regent had need of money, and Law promised to secure it. The Bank of England had been founded and was prosperous. Law advocated and established a *Banque des Dépôts et d'Escompte*. He agreed to accept the depreciated Government paper money up to three-fourths of the capital, and in 1716 he was given twenty years' privilege for his bank. Among the advantages he enjoyed were the fact that his bank-notes were valid for the payment of taxes, and the paper issued by Law rapidly went to a premium because of the convenience of handling as opposed to metal currency, and because of the non-fluctuation in value. Law's bank absorbed some $4\frac{1}{2}$ milliard *livres* of depreciated State paper, and in 1717 he was authorised to issue a fresh company for exploiting Louisiana and for all sorts of other purposes. Eventually his company absorbed practically the whole of the French revenue, and he was given the farming-out of tobacco, the right of coining and a monopoly in the most varied forms of colonial enterprise.

State paper was taken as capital, and 200,000 shares were issued at £500 each; at the height of the boom a share was worth £20,000. Law was undoubtedly one of the most potent causes of the French Revolution. He thoroughly demoralised the upper classes by encouraging them in violent speculation. In 1721, despite the employment of every possible financial artifice, he failed; and his failure ruined hundreds of thousands.

Turgot as Finance Minister under Louis XVI reattempted the Sisyphean task of re-establishing order, but matters had gone too far. He succeeded in establishing the principle that Finance Ministers should be consulted by other State departments before expenditure was engaged. He founded the famous *Banque d'Escompte*. Necker succeeded and, working on a forlorn hope, followed ordinary banking methods, forcing the various State accountants to give in daily returns. He also showed astonishing initiative by arranging for the publication in the press of the National Budget Sheet.

In 1789 the crash came. The National Assembly decreed the sale of national and church property; but meanwhile it issued paper assignats which had to be accepted by the Treasury as payment for real property. In seven years' time over forty-five milliards of paper pounds had been issued, and a year later these milliards were valueless.

Napoleon re-established order, and one of his first preoccupations was to place his administration on a proper financial basis. One of his ministers was put definitely in charge of the Treasury, and he had under him two *administrateurs*, one of whom was responsible for receipts and the other for expenditure. Further, the Treasury was divided into six great departments, and in 1803 the *Banque de France* was founded. Speaking generally, it may be stated that the present system of French finance was established in 1817, when a Finance Minister was appointed directly responsible to Parliament; and from that date onward the Finance of France has followed ordinary constitutional lines. It has been subjected to two great shocks, not to mention many lesser ones, the War of 1870 and the recent war. The war of 1870 cost France in cash the payment of five milliards of francs. Such however was the wealth held by individuals of the country that it rapidly recovered, and the strain in the years following '70 was infinitely less than the strain under which France, although victorious, is suffering to-day.

(b) PRESENT

The position of France financially at the moment of writing (1923) is unquestionably grave, as is shown by the following analysis of the situation based on official figures available at the beginning of the year :

FRENCH DEBT

	Francs.
Total French Debt on August 1914	27,700,000,000
Perpetual Internal Debt at that date	22,000,000,000
Floating Debt	1,608,000,000
Debt on account of annuities	340,000,000
On March 31, 1922 French Debt amounted to	316,984,988,953
In this figure Perpetual and Short-term Debts amount to	155,058,325,853
Floating Debt amounts to	87,050,312,100
Debt to Bank of France on March 31, 1922	22,650,000,000
Foreign Debt at rate of exchange on Feb. 28 more than	74,876,351,000
In addition to the 317 milliards there is an item of arrears on account of Annuity Debt	1,000,000,000
Probable cost of Pensions	60,000,000,000
Other damage to persons	4,852,000,000
Damage to property	140,000,000,000
Or in all	218,500,000,000
Of this total France had paid on German account by March 1921	38,000,000,000

FRENCH BUDGET SITUATION

Total expenses for 1922	48,720,000,000
Of which the normal Budget amounts to	23,179,676,287
And Budget annexes to	5,238,211,328
Alsace-Lorraine Budget	439,044,510
There is a deficit for the first quarter of 1922 of	500,000,000
A deficit for preceding year (to be covered by a loan) of	3,900,000,000
Receipts are estimated at :	
Ordinary receipts	18,060,459,387
Exceptional resources	1,225,000,000
The deficit mainly due to advances made for Germany will exceed	20,000,000,000

The expenditure during the war by France and by the other countries can fairly be described as colossal. The official figures as reproduced in the *Annuaire général de la France et de l'Etranger* show the appallingly rapid increase caused by the War. They are as follows (in thousands of francs) :—

—	Military expenses and exceptional war expenses.	Debt.	Ordinary civil expenses.	Total.
1914 (5 mths.)	6,400,926	859,627	128,881	6,589,434
1915 . . .	18,455,407	1,899,394	2,449,686	22,804,487
1916 . . .	27,240,404	3,333,016	2,371,725	32,945,145
1917 . . .	34,065,809	4,863,584	2,786,895	41,679,599
1918 . . .	44,047,748	7,087,678	3,401,679	54,537,105
1919 . . .	35,245,205	7,987,000	5,131,000	48,363,205
Total . .	165,455,499	25,230,405	16,233,075	206,918,975

They can perhaps be best appreciated by comparing them with typical years of French pre-war Budgets, which are as follows :

—	Receipts.	Expenses.	Exceeding receipts.	Exceeding expenses.
1850 . .	1,296,545	1,380,301	—	83,756
1860 . .	1,722,305	2,021,764	—	299,459
1870 . .	1,661,981	2,448,663	—	786,682
1871 . .	2,014,091	1,899,582	114,509	—
1875 . .	2,705,358	2,626,868	78,490	—
1880 . .	2,956,923	2,826,611	130,312	—
1890 . .	3,229,372	3,141,519	87,853	—
1900 . .	3,814,943	3,746,959	67,984	—
1910 . .	4,273,890	4,321,918	—	48,028
1913 . .	5,091,744	5,066,931	24,813	—

The general financial situation of France to-day can perhaps best be appreciated by the following analysis (in francs) compiled from official figures available early in 1922. They do not take into account the Budget for 1923, as the figures therein contained are only provisional :

FINANCIAL SITUATION OF FRANCE

RECEIPTS		EXPENDITURE	
(Excluding money received on loans and bonds.)			
1914 (Aug. to Dec.) .	1,238,822,000	1914 . . .	11,969,585,822
1915 . . .	4,113,432,000	1915 . . .	22,804,486,525
1916 . . .	4,640,812,000	1916 . . .	32,945,145,169
1917 . . .	5,811,273,000	1917 . . .	41,679,599,629
1918 . . .	6,986,794,000	1918 . . .	54,537,105,100
1919 . . .	10,176,759,000	1919 . . .	49,029,399,951
1920 . . .	21,105,243,131	1920 . . .	49,821,018,999
1921 . . .	22,335,896,485	1921 . . .	44,752,601,932
1922 (estimated) .	24,702,059,912	1922 . . .	52,547,108,252
	101,111,091,528		
Add extraordinary receipts Aug. 1, 1914 to Dec. 31, 1919 .	2,300,000,000		
	103,411,091,528		360,086,051,379

DETAILS OF FOREIGN DEBT

Bonds in England	31,272,000
„ issued in the United States	128,464,000
„ with the British Treasury	12,326,779,000
„ with the Bank of England	1,639,300,000
„ issued in Japan	78,282,000
Short-term credit in Spain	592,725,000
„ „ „ „ Sweden	69,500,000
„ „ „ „ Norway	83,400,000
„ „ „ „ Argentine	145,378,000
„ „ „ „ Switzerland	140,000,000
„ „ „ „ Holland	114,565,000
„ „ „ „ England	320,824,000
„ „ „ „ Uruguay	80,400,000
Anglo-French loan in the United States	1,295,000,000
Loan of the " Ville de Paris "	259,000,000
„ „ " Villes de Lyon, Bordeaux, et Marseille "	233,100,000
Advances of the American Treasury	14,428,013,000
Loan issued in Japan	258,000,000
Bonds given for stock to the American Government	2,072,000,000
Total	34,296,102,000¹

NOTE.—The above figures have been calculated at the pre-war rate of exchange.

The Budget as presented before the Chamber and the Senate in 1921 for the year 1922 was historic and will remain so for many years, because the discussions that took place brought out clearly the difficulties with which the French Finance Minister has been faced. At the moment of writing the similar discussions on the 1923 budget have not yet taken place. France, as the figures quoted above have shown, depends essentially on the payment by Germany of the sums due to her under the Versailles Treaty. As a result of the special situation it was necessary for a series of different Budgets to be compiled, but the most interesting feature of French finance, and a feature that will continue to be interesting for many years to come, was the special Budget that had to be established to meet those expenses that France was forced to incur owing to the default of Germany.

The general French Budget as voted by the Chamber and Senate amounted to 25 milliards 756 million francs. The charge was a heavy one for a country comprising merely 37 millions of inhabitants, whose Budget in 1914 amounted only to 5 milliards 422 millions, and that since then has seen the richest portions of its territory ruined during the war. The increase in the general Budget was due mostly to the expenditure on account of debt which increased from 1 milliard 306 millions in 1914 to 11 milliards 449 millions in 1922. In other words,

¹ Over 29 milliards of francs in 1921, and over 31 in 1922, were borrowed by the Government.

ANALYSIS OF EXPENDITURES

—	Ordinary Budget.	Extraordinary Budget.	Supplementary Budgets.	Military and extraordinary expenses.	Interest on Public Debt.	Miscellaneous credits and expenses.	Expenditures made but recoverable from Germany.	Interest guaranteed by State but recoverable from Germany.	Total.
1914	5,191,643,085	—	—	6,589,434,249	59,626,763	128,881,725	—	—	11,969,585,822
1915	—	—	—	18,455,406,750	1,899,393,073	2,449,086,102	—	—	22,804,486,525
1916	—	—	—	27,240,404,259	3,333,015,879	2,371,725,031	—	—	32,945,145,169
1917	—	—	—	34,065,809,126	4,863,686,400	2,750,104,103	—	—	41,679,599,629
1918	—	—	—	44,047,748,089	7,087,677,888	3,401,679,123	—	—	54,537,105,100
1919	—	—	—	35,814,513,673	7,986,823,151	5,228,063,127	—	—	49,029,399,951
1920	21,090,082,828	5,225,214,791	2,696,119,604	—	Included in	252,952,871	20,556,648,905	—	49,821,018,999
1921	22,842,478,903	—	3,586,676,826	—	Ordinary	—	2,606,446,203	15,717,000,000	44,752,601,932
1922	24,693,980,935	—	3,594,127,317	—	Budget	—	12,000,000,000	12,159,000,000	52,547,108,252
	73,818,185,751	5,225,214,791	9,976,923,747	166,213,316,146	25,230,223,754	16,583,092,082	35,163,095,108	27,876,000,000	360,086,051,379

France is paying to-day more than 10 milliards to meet interest on loan, pensions and expenses of reconstruction. Leaving aside the expenditure on debt, other expenditure that required 4 milliards 916 millions in 1914 required an expenditure of 14 milliards 307 millions : expenditure in fact has more than tripled, the co-efficient of increases being 3.47. The fact is natural, because the value of money during the period considered has at least equally depreciated.

The increase was by no means uniform in all categories. Thus as regards the army and navy, where expenditure in 1914 was budgeted at 2 milliards 44 millions, the budget of 1922 was estimated at 5 milliards 745 millions, giving a coefficient of increase of 2.8. In the estimates for 1923 this is reduced to 5 milliards. In view of the peace of Europe it is satisfactory to note that the military coefficient is low, but at the same time it is regrettable that there is a similarly low coefficient of increase for the amounts allocated for relief of all sorts. These amounted to 221 millions in 1914 and 509 millions in 1922. Expenditure devoted to intellectual advancement was at the normal rate, as the credits voted increased from 371 millions in 1914 to 1,306 millions in 1922.

The great increase in expenditure was in the following categories : economic development, that rose from 435 millions in 1914 to 1,735 millions in 1922 ; State industries (including posts, telegraphs and railways) that increased from 462 millions to 1,969 millions ; expenditure affecting French sovereignty, that is diplomatic relations, judicature, police, cost of tax-collection, etc., that rose from 538 millions to 2 milliards 262 millions ; various expenditure that rose from 45 to 175 millions ; and the Extraordinary Budget for Alsace-Lorraine that amounted to 600 millions. The situation can be expressed in tabular form as follows :

Nature of expenditure.	Credits for 1914 Budget.	Credits for 1922 Budget.
Public debt	1,306 million frs.	11,449 million frs.
Military expenditure	2,044 "	5,745 "
Sovereign expenditure	538 "	2,262 "
Economic development	435 "	1,733 "
Industrial development	462 "	1,977 "
Intellectual development	371 "	1,306 "
Relief of all sorts	221 "	509 "
Various	45 "	175 "
Alsace-Lorraine	— "	600 "
Total	5,422 million frs.	25,756 million frs.

We turn now to the future as dealt with in May 1922 by the Finance Minister, M. de Lasteyrie, in introducing the ordinary Budget for 1923. The Bill provides for an estimated expenditure of 23,180,000,000 francs and for an estimated revenue of 18,060,000,000 francs from normal sources, with additional revenue of 1,225,000,000 francs from the liquidation of war stocks and the special tax on war-profits. There is thus left outstanding a deficit of 3,900,000,000 to be covered by loan; and this deficit in round figures represents the interest on the sums advanced by France on German account for Reparations. But for this France would be able to claim that her receipts balance expenditure. It will be noted that considerable economies have been effected, notably in the reduction of the personnel, and also that income-tax, which it was thought would be very repugnant to the French mind, is producing a more than satisfactory yield. In 1916, for instance, the tax was estimated to bring in 40,000,000 francs and actually yielded 51,303,000; and in 1921 when the tax was expected to produce 800,000,000 francs the Treasury recovered 1,137,530,000 francs. In his Budget speech the Minister prophesied that this and other taxes, when the public got thoroughly used to them, would result in producing still further revenue to the State. For the time being it is argued that the full limit of taxation has been reached, and that increased revenue is to be hoped for mainly by securing a better yield from existing taxes through the suppression of fraud and more efficient methods of collection. It has to be remembered that the fiscal representatives of the State, many of whom were mobilised and many of whom were killed, have left a gap that it is difficult to fill; and experience has shown that temporary officials are considerably less efficient than permanent officials. Finally, the commercial and industrial crisis has very gravely affected the yield of taxation.

For these and similar reasons the future that is gloomy enough at the moment of writing is less gloomy for the year 1923 and for subsequent years. France has already made enormous efforts, as can be realised by studying the present yield of her taxation. As regards direct and similar taxation the yield advanced from 635 millions in 1914 to 2 milliards in 1921, and is budgeted for in 1923 at 2,983,140,260 francs, whilst registration dues on sales, death duties, securities, advanced from 1 milliard 263 millions to 3 milliards 790 millions. Taxes on consumption increased from 1,500 millions to 4 milliards 354 millions. Taxation on business turnover—a new tax that in 1921 brought in 1,897,457,000

frances—is expected to bring in 2 milliards 500 millions in 1923.

So much has been said in England as to the refusal of France to meet taxation that it may be of interest to place on record the extent to which taxation has increased on certain staple products. The hectolitre of wine that in 1914 paid 1 fr. 50 c., to-day pays 59 fr. plus 15 per cent. on its value, with other supplementary taxes. A consumer who would have bought a bottle of wine for 11 fr. before the war would have paid the State $1\frac{1}{2}$ centimes. To-day he pays 2 fr. 50. The tax on sugar has been doubled, amounting to-day to 50 fr. per 100 kilos. Before the war transport by rail was free of tax. To-day the State demands one-eleventh of the cost. Railway passengers pay one-fifth of the cost of transport to the State, while first-class passengers pay one-third. Coffee, tea, mineral waters, patent medicines, matches, tobacco, vinegar, mineral oils, petroleum, carriages, motor-cars, entertainments, have all had their dues largely increased or have had new dues added. It is the same with death duties. To take the case of the only son inheriting from his father. If in 1914 he had received 20,000, 100,000 or 1,000,000 francs he would have paid in 1914 344, 2,190 or 35,440 francs. To-day he pays 945, 6,624 or 99,734. In 1914 the possessor of commercial shares that brought in an annual revenue of 30 francs paid 2 fr. 70 in taxation. To-day he pays 6 fr. Since 1916 the income-tax has been in force, and when first applied in 1916 was estimated to bring in 40 million francs. To-day, having been raised by successive legislation, it is estimated that a yield of 800 millions will be obtained, or twenty times the value in 1916.

If it were possible to go into detail it could be shown that the French Treasury during the war was overburdened by a vast number of special charges. Supplies, for instance, to quote one special item, registered a loss of over 3 milliards 600 millions, railways since 1919 have cost over a milliard and commercial shipping over 40 millions a month. The wheat subvention was also a heavy burden on France.

The *Budget recouvrable*, as the French term the Budget for which the Germans must assume responsibility, is so formidable a factor that it is desirable that it should be put on record. In the preamble to the Budget Bill for 1923 M. de Lasteyrie shows that by December 31, 1922 France had incurred in expenditure under this heading an amount totalling 74 milliards of francs.

Everything has been done by the Government to relieve the

country as far as possible of the expenditure involved, and in 1919 a special company was formed, known as the Crédit National, which has as its object to undertake by subscriptions from the public the cost of reconstruction.

In 1919 this organisation issued bonds amounting to 3,960 million francs, and in the three subsequent years bonds amounting to 3,880, 2,970 and 4,000 million francs respectively. Other organisations have been authorised to come to the aid of the devastated areas, with a view of relieving the heavy charges incumbent on the Treasury.

Nothing written on the French financial situation could be regarded as at all dealing with the situation without a reference to the exchange. France throughout the war enjoyed an exchange that was artificially stabilised at 28 francs to the pound sterling, but since then the exchange has shown such violent fluctuations that business has been increasingly difficult with all countries. Diagrams have been published regularly by the *Situation Economique et Financière* dealing with the question, but the strain has been very serious. At the date of the Treaty of Versailles the exchange was 30·95; but the conclusion of peace produced hardly any effect, and the exchange fell regularly until the middle of March 1920, when it touched 67·45. It rose to 45·70 in June of the same year, and then fell again to over 61 in March 1921. In the summer of 1921 it reached 45, but since then has been fluctuating, and has recently¹ fallen again to about 67. In view of the growing belief that it will be difficult to enforce the payments due from Germany the fear is becoming general that there will be a further fall of value of the franc.

As to the future, speculation is scarcely possible. As an immediate factor, everything depends on the payment in full by Germany of the debt due to France under the Treaty of Versailles. Otherwise the situation is of the utmost gravity. If the German debt is paid, France has sufficient vitality to reinstate her finances, despite the severe strain to which they were subjected. There were moments during the war when she was faced with an empty Treasury and when she was forced to borrow from her great industrial towns, from the manufacturers that were supplying her army and from all and sundry. She succeeded however in winning through, and her financiers are confident that, provided that peace is maintained and that the German moneys are paid, the industry of her people and their determination to remain a great Power will make it possible for her to re-establish her financial position.

¹ December 1922.

² 79 on February 1, 1923.—Ed.

APPENDIX

DEFENCE

ARMY

THOUGH the future size and organisation of the French Army have not been completely determined, it is certain that compulsory military service will be retained, and that the Army will, as before, be divided into the Metropolitan and the Colonial Army. Both are under the War Minister, but the estimates for the Colonial troops, other than those in France and in North Africa, are contained in the Budget of the Minister for the Colonies.

Compulsory service will be for 30 years: $1\frac{1}{2}$ years in Active Army, $18\frac{1}{2}$ in the Reserve, and 10 in the Territorial Army. Annual Contingent about 250,000.

Voluntary enlistment is encouraged, and is largely applied in the recruiting of the native North African troops.

The strength of the Active (standing) Army in round figures is as follows:

$1\frac{1}{2}$ Classes	375,000
Volunteers and re-engaged Frenchmen	100,000
Natives of North Africa	100,000
Natives of the Colonies	100,000
Foreign Legion	15,000
	690,000

The Active Army is organised in Infantry Divisions and Cavalry Divisions. In certain cases, such as on the Rhine and on the frontier, permanent Army Corps of 2 Infantry Divisions are formed. The normal composition of Infantry Divisions is 3 Infantry Regiments each of 3 Battalions, 1 Regiment of Artillery of 8 Batteries 75 mm. guns and 4 Batteries 155 mm. howitzers. A Cavalry Division consists of 3 Brigades, each of 2 Regiments, and a proportion of Armoured Cars, Horse Artillery and Cyclists.

Numbers available in war from all sources amount approximately to $4\frac{3}{4}$ millions, besides about $1\frac{1}{4}$ million Territorials.

Uniform: "horizon-blue," except for the Chasseurs (dark blue), and the Colonial troops (khaki).

Rifle: Lebel magazine; calibre .315. Field-gun 75 mm.; field-howitzer 155 mm.

NAVY

For purposes of administration the coasts are divided into five Maritime Arrondissements, with headquarters at Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort and Toulon, with a vice-admiral (Maritime Prefect) at the head of each.

The Fleet, of two squadrons, is manned by the Armed Reserve ; the First Squadron, in the Mediterranean, has six Dreadnoughts, and the Second has two divisions, one of three Dreadnoughts and the other of three armoured cruisers. This arrangement places the whole, except one division, on a reserve basis.

The Navy is manned partly by conscription and partly by voluntary enlistment. The reserve is about 114,000 men, of whom about 25,500 serve with the Fleet. The time of service in the Navy is at present the same as in the Army.

The Fleet in 1922 consisted of about :

- 17 Battleships,
- 27 Cruisers,
- 35 Gunboats,
- 80 Destroyers,
- 100 Torpedo-boats,
- 104 Submarines.

POPULATION

The Census returns of 1921, published in 1922, show the present population of France to be 39,209,766. The 1911 Census gave a population of 39,602,258. The War losses were 1,400,000 during this period. On the other hand the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine brought an addition of 1,700,000 persons. It was calculated that 100,000 should be added for the sailors and soldiers serving abroad when the Census was taken.

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
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
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THE WESTERN FRONT—NORTHERN HALF



THE WESTERN FRONT—SOUTHERN HALF



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
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